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Preface
In 1980, slavery was abolished in Mauritania for the third time in the
th 120 century. The issue is, however, of such longevity that it continues to
attract the attention of abolitionists and human rights groups, but also of
2international donors and journalists up to the present day. Like the vast
majority of these popular perceptions the present analysis focuses exclusively
on Moorish, or, in the terminology that will be adopted here, on bı¯z. a¯n
society. However, to equate slavery within this largest ethnic group in
Mauritania with slavery in this country, as is frequently done in the media, is
misleading. Similar institutions existed, and still can be traced too, among the
black African ethnic groups in Mauritania as well as among most other
Sahelian and West African ethnic groups. This is acknowledged and high-
lighted by a number of human rights groups, such as “Human Rights
Watch”, “Anti-Slavery International” and the Mauritanian “SOS esclaves”,
3to name only a few.
   Closer to the heart of the matter are statements from pressure groups which
criticise the government of Mauritania for doing at best little or else nothing
at all to promote the slaves’ and former slaves’ emancipation and economic
development, and hence for allowing slavery to continue. While these
accusations cannot be compared with those against the government of Sudan,
which has been accused at least for tolerating if not promoting the enslave-
ment of women and children in the country’s south by northerners, the
whole issue seems outdated: after all it is more than 150 years since the
abolition of slavery by France under the initiative of Viktor Schoelcher. This
declaration, however, only followed similar earlier declarations concluded in
1792 in Denmark, in 1807 in Great Britain, and in 1815 at the Congress of
Vienna. Today the framework of international consensus on the abolition of
slavery, human rights and the rights of the individual is provided by the
Universal Declaration of the Human Rights of 1948, the “Slavery Conven-
tion” of 1926, the “Forced Labour Convention” of 1930, the “Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery” of 1956, and the ILO convention nº 105 of 1957
concerning the “Abolition of Forced Labour”. The various conventions not
only condemn slavery and forced labour, but also call for measures to
prevent these. In view of this long history of abolition, and the consensus on
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this issue within the international community, the accusation of continuing
to tolerate slavery hits hard. It brings into the present an institution of
domination and oppression commonly thought to have long been consigned
to history, and thus puts back on the agenda the question of what “slavery”
4means.
   I became involved with Mauritania, and with the problem of slavery in this
country, in 1992. Besides the many fascinating aspects of bı¯z. a¯n society I got
to know during this first stay, I was struck by people speaking publicly and
without any uneasiness of their slaves and former slaves. A little later I
became acquainted with settlements inhabited exclusively by slaves and
former slaves, and I realised that these people live in the worst conditions I
had ever seen thus far – though I had to admit that the situation many of their
masters lived in was hardly more enviable. This experience, which is first of
all one of social inequality, and thus in no way particular to Mauritania,
would not have raised my concern so strongly, had there not been what may
be called a mental state of slavery: arrogance on the part of the former
masters, the bı¯z. a¯n, and subservience on the part of the su¯da¯n, the slaves and
manumitted slaves (h. ara¯t.ı¯n).
   Having worked on local institutions of participation in a development
project and beyond, and the sedentarisation of the bı¯z. a¯n pastoral nomads
while finishing my studies (cf. Ruf 1993, 1995), the wish to go to Mauritania
for a further period and explore what remained of slavery persisted. A
generous research grant for a Ph.D. thesis from the graduate school “Market,
State, Ethnicity” at the Social Development Research Centre, which is part of
the Department of Sociology at the University of Bielefeld, funded by the
German Research Foundation (DFG) and the federal state of North-Rhine
Westphalia, finally provided the material means to turn this project into
reality.
   Almost one year of fieldwork primarily among slaves and manumitted
slaves (h. ara¯t.ı¯n), but former masters, the bı¯z. a¯n, too, was a rich experience
providing many insights into the complex universe of hierarchy and depend-
ency in bı¯z. a¯n society. I was able to witness slaves still experiencing maltreat-
ment by their masters, a great number of slaves and former slaves living in
highly ambivalent relations with masters and former masters, and finally
slaves and former slaves defying not only their former master, but the bı¯z. a¯n
as such. However, beyond all these differentiations, which highlight that
things are indeed changing in Mauritania, I still feel anger whenever my
thoughts go back to some of the experiences I had and which have to be
named. There is the bitterness underlying many slave narratives telling how
things used to be, and there is the memory of one particular old slave man,
who, being no longer of any use, had to sit all day long outside in the
courtyard, barely protected by a hut of branches from the beating desert sun,
while his master, a likeable and learned man, resided in the modest house
build of clay-bricks a few steps away.
   This, and various other experiences which taught me what an end to slavery
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can mean to those who still suffer from it made me decide that this analysis
should contribute to changing this situation. Indeed, the vast majority of
Mauritanians, living in one of the least developed countries of this world,
need better living conditions. However, among these Mauritanians, the slaves
and manumitted slaves, together with a number of other despised social
groups, deserve special attention. Their deprivation resides not only in such
domains as economy and welfare, but also in ongoing social discrimination,
which is a result of their slave past. Change in this domain needs understand-
ing and an open, unprejudiced debate about the nature of the past. This is, as
recent cases show, a sensitive and most difficult task. Nevertheless, it is to
such a future project that the present discussion would like to propose some
arguments.
   As far as this aim is concerned, the present study is far from all encompas-
sing. Its intention is to unravel perspectives on bı¯z. a¯n slavery that until today
have remained largely ignored. Its leitmotif is that it is the points of view of
the oppressed which need to be made explicit, and which have to be contras-
ted with those representations of the social provided by the discourses of the
5dominant strata. Such a perspective allows one to discern what makes up
lines of conflict in society and how these are maintained, shifted or overcome.
Social hierarchy in the light of such an analysis is free from that certain taste
of social consent that common-sense definitions of difference in society tend
6to suggest and which the powerful like to maintain.
   As a critical approach to the analysis of bı¯z. a¯n society, the present work
takes up a concern expressed by a long and illustrious list of social scientists.
It was Karl Marx ([1846] 1983b) who stated that philosophical reasoning,
which was judged to have only interpreted the world in different ways until
then, should turn towards changing the world. Later this tradition lived on,
among others in the works of Antonio Gramsci ([1929-35] 1971) and Frantz
Fanon (1952). While the voices of these scholars continue to influence
present discourses, engaging in public debate on political issues, however,
still remains open to the reproach of leaving scientific territory. A most
recent example for this divide is the recent debate in France concerning what
has come to be the “case” of Pierre Bourdieu – as opposed to the social
scientist (cf. Priester 1998).
   Although I am aware that the present analysis could be vulnerable because
of this impetus and its explicit premises, I prefer this more precarious status
to hiding behind ritual and meaningless evocations of the ideals of scientific
impartiality. The descriptions of social relations in Mauritanian society which
will be developed in the subsequent chapters are laden with theory, and
hence “thick descriptions” (cf. Geertz 1973). They are aimed at providing a
narrative capable of changing the perceptions of the social topography of
Mauritania. However, this means not engaging in unfounded polemics, but
on the contrary unfolding a sound analysis enabling the reader to discern
how relations of dependency, which have come to be known as slavery,
evolve, how they are maintained, and what, today, brings them to an end.
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   This work is offered to all Mauritanians wishing to tackle the issue of
slavery in their society further, as well as to scholars concerned with Mauri-
tania, development sociologists and of course everybody interested in the
study of slavery and relations of dependency. As a view from the outside, this
study will, it is hoped, provide new insights, while it will undoubtedly also
receive criticism for misunderstanding bı¯z. a¯n society. Indeed much of Mauri-
tania and bı¯z. a¯n society still remains alien to me, but seeing this country and
its people through the eyes of a stranger is not necessarily a disadvantage, nor
does it systematically inhibit the acquisition of knowledge. On the contrary,
strangeness to the object of study is a prerequisite to the production of
knowledge. In the social sciences it is certainly one of the greatest strengths
of social anthropology and ethnography to have developed systematically the
productive tension resulting from strangeness to cultures observed and
immersion in these cultures, regardless whether this is a subculture around
the corner, or the culture of an ethnic group on the opposite side of the globe
(cf. Knorr-Cetina 1991; Hirschauer/Amann 1997).
   For those to whom Mauritania is alien, it has to be explained that the debate
whether there is slavery, and what slavery has meant and continues to mean
to members of bı¯z. a¯n society, continues to go on both in the country and
abroad. Periodically the issue surfaces in the independent Mauritanian press
as well as among the Mauritanian emigrants, who today are linked by the
7newsgroup Mauritanie-Net. Until today debates remain heated and highly
controversial. Points of view vary from denying both the significance of
slavery in the past and especially its persistence until the present to denounc-
ing continued slavery. This controversy is reflected also by the public debate
between the government and various Mauritanian NGOs, aiming to defend
8the rights of slaves and former slaves. In January 1997, president Maouya
Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya dealt for the first time in a public speech with the
issue of slavery. Acknowledging this institution to be part of the nation’s
past, he altogether denied its persistence until the present. Consequently
there are not remnants but only “sequels” of slavery to be witnessed in
Mauritania (cf. Mauritanie Nouvelles, nº 234, 12.1.1997: 10).
   The practical consequences of this kind of definition became obvious about
one year later. On the 12 February 1998 five prominent Mauritanian
anti-slavery activists were sentenced by a Mauritanian court to thirteen
months of jail, and a 30,000 UM fine after having participated in a French
television programme focusing, among other topics, on the issue of slavery in
9Mauritania. On the 24 March the appeal of the human rights activists was
refused and the sentence confirmed. However, numerous international
protests and – probably more important – a meeting with a group of interna-
tional donors scheduled for the next day, made the president of Mauritania,
Maouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, lift the sentence (cf. L’Autre Afrique,
1.4.1998).
   Witnessing these recent trends towards a more rigid handling of the issue of
slavery in Mauritania by local authorities, the present study, which will be
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the second one focusing on Mauritania’s slaves and former slaves in only a
short period (cf. Brhane 1997a,b), will provide some further substance to the
debate, and thus contribute to a more thorough treatment of this serious
issue. This indeed is needed, as the recent evolution has polarised opinions
rather than encouraged to dialogue.
   This book aims at describing the slave experience from a grassroots
perspective; it wants to give the oppressed a voice, and to provide a forum
where both their dignity and humiliation can be expressed. Indeed slaves
resisted their masters, developed strategies to enlarge their autonomy, and
much more, while still living under the threats resulting from their slave
estate.
   Tracking these slaves’ and former slaves’ experiences in quest of their point
of view was done by conducting numerous individual interviews with people
still bound to the slave estate and h. ara¯t.ı¯n (manumitted slaves). The locus of
research was the region of Achram-Diouk, a small rural area in central
Mauritania. Fieldwork consisted in many respects of learning by doing, as I
failed to anticipate a number of issues sensitive to the interviewees and also
because the latter had never been confronted with questions of the kind I
confronted them with. Nevertheless, as will be outlined in detail later on (cf.
p. 44-47, 50-57), the people of Achram-Diouk came to teach me a lot about
their lives, and consequently about what it meant to have been a slave in
bı¯z. a¯n society, or to be still bound to this estate. While some refused to take part
in my investigations, most were ready to answer my questions. Ultimately
they introduced me in a subtle and tactful way, to this particular social
milieu, and I have to thank them for their readiness to endure and forgive my
unawareness of many of the finer and more major points of good conduct.
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Note on Transliteration
Two distinct types of Arabic transliteration are used throughout this book.
Personal names of Mauritanians, such as interviewees, are transcribed in the
Latin alphabet according to the practice common in Mauritania and used in
newspapers for example. Names of locations and towns are transcribed in the
same way, taking whenever possible as a reference the transcriptions
provided by the Michelin Map nº 953 “Africa North and West”. Expressions
in h. assa¯niyya Arabic dialect, as well as names of bı¯z. a¯n tribes and of a few
historical figures are – with a few changes revealing consonants specific to
h. assa¯niyya dialect – transcribed according to the system of transliteration of
th Arabic as suggested by the 19 conference of Orientalists in Rome in 1935
(cf. Krahl/Reuschel 1980: 31). Transliteration is documented on p. 395. By
this choice I hope the interested reader might be able to further investi-
gate the etymology and meaning of h. assa¯niyya Arabic dialect terms (com-
prising also a number of terms which are derived from the Berber language),
while good readability is maintained by avoiding the overloading of the text
with diacritics.
         
 
 
Map 1: Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Based on “Mauritania 1995”; Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of
Texas at Austin
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Introduction
Studying the end of slavery means studying social change. In the case of the
bı¯z. a¯n society of Mauritania, i.e. the Moors, who are the focus here, this
process of transformation constitutes a challenge in many domains. It affects
social structures as well as patterns of identification in the former slave
society and underlies changes in the economy. While some societies managed
to leave relations of slavery behind quickly, this process is one of long
duration in the case of the bı¯z. a¯n society. Struggles between new and old,
between relations of dependency embedded in the slave system and social
relations no longer moulded in this framework have now been going on for
decades. However, while this process only began to take shape slowly after
th the French colonisation of Mauritania at the start of the 20 century, the
transformation of bı¯z. a¯n society evolved at a faster pace since the 1970s.
During this decade the country was first hit by the beginning of the Sahelian
drought cycle. Later Mauritania occupied a part of the former Spanish
Western Sahara; the subsequent war with the POLISARIO liberation
movement, which was soon lost, led into a long period of political and
1economic instability.
   In the course of this fundamental restructuring of bı¯z. a¯n society all major
sectors of social and economic life were affected. Undoubtedly the most
striking and visible change has been the sedentarisation of the vast majority
of the former pastoral nomadic population and the rapid emergence of the
capital Nouakchott as the biggest city in the country, today home to about
one third of the national population. This rapid and profound transition also
challenged relations of hierarchy and dependency. Where masters lost the
means to sustain even themselves, they also lost all means to maintain others
in a state of dependence. Where new economic opportunities which no
longer unequivocally favoured the former masters evolved, subordination to
2them lost much of its meaning. This recent turmoil in bı¯z. a¯n society,
however, helps the observer and researcher to investigate the change of social
relations, for periods of accelerated transition make social relations transpar-
ent: they are discussed and contested publicly, taboos are broken, social
norms and values questioned. In this respect, periods of crisis also provide
information about the past when the present lines of conflict were already in
place, but had not yet surfaced as a result of relations of domination still
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3remaining largely unquestioned. Moments of crisis thus are moments in
which the past becomes rationalised, and is remembered and expressed in
new terms, for what is no longer self-evident needs explanation. These newly
emerging discourses, far from simply representing the past, instead interpret
it in order to speak about the present and the future. As such they are a
crucial source in unravelling the past of subservient strata such as slaves and
manumitted slaves. By discerning why and at which point relations of
domination stop working, the researcher is able to see more clearly how they
functioned in the past. This means dealing much more profoundly with one
of the most crucial questions emerging in the context of a sociological
approach to slavery, the question of how is slavery possible.
   The present study aims to specify these questions and to suggest answers
by analysing slavery in bı¯z. a¯n society from different perspectives. Besides a
discussion of theories of slavery and hence a definition of the problem in
question, this means engaging in exploring the meaning of slavery in different
contexts. Naturally descriptions of slavery differ depending on whether they
are provided by masters or slaves, but they also differ among slaves because
experiences are varied. The significance of slavery in bı¯z. a¯n society, which
gradually changed into a social institution legitimated and regulated by
precepts of Islamic jurisprudence, as well as slavery in other societies, cannot
be understood properly without an understanding of its history. It is this
perspective that makes it possible to discern how and in which domains of
society slavery was practised and what kind of ambiguous interrelation
evolved between the shape of society and the practice of slavery. Finally, as
this study aims to reflect on the end of slavery in contemporary bı¯z. a¯n
society, those processes and articulations marking and fuelling change have to
be highlighted. These can be found both in past and present trends of social
and economic change as well as in discourses which reinterpret the past in
order to give the present a new shape.
   Throughout the following chapters arguments will be developed throwing
light not only on what slavery in bı¯z. a¯n society meant in different phases of
history, but also on how it was perceived by the different social strata, and
among these above all by the slaves and manumitted slaves themselves.
Besides a factual reconstruction of the slave past in bı¯z. a¯n society and of its –
quite vigorous – remnants in the present, these arguments are able to give
insights on how the divide between masters and slaves was upheld and
reproduced. Stating that for some decades now there has been a great change
going on in master-slave relations, changes that even go so far as to result in
their dissolution, does not imply that in former times these relations were
static. Individual slaves’ conditions always resulted in struggles over where to
set the limits of a slave’s freedom of action. Although the relation of power
between masters and slaves tended to be biased drastically in favour of the
former, coercion as a means of rule was complemented by negotiation, and
4slaves had means to resist and to oppose their masters’ will.
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A Note on Terminology
Before presenting an overview of this book, an initial outline of the terminol-
ogy of social hierarchy in bı¯z. a¯n society has to be given. Moorish society is
divided essentially into two major groups – bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n – but these
notions may refer to different people in different contexts. Bı¯z. a¯n refers either
to all freemen, i.e. only freeborn people, or to all speakers of the h. assa¯niyya
language, and thus includes all constituents of bı¯z. a¯n society besides the
freeborn, namely the slaves and manumitted slaves. To make transparent this
distinction, the idea of a bı¯z. a¯n ethnic community constituted by a shared
language and culture will be expressed by the term bı¯z. a¯n society in the
following, while the designation bı¯z. a¯n will only refer to the status group of
freeborn people. Slaves and freed slaves as a group also sharing some features
will appear under the emic designation of su¯da¯n. However, the su¯da¯n are far
from constituting a uniform group. They are essentially divided into ^abı¯d
(Arabic: slaves; sing. ^abd) and h. ara¯t.ı¯n (Arabic, sing. h. art.a¯ni). The latter term
is commonly described as meaning freed slave or freemen of secondary rank.
As many members of this social group lay great emphasis on their claim not
to have a slave ancestry, the notion of h. ara¯t.ı¯n will be used to comprise all
these meanings, which in fact all describe the idea of a group of freemen
which is distinct from the bı¯z. a¯n, and discriminated against in some respects.
A detailed exploration of bı¯z. a¯n social hierarchy, taking up these definitions,
will be given in chapter one, p. 38-44.
This Study
Theoretical reflections on the ambiguities inherent in the master-slave
relation and on the implications the practice of slavery has on the shape of
society will introduce central arguments of the present study in chapter one.
In a discussion of major theoretical contributions to the study of slavery in
Africa, the case of bı¯z. a¯n slavery in Mauritania will serve as a foil against
which theoretical approaches to slavery may be critically evaluated. By
synthesising the arguments thus developed, the theoretical devices underlying
the present study will be outlined. These insights will be used to discuss
social hierarchy and conflicting interpretations of bı¯z. a¯n social order. The
chapter’s final section will reflect on the methods of field research that were
used to gather data among residents of the region of Achram-Diouk in
central Mauritania. As living in slavery is an experience of personal alienation
and in many respects of the annihilation of individual personhood, inquiring
into this aspect of people’s life means embarking on the most sensitive topics
of individual life histories. Enhancing one’s individual status in these circum-
stances has much to do with deleting and reconstructing the past. Because
slavery is nothing glorious to remember, neither for the former slaves nor
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their masters today, it does not become part of great public traditions and
narratives. Instead it remains incorporated into tales of the past. There it
figures as a subtext which can be deciphered and which is needed to appre-
hend fully how society worked. Despite all these problems individual
accounts of life histories developed by biographic interviewing turned out to
deal both directly and indirectly with the issue of slavery. The personalised
character of this information was of great value. Individual data could be
contextualised and related to information derived from other sources, but
also be checked for internal consistency. Besides these analytical characteris-
tics the narratives are a rich source of information because they gave those
who had experienced slavery the option of describing their life in words of
5their own.
   Chapter two is devoted to the development of this narrative strain of
argumentation. Based on a number of life histories, arguments will be raised
which open the way for the evaluation of what slavery meant in rural Mauri-
tania and what it continues to mean in the present. A discussion of how to
bridge the gap lying between individual experiences and individual case-
studies on the one hand and an analysis of slavery on the other introduces
this approach, which has a prominent place in the context of this study.
While most chapters are arranged in a systematic order, putting the emphasis
on different topics and subjecting all kinds of empirical evidence to systemat-
ic questioning, this chapter has its own perspective. Rather than isolating out
interview fragments, major parts of interviews are arranged into narratives,
each of which deals with different perceptions of slavery and social hierarchy
in bı¯z. a¯n society, thus laying the basis for further discussion. Two narratives
by slaves who managed to gain autonomy, though by very different means
and starting from very different conditions, introduce this section. The
second narrative is complemented by and contrasted with passages from two
further life histories, that of the interviewee’s mother and of the former
master’s son. The story of an old slave woman who continues to have strong
affective ties to her masters but nevertheless manages to give expression to
her experiences of humiliation deepens the insights on the different meanings
of having been and being a slave. Shifting sides from the su¯da¯n to the bı¯z. a¯n,
in order to get the outside view of slavery, a woman of tributary (zna¯ga)
status reveals some aspects of how female identity and a subordinate position
in society shape individual aspirations. The circle is closed by two narratives
from bı¯z. a¯n men, who because of their mother having been of slave or
manumitted slave status have come to live across the lines of status segrega-
tion. Major aspects of the relations of dependency and hierarchy surfacing in
the narratives are worked into an initial synthesis of the different meanings
slavery and ending slavery has for different members of bı¯z. a¯n society. This
outline of arguments will carve out from the narratives major insights into
the working and ending of slavery in bı¯z. a¯n society.
   Certainly one of the greatest strengths of the life history narratives is that
they highlight the relationship between gender and distinct practices of
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slavery. Chapter three takes up this issue and further investigates the distinct
position of slave women in bı¯z. a¯n society. Indeed the experiences of slave
women are marked by a strong ambivalence. They often lived closest to the
masters, and were able to escape the slave estate and become incorporated
into the freemen by marrying a freeborn man (an act that needed their formal
manumission). This intimate relationship with the masters offered slave
women a number of advantages with regard to status enhancement compared
to slave men. However, being so closely intertwined with the masters also
had distinct disadvantages. In addition to the integration of slave women into
the society of the masters, manifested in distinct institutions such as milk-
kinship, concubinage, secret marriage and marriage, slave women remained in
a dependent position unlike that of free bı¯z. a¯n women. Their avenue into the
society of the freemen was paved by men. This made them experience
resistance from free women who saw their power and bargaining abilities in
marital relations threatened by the competition of slave women who would
depend absolutely on the men.
   A crucial aspect of the gender differential in bı¯z. a¯n slavery is whether this
phenomenon is of demographic significance. In order to explore this dimen-
sion, chapter four undertakes an evaluation of the African slave trades.
Recent studies have underscored earlier evidence that the inner-African trade
in slaves, as well as the slave trade to the Islamic world of North Africa and
the Near East, transported markedly more women than men, while the
opposite was the case in the trade of slaves across the Atlantic. Although
sources that make it possible to assess directly the gender specifics or detailed
figures of bı¯z. a¯n slave imports are lacking, a number of sources indicate a
bı¯z. a¯n preference for slave women. When the trade in slaves came to an end at
the beginning of this century, this interest in slave women persisted and
might even have increased, as slave women then had become the only source
of new slaves. While empirical evidence for the precolonial era is lacking, data
from colonial records shows slave and manumitted slave women clearly
outnumbering slave and manumitted slave men, and hence make a strong
argument for the hypothesis. Further evidence is raised by survey studies
conducted in eleven villages and neighbourhoods. These highlight that today
the majority of those who remain bound to formal slave status in the area of
Achram-Diouk are women, whereas formal manumission according to the
precepts of Islamic jurisprudence remains to a large extent the privilege of
former slave men.
   Chapter five is concerned with another aspect of the gender differential in bı¯-
z. a¯n slavery: the issue of a gender division of slave labour. As the life histor-
ies, and here again above all those of the slave women show, slaves could
expect little respect for their gender identity in matters of the tasks they were
assigned to. De-socialising and de-gendering slaves was a means to increase
the difference between slaves and masters, and thus to maintain the latter’s
domination. Nevertheless slaves in bı¯z. a¯n society were not subjected without
differentiation to all kinds of labour. When the assignment of labour to slaves
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revealed some of the patterns it had among the freemen, this was only
partially a result of successful slave struggles. These differentials reflected to a
large extent attitudes of the mistresses and masters, who did not want to have
men of any status disrupt the privacy of the women’s spheres, namely the
tent and the camp. While occasionally slave men had to do housework or
other tasks with a feminine connotation they were mostly supposed to
remain at the periphery of the camp or beyond this boundary, in the bush.
Slave women, on the contrary, were made more versatile workers. They
could be assigned both work within the sphere of female privacy and beyond
it. Nevertheless portraying slaves as having done all work misses the point.
As the analyses of work in different sectors show, free members of bı¯z. a¯n
society participated in many productive activities, though with different
emphasis. This partly resulted from numbers of bı¯z. a¯n being too poor to own
slaves themselves or owning too few to give up all work, but also from a
social ranking of tasks that allowed bı¯z. a¯n (men more than women) to do
certain kinds of work without experiencing social discrimination while other
kinds were perceived as dishonourable. Work thus was a social field in which
status could be both expressed and achieved. While freemen could be forced
from material need to perform tasks conflicting with their ideals of good
conduct, slaves, and among these above all men, by being assigned jobs
associated with the qualities of freemen, could manage to enhance their
condition.
   Currently persisting patterns of slavery in Mauritania are hard to under-
stand and explain without considering the history of slavery and slave
emancipation in this country. While the analysis of slave work in bı¯z. a¯n
society in chapter five has to strike a balance between the description of basic
and hence persisting characteristics of slave work on the one hand and
changes in the character and domains of slave work in the course of history
on the other, chapter six is engaged explicitly with the history of bı¯z. a¯n
economy. The evaluation of the impact of trade on the economy of precolo-
nial bı¯z. a¯n society shows the desert pastoralists to have been involved in
commercial transactions of a significant volume for centuries and to have
adapted rapidly to changing market conditions. Certainly the most decisive
change in the environment of the bı¯z. a¯n economy was marked by the start of
French colonisation, which coincided with the rapid decline of the trade in bı¯-
th z. a¯n gum arabic at the beginning of the 20 century. The subsequent shift to
meat production for the rapidly emerging markets in the French colony of
Senegal had a strong impact on bı¯z. a¯n society and by restructuring the
pastoral economy also affected the relations between masters and slaves. By
creating new economic opportunities, above all for manual labourers,
colonial rule opened up new opportunities which profited primarily slave
men wishing to increase their economic autonomy. While the basic elements
of this new configuration of master-slave relations were already laid out
during the first decades of colonisation, economic diversification by wage
labour and migration of slaves expanded rapidly after the Second World War.
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The start of the still ongoing drought cycle in the Sahel in the early 1970s was
the most decisive blow to bı¯z. a¯n society, which until then had been portrayed
as unchanged and somewhat archaic by many observers. Migration for work
– until then almost exclusively a slaves’ and former slaves’ affair – suddenly
became a necessity common for most freemen too. While the pastoral sector
went into a deep crisis, efforts for the cultivation of subsistence crops, namely
millet, were strongly increased. The result of this economic restructuring and
drawback severely affected the configuration of master-slave relations, and
transformed lifestyles. The bı¯z. a¯n of Mauritania in only a few decades
changed from a predominantly pastoral nomadic people into a sedentary
people.
   Chapter seven is dedicated to one of the most pertinent issues of continuing
relations of dependency in Mauritania, the question of land tenure. Up to the
present people with a slave past continue to suffer from their foremothers’
and forefathers’ exclusion from the ownership of land. Although the Mauri-
tanian government issued new legislation on land ownership, designed to
enhance the situation of the many landless making their living by something
akin to sharecropping in 1983, the effects of this law, as well as later supple-
ments, remain limited until today. Land tenure in most parts of Mauritania
continues to be structured by customary arrangements strongly influenced
by Islamic jurisprudence of the Ma¯liki school. Starting from an overview of
the legal framework of land tenure in the western Sahara and later Maurita-
nia, the focus of this chapter turns to a number of case studies revealing how
land tenure effectively changed in the course of this century as a response to
colonial rule, changing relations of power within bı¯z. a¯n society, and finally
changing patterns of land-use. Hence it is shown how the h. assa¯n, the
warriors of bı¯z. a¯n society, who had previously held only political power,
managed to achieve the proprietorship of land in the region of Achram-
Diouk. Of vital importance to these acts of appropriation was the construc-
tion of small and large dams, an activity that was favoured by the colonial
administration, which also developed a land register. From the 1970s on land
tenure became an even more crucial question as a result of the drought cycle
and the conversion of many former pastoralists to agriculture. Being the
owners of the land, impoverished bı¯z. a¯n masters started to claim increased
duties from their cultivating dependents. In some cases land used by former
slaves and slaves was even claimed back by its bı¯z. a¯n owners. In this context
distinct arrangements regulating access to land and between landless cultiva-
tors and land owners developed and will be analysed. While some of these
new relations expressed the maintenance of old relations of dependency
others mark an increased autonomy of slaves and former slaves. Finally the
control of land is not only an issue of dyadic master-slave relations but also a
highly political one, involving collective tribally organised use-rights,
discussed both with regard to their significance for the relations of dependen-
cy and for the articulation of local politics.
   Leaving the complex of historical, material and legal factors contributing to
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the ongoing discrimination against people of slave past in bı¯z. a¯n society,
chapter eight embarks on an evaluation of the consequences of this power
differential for the shape of Mauritanian society and politics. In an introduc-
tory section the politics of a distinct h. ara¯t.ı¯n, i.e. slave and former slave
identity as opposed to that of the bı¯z. a¯n masters and former masters is
discussed. Here again the focus is on the situation in the rural hinterland,
where lines of conflict and discourses are revealed to be strongly influenced
by those developed in the cities. The presentation and analysis of distinct
discourses and practices related to the production of identity and difference
between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n, i.e. former masters and slaves and former slaves,
makes it possible to further differentiate this argument. The struggle for
emancipation of the dependent strata of bı¯z. a¯n society results in members of
this group stressing both their difference from and identity with their former
bı¯z. a¯n masters. This conclusion highlights yet again the ambiguity of slave
condition, and demonstrates how patterns of social discrimination that have
emerged in the course of slavery continue to shape the present. Finally it will
be argued that the contradictions manifest in the slaves’ and former slaves’
discourses on identity reveal no false consciousness. Rather they bring to the
fore how the contradictory nature of slave condition, which meant being
both included in and excluded from society, continues to shape present day
attitudes.
   Today the process of emancipation of the servile strata of bı¯z. a¯n society is
still going on and it seems likely it will gain in significance. However, as will
be argued in the concluding chapter nine, the aspirations of the former slaves
and slaves means they are likely to further stress their identity with, and not
their difference from the bı¯z. a¯n, i.e. the former masters. This is not only the
case in the rural areas, where face-to-face interactions and persisting knowl-
edge of individual people’s status and past make it difficult to struggle for
dissociation from the society of the former masters. Indeed, the configuration
of political power on the national level today leaves little room for other
options. As has been shown for the case of the Sudan, the most beneficial
choice for former slaves is to side with their former masters, wherever these
control the vast majority of political and economic resources.
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Chapter 1
Approaching Slavery in Bı¯z. a¯n Society
Theorising Slavery
“There is nothing notably peculiar about the institution of slavery” wrote
Orlando Patterson (1982: VII) in his introduction to “slavery and social
death”, for as he argued, “it has existed from before the dawn of human
society right down to the twentieth century”. The present discomfort with
slavery arose as late as the Enlightenment, when the universality of human
rights became a concern on the European continent. Rapidly taken up by
1Protestant churches, the abolitionist discourse expressed discomfort with
the great democracies of classical antiquity having been based on the practice
of slavery, and also with the fact that the first US-American presidents
2Thomas Jefferson and George Washington had been large-scale slave
holders.
   While in the Americas slavery has become an integral part of history
because of its still recent past, it has been all but expunged from central
European public memory. Here slavery has come to mean the history of
others, such as the peoples of antiquity or of the Americas, even though
major European powers were in their time the backbones of the transatlantic
slave trade, and for a long time the European colonial powers did little to end
slavery. What indeed leads to slavery being perceived today as a peculiar
institution despite the contradictory evidence forwarded by Orlando Patter-
son (1982), is that it seems to be the complete negation of those ideas of
individual freedom and democracy which after the breakdown of socialist
3states have gained world-wide hegemony. In this respect Karl Marx’s
critique of capitalist ideology is still illuminating, for it highlights exactly
what makes the difference between unfreedom in feudal society (which
shares some characteristics with slave-keeping societies), and the ambivalence
inherent in capitalist freedom. Together with his relations of subservience,
and his obligations to work for his master’s benefit, the serf (and likewise the
slave) who becomes the capitalist worker loses all of his moral and material
rights to be sustained, and remains with nothing else to sell for a living than
his labour power (cf. Marx [1867] 1983a: 183). The close relation between
trust in the virtues of capitalist economy (or rather, compliance with capital-
ist ideology) and the active struggle against what remained of the personalised
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relations of domination such as slavery is highlighted by abolitionist dis-
courses up to the present. Focusing on the establishment of justice for
those who suffer under personal ties of dependence, the claims for a just
remuneration of work, and free labour ideology always constituted pivotal
points of abolitionist argumentation (cf. Klein 1993b: 15ff.). Karl Marx’s
objection that there can be no such thing as “just wages” in capitalist society
has not entered the abolitionist discourse up to now, not even that of the
progressive former slaves’ self-help organisations in today’s Mauritania.
   Unpaid labour emerges as one central element of a common-sense defini-
tion of slavery, but it is by far not sufficient to define slavery as a distinct
institution, for there are many forms of unfree and unpaid labour, such as e.g.
serfdom. The second major feature of slavery which raises emotions today, is
the coercive nature of slave exploitation. The slave as the property of his
master, and subjected to the will of the latter, comes to represent the most
totalitarian form of human alienation. This latter aspect, the treatment of
slaves as chattels and hence as commodities, entails a number of far-reaching
consequences. Excluded from the body of society and deprived of the social
rights of the free, the slave has no right to kinship. All of his social relations
are mediated by and at the responsibility of his master, while the slave
himself is a legal minor. Another, and decisive, specificity of slave existence
lies in the fact that coercion lies at its root, in the initial and frequently violent
act of enslavement. It is violence that lays the basis for the legal fiction of the
ownership of one human being by another and for the transformation of a
freeman into a chattel. Physical violence thus becomes transformed into legal
or institutional relations of power, giving the slave-owner the right to deprive
the slave of the essentials of self-determination (cf. Finley 1968: 307ff.;
4Lovejoy 1983: 1ff.).
   By these characteristics, the slave becomes to some extent the antithesis of
the free. Being free, however, meant different things at different places and
times. While today freedom has come to be most closely associated with the
rights of the individual, being free in societies whose structure is based on
kinship – as bı¯z. a¯n society continues to be in many respects – was first of all
marked by one’s inclusion in kin-relations, and hence membership of society.
At the risk of essentialising slavery, one could thus argue that the exclusion
of the slaves from kinship, which has been stressed by Claude Meillassoux
(1986: 35) in his analysis of African slavery, constitutes the core of the
5dividing line between the free and the slaves. The slave is an outsider,
because he has no parents in his host society, and he will remain an outsider
because he is excluded from kinship ties with the host society and is denied
social paternity with regard to his own offspring.
   This dichotomy between the free person and the slave, the member of
society and the excluded, besides describing features central to the institution
of slavery, can also develop into a crucial element for the definition of social
groups, or else of society. Research on ethnic boundaries and their mainte-
nance has demonstrated that there need not be a distinct ethnic territory and
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an outer limit. Rather, ethnic differentiation is articulated most strongly in all
areas of inter-ethnic contact and contributes to the solidification of ethnic
identities (cf. Barth 1969a; Schlee/Werner 1996a). Slaves incorporated into a
society can be discerned as such a group, and discrimination against this
group can be turned into a means of identification for the masters. Antitheti-
cal descriptions of slaves and masters therefore are part of a wider ideological
context, aiming not only at the maintenance of slavery as an institution, but
6also at the maintenance of the masters’ identity.
   For the slaves, however, these ideological conceptions of their estate had
quite a number of practical results. When treated as non-kin the slave had to
suffer far-reaching consequences: kin relations among slaves, though existing
in biological terms, are denied their legal and social meaning. It is the master
who decides on marriages of his slaves. Even if these are admitted, the
ownership rights of the masters override the slaves’ rights in the newly
founded families. Thus in patrilineal societies slave children come to belong
to the owner of their mother. And if the slaves ever have the right to own
property they are not allowed to transmit it. It will be the master who has the
right to inherit from his slaves.
Controversies
   In a way it is paradoxical that because of the absolute rights of masters over
their slaves, the material welfare of slaves can differ considerably, and this
despite their common estate. History gives a long list of occupations slaves
fulfilled, and by far not all of these tasks implied coercion and menial work.
Slaves could be important scholars, like for example the famous Leo Africa-
nus, who having become slave of the Pope was responsible for a net transfer
of oriental knowledge to the Catholic clergy; in addition we find eunuchs in
Arabian harems, counsellors of kings (also often eunuchs), leaders and
soldiers of armies, concubines and, at the end of the scale peasants forced to
work on the master’s fields or plantations, or do work in the household.
These differences in the practical living conditions of slaves have led a
number of scholars to reject the notion of slavery in the scientific analysis of
African societies, i.e. to avoid the impression of a uniform phenomenon the
term implies. The emphasis is laid on the diversity of living conditions slaves
experienced and on the fact that manumission of slaves was commonly
practised in a large number of African slave-keeping societies.
   The main thesis Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff (1977a) advance in their
theoretical approach to slavery in Africa is the rejection of the notion of
property to define what they classified as a distinct, African kind of slavery
(indeed considered to be so distinct that “slavery” appears only in inverted
commas). Although both authors do recognise the existence of chattel slavery
in Africa, they perceive the concepts of property and freedom as western-
biased and not fitting the African context as a whole. Africans, according to
this perspective, belong to kin-groups. This African configuration of society
means that freedom comes from belonging to a kin group, a patron or some
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powerful group, the involvement in often hierarchical social relations, and is
not related to the ideal of an autonomous individual. The latter would be
perceived as threatened by dangers of all kinds and not free at all. This
effective lack of individual freedom expresses itself in the notion of “rights in
persons” that every kin-group has over its members. In this light the categor-
ical differences between the free and the unfree are transformed to gradual
ones on the large scale of African social hierarchies. Some of the features
commonly attributed only to slaves can even be applied to the so-called free,
e.g. the threat of being sold into slavery. As on the one hand the free begin to
resemble the slaves, on the other hand (some!) slaves become much like the
free. Forced to establish some relationship with the acquired slaves, the host
societies have to include them. The paradox is formulated in the following
terms: “But the problem for the host society is really that of including the
stranger while continuing to treat him as a stranger.” (Miers/Kopytoff 1977a:
15) The concern of the African slave-keeping societies thus becomes not the
exclusion of the appropriated slaves but their inclusion. This whole process is
seen to be fuelled by the permanent need to enlarge one’s own kin-group.
Instead of slavery as an institution producing social outsiders, there is a
“‘slavery’-to-kinship continuum” (Miers/Kopytoff 1977a: 24).
   How far scientific perception may be shaped by its theoretical assumptions
is revealed by the argumentation of Claude Meillassoux (1986), who consid-
ers the concept of “rights in persons” to be rather an outcome of modern
western capitalistic thought and conceptions than African emic categories.
The major argument developed by Miers and Kopytoff thus appears miscon-
ceived, resulting from the legalism, functionalism, and economism inherent in
this approach. Focusing on the legal position of the individual and therefore
the magnitude of its variations obscures the view of slavery as an institution.
The distinction to be made is between the estate and the (individual) condi-
7tion of the slave. This analytical tool provides the means to tackle the fact
that although slaves are considered to be chattels, for their exploitation they
have to be treated as humans. One becomes a slave (and remains it) not
because of the master, but because of the institutions of slavery and the
structures that constitute the framework of its practice:
La faiblesse de l’approche juridique est de considérer ici l’aliénabilité
comme un attribut inhérent aux esclaves. L’aliénabilité n’est significative,
pourtant, que dans le cadre des institutions qui en permettent la réalisa-
tion: la guerre de capture et le “marché aux esclaves”, c’est-à-dire l’ensemb-
le des mécanismes et des opérations par lesquelles une classe d’individus
se trouve privée de personnalité sociale, transformée en cheptel, vendue
comme marchandises et exploitée ou employée d’une manière qui permet-
tra d’en recouvrir le coût, fût il de la capture ou de l’achat. (Meillassoux
1986: 11)
As an institution, slavery, according to Meillassoux, cannot result from
strong but rather individual forces like the “permanent need to enlarge one’s
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own kin-group” envisaged by Miers and Kopytoff (1977a). The underlying
paradigm of “the more, the better” is an element of modern capitalistic
thought rather than of pre-modern African slave-keeping societies. But then,
what else incited the existence, perpetuation and even expansion of slavery in
the African context?
   As an institution, i.e. a structural element of society, slavery has to be
constantly reproduced. Slavery as an institution is not identical with the
existence of some slaves in a society. To speak of slavery there has to be a
group, a class of individuals, bound to a particular, servile estate that is
8reproduced as such over time (Meillassoux 1986: 35). It is right here that
empirical evidence enters the scene to modify the notion of reproduction of
social institutions. For a number of reasons the mainly female African slave
populations (like most others) were in permanent decline, and did not
9reproduce themselves. Birth rates among slaves were far below those of the
host societies and the slaves’ frequently poor living conditions further
negatively influenced slave demography. Manumission also contributed to
diminishing the number of slaves. Nearly all African slave holding societies
provided status mobility and progressive integration to the slave-strangers,
for example in the course of intergenerational changes. African slavery thus –
like the Atlantic slave trade that influenced the expansion and transition
towards a more rigid and systematic exploitation of slaves in African slave
10systems – created a sustained demand for new slaves that could only be
satisfied from within the continent. In order to satisfy this demand and
ensure a regular supply, enslavement and slave marketing had to become
11separate businesses in Africa (cf. Meillassoux 1986).
   In addition to much appreciation for offering insights on how slavery is
interrelated with society and providing a framework to track conflict within
slave societies, Meillassoux’s approach has also received powerful criticism.
Certainly the most trenchant arguments in this respect are that despite its
impetus to move beyond the legalism inherent to functionalist approaches,
Meillassoux’s work ends up, though from a different perspective, essentialis-
ing slave estate. According to his vision the “social death” of the slaves is not
perceived as an ideological construct, but as created by the slave mode of
reproduction. Slaves thus, as in the work of Orlando Patterson (1982), appear
as absolutely powerless and masters as almighty. The slave estate comes to
12represent not a legal fiction, but a social fact (cf. Glassman 1995).
   Nevertheless the distinction of slave estate from various slave conditions
can be used as a powerful analytical tool to explore the struggles taking place
between masters and slaves. Indeed this differentiation reflects the fundamen-
tal contradiction of the slave existence, namely the formal treatment of slaves
as chattels, while their humanity remains the basis for exploitation (cf. Davis
131966: 31-35, 58-61; Lovejoy 1981). Practices of slavery thus always take
part in the social deconstruction of the slave as property. However, the
notion of the slave as property is not only a legal fiction, but is an element of
those practices and discourses by which masters maintain their domination
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over slaves. Treating a slave as property, i.e. evoking his saleability or
denouncing his kinlessness, was a means to threaten and hence to dominate
slaves. Such threats had not to be overt to develop their power, but achieved
this end also as a kind of a last resort for masters wishing to pull the balance
of power back onto their sides. While slaves indeed in many cases managed to
receive better treatment from their master and were able to reduce the range
of the latter’s direct control (i.e. to enhance their condition in Meillassoux’s
terminology), they were unable to alter the basis of the discrimination against
them. Although Jonathon Glassman (1995) in his critique of Meillassoux is
right when stating that better slave conditions were the result of the slaves’
struggles, in his conclusion he comes close to trying too hard to define
distinct, vested rights of slaves as a result of these encounters, and thus to
contradict his own credo that such attempts lead attention away from the
14question of how slaves improved their lot.
   In accordance with Claude Meillassoux (1986), the present analysis takes a
more radical perspective, querying the notion of distinct slaves’ rights
altogether. Indeed one such right which is often named is the non-saleability
of slaves “born in the house”, i.e. second generation slaves. In general this
was true, but nevertheless such sales occurred, either as a result of a desperate
situation the master was in or as a severe kind of punishment; furthermore
selling slaves continued far into this century, at least in much of the western
Sudan and especially at the desert edge (cf. Klein 1993c: 190 and 1983: 78;
15Meillassoux 1986: 125 and 1975b: 227).
   In the context of bı¯z. a¯n slavery the notion of a slave estate as opposed to
variable slave conditions is able to reflect the difference between the often
ambivalent characteristics of everyday master-slave interaction and the rigid
framework of Islamic jurisprudence, defining and legitimising the slaves’
16inferiority, and also serving as a recourse for the masters. Indeed, many of
the slave accounts forming the basis of this study reveal that slaves wanted
and were able to achieve greater autonomy. However, both in the masters’
and the slaves’ perception such arrangements resulted from individual action,
by either soft or generous masters, or else their counterparts, strong and
demanding slaves. How much the slave estate remained a threat, despite the
considerable success some slaves achieved in these struggles, can be discerned
from those cases in which a slave master insisted on being the sole heir of a
deceased “independent” slave (cf. the case of Brahim’s father p. 62f.; such
17cases continue to be reported from Mauritania up to the present). To all
other slaves, especially all members of the slave’s family, such events are a
revelation of what remains the foundation their current condition is built on.
Slaves indeed managed to live with a high degree of autonomy in bı¯z. a¯n
society, but this, their “right”, depended on their actual power to defend it.
Once dead, they and their power had gone, leaving their masters free to
return to basics, i.e. to treat their (dead) slave as what he had always been: a
18slave.
   This short glance at the ambivalence of the slave condition in bı¯z. a¯n society
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shows that it remained a constant concern for those slaves eager to improve
their fate. The only means to overcome the restrictions resulting from the
slave estate was manumission. This latter act indeed plays a major role in
Islamic jurisprudence, and hence ideology of slavery. Manumission is
recommended in the Qur\a¯n, and in a number of distinct cases is prescribed
19as a religious penance. Slaves could also contract for freedom for payment if
they were allowed to develop their own patrimony (cf. Brunschwig 1960;
Schacht 1964: 129ff.; Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî 1983: 141, 169, 189, 221ff.;
Lewis 1990: 5ff.). By becoming a h. ara¯t.ı¯n, literally a freed slave, slaves
achieved the personal rights of a freeman. They were finally able to contract
marriages of their free will, and develop kin relations, but problems remain-
ed. Most African masters, and especially those practising slavery in a
household context, had a marked preference for slave women. In bı¯z. a¯n
society, this gender bias in slavery led masters to manumit slave men much
more often than women. As a consequence, h. ara¯t.ı¯n men were often unable to
marry other women than slaves, the children of whom would inherit their
estate from the mother and belong to the mother’s master. Also when freed
slave men and women married and thus were able to constitute families with
all legal rights, their slave past continued to cut their descendants off from an
20ancestry of freemen and hence paved the way for future social discrimination.
This whole dilemma of slave existence is put in a nutshell by Frederick
Cooper, discussing the absorption thesis of Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff
(1977a):
Even where slaves were readily assimilated, they suffered a devastating
cultural subordination: their loss of their ancestry. Their destruction as a
people was the other side of absorption. But where the slave’s distinctive-
ness was not a limbic state but an ideological basis for exploitation and
control, it was all the more devastating. It is at this point that the absorp-
tionist approach most clearly shows its inadequacy and most case-studies
stop short. For, if African societies were inherently absorptive, there was
little for slaves to do but be absorbed. (Cooper 1979: 124)
Indeed there has always been only one alternative for slaves wanting to
escape the power of their masters: running away. However, this option was
no easy choice for a great number of slaves. Those who had been transported
over large distances faced great hardship when trying to get back, and for
those who had been enslaved for quite some time, returning home became
difficult because everybody there had become used to arrangements that no
longer accommodated the enslaved kinsmen. Eventually all second genera-
tion slaves were for this reason almost completely deprived of this option.
Nevertheless, slavery in many parts of western Africa was unpleasant enough
for an exodus of great numbers of slaves from different societies shortly after
colonisation by the French had begun. By far not all returned home. Many
overcame the hardship to develop a new existence based on cultivation.
Others entered the new economic sectors that developed in the wake of
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colonisation, or, in the case of Senegal, joined the Mouride brotherhood,
which offered both a social network and a new corporate identity (cf. Klein
211993c: 182ff; Roberts 1988).
   Slavery in the light of these arguments is revealed to be the outcome of a
distinct relation of power (Herrschaftsverhältnis), a designation shaped by
Karl Marx ([1858] 1983c: 254). As such slavery is not static, but is subject to
changes resulting from transformation processes in those social and economic
relations forming its basis. Indeed the power of the masters can be challenged
from two sides, in both of which the configuration of power between masters
and slaves becomes affected. Either from the outside, when invaders take
over power from the masters, as had been the case with colonisation, or by
the subordinate in society themselves. That slavery nevertheless proves so
difficult to overcome from within society, as has been outlined so far, results
from the many implications such a complex relation of power as slavery has
(this will be a recurrent topic in the following chapters as far as bı¯z. a¯n slavery
is concerned). Slavery encompasses and pervades all major fields of society,
from the economic to the social. It is present in all those values, attitudes and
notions which constitute central elements of the slave society’s culture. As
22such slavery cannot be reduced to an economic problem, but has to be
analysed in all of its meanings to society. In order to produce insights on how
slavery changes and how slave emancipation progresses, the present analysis
makes use of the configurational approach developed by Norbert Elias (1988
and 1990).
   This theoretic device allows for the systematic examination of how
relations between groups change not only as the result of the groups’ direct
action, but also in response to processes of spatial segregation and external
challenges to given power relations as well as to other factors. These insights,
which are detailed in chapter two (cf. p. 78-91), will be reflected throughout
the present study by the notion of configurations of hierarchy and dependen-
cy. Wherever group interactions are concerned these will be characterised as
relations of hierarchy and dependency, while interpersonal interactions
involving masters and slaves will be referred to as master-slave relations.
   Besides these aspects this study develops arguments dealing with two more
issues needing further attention in the study of slavery. Little has been said so
far about the modes of domination maintaining slavery. The major thesis in
this domain remains that slave resistance in Africa was consistently weak
because the slaves rarely became a homogeneous group in the way they were
on the plantations of the US South. Differentiations with regard to slaves, e.g.
between slaves newly acquired and other slaves or slaves of the first and
second generation were indeed effective means to undercut slave solidarity.
Limited attention has been paid so far in this context to questions of gender
23and the different treatment of slave women and men. Masters not only had
a means to control their slaves by their power to deny them marriages and
kin relations, but also because slave women and men had different aspirations
as far as their individual ascension and integration into the slave society was
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concerned. While women could ascend, although still with an ambivalent
status, into the masters’ society by being married by a freeman or by devel-
oping quasi-kin relations with the masters’ and mistress’ children e.g. by
establishing relations of milk-kinship, this was not an option for slave men
due to the rule of female hypergamy in bı¯z. a¯n society. Conversely, work
offered few options for slave women to achieve a better condition, while
slave men as professional herders, trade assistants and the like could achieve a
great deal of autonomy and occasionally, as a reward, become manumitted.
   Studying the end of slavery in terms of an inquiry into social change also
raises another set of questions. Besides examining how social relations
changed it has to be asked what changed and why. This implies reflecting
once again on the nature of slavery. Already about two decades ago Frederick
Cooper (1979: 111) hinted at this problem in his assumption that slavery in
Africa has been described by anthropologists as “benign” so often only
because these studies did not consider slavery as changing in time and space,
but based their assumptions on systems of slavery already in decay and
therefore becoming more integrative. This conclusion, which has come to be
accepted among scholars of slavery (cf. Miers/Roberts 1988a: 6), is supported
by the evidence raised in this study. Although the French colonists, who had
started the occupation of Mauritanian territory by the turn of the
th 20 century, refrained largely from pursuing an abolitionist policy (cf.
Acloque 1998; Ould Cheikh 1993: 188), the relations of hierarchy and
dependency at the desert edge became seriously affected. Slaves gained a
greater range of alternatives to their life with the masters and the latter in
turn had to do more to make their slaves stay. However, this evolution, at
least in the case of bı¯z. a¯n society, favoured above all men. It was they who
profited on a large scale from promotion to h. ara¯t.ı¯n status during this
century, while slave women did not (cf. chapter four). Indeed the develop-
ment of slaves’ conditions seems to have been contradictory. While the end
of the slave trade made slaves more precious, and especially difficult to
replace, the consequences of this trend were double-edged. As masters had to
fear slaves running away, they had to treat them well, but on the other hand
the lack of an external slave supply also meant those masters wishing to
continue slavery had to rely more heavily on the single, remaining resource
for new slaves: slave women. Extended practices of manumission applied to
slave men were thus accompanied by a rigidification of slave women’s
conditions and the meaning of slave estate. It is indeed the weakening of the
masters’ power that made them rely more heavily on legal principles to
justify and maintain their supremacy. The response of slave societies to
external forces weakening the masters and promoting the slaves therefore has
to be observed with special attention, for the result of the response is likely to
be highly ambivalent.
   In Mauritania, it is this strengthening of the ideology of a fundamental
difference between masters and slaves that lives on until today and rules
much of the discourses focusing on the integration, or else the exclusion of
36        Chapter 1
 
 
the su¯da¯n from bı¯z. a¯n society (cf. chapter eight). While social mobility has
always existed and continues to bridge the divide between enslaved and free,
it is the formally correct legitimation of the end of individual slave estate that
has become a great concern to many involved. Significant numbers of slaves
in Mauritania continue to strive – and pay – for formal manumission because
they perceive this act still as the most effective way to demonstrate their
departure from the slave estate. By this practice, however, they reproduce
and maintain the dichotomy of “slave” and “free”, and hence keep alive the
label “slave” as a social category laden with a symbolic meaning discriminat-
ing against all those still bound to the slave estate.
Slavery and Social Hierarchy in Bı¯z. a¯n Society
Making use of slaves contributes to the differentiation of society. This is most
apparent in those cases where a class of masters evolved, or as was the case in
many western Sudanese societies, slavery, together with the capture of and
trade in slaves, allowed for the evolution of strong military and trading
groups, and thus facilitated state formation. The establishment of clerical
states in the western Sudan, as was the case in the course of the gˇiha¯ds in
Fuuta Jallon, Hausaland and Masina, was based on the sedentarisation of the
pastoralists involved. This shift in the mode of life was considerably eased
due to the exploitation of slave labour. Slavery also paved the way for
another kind of social differentiation. It has been argued that the evolution of
the typical West African, rural-based Islam was accompanied and facilitated
by the establishment of slave farming. Islamic scholarship therefore could
th shift during the 16 century and continue to do so until the beginning of
colonisation, from the big trading towns to religious centres in the hinterland
24(Levtzion 1987: 4).
   In the western Sahara patterns of social differentiation resulting from the
practice of slavery were less marked. Most slaves were used in households,
and no plantations worked by slaves developed as has been the case around
the big western Sudanese towns and within the powerful states of the area (cf.
Klein 1993c: 171f.). Nevertheless, the percentage of slaves in bı¯z. a¯n society
was high, ranging from about a half to a quarter of the whole population or
sometimes less, depending on various factors. The demographic significance
of bı¯z. a¯n slavery was comparable to that of neighbouring societies subjecting
their slaves more rigorously to distinct productive activities, such as farming.
Despite the more diffuse use of slave labour, the western Sahara also witnes-
sed the evolution of distinct warrior groups and of an Islamic scholarship of
great renown. The warrior groups, the h. assa¯n, lived off tributes from either
clerical, i.e. zwa¯ya tribes (h. assa¯niyya/Arabic: qabı¯la), or groups of tributaries
(zna¯ga). These latter two groups built the productive backbone of bı¯z. a¯n
society and, though on a different scale (the zwa¯ya more, the zna¯ga less),
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relied on and employed slave labour. Slaves therefore took part in the
production of those values that later on became infused in the system of
inter-tribal exchanges of tributes that allowed the warriors to live by and
large without producing themselves. Dependent labour also contributed
significantly to the wealth which allowed nomadic desert scholars to devote
their lives entirely to religious learning. Unlike those scholars living in the
very few trade towns of the western Sahara, who lived off trade and thus
followed a common pattern of Muslim scholarship, the rural scholars were
only marginally involved in trade, but lived off a large body of disciples and
25slaves. Although slaves produced an important part of the goods appropriat-
ed by those dominant in society and hence ensured both their material and
symbolic reproduction, it remains difficult to prove that slave labour, which
constituted only one of several forms of dependent labour, had been most
significant in this process. Though highly instructive because of the insights it
opens on the connection between bı¯z. a¯n slavery and economic development
in the western Sahara, the thesis of Constant Hamès (1979), stating that in the
th th context of the bı¯z. a¯n trade in gum arabic (17 –19 century) a zwa¯ya industry
based on slave labour developed, can be questioned on empirical grounds (cf.
Webb 1995: 98).
   The present study will take up this initial interest in the relationship
between bı¯z. a¯n economy and slavery, and widen its perspective in order to
analyse the significance of slavery and slave labour to the shape of bı¯z. a¯n
society and economy in different fields. The question is how slavery became
so closely intertwined with bı¯z. a¯n society and social hierarchy that social
practices which emerged in the context of slavery are still so hard to over-
come in today’s Mauritania. Before engaging in this project, the patterns of
bı¯z. a¯n slavery have to be located in the context of the different types of slavery
practised in the Sahel and western Sudan.
   According to Claude Meillassoux (1975a and 1986: 87f., 117ff., 254f.) and
Frederick Cooper (1979: 116), three different types of slave labour can be
distinguished in African societies. Slaves were employed on plantations,
where they worked under supervision in gangs for market demands; they
lived in semi-autonomous villages and had to pay a more or less fixed share
of their harvest to their masters, or they lived in their masters’ households
and replaced the labour of the masters’ kinsmen.
   In the western Sahara only the latter two types of slave labour occurred,
although there were a few sectors in which a specialised production for
market demands developed. Such cases are the salt mines and to a lesser
extent date-palm cultivation. However, the most important bı¯z. a¯n desert
rock-salt mine at Ijil was not exploited by slaves, but a specific group of
26clients, the Azazir (h. assa¯niyya: ^ag˙za¯zı¯r). Indeed the question whether slave
or free labour predominated in the Saharan salt mines, or if there was any
slave labour in this sector is still controversial (cf. McDougall 1990: 248ff.;
Lovejoy 1986: 115-52). In the oases, ownership of land and palm trees was
not strongly centralised. The market production taking place in these
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locations hardly had the character of organised plantation work, putting large
numbers of slave workers under the authority of landlords, but remained
within the framework of individual masters owning small plots and ruling
over a small group of slaves or manumitted slaves.
   Semi-autonomous villages of slaves were more common in bı¯z. a¯n society,
although the great majority was located in the south of bı¯z. a¯n territory, where
rainfed agriculture was possible. Bı¯z. a¯n nomadic pastoralists, by settling their
slaves in distinct communities in these areas, were able to get hold of a more
or less regular supply of grain that was crucial to complement their animal-
27based diet. However, in precolonial times warfare and raiding seem to have
strongly constrained the benefit that could be obtained from these slave
villages (h. assa¯niyya: adwaba), many of which were not permanent settle-
ments but were occupied only during the cultivation period. Consequently
the majority of these agricultural settlements developed only after colonisa-
tion and pacification, and then became the locale of sedentarisation not only
for slaves but also for manumitted and runaway slaves.
   As regards slavery in bı¯z. a¯n precolonial society, it can be concluded that the
vast majority of slaves were employed on the level of household production.
They replaced the work of freemen, or increased the work capacity of the bı¯-
z. a¯n families. Employing slave labour could serve specific ends. Either it was
used as a means to enhance the economic basis of the family production unit
by enabling the further accumulation of livestock, or it helped assure subsist-
ence production and freed the masters from manual labour. The latter thus
became able to devote their energies to religious scholarship, to warfare, or
simply to enjoy idleness or alternatively, the work of directing slave labour.
It was the bı¯z. a¯n women who became most closely associated with a lifestyle
marked by inactivity. Together with obesity, this was a means to express
affluence and emerged as the bı¯z. a¯n ideal of femininity. Having thus outlined
what places slaves occupied in bı¯z. a¯n society, the following overview of bı¯z. a¯n
social hierarchy and social groups will complement this picture.
Status Groups and Social Strata
Su¯da¯n
   This study is concerned with the most apparent and manifest divide in
bı¯z. a¯n society, the one between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n, or literally between black
28Moors and white Moors. In h. assa¯niyya Arabic dialect “su¯da¯n” has a
different meaning from that in classical Arabic, where it designates black
Africans, and also refers to sub-Saharan Africa as the land of the blacks (bila¯d
as su¯da¯n). In bı¯z. a¯n society this original designation of the African outer
border of Arab society has been turned into an internal one distinguishing
the freemen from those having a slave past. Consequently, once it is not
question of their ethnic affiliation, black Africans are not called su¯da¯n in
29bı¯z. a¯n society but kwa¯r. However, the division into black and white in bı¯z. a¯n
society is much less neat and obvious than these terms suggest. First it has to
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be noted that phenotype is not a reliable indicator of social status in bı¯z. a¯n
society, as freemen of noble origin are frequently of dark complexion, while
the reverse also occurs among su¯da¯n. Second neither bı¯z. a¯n nor su¯da¯n are a
homogeneous social and status group and additionally, several status groups
fail to fit easily into either category.
   While the su¯da¯n are supposed to comprise all those members of bı¯z. a¯n
society who have a slave past, the composition of this group of h. ara¯t.ı¯n, who
are free, and ^abı¯d, i.e. slaves, can be seen as a paradox. As freemen the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
– one could suggest – should be able to figure among all other free people,
namely the bı¯z. a¯n, and the major divide of society into free and servile hence
should distinguish h. ara¯t.ı¯n and slaves rather than put them into one social
category. That this is not the case reveals a good deal about the different
meanings freedom can have in bı¯z. a¯n society. The freedom resulting from
manumission is not the same as that achieved by being born free (cf. Meillas-
soux 1986: 23).
“Haratines”. Le choix de ce nom qui signifie en Hassaniya “Titulaire
d’une liberté acquise après la naissance” dénote du souci constant de
rappeler à ces gens-là qu’ils ne peuvent pas prétendre aux honneurs dues à
l’autre groupe de “Ahrar” ou libres tout court. (Ould Ahmed Meidah
1993: 9)
The h. ara¯t.ı¯n’s very resemblance to the slaves according to this definition is
due to the fact that they once had a slave past. Although they have become
free by manumission, and hence are able to pass this status on to their
children (provided that the mother is a h. art.a¯niyya and not a slave) the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
are not equal because of their slave origin. To bı¯z. a¯n the slave past of the h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n appears everlasting. Even several generations of being born free as a h. ara¯t.ı¯n
are perceived as being unable to delete this past. This perspective of what
being a h. ara¯t.ı¯n means is predominant in bı¯z. a¯n minds, and beyond the literal
meanings of “manumitted slave” the difference between masters and manu-
mitted slave descendants has also been rationalised by folk etymologies,
portraying the term to be derived from “h. urr ta¯ni” meaning freeman of
30secondary rank or “h. arra¯t” ploughman. However, none of these etymolo-
gies is phonetically or semantically satisfying, and still today the origin of the
word h. ara¯t.ı¯n remains unclear. More instructive is a comparison with the
meanings of the term in Berber languages (of which h. ara¯t.ı¯n may be an
Arabised variant), where corresponding terms refer besides the notions of
slavery, manumission, dark-phenotype and half-caste to the idea of mixing
blood or different races. This latter meaning has also become part of
h. assa¯niyya language, where h. art.an signifies the blending of equine races (cf.
Taine-Cheikh 1989a: 95f. and 1989c: 395; Nicolas 1977; Colin 1960).
   The close association of h. ara¯t.ı¯n with slaves and a slave origin in contempo-
rary Mauritania is most prominently expressed by the use of “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” as a
euphemism for both people of h. ara¯t.ı¯n status and ^abı¯d (slaves). This equation
is contested by those who thus feel themselves discriminated against – h. ara¯t.ı¯n
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who have been manumitted for generations and h. ara¯t.ı¯n claiming to have no
31slave past at all. These today decry the devaluation of h. ara¯t.ı¯n status brought
about by the many people of slave descent, who in the anonymity of the big
cities, or after moving into new areas of residence take on a new identity and
claim to be h. ara¯t.ı¯n although they have not been formally manumitted.
Indeed, hardly anybody continues to describe himself publicly as a slave in
contemporary Mauritania, and the use of h. ara¯t.ı¯n as a euphemism hence is far
32from resulting from bı¯z. a¯n practices alone.
   In order to defy this problem, h. ara¯t.ı¯n and ^abı¯d, when wishing to refer to
themselves as one group, commonly use other terms than “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” which
are considered to be less pejorative and also not to devaluate the meaning of
h. ara¯t.ı¯n as a freeman’s status. In the area of Achram-Diouk the term most
frequently employed to this end was “su¯da¯n”. It is for this reason, and in
order to be able to distinguish consistently between ^abı¯d (slaves) and h. ara¯t.ı¯n
that throughout this study the designation su¯da¯n will be employed whenever
both groups are considered as one. Su¯da¯n, however, is not the only term used
to avoid the pejorative connotation of h. ara¯t.ı¯n. There are also other words,
denoting dark colour too, which are in use among su¯da¯n in Nouakchott to
refer to themselves as a distinct group: h
˘
ad. a¯ra (derived from ah˘
d. ar, dark
33green) and gˇal akh. al (literally black skin;  cf. Brhane 1997a: 59).
   As among the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and among the ^abı¯d too, a number of distinct groups
are distinguished. Similarly to many other slave societies, a distinction is
made between slaves closely associated with the masters as a consequence of
a slave ownership lasting for generations on the one hand and slaves having
no affective ties with their bı¯z. a¯n overlords on the other hand. Two terms are
used to refer to the former group of slaves: tila¯d and na¯nme (cf. Ould Cheikh
1993: 183). Of these two in the region of Achram-Diouk only na¯nme
appeared to be in use. While among the bı¯z. a¯n and among a few slaves who
still maintain a close relationship with their masters, this term effectively
bears affective connotations, the designation na¯nme has come to be used by a
number of su¯da¯n in quite a different way. Saying that other slaves are na¯nme
(which is done more often with regard to women than men) is indeed a
means to distinguish oneself from others supposed to be backward, and
34hence to stress one’s own independence and autonomy from former masters.
A second differentiation occurs in the terminology for slaves as far as slave
men or women are concerned. While the singular form for a slave man is
35^abd, the slave woman is called h
˘
a¯dem (cf. the story of M’Barke, p. 67-69;
Ould Cheikh 1993: 183f.; Villasante-de Beauvais 1997: 615; see also note
2, chapter 3).
Bı¯z. a¯n
   The notion of bı¯z. a¯n has shifting meanings. As Raymond Taylor (1996: 3f.,
th 47ff.) argues, bı¯z. a¯n came to be used in the course of the 18 century by
western Saharans in order to refer to themselves as distinct from the neigh-
bouring black African ethnic groups, which by this time still appeared as
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36su¯da¯n and hence conform to classical Arabic terminology. However, even
more than today the bı¯z. a¯n at that time were a heterogeneous group. Many, at
least in the Gebla region close to the river Senegal, were polyglot. For a
considerable number of Gebla inhabitants the h. assa¯niyya language was even
not their native language, as this was still the Berber dialect of the western
Sahara, the zna¯ga language. One of today’s two distinct notions of bı¯z. a¯n,
namely that of an ethnic group defined by its members sharing the
th h. assa¯niyya language, underscores that ever since the 18 century a decisive
transformation and homogenisation process has been taking place. Compar-
ing past meanings with present ones provokes the query whether today’s
differential in the meaning of bı¯z. a¯n, as either including su¯da¯n because of their
h. assa¯niyya language or excluding them for not being integrated into bı¯z. a¯n
genealogies is a recent phenomenon or can be traced back to the origin of the
notion bı¯z. a¯n. While specific considerations of this issue are still lacking, it can
be argued that the present dichotomy in the meaning of bı¯z. a¯n does not
contradict its early use as a means for expressing a distinct identity. Much
like the Greek polis, bı¯z. a¯n society was conceived by the freemen and these
most naturally thought themselves to be the sole constitutive elements of
society. Regarding slaves, pawns or other dependent and unfree elements as
being incorporated into or associated with the freemen’s society hence was
not a matter to be considered. Nevertheless, this does not mean that when
speaking of bı¯z. a¯n, the freemen excluded the dependent strata altogether.
While they were not constitutive elements of society, the dependent and
unfree strata were still part of bı¯z. a¯n society – with the only difference that
they belonged to it much like other kinds of bı¯z. a¯n patrimony. This alienated
incorporation into bı¯z. a¯n society became increasingly contested in the course
th of the 20 century. The members of the dependent and unfree strata began
not only to claim their social integration, but struggled also to define their
own bı¯z. a¯n-ness and hence to compete with the bı¯z. a¯n on symbolic grounds
(cf. chapter eight).
   Such a perception of bı¯z. a¯n identity and status groups, or else bı¯z. a¯n orders
(cf. Bonte 1987a), as historical and dynamic entities is also illuminating for
the issue of what makes up bı¯z. a¯n social hierarchy. Classical descriptions of
37bı¯z. a¯n society differentiate three orders among the freemen. The h. assa¯n
(warriors), the zwa¯ya (clerics) and the zna¯ga (tributaries). While all members
of these groups shared the characteristic of having been born free, a social
hierarchy did exist among the groups and also the members of the distinct
orders. The h. assa¯n tribes (h. assa¯niyya/Arabic: qabı¯la) were politically
dominant, but accounted for only a small proportion of all bı¯z. a¯n. Their
counter-pole was constituted by the zwa¯ya tribes. These were strong in
numbers and also held control of most economic resources. Nevertheless
many zwa¯ya remained, despite tribal autonomy, in a dependent position
towards the h. assa¯n to whom they had to pay tributes. The zna¯ga were on the
lower edge of the social hierarchy. They were most often closely associated
with h. assa¯n overlords and sometimes zwa¯ya spiritual protectors too. Zna¯ga
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tributes contributed essentially to the maintenance of the h. assa¯n as a group of
warriors only marginally involved in productive activities, and also helped
zwa¯ya to accumulate a greater wealth.
   This static representation of bı¯z. a¯n society, however, coincides only margin-
ally with the real picture and fails to reflect the dynamics by which tribes and
members of the three orders continued to struggle for a relocation in the
38social space (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985a: 366). The major rationale in this
competition was the issue of leadership in bı¯z. a¯n society. While military and
thus political power was held by the h. assa¯n (who prefer the designation of
39^arab (Arab), for h. assa¯n bears some pejorative connotations), the zwa¯ya
40(often called t.olba in the eastern parts of Mauritania), by their management
of the divine sphere, had a powerful means of claiming at least moral leader-
ship. Further, by producing the vast majority of written accounts of bı¯z. a¯n
society, they were able to transport their perception of society and social
order much more effectively than the h. assa¯n, who were, however, helped in
this respect by the igga¯wen (bards) singing the praise of their h. assa¯n protec-
tors and benefactors. Despite these many practices of producing difference
between h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya, the nature of this divide was by far not as
clear-cut as one might suppose and many descriptions of bı¯z. a¯n society
portray. Social mobility among the bı¯z. a¯n orders occurred and indeed the
“repenting” of h. assa¯n, and abandoning warfare and converting to an exist-
41ence as zwa¯ya (towba) was almost institutionalised (cf. Bonte 1988).
However not only individuals crossed the borders of the zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n
order but whole tribes too. The Kunta and the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d are only
two examples of tribes or else tribal confederations difficult to classify as
42either h. assa¯n or zwa¯ya.
   The characteristics outlined here make h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya modes of life
appear as complementary models of bı¯z. a¯n virtues, the opposition to which
was essential to the creation and maintenance of two distinct spheres of
power in bı¯z. a¯n society. While in general the h. assa¯n were the more powerful
43group, the zwa¯ya were by far not powerless. Their religious prestige
allowed them to mediate conflicts, and in some cases zwa¯ya with great
spiritual authority managed to acquire an even greater influence on the
supra-tribal level than leading h. assa¯n chiefs had (cf. Ould Cheikh 1991b;
Stewart 1973). Finally the integration of both orders by some tribes further
underscores the view that the distinction between zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n was seen
by many bı¯z. a¯n less as representing a social hierarchy than as representing
44complementary patterns of bı¯z. a¯n-ness.
   The case is different for the zna¯ga, the tributary order among the bı¯z. a¯n
45(also called lah. me). On the one hand the designation zna¯ga refers to a not
very prestigious professional specialisation in livestock rearing, and on the
other hand is used as a name for tribal groups or individuals that have been
defeated in battle and forced into tributary relations with a more powerful
tribe or personal overlord. The readiness to accept the latter unfavourable
status, however, seems to have changed over time. Today designating people
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as being of zna¯ga status is even more of an offence than claiming someone is a
slave. This, however, does not hinder persisting traditions telling of bı¯z. a¯n
tribes which once became reduced to zna¯ga status, but later managed to
46regain their strength and defeat their enemies and overlords. While these
memories of inglorious periods of tribal history are only partially suppressed
in public discourses (a fact that may be explained by the outcome of these
traditions), zna¯ga people are very keen to get rid off their status affiliation.
The means to achieve this end, however, are no longer the shifting luck in
warfare and concluding of alliances that once enabled tributary tribes to
achieve social ascension. Today more subtle strategies are applied. The zna¯ga,
who are known for their light complexion, first of all exploit their physical
appearance to underpin their bı¯z. a¯n-ness. Direct inquiries about individual
status among bı¯z. a¯n nowadays hardly ever reveal zna¯ga, but only h. assa¯n and
zwa¯ya. That the issue of zna¯ga status nevertheless is still not banished
completely from the bı¯z. a¯n social topography is at least partially a result of
the contestation of this social order by su¯da¯n wishing to stress their closeness
to the bı¯z. a¯n by demonstrating their superiority to the zna¯ga. Discussing the
location of zna¯ga status in a representation of social hierarchy encompassing
not only the bı¯z. a¯n but all groups of bı¯z. a¯n society paves a way for the su¯da¯n
to enter into competition with a group which is – according to the predomi-
nant view – considered to be part of the bı¯z. a¯n social universe. Claiming the
zna¯ga status to be worthless by stating that zna¯ga are uprooted people who
are no longer able to ascertain or defend publicly their genealogical ties
towards their origins, is indeed a rhetoric by which su¯da¯n place themselves
above the zna¯ga, and hence locate themselves among the bı¯z. a¯n, i.e. the
47people of known origins (cf. chapter eight; Ruf 1998b).
   Professional specialisation is the distinctive criterion for a number of
further groups in bı¯z. a¯n society. The igga¯wen are bards and musicians much
like the griots in most of West Africa. This group evolved to become the
praise singers of the h. assa¯n elites and were (and sometimes still are) rejected
by zwa¯ya adhering to a strict interpretation of Islam, which sees music
accompanied by instruments as evil. Nevertheless listening to the music of
the igga¯wen today is a favourite pastime of most members of bı¯z. a¯n society
48and competes well with imported music of western style. The ma^alimı¯n,
the blacksmiths of bı¯z. a¯n society, constitute another distinct group. Despised
for a number of reasons, such as the accusation of cowardice and their habit
of living by selling the products of their work, the ma^alimı¯n were also
feared. Their mastery of fire and iron made it seem likely that they maintain-
ed close relations with the world of the supernatural powers and spirits.
   Two more groups have to be named for the sake of completeness in this
overview of groups inhabiting the western Sahara: the nema¯di and the
imragen. The former are a group of hunters and gatherers, of whom a few
still live in the interior of Mauritania. The nema¯di, who used to hunt with the
help of dogs, are not considered to be part of their society by the bı¯z. a¯n, who
disdain the nema¯di lifestyle. The imragen are a people of fishermen living on
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the Atlantic coast. They used to be subjected to tributary relations with the
nomadic pastoralists of the interior, who also depreciate this group and its
mode of living.
A Methodology of Rural Slave System Studies
Researching slavery is a complex task involving major difficulties: one serious
issue for a study like the present one is the difficulty of obtaining empirical
evidence pertaining to slavery. Slavery and the slave past of individuals are
neither topics generating glorious accounts and traditions, nor likely to be
among those experiences one would tell freely to strangers and researchers.
Besides leading to a deliberate veiling of the past, the structures of slavery
contribute to a distortion of memories as well. Slave experiences like
enslavement are likely to become repressed and to slip out of memory once
acculturation into the slave society becomes the nodal point of the enslaved.
Likewise the incorporation of many slaves into the slave society at an early
age meant that these children lost the memory of their origins and indeed
knew nothing else but the life of a slave (cf. Miers/Roberts 1988a: 6).
   In looking for a strategy to enter into a dialogue about these sensitive issues
of the past, and sometimes the present too, without introducing the topic of
slavery directly, I came up with the idea of taking interviews about personal
life histories as a starting point for field-research. By tape-recording the
49overwhelming majority of these, and in general translating and transcribing
them into German on the same day, great care was taken to document not
only the interview but also observations and other relevant circumstances
besides note-taking during the interviews. The emphasis on direct treatment
of the interview data much enhanced an ongoing process of reflection which
contributed significantly to uncovering new issues for research, adapting the
research strategy and to revising the interview guideline. This approach soon
proved to be both feasible and productive as regards coming to grips with bı¯-
z. a¯n slavery. Asking about life and living conditions in the present and in the
past enabled both the interviewees and me to speak about sensitive issues
without – in most cases – making too explicit any personal involvement in
master-slave relations that now seem offensive to many. Many of the
questions arising in this context, such as personal status, were communicated
as part of a subtext, or when a particularly intimate atmosphere had evolved,
also directly. Taking individual life-histories and their localisation in a wider
framework of circumstances such as nomadisation patterns, customs of
nutrition and the like, were fruitful also in another way. This approach later
on greatly eased the process of localising individual experiences in a wider
context of social and economic life of bı¯z. a¯n society as well as cross-checking
distinct information.
   Crucial to all empirical research is the question of sampling. From the
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beginning this study was meant to cover not only one community or village,
but to focus on a number of villages and localities with distinct characteristics
within the region of Achram-Diouk. Experiences from an earlier stay in the
area significantly eased this undertaking. When I arrived to undertake this
study in 1995 I already knew many settlements as well as a number of su¯da¯n
and bı¯z. a¯n living in the area. The choice of interviewees was based on a
number of diverse rationales. On the one hand there were distinct personal-
ities playing a central role in social life who were interviewed for this reason.
Within communities, snowball sampling, and later information from survey
data, were also used as a means to find further people fitting into distinct
social categories for interview. On the other hand, looking for those deprived
of social power meant investigating on my own and wandering around the
villages (and later, during the cultivation season, going from one field to
another) to look for people displaying little evidence of being influential in
society and hence easily overlooked by local informants. As the region under
research covers an area of about eighty kilometres in length and fifty in
width, looking up particular people (who quite often were temporarily
absent) and embarking on follow-up interviews later on, meant having to be
highly mobile, i.e. having access to a motorised vehicle. This I was lucky
enough to have been lent by the local development project.
   The focus on interviews with individuals made it possible to seek points of
view of dependents and other people and groups who have difficulties in
making their voice heard in public. Consequently the majority of interview-
ees were su¯da¯n, both slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n. Interviews with women make up
about one fourth of the interviews (the total number of which is close to one
hundred). Besides this perspective, the point of view of the masters had to be
explored as well. Interviewees among bı¯z. a¯n were chosen according to many
criteria, in order to get a highly diversified sample. Members of both the h. as-
sa¯n and zwa¯ya elite had to be interviewed and special attention was paid to
getting information from people central to the public life of the region, such
as the local qa¯d. i, the local director of the school, as well as people active in
local business, politics and administration. Second came the quest for bı¯z. a¯n
with close and ambivalent relations with both the su¯da¯n and the bı¯z. a¯n
because of a split ancestry, i.e. a mother of su¯da¯n origin and a father of bı¯z. a¯n
origin. Third, networks of dependent relationships were to be uncovered by
interviewing former masters and their slaves in order to be able to contrast
their visions of the past and of the master-slave relationship. While the two
former goals could be achieved in a satisfying way, the last aim proved to be
difficult. In many cases the residential dispersion of former masters and slaves,
death and other factors made it impossible to get hold of the people concerned,
while wherever these people still lived in close neighbourhood, information
about these relationships remained effectively obscured. Nevertheless one case
of specific people (a h. art.a¯ni, his mother and the son of their former master)
reflecting on just one shared experience could be unravelled and is presented in
in the following chapter (cf. the narratives of Brahim and Zeyneb, p. 59-66).
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   Another aim was to conduct interviews with as little public attendance as
possible in order to protect those talking about sensitive individual issues
from the threat of gossip. Interviews were generally held at the residence of
the interviewees, either in their homes or under their tents and during the
cultivation season most often at their workplace in the fields. A few inter-
views with local notables were held at my own place at Debissa near Achram.
While the goal of conducting interviews in an atmosphere of privacy could
not be achieved by a long shot in all interviews, sensitive issues could be dealt
with in the great majority. On many occasions it even seemed as if slavery, as
a kind of a vanishing problem, raised fewer emotions, and hence produced
less reluctance to cooperate in interviews than did topics more closely related
to issues of the present, such as politics.
   The individual life accounts, despite these many advantages, also proved to
have characteristics making them difficult to exploit systematically. Their
highly individual character gave them a kind of a monolithic nature, and
pulling out sections and single phrases seemed to do a good deal injustice to
this material. Indeed the topics treated in the interviews are closely interrelat-
ed, and the internal dynamic of the interviews often overruled the research-
er’s wish to gather data systematically or confirm evidence more precisely.
Unlike the impression after a period of retrospective reflection and detailed
analysis that had begun once back home (described in the following chapter,
p. 50-56), the interview data during the field research seemed to be largely a
mess. There were endless contradictions both within the interviews and
among different interviewees asked about the same topics. And whenever I
tried to remedy this situation after periods of frustration by a stronger
emphasis on systematic inquiry, this incited even greater discomfort. Instead
of becoming more precise and accurate, the data on distinct issues seemed to
become ever more confused and contradictory rather than to condense into
evidence. On such occasions it was most often the interviewees who put an
end to the dilemma. Pretending a certain kind of ignorance towards endless
circular questions focusing on details which seemed completely insignificant
to them, the interviewees shifted the topic and hence made clear to the
interviewer that time was passing and that it was limited too.
   Comfort to the aching researcher’s soul came from almost daily afternoon
meetings with Khalifa Ould Kebab, my research assistant during all of the
stay at Achram, who also did all translations from h. assa¯niyya into French for
me. Sipping the traditional three glasses of sweetened mint tea, which Khalifa
Ould Kebab knew how to prepare in a masterly way and used to flavour with
lots of fresh mint he grew for local sale, bı¯z. a¯n society became less an object
of confusing research but a mode of life to enjoy. It was the many discussions
on these afternoons that offered me essential insights which both helped to
readjust current research strategies and tactics as well as later helped greatly
to develop the present analysis. Discussing with Khalifa Ould Kebab
interviews and questions that had come to my mind during interview
transcription was an experience crucial for increasing my insights into the
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meaning of the narratives. On many occasions what first had seemed to me a
contradiction thus became related by a distinct logic. These discussions and
the reflective process they underwent also were an important complement to
the strong reliance on translation during interviews. The h. assa¯niyya dialect,
despite the efforts of Khalifa Ould Kebab and many others to make me learn
50it, still remains strange enough for me to be far from able to conduct
interviews of my own. However, my knowledge of standard Arabic enabled
me to engage in developing my own list of vocabulary of h. assa¯niyya key
terms and to develop transcriptions not only in Latin characters but in Arab
ones. Together with the discussions I had on numbers of key terms with
bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n, this enabled me later to compare the h. assa¯niyya expressions
with the meanings of the corresponding roots in standard Arabic.
   A smaller number of interviews with local intellectuals were held in French,
but also in presence of Khalifa Ould Kebab. The subsequent discussion and
reflection process, like that usually following the interviews held in
h. assa¯niyya, proved to be most fruitful in these circumstances too. However the
number of translations the interviews later underwent in transcription was
reduced considerably.
   Besides the interviews focusing on life history, participant observation was
an important source of insights into relations of hierarchy and dependency.
Indeed body talk often revealed much of what discourses tried to deny in this
domain (cf. Henley 1988). Systematic field research was undertaken especial-
ly to uncover current modes of land tenure. The action of the local develop-
ment project, of the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammen-
arbeit) and the SO.NA.DE.R (Société Nationale pour le Développement
Rural) were also a topic of specific research among both project employees
and the local population. As external support is a crucial issue for the modes
of life in the Mauritanian countryside the action of the most important local
Mauritanian NGO, the UCT (Union des Coopératives du Tagant), was
discussed with both people of the region and a leading employee of this
NGO. Finally, in order to get a grip of the demographic significance of
slavery in the region of Achram-Diouk, a survey aiming to unravel the status
of the leading members in all households of eleven villages and neighbour-
hoods was undertaken. As this was certainly the most sensitive issue of
research, data were not obtained by direct inquiry on the ground, but
through a number of informants coming from the villages and neighbour-
hoods (cf. chapter four, p. 129-133).
   Research in the field was complemented by archival studies. In Moudjéria I
was fortunate enough to have access to both the land register and the archives
(henceforth: AM). The latter consisted of an old cupboard where, stowed
away behind an old, apparently once confiscated gun, a number of colonial
records about the region especially in the 1930s and 1940s had survived the
vagaries of time. Scattered information on tribes, tribal chiefs and conflicts
and finally the mental state of many administrators complemented this set of
data, giving an initiation into local history according to the colonisers’ point
48        Chapter 1
 
 
of view. A second attempt to get hold of documents in local archives,
however, failed. In Tidjikja, whence I had undertaken a trip for this reason, I
was told that rains had damaged the archives (AT) which therefore were
forbidden to be used until the damage had been repaired. As this reconstruc-
tion was likely to exceed not only the few days I had for my stay at Tidjikja,
but also the duration of my research grant, I cancelled the undertaking. A
subsequent trip to several remote locations having plaid a major role in
Tagant history, however, did much to compensate for this disappointing
experience. In the meantime, I learnt that the Mauritanian former regional
archives (at least in theory) had all been moved to the national archives
(ANM) in Nouakchott. Therefore, it is unclear whether any major docu-
ments remain in locations like Tidjikja. In the national archives, after waiting
several weeks for permission for access I was lucky again. While numerous
authors have mentioned that orientation in these archives is impossible, I
cannot confirm these statements on the whole. Indeed the archives do seem
to have been emptied of a number of documents containing sensitive infor-
mation on certain personalities and tribes, or perhaps they were lost during
transfer, but nevertheless there is an interesting stock of documents to be
found. In my attempt to explore some of these, I was effectively helped by
one old employee who seems to know most of the documents all too well,
but is also probably the only person with this knowledge. While I had to
choose the documents I wanted to consult from a rather ill-organised list
(originally established by the French colonial administration, not Mauritani-
ans) it was his few but pointed comments that helped me enormously to filter
a few documents of great value out of heaps of insignificant material. Unfor-
tunately, time constraints and later a computer breakdown, destroying a
number of notes I had taken, did much to limit these researches. This gap was
later filled to a large extent by Roger Botte, who, when we met by chance in
Paris, generously offered me access to his copies of archival documents
microfilmed in the late 1970s.
   Finally the independent press of Mauritania, which despite the threat of
censorship in many cases produces journalism of a high professional stand-
ard, was a source from which to follow ongoing discussions about national
politics and naturally the issue of slavery in Mauritania.
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Chapter 2
Changing Configurations of Hierarchy
and Dependency
Coming to grips with an empirically based analysis of present day social life
in the region of Achram-Diouk meant engaging in a process needing both
empathy and distance towards the subject of the study, as well as the people I
came to know and the experiences I had. To reflect how the arguments of this
book were developed, three perspectives on the empirical data and analytical
reasoning are presented. This triad is introduced by methodological conside-
rations based on theoretical assumptions, the fieldwork carried out, and the
strategies implemented to transform field data into the final text. Life
histories of su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n reveal contrasting experiences of slavery. The
historical dimension which these narratives offer opens insights into the
evolution of webs of (inter-)dependency between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n. This
makes it possible to discern the su¯da¯n’s complex struggles for increased
autonomy, as well as the dynamics of the bı¯z. a¯n society’s transformation in
recent decades, the latter aspect being a major concern of the bı¯z. a¯n narratives.
Finally, these life-stories are successively examined to develop the different
meanings of “getting free” in the context of the rural bı¯z. a¯n society under
study.
   These changing patterns of hierarchy and dependency carved out of the life
histories are presented as different configurations, a term introduced by
Norbert Elias (1990: XIII, XX, IL, LXVIIf.) in the attempt to systematise his
1approach to “social change” – a term he vehemently rejected. Configura-
tions, or Figurations, meaning “webs of interdependency built by people”
(Elias 1990: LXVIII, author’s translation), are best illustrated by the meta-
phor of dance. While dancing different kinds of dances, people perform a
plurality of relations, thus being interdependent. What the theory aims at is
to link structural and individualistic approaches and to demonstrate the need
for a holistic view. While the individual and the individual’s disposition are
essential to the constitution of a corpus of dancers, the dance itself, i.e. the
performed interdependency, cannot be reduced to the action of the individual
dancer. Both a structural and an individualistic perspective are needed to
fully determine social significance. To Elias it is fundamental that the
individual dancer is always a visible element in a play that can only be
interpreted in relation to its non-individual, specific setting. The dancer both
performs and reveals the interdependency he is bound to. Humans engage in
50        Chapter 2
 
 
relationships that are animated by an inherent dynamic. The evolution of
(social) configurations is neither the result of planned action nor of mere
change, it is structured along its own characteristics. An appropriate under-
standing of processes of social change thus has to trace their genesis (cf. Elias
1990: LXVIII, X).
   Elias’ theorising does not stop at this point. He embarks on enlarging his
theoretical outline into one of a general process of civilisation, or to use a
term a little less laden with teleological implications: a global theory of social
development. The key concept advanced is a sort of correlation between the
development of human mental structures and the evolution of social configu-
rations. This Elias tries to prove through abundant historical studies, discov-
ering analogies between the historical development of the human psycho-
logical structures towards self-control and an increasing civilisation and
pacification of social structures. This attempt has been denounced by Antho-
ny Giddens (1992: 295ff.) as being a “homology”. The argument goes to the
core, as it calls into question the mutual transposition of psychological and
sociological analysis by pointing out its methodological weakness. Elias’
theory for this reason will paradoxically always remain contested on the very
feature supposed to be its greatest strength – the integration of intense
empirical studies in history into sociological reasoning. A deconstructive
reading reveals the interpretations Elias extracts from his historic material to
be bound much too closely to his interpretative framework, which is suspi-
cious of teleological determinism (for a prominent elaboration of this
argument, evoking the question of a change in human mental constitution
over the centuries, cf. Duerr 1988).
   Leaving out these potential flaws, the questions and the general orientation
of the empirical approach laid out by Norbert Elias are still a tempting
incentive to the interpretation of processes of social change and development.
Here the configuration approach will be related to the permanent redefinition
of the status of both the dependent and the free people in the rural area of
Achram-Diouk. The actual processes of social change there, together with
their various settings, cannot be explained without an accurate understanding
of past developments and the heterogeneity of the individual’s experience of
dependency.
2Methodological Considerations
   Why present the same empirical data through different perspectives? One
of the merits of recent self-reflexive and post-modern sociology is that it has
put a question mark over uniformity in scientific writing and thus makes a
plea for multivocality and plurality of styles. The enforced quest for new
forms of textual representation of scientific reasoning was generated by
critics of the misrepresentations or the “white patches” produced by
traditional approaches. Emerging feminist research has made a major
contribution to the development of these arguments.
   In Anthropology one main concern of criticism was to give a voice to the
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other. Two early approaches in this respect are from Marjorie Shostak (1983)
and Camille Lacoste-Dujardin (1977). Both focus on the life of a single
woman, to offer insight into the life of women in an alien society. The
subjectivity involved is not denied, but rather put to use to work out the
process of research. The informants are no longer anonymously subsumed
under the authority of the anthropologist, but are given space for their own
articulation. Once the anthropologist’s knowledge is contextualised, it
becomes vulnerable to enhanced critiques. James Clifford (1986: 109) notes:
“The new tendencies to name and quote informants more fully and to
introduce personal elements into the text is altering ethnography’s discursive
strategy and mode of authority. Much of our knowledge about other cultures
must now be seen as contingent, the problematic outcome of intersubjective
dialogue, translation and projection.” It is precisely the contingency of
knowledge resulting from the intersubjective and fragmentary character of
fieldwork that post-modern writing wants to reveal by turning from repre-
sentation to evocation (cf. Tyler 1986: 130f.). The chapter at hand acknowl-
edges this challenge by presenting empirical data and evidence through
different perspectives. However, this is not identical to the project of
polyphony:
We better understand the ethnographic context as one of cooperative
story making that, in one of its ideal forms, would result in a polyphonic
text, none of whose participants would have the final word in the form of
a framing story or encompassing synthesis – a discourse on the discourse.
(Tyler 1986: 126)
Despite these objections, the following texts are all considered to be framed.
Tyler rightly stresses the (omni-)presence of relations of domination in the
reproduction of the other’s discourse. Interpretative practices are already
included in the generation of the original dialogue (cf. Tyler 1986: 127). This
impregnation of any of the discourses with the author’s work and ambition is
hardly ever to be eliminated, as the perspectives presented cannot escape the
total control of the author, and because polyphony is not a matter of stylistic
devices: “Dialogic texts can be just as staged and controlled as experiential or
interpretive texts. The mode offers no textual guarantees.” (Rabinow 1986:
246)
   The following biographic life accounts, their interpretations and the
following systematic elaboration of distinct configurations of social hierarchy
and dependency, are not supposed to constitute another cornerstone of
stylistic devices. On the contrary, much more obviously it relates to a
classical arrangement of different levels of data aggregation, a shift from
supposedly “soft” to “hard” scientific reasoning, from description to analysis
– with a strong emphasis on analysis. The post-modern challenge consists
precisely in enforcing a re-reading of this classification. Not only does
presenting biographic accounts in such a prominent place add a facet other-
wise difficult to integrate into system-oriented analysis. These narratives
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present an integrated, though not hermetic set of individual interpretations.
They present life-stories that organise events, contexts and meanings
according to individual patterns, and thus reveal in which situations social
structures interfere with individual action, and how everyday life produces
contradictions to challenge social settings. This is described from the individ-
ual’s experience and according to his enunciation. For this reason, the
biographic accounts provide two perspectives: they evoke typical traits of
social hierarchy and its transformation as well as the distortions and deficits
of the typologies and ideal type social categorisation involved. Therefore the
different sections within this chapter and the following chapters are not only
to be seen as a stepwise initiation into bı¯z. a¯n society’s webs of social hierarchy
and dependency, but as distinct complementary analytic perspectives, each
trying to get a grip on the same topic as well as evoking different spheres of
imagination.
   In fact the interrelations between the different chapters of this book are
much closer than a first hand classification along different levels of reference
to field data and other sources and references might suggest. All result from
the same fieldwork and set of data. Their writing included mutual reassess-
ment and reasoning, thus the chapters cannot be conceived as totally inde-
pendent of each other. Although the interview representations were not
changed after their initial elaboration, later editing would have been possible
and provided a powerful means of evoking meaning. But the question of
interpretation has to be put more radically, for it is still tempting to draw a
border between data presentation and interpretation and thus associate the
biographic account with authenticity and the systematic analysis with
interpretation. However, the contours of this distinction are blurred. Any
description portraying meaning assumes and incorporates interpretation, as
has best been demonstrated by Clifford Geertz (1973) in his reasoning on
“thick description”. The biographic narratives tape-recorded in the field are
descriptions of life histories produced in response to the request of a stranger.
In this respect the (biographic) interview reveals a prominent characteristic
inherent in fieldwork. Engaging in a process of understanding (“verstehen”)
implies permanent shifting between different interdependent perspectives of
reasoning (fact, context and meaning; cf. Clifford 1988: 16f.). Conducting an
interview requires the maintenance of mutual understanding (or at least
3recognition), assumed through mutual interpretation. Each interview is a
co-construct of the interviewer and the interviewee along interpretative
patterns of the specific interview, as well as of the interviewer’s evolving
interpretative scheme throughout the fieldwork. By their very nature, these
4accounts are not authentic emic discourses tapped by the anthropologist.
On the contrary, the case studies presented here are descriptions most
obviously resulting from interpretative action on two distinct levels. They
were developed from specific contexts of reasoning in the field in Mauritania,
i.e. from the immediate historicity of field research, and later in Germany
selected and edited to present stories telling of social change and stratification
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in the region of Achram-Diouk. As the edition of these somewhat co-
authored narratives marked the beginning of the systematic written elaboration
of this book, a cross-reading of the different chapters is revealing of the
development of the interpretative framework and its ties with people’s
personal experiences as expressed in the life-stories.
Writing Biographies
   Carving a biographical life narrative out of dialogic interviews, consisting
of a constant flux and re-flux between questions and answers (sometimes also
a question-question-question-answer scheme is more suited to describe the
situation) already raises in itself important questions of textual representa-
tion. How to put a text that originated in a spontaneous, topic-shifting
dialogue on biographic subjects into an easy-to-read monologic narrative,
accurately centred on the topics most crucial to the study presented? Most
commonly biographic narratives take the form of a monologue. Although
introductions can make the reader aware of the existence of interviewers and
later transcription and translation, these factors and processes are invisible in
the narrative (cf. for examples Cross/Barker 1992; Olivier de Sardan 1976).
The reader is confronted with individuals obviously intrinsically motivated
to present their life and other narratives in either a chronological order or
focused on key events. The biographic narrative seems addressed directly to
an audience the imagined narrator most probably does not know. If not
impossible, this rarely is the case (Richardson 1990: 130). The interviewer and
the editor become an indiscernible part of the final product, the textual
account. Performed as such the genre is a lure to the reader, trapping him into
imagined representation. The “I” the reader is confronted with is not the
single self-narrator it is in an authentic autobiography, but a co-authored I.
What at first seems to be first hand, descriptive narration, is in fact the
outcome of complex interactive and interpretative work. The naturalistic
5look then is a feature added by the almighty author in the background.
There are attempts to deal with these shortcomings of textualised biographic
information. Two strategies are to be distinguished. Strategies of involving
the intersubjectivity of fieldwork and those aiming to give most accurate
representation of the emic discourse by employing highly articulated transla-
tion. Intersubjectivity as the constituent and driving force of the narrative is
best worked out in biographies of individuals (e.g. Lacoste-Dujardin 1977;
Shostak 1983). A different strategy is developed by Smadar Lavie (1990). She
elaborates allegories of Mzeini Bedouin life by a typified collage of interviews
conducted during thirteen years of field research. The implications of
intersubjectivity are integrated and expressed through polyphony, here put
into the form of dialogic text. The argument also has a further dimension, as
it tries to display the making of these dialogues, and thus makes a bit more
transparent the excluded “middle” of text and fieldwork (cf. Agar 1990: 73).
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I wanted to engage my voice with the voices of Mzeini men and women,
while avoiding the poetically powerful exoticizations typical of Western
multivocal depictions of Other worlds . . . I also wanted the text to be
written in such a way that it could be translated back into Arabic, its
language of origin, and be read by those about whom it was written.
   The solution was to transcribe, whenever appropriate to my purpose, a
polyphony of voices, including my own, directly out of the raw material
of my diary-style fieldnotes . . . I chose to transcribe very strictly, as
theater-script-like polyphonic dialogues . . . I accompanied these lines by
stage directions straight from my diary. (Lavie 1990: 36)
Stating the author’s deep concern with intersubjectivity up to the final text is
a major concern of this writing, but this strategy has a second outcome: to
produce a strong appeal to the reader, to accept the author’s ability to write
the other’s narrative. Thus it accomplishes a most classical element of
anthropological writing: the establishment of the anthropologist’s authority.
This double bind is most obvious with Smadar Lavie when citing one of her
interviewees: “Comparing my work to the other ethnographies, the old man
said, ‘All these people write about us, about what they think we are, except
one – the one that just writes us, exactly as we talk, and laugh, and gesture
[with our hands], just as we are.’” (Lavie 1990: 37) This passage, as well as
many others throughout the book, recall the experiential mode of ethno-
graphic authority criticised recently (cf. Clifford 1988: 16f.; Rabinow 1986:
245). Camille Lacoste-Dujardin presents a similar confirmation of her work,
although with a slight self-doubting undertone: “Il approuve mon projet.
Quand plus tard, je lui transmettrai les premiers résultats de mon travail, il
me décernera ce précieux compliment: ‘C’est tout à fait ça! Comment
avez-vous fait? . . .’” (Lacoste-Dujardin 1977: 37) These statements most
directly show that the need for the anthropologist’s authority to write the
Other is not altered by the choice of textual representation (cf. Clifford 1988:
15f.; Geertz 1988: 4f.). What is changed indeed, is the author’s concern with
making his aspirations at least partially visible to the reader.
   There is no standardisation of the methodology, the use, and presentation
of life stories. Nevertheless two main trends can be identified, one focusing
upon the “symbolic in social life and meaning in individual lives” and a
second, considering “interviewees as informants – in ethnographic fashion.
The aim is to get accurate descriptions of the interviewees’ life trajectories in
social contexts, in order to uncover the patterns of social relations and the
special processes that shaped them.” (Bertaux/Kohli 1984: 215)
   The narratives presented here are best associated with the latter approach.
Carrying out interviews focusing on the interviewee’s life history was
conceived as a means of both introducing the topic of slavery and social
dependency, and of providing data for a general contextual framework.
Indeed, the concern with the interview’s biographic foundation grew
throughout the fieldwork. A topical, and a chronological, event-oriented
interview-guideline was developed and constantly revised. Included in this
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ongoing process of refinement was a constant shift in topics in the main
focus, much resembling the saturation that marks off the point where new
cases merely confirm the validity of former findings (cf. Bertaux/Kohli 1984:
226). However, this I only came to uncover back home while reflecting on
how to come to grips with my data. Insofar, all narratives have a strong
emphasis on questions of social hierarchy and dependency – as far as these
topics could be unearthed – and are marked by a fragmentary character, due
both to the historicity of the research and the eventuality of the interviewees’
remaining mute for various reasons.
   Reading and re-reading interview transcripts in a quest for hidden mean-
ings, I realised that most interviews told a story. This was unexpected for
me, for most of the interview settings opposed arrangements to facilitate
personalised narration. The topical focus and the initial concept of the
biographic interview as a means to unravel webs of dependency as well,
rather hindered the unfolding of a fragile, not previously conceived narrative.
Finally, many problems had occurred in collecting biographic data, which
forced me to the provisional conclusion that my chronological, key-event
driven concept of life history was strange to the overwhelming majority of
rural Mauritanians. This hypothesis is strengthened by the exceptions to the
rule: it was no problem to ask openly for a life account when speaking to
local intellectuals, i.e. secondary school trained people, and some h. ara¯t.ı¯n
“organic” intellectuals in the Gramscian use of the term (cf. Gramsci
6[1929-35] 1971: 3, 6). In fact, these h. ara¯t.ı¯n were among the few to have
participated in either traditional Qur\a¯n education or modern-type schooling.
Nevertheless the narratives produced, especially by school trained interview
partners, took the character much more of a curriculum vitae than of a rich
life-story. What follows is a somewhat paradoxical conclusion, the narratives
produced during the interviews have a hybrid character. They reveal the
individual’s life through the medium of external incentives, the result of a
complex co-operation. It is this, right from the beginning, most obvious
co-constructive character of the biographic texts that hindered me in treating
them as emic, auto-biography-like narratives.
   Somewhat caught fast between these restrictions on authenticity, further
increased through (in the most cases), various stages of translation, and a
fragmented but on the whole highly instructive content, I had to choose an
option for the presentation of these data. What the biographic data, taken as
life-stories, were able to narrate was the diversity of life experiences people of
different social strata, but all originating from the same small rural region,
had gone through, and how differently they both perceived and were coping
with their actual situation. To present the stories, somewhat cramped in the
transcripts, I chose to take the plunge of interpretation and shape out of the
interview dialogues more or less monologic biographic narratives (cf. Rich-
ardson 1992).
   The texts presented are all based exclusively on interview transcripts and
field notes. They are fictive, as they perform a collage of the interviewees’
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statements resulting in a monologue revealing interviewer-induced key topics
and comprising elements of dramatisation as a result of the editing and
collage process, driven by the fieldnotes and memory. These devices are not
applied monolithically, and the narratives differ with regard to the degree of
their implementation. Some narratives, or some of their sub-paragraphs
present only slightly edited transcript material, while others result from
intensive use of collage techniques and textual rearrangement. In addition the
monologic structure of the text is interrupted in several cases. The single-
person/single event focus in one case is split up. Several narratives of
interviewees who are closely interrelated are synchronised and thus present
to the reader an imaginary communication. Also – if found necessary – the
original dialogue of the interview is brought back into the account, e.g. when
a sudden, unexpected shift in topic, in the mood or something else which was
directly related to questioning occurs. This especially is true to the narrative
of M’Barke, an old slave woman (h
˘
a¯dem). One question in an already
difficult interview setting proved to be most offensive. Although I am
personally still ashamed of unknowingly disrespecting the old woman’s
sentiments, the crisis provoked in the interview proved to be most instructive
to the anthropologist. In fact, much as in a crisis experiment (cf. Garfinkel
1967), the old woman’s insults revealed the extreme sensitivity of matters of
legal descent among slaves, and thus former slaves – a matter much obscured
among the younger generation, busily engaged in “forgetting” these aspects
of family history.
   Finally, the texture of the narratives presented, despite editing and collage,
will not deny their origin in various interview settings, the main aspects being
highlighted in introductory remarks. The interviewees’ identities, and some
names of places, are changed in an attempt to protect the informants’ privacy.
Unfortunately, up to today the narratives presented have not been approved
by those they are supposed to represent. Nevertheless I hope to show them
to the interviewees on a later occasion. For the moment all I can do is to
thank all persons involved in my interviews for their will to co-operate and
the trust – I wish to affirm once more – they expressed towards me.
Contrasting Life Stories
The stories presented have been chosen to create an insight into the diversity
of life experiences I encountered. In this respect they aim to give an impres-
sion of the region’s life stories as a whole. The stories also present typical
aspects, although the individual cases presented are rather experiences at the
margin of the rural society. As so often, typical or stereotyped images are
best revealed in an atypical setting. And as the stories presented are based on
authentic, individual accounts, they are not ideal-types, and there is no
aspiration to create any. What instead is intended, is to trace cross-cutting
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patterns and ties characterising and relating those involved in the configura-
tion of hierarchy and dependency.
   The first narrative presents the story of Badeyn, who discovered his slave
origin only at the age of fifteen. Having formerly been fully integrated into
the household of his mother’s master, he then started a career typical for the
many h. ara¯t.ı¯n who created independence through their own work. Brahim,
another h. art.a¯ni, is a sort of organic intellectual. He attended traditional
religious education of his own will to cope with what he called “ignorance”
among the h. ara¯t.ı¯n and slaves, hence he experiences being at the margins of
his own community. He has to cope with the contradictions between his own
(and his family’s) aspiration to emancipation and his commitment to tradi-
tional bı¯z. a¯n ideology. Brahim’s story is occasionally backed up by narratives
of Zeyneb (his mother) and in one case Moustava (the son of both Brahim’s
and Zeyneb’s former master), both providing contrasting perspectives of
Brahim’s narrative. M’Barke’s story is of a completely different kind. The old
slave woman evokes most impressively the woman slave’s condition, clearly
distinct from the men’s. Valha is a member of the tributary, zna¯ga stratum of
bı¯z. a¯n society. This status nowadays is hardly ever admitted publicly, for it is
conceived of as being even more dishonourable than h. ara¯t.ı¯n or slave status.
The narrative gives a very interesting perspective of bı¯z. a¯n women’s everyday
life, as neither Valha’s family, nor anybody in their camp ever had slaves. It is
just one example that pastoral life was to a certain degree independent of
slave labour and its inputs. Two more narratives reveal the bı¯z. a¯n perspective.
Tourad is a true intellectual in the term’s western sense. He is a teacher, fully
bilingual in French and classical Arabic, took part in the country’s early
seventies leftist student movements, and is now engaged in local tribal
politics. His life-story exemplifies much of the bı¯z. a¯n intellectuals’ attitudes.
A commitment to a western type of modernity is paired with a fundamental,
western-like misconception of their own society. Tourad’s identity is split, as
his father was of noble zwa¯ya origin, while his mother is of h. ara¯t.ı¯n-status
(probably of slave origin and manumitted to engage in a legal marriage).
Youba finally faces similar identity problems induced by his split origin of a
noble h. assa¯n father and a h. art.a¯niyya mother, but the outcome of his social
positioning is different: he chose to integrate in a h. ara¯t.ı¯n community. His life
is characterised by long wage labour migration, indeed much of it would
resemble that of other h. ara¯t.ı¯n, were it not for some decisive differences.
Su¯da¯n
Badeyn
   Badeyn’s narrative refers to the grey zones of slave dependency in a
generalised household slavery context. It reveals two contradicting principles,
both ruling the master-slave-relationship. First comes a sentiment of near-
ness, and in many cases affection, resulting from the close co-residence in a
household, or else tent. This aspect is most immediate to the individual level.
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Second comes the social division into free and unfree, in this case as the
difference between affiliated and associated parenthood. This is how social
texture forms the basis of individual types of dependency. Badeyn lived
successively in contradicting status positions: noble origin, slave descent, and
a sort of self-attained freedom and independence. Although this life-history
confirms the normative power of the hierarchical value system, it also reveals
contradictions in it resulting from everyday life practices. Here it becomes
apparent what weaknesses an approach based solely on an elaboration of the
dominant ideology would have. Domination depends on the knowledge
needed to create and maintain (cultural) distinctions, but this monopoly of
knowledge can be disrupted: Badeyn lived a noble’s life until recognition of
his origins was enforced by a third party, and he was thus excluded from this
kind of existence. The text presents a major episode of the interview along
with detailing, chronologically organised information.
Badeyn: I was born in S. It was a bı¯z. a¯n family who brought me up, without father or
mother. In the 60s, there was an epidemic in S., it’s called Mahamrou. At that
time I was two years old, perhaps three years, because I just had a little sister.
That year, the people tell, it got the whole of S., perhaps one hundred people
were killed by the epidemic, my father, my mother, my sister and more. For six
months I couldn’t see anything, because there was something coming out of my
eyes.
   There was that bı¯z. a¯n family, it was them who took my family as slaves, they
brought me up. When I was young, I thought that family is mine, that it is my
own family. I believe, the man is my father, the woman my mother. It continued
like that until I was fifteen. I thought they were my parents. I knew nothing. Only
while having fun with the children out in the street I got to know – it was the
children who taught me about my parents.
   I ran home, there was my [adoptive] mother sitting and weeping till the end. I
tell you, after that I entered my second class in school. That was still in S. I did
school until my fourth year, the CFD exams, then the woman [the adoptive
mother] divorced and another man married her. At that moment my studies
were wrecked. It was him who destroyed them, he was a bı¯z. a¯n without any
colour, he had something he should be saved of, he started treating me as a
7black.  And my youth did not understand of what use studies are.
   I left S. with them and continued another two years in that situation. I did all
construction for them. Finally, I went to the mother, I treated her as mother, I
told her I have been happy with everything she did for me in those days, but
that now I am no longer happy, that I want to go where I am able to live. She
would be my mother as long as she would be in need of me and I would be her
son. But she being like that, I’d leave. When I went off she ran behind me. It
wasn’t her who had changed, it’s only the man, it is him who decides, not her.
   I visited a military camp. There they needed a washer, I started to do the job.
After a while I left and started as herdsmen for the camels of a friend of mine,
also from my tribe [a bı¯z. a¯n]. Later I went to town and worked as washer once
Changing Configurations of Hierarchy and Dependency        59
 
 
again. At the same time I built bricks for the construction of houses and was an
8apprentice to a baker. I also worked as day-labourer loading and unloading
trucks, and I built wells.
   After some time I came back to the Tamourt en-Naaj and married for the first
time. The SO.NA.DE.R had started the first development project there. In one
year I earned enough money to rest for a whole year, 240,000 UM! I organised
myself to go on with the money, then the SO.NA.DE.R left, they moved to
Achram. I managed to find a šar ı¯v, for whom I washed the clothes some time
ago. So I had a friend there, who was chief of the garage there. That was how I
came here. I did the job until the first wave of discharges occurred. I was the first
on the list to be fired. It was because the first, here people say, is the one who
has two arms, i.e. the one who has two brothers. With him it won’t be like that,
he who has the brothers is right. One won’t be able to put him off.
   I started to work on the fields, to grow some millet. The harvest was good.
After that half a year I went back to the SO.NA.DE.R and they employed me
until now.
   During my first time here I travelled every month to S. in order to visit my
family. After two years I wanted to change that situation, and get her to move
with me to Achram. But she was what one nowadays would call a slave. I went
and asked her parents to give consent to my wish, they agreed that she moved.
It was her masters who refused. I kept on with this situation for another year,
and looking for a solution in S. Later I married here in Achram for a second time.
Here I have five children, in S. are two from my first marriage. Every two to
three months I send money to their mother for the children there.
   Here I have bought some fields. In total I have five fields now. Some of them
are behind a dam, the others behind a small dam. Every year I work the fields
together with my wife. I also have some goats, all in all about 40, I do not like to
have sheep, they are too stupid! Goats are much more intelligent and much less
complicated than sheep. I also have one cow. For some years I also worked as
baker here in A., but now I find it too tiring to get up so early and do my job in
the garage afterwards.
Brahim and Zeyneb
   Brahim’s narrative is characterised by being both very typical and untypical
of slave/h. ara¯t.ı¯n biographies of the region. Again, as in Badeyn’s narrative, a
tension is obvious between the well-defined “indissoluble” origin, i.e. the
slave estate defined through birth, and on the other hand an achieved social
knowledge, which put into practice contests the status-defined role set. The
ambivalence of Brahim’s situation is evident: through personal effort he
9gained certified religious knowledge that enables him to respond to the
hegemonic discourse of social hierarchy and thus to surmount the boundaries
drawn for him by social structures. A second outcome of the knowledge
gained through traditional learning is the at least partial adoption of the social
hierarchy’s framework, whose effect is to cement Brahim’s original low
status.
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   It should also be observed that Brahim’s excellent memory – and his
mother’s too – constituted a never-ending stock of topics for discussion (and
the generation of questions) for me. The following compilation, however,
stands out, for it contrasts several points of view on a substantially common-
ly lived and deeply intertwined experience, as expressed by people of close
relationship: Brahim, Zeyneb, his mother, and Moustava, her (or else his)
zwa¯ya master’s son. Of special interest are the different perceptions Brahim
and Zeyneb have of the process of their successive liberation.
Brahim: I was born about 1956 in the Oued El Abiod, near the well Kharge. I was
with my parents, the herds of goats and cattle, there was nobody else with us.
We had some date-palms too, it was my father and some of his brothers who
planted them when I was very small. The name of the well was Kharge, because
it was so effectively hidden by the trees and bushes, one had to look carefully to
find it, so dense was the vegetation at that place. I stayed with my family and at
the same time I attended Qur\a¯n lessons. I herded the goats and worked the
fields and at the same time went to the Qur\a¯n school. During summer I stayed
with the master [of the Qur\a¯n school], during the rainy and the cold season I
went home and herded the goats. The master [of the Qur\a¯n school] was of
another tribe, he was of the Awla¯d ^Alı¯ , who are not part of the Tagˇaka¯net.
   While we were at the well of Kharge, the two camps were always close to
each other. During the rainy season and winter, we then moved to Liwa, where
we had the fields. It lies to the west of here, some of the people here and I
myself still have fields over there. Every family has a small dam of its own and
every member of the family cultivates and makes his own field.
   There were a lot of bı¯z. a¯n with the [Qur\a¯n] master, they passed a lot of time
in that activity. In fact, I was the only su¯da¯n there.
Author: How did that come?
Brahim: Well, I was the third son in my family, at that time we were nearly rich, so I
was not really obliged to work. But I was bothered by the ignorance [of the
su¯da¯n], I did not want to stay without learning. That’s the reason why I looked for
a task, the possibility to study. I found that man [the Qur\a¯n master] and asked
him if he would accept me to study with him and he agreed. With him I learned
the alphabet and started the Qur\a¯n. When the rainy season came, he went off
to look for pasture for his livestock. I looked out for another [Qur\a¯n] teacher.
He gave me a book, by that time I already could read and started to write. With
another master I found two more books dealing with questions of prayer and
10zaka¯t, the šar ı¯ ^a. Every time the [Qur\a¯n] masters left with their livestock for
the south I stayed there at Kharge; I did my studies always only half a year, during
the dry season, the rest of the year I worked on the fields. I spent six years with
the first master, from 1970-76, and another two with the second one. You
know, once you are able to read and write, studying becomes less complicated,
because then you can continue the work on your own and afterwards ask
somebody to correct your mistakes.
   There were a lot of students with the [first Qur\a¯n] master, he lived in a camp
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of about 60 tents and had about 90 to 100 students. His wife gave lessons too,
everything concerning the women and girls was her duty. While the camp of the
master was near to the well of my parents, I could walk home every evening, but
when they left for more distant places, we had to stay with them. We did not
bring our own food with us, I never saw that with the students coming from
other camps. We helped the master’s family with its work. He had about
60 goats, 30 cows and 3 camels. Everybody helped to water the herds or to milk
11them. My family also gave the master sometimes 10 mu¯d of millet while the
harvest was going on.
   We left the place of Kharge in 1982, there were only some palm-trees left,
growing only a small amount of dates. All the people who once came to that
well left it to come here when the new well was constructed. We too wanted
12to approach the new dam here, that was constructed in 1978 for the first
time. We hoped to cultivate a lot of millet here.
   I am the only one of my brothers still here. The first left in 1982 for Nouak-
chott, in 1986 he went to the Arab Emirates to work there as a policeman, two
more brothers are traders in Nouakchott, the younger one left here in 1993, the
older one in 1989, then there is one of my brothers who is now taxi-driver in
Nouakchott and one who is with the National Guard there. Two of my sisters
are married and live here in the village. Three of my brothers’ wives live here as
well, two of them live at Nouakchott.
   I prefer staying here instead of going to Nouakchott. Here I have my own
millet, my own field, my own work, here I have something to do, and I have
food enough to eat. In Nouakchott everything is related to work. Relying on my
animals there, I would survive for only one month, I couldn’t let them graze
there, for there is no pasture. I would be obliged to buy them fodder, and I can’t
afford that. I would be obliged to sell them and live off the money. After a short
while the whole money would be eaten up, and I would remain with nothing!
Then all those goods, being cheaper in Nouakchott than here, won’t make any
sense to me. No, without getting a job you can’t live in Nouakchott. I never
stayed there for long.
Experiencing the 1969 Drought
Brahim: I remember 1960-65 there was a drought, that was a time without millet,
but the animals were only slightly affected. 1966 was a good year, 1967 ran
short of pasture at the end, 1968 again was without problems, and in 1969 fi-
13nally, there was nothing at all. At that time we had two herds of small stock ,
270 sheep and 100 goats and another 60 cows. After the drought there
remained only three cows. The goats were the least affected, they remained
with a number of 50. Altogether we had about 100 small ruminants left when
the drought was over. We didn’t start a big movement with our animals during
the drought. We stayed at Khaoulete, that is near, about 30 km to the east.
When the pasture was finished we came back, but not to the well, there were
too many people there at the time. We chose another well in order to get clean
water for the animals.
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After the drought, we responded to the death of the animals by increasing the
number of our fields.
Zeyneb (mother): It was my husband who had some animals. . . .
I think there were about 60-100 small ruminants and about 10 cows with my
husband. After the heavy drought [1969] he lost nearly everything. He remained
with 3 cows and in 1970 he died.
Our master lost a lot of his animals too. That’s why we kept together and didn’t
move around that year.
I then stayed with my children, until today. We continued to cultivate our fields.
We had our work. I did not return to the master, why should I? The master,
when he comes and asks for something, we will give it to him. He has got
nothing to give us. In those days he had something, and I didn’t, he gave me
what I needed. In that time he didn’t ask me to give him anything. I continued to
cultivate with my children, we had good harvests. When he came, we gave him
a part of our millet. And we continued eating our millet and buying animals of it.
Moustava (master’s son): Before the drought, there were already a lot of diseases
diminishing the number of my father’s animals. These years were not terrible, it
just killed some animals every time. At the beginning of the drought in 1969, my
family was left with 30 cows, no other animals remained with us. At the end of
the drought all cows were finished. We lost all animals.
As there was nothing left, I went off to look for work. I mounted a truck and
went to Boghé, where I found a job as manager of a boutique [shop]. There
were people of the Legwa¯t.it. , they were big traders, it was them to give me the
work. And I continued to work for them for about six or seven years. They paid
me 4,000 UM, every time I got money I sent it home to my family. They never
augmented the salary, they even wanted to lower it, because there was a lot of
people looking for work. Nevertheless I accepted the situation, I was even
fortunate, for they had trust in me, otherwise they never would have paid as
much as 4,000 UM.
Brahim’s Father’s Life and Death
Brahim: In 1970 my father died. He had worked to get the animals, every time he
had a lot of millet he sold some to buy animals with the money. He also had a
second job, herding. Every two months and ten days he had the right to receive
one goat. He had done that work for several families since his early youth, so he
had got a lot of animals. Then he had another job, he watered the animals, that
is the only work I saw my father do. I never saw him herding, I only heard of him
doing that sort of work.
   Each time someone wanted to sell a female goat or sheep for slaughter, we
exchanged one of our male animals with him. So we could manage to get the
14herd grow faster. I don’t remember exactly what size were the parts of my
father and my brothers in our herd, but every one of us had his own animals,
with his own brand. My father didn’t give some of his animals to us, we were
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paid for our work of herding other people’s animals. When after my father’s
death his master came to pick up his animals, he took all of my father’s, but left
those of my brothers and me. At that time, my father also gave him a part of the
harvest, but this was not fixed, the fields were not fixed to one place and neither
was the contribution.
Zeyneb (Brahim’s mother): Already at the time of the presidency of Mokhtar Ould
Daddah the su¯da¯n lived in adwaba [sedentary camps composed only of su¯da¯n].
15I remember we paid the ^ašu¯r . The animals we had were our own, they didn’t
come from our master, but from our own work, my husband’s, my children’s
and my own work on the fields, and herding of other people’s animals.
   Yes, I am like them [her masters], I married after they married. My husband
sometimes stayed with me and my masters, sometimes we also went to his
masters. We were always together and never separated. For some time after
the marriage, I continued to work for my master. My husband had fields. And we
continued like that, moving around with my masters, until they didn’t need us
any longer. Then we settled with my husband’s family, near their fields. We had
no masters! He was a sa¯yib [slave who wasn’t guarded]. His master didn’t need
him, and if he did, he came to him and asked.
   When my husband died, his master came and took off two of the three cows
that remained with us after the drought, and some of the small ruminants too!
16He told us that my husband had been his h. art.a¯n ı¯ , and therefore he had the
right to take my husband’s animals. Yes, he was right about that point, he did not
want to be unfair to us, he was even kind with us, as he didn’t take all the
animals that were left with us. This is part of the šar ı¯ ^a, it is a Mauritanian habit.
This did no harm to us. I am not saying anything, I only tell you because you
don’t know the habits of Mauritania.
Seeking Manumission
Author: The white family you told me you belonged to, are they still around here?
Brahim: Yes, they live in Leqraye and in Kdân, that is between Ghabbra and Foum
Gleita, there are a lot of Legwa¯t.it. there [a zwa¯ya tribe], one of them [of the
family] is a municipal counsellor and a trader. We are almost like brothers to
him. . . . Yes, it is possible that they do help us when we are in need, that’s true
for all of them, that’s mutual, I help them, they help me. . . . Once I received a
darra¯^a [men’s traditional dress] worth 2,500 UM from them. I helped them
with the construction of a small dam [French: diguette] once, I went to the
project in order to get them some assistance in the construction. I also sent
17them [the family] 125 mu¯d of millet, that was at the time of harvest, and it
constituted my whole harvest that year. I did that several times, it is part of our
mutual relations. I also herd his cows, if we have pasture around here whereas
he has not and comes and asks me to do so. He is my comrade, and every time
I go to Leqraye I visit him and stay with him, as he is the only one I know there.
Author: The last times you occasionally mentioned that Ould Haidalla [leader of the
military regime 1980-84] announced the end of slavery on the radio. I am still
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confused about the question when he held this speech, do you remember the
year?
Brahim: I remember well the time of Haidalla, normally you would speak of two
years related to Haidalla, first the year he came into office, second the one he
was pushed out. His announcement concerning the end of slavery, that was at
18the end of his first year in office, the beginning of the second. In this an-
nouncement he proclaimed a deadline. It meant that anyone having a slave had
to prove the slave’s origin, i.e. he had to provide proofs. If he failed to do so,
then the slave no longer was his slave. He had to enumerate the slave’s fathers
up to the tenth father. If he only could trace about four or five fathers, then the
slave was no longer a slave.
Author: Did Haidalla say that in the radio?
Brahim: No, that is a question of jurisprudence, that belongs to the domain of the qa¯d. i
[judge]. That was the time Haidalla introduced the šar ı¯ ^a . . . he was very
severe about everything he did, everything he ordered had to be executed. . . .
His announcement concerning the liberation of the slaves was on the radio, but
he didn’t speak of slaves or anything like that, he just said that all people were
equal, that there would be no-one to oblige another [to do something]. All
people, the white and the black are equal, they are like brothers. He did not
speak of h. ara¯t. ı¯n or slaves, he just said Mauritania should be a country of equals,
where all people work together and don’t oblige one another [to do anything].
That was also the time of problems between the bı¯z. a¯n and the su¯da¯n, because
the bı¯z. a¯n wanted to force the su¯da¯n to come back to them. If the bı¯z. a¯n went to
see a judge, the judge would send them back, he would let the su¯da¯n be totally
free. This happened after the announcement of Haidalla in the radio. Before it
wasn’t like that, but after I never again saw a white beating a slave or a su¯da¯n.
Before, I saw that frequently with the su¯da¯n of A. [village nearby], they are not
like the other su¯da¯n. . . .
   Slavery is something which has officially come from Allah, which has always
existed in the times ever. I know very well the difference between a freed
person and a slave. The announcement Haidalla made, that was of a general
sort, but I, I know what I know, I didn’t trust that announcement. What I wanted
was something official, a public declaration, because they [the government] also
can say that they will undo their decision. I wanted manumission directly from
my master. I found him here, so we went directly to the qa¯d. i. There were also
some others, i.e. there are others belonging to the master, who were not my
brothers, but of other families. They were already manumitted before the
announcement. After the announcement, I went to the master too. I followed
him and told him that there has been an announcement, that there are no more
slaves in Mauritania, and that everybody has heard of this message on the radio.
You have slaves, I told him, but you know very well that they won’t be of any
use to you, that they won’t work for you. Thus there is no need to say that you
have slaves. At that point he accepted [my argument]. First he liberated me, and
later he made a written manumission for the whole family. There were two
copies of the manumission act. One for the master and one for the family. It was
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him [the master] who made a further copy for himself, for one never knows
what will be in future. If there is only a manumission contract with me, perhaps
his [the master’s] sons would think that there are still slaves. If the contract is
only with me, it is less clear than with a copy [being with the master]. Today we
are like brothers, if one sees us together, he would think we are father and son.
Zeyneb (Brahim’s mother): When I was small I lived with the bı¯z. a¯n. The master and
my mother [she only remembers little of her mother, whom she considers not
to have worked much], my brothers and my sisters. We had a tent beneath the
master’s tent. The master had one son, and we lived with him, we were one
family, black and white. That was the time when there were only few fields and
everybody in the camp had animals. They were neither rich nor poor, they had
cows and goats. In that time there weren’t many fields, and herders and
cultivators could stay together [in one camp] and the owners of the herds could
watch them. I didn’t dress at that time [i.e. she was under the age of seven].
   I did the work of pounding millet, fetched water and also herded goats, there
were a lot of animals. Herding was unusual for girls, but the men all had to work
on the fields. My mother didn’t herd. Cultivating the fields behind the small dams
started by the time I had children, then it increased one by one.
   In this time the camps of the su¯da¯n and of the bı¯z. a¯n were [already] separated.
The adwaba was the camp of the su¯da¯n, the su¯da¯n always remained near the
fields, whereas the bı¯z. a¯n moved around with the herds to get good pasture.
This continued until the harvest, then the bı¯z. a¯n came to take their share of
millet. When everything was distributed the b ı¯z. a¯n left and the su¯da¯n remained.
   For some years, until I had four or five children, I kept with the master during
summer, I fetched water. Whenever the rain started I left for the fields. When I
didn’t want to carry on like that, I fortunately had my daughters. All of them did
one year with the master, one after the other they went to him, to do him his
work. Before, I had shared the work for the master with my sister, one period of
the summer it was her turn, the other mine. This continued until we had
children. It was the sons, who were the first to leave him [the master], they
couldn’t bear the work with him, they kept with the adwaba or they went off to
work. He [the master] wasn’t in need of them, they left him when he couldn’t
resolve their problems any longer. That’s why they left in order to look for work
and give something to the master, if they didn’t it didn’t matter. If they came
back from their work, they only came to the adwaba [not to the master], they
were already married men. In order to marry, they properly asked [the master],
19and he did them their marriage.
   Our master was a very good man, he was very kind to us, he didn’t make us
work for somebody else, he only took what was left behind us, he gave us
clothes and shoes, he always did things that pleased us, and he was full with
animals [i.e. rich in animals]. People came to stay with him and drink milk. We
kept with him until the times when the animals were diminishing and finally all
had disappeared. The master kept with us like a family member, every time he
was in need of something, we gave it to him. We always kept in relation to him
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until last year, when he died, he was already old. There is his son who comes
after him now, he is like our brother, he drank of my milk when he was small.
He frequently visits us when he is in need of something. Nowadays we only give
him the zaka¯t, but if he has no millet we also give him some more. And he too, if
he has got something he will give it to us.
   We left the master in 1969. It was because he had lost his animals. He no
longer had the means to sustain us, and we too did not have any means. The
separation between us took place because I was the mother of a family, I had a
tent of my own and my children, and I worked for myself. They [the master] also
had their work of their own. The only thing shared between us were the fields.
We take a part and they take a part of the harvest. Nowadays, we only give him
the zaka¯t.
   During the drought [1969] we lost a lot of our animals as well. But we
remained on good terms with the master. This continued until the time of the
first democracy in Mauritania in 1982, that was the SEM [Structures d’Éducation
des Masses; cf. p. 272f.] at that time. With this, we found ourselves in two
opposing camps. It was just politics that divided us. At that time, I already had my
own tent. Since 1960 I have had my own tent, my husband, my children, and we
just gave him a part of our harvest. Since 1983 we have been freed, we no
longer belong to him.
Author: How did that come about?
Zeyneb: In 1983 there was a presidential decree, it was transmitted over the radio
[cf. note 18, this chapter]. The president said, all should see each other as
brother, if one would like to get something from somebody, he should ask for it.
What was the property of the slaves should remain their property. Our master
had already manumitted four men before that decree. These were two of my
sons and two of my sister’s sons. All the others he only manumitted after the
decree. It was us who asked him for manumission after the presidential decree.
We asked either for paid or unpaid manumission. We sent Brahim to go and
speak with him about our manumission. The master then manumitted us for
free, we didn’t have to pay. He made us an official document on a paper. He did
that for every member of my family. Then we made another document con-
cerning the whole family. That one today is with Brahim.
   Today the master’s son comes to us when he is in need of something, but we
have stopped working for him. But if he is in need of millet, he will receive
something from us. We give him the zaka¯t, and if he is in need, we will give him
more than that. If he has millet of his own, we will just give him the zaka¯t. He
sometimes gives us some of his dates.
M’Barke
   My introduction to M’Barke resulted from a favour to a zwa¯ya interviewee.
His wish for a lift to Khouba, a place some 35 km to the south, offered the
opportunity to visit a place of very recent sedentarisation. In the middle of
May the spot was nearly deserted. The sun was beating on the barren, stony
plain, temperature in the shade was around 45ºC. Besides some distant zwa¯ya
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tents near to a few bushes, the camp was composed of some of the most
miserable su¯da¯n tents I had ever seen anywhere in the zone. Desperately
seeking a su¯da¯n interview and always under the attentive eyes of my bı¯z. a¯n
hosts, we ended up under the tent of M’Barke. She was a very old slave
woman (h
˘
a¯dem), hard of hearing and almost blind. My research assistant,
Khalifa Ould Kebab, was uncomfortable about starting an interview with
her, as he classified her among the “complicated persons”, i.e. people reacting
at best unpredictably to a stranger’s questions. I for my part felt uncomforta-
ble as well. The village’s appearance was depressing, the most bitter poverty
was obvious in every corner. Except for two tattered chickens, no signs of
animal property were to be seen, and the few su¯da¯n around, above all the
children, were visibly suffering from malnutrition. Even the tent we were
sitting under was so small that, small a group as we were, we hardly managed
to shelter from the midday sun. Interviewing M’Barke was an experience of
learning from one’s own mistakes – and at the expense of the interviewee.
The occasion of severe dissonance was created by asking a question employ-
ed numerous times before without problems. However, changing circum-
stances may change experience. To ask an old woman who had lived a slave’s
life about her marriage can be an insult in that these people often were not
allowed to contract legal marriages. Legal exclusion from parenthood,
however, does not mean exclusion from parenthood-like practices amongst
the master’s family: indeed a boy of about seventeen from the master’s family
joined the interview to see and hear what was going on. Sitting close to the
old blind woman, he could not escape being intensely caressed by her,
although this embarrassed him severely. He nevertheless had to respect
someone who had participated in bringing him up.
M’Barke: I was born in a place called Twueyle, which is near Djonâba. That was in
20the year of the first banknote, it also was the year of the diseases. Khalil [her
zwa¯ya master] is older than me, I drank of his mother’s milk when it was nearly
finished, it was just before his mother stopped breast-feeding him. I am not of
this place, I am not of the people of Khouba, I am a h. art.a¯niyya for the Ahel D. of
the Tmoddek and they are backed by Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar [the former
^amı¯r of Tagant], that Allah may welcome him in paradise. I’ve been to the east
until Khouba belongs to the Tmoddek. Then we came here to watch the place
for the people wanting to make their fields here. We stayed here, me, my
children and my brother. We came here in the year of the battle between the
Tmoddek, those born in that year now are already grown up [this means an age
of about 20 years, probably the event took place in about 1974]. In those days
we were always in the east, we kept close to the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane, some-
times we went up the Tagant. We cultivate the fields near Achram and Chelkhet
Arkham, for everybody who knows the Tmoddek, knows them in these places.
   The Tmoddek are based on livestock, they have no fixed place, they are
always found where there is good pasture. Ouneije, Djonâba, Asma^a, all these
places are for the Tmoddek, they belong to them. When I was young the
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Tmoddek had all sorts of animals, goats, sheep, cattle, some male camels too,
camels were only used for transport. There were a lot of donkeys too. And
there were mah. az. ra [Qur\a¯nic schools] as the Tmoddek were zwa¯ya, they did
not make war, they were defended by Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar.
   I only remember my mother, we were all with my mother with our masters.
There were three brothers to me and two sisters. I worked with my mother,
21who fetched water, pounded millet and gathered ^az [wild grains suited for
22food]. She also gathered another sort of grain that was found on trees [eyzin].
You had to lay it into water for five or six days before it was ready to be eaten.
All this has stopped now, there is no eyzin any more. It was tiring, it took much
time to prepare food with it, and it smelled bad. It also provoked a disease called
igwindi, you started coughing, and there was no milk to cure the pain.
   My mother pounded the millet three times a day, there was breakfast, lunch
and dinner. We prepared ba¯si, ^aiš and couscous with the millet. Millet was
eaten three times a day, but all of it was not a lot of millet, for we had milk.
Today we pound the millet only once a day, in the afternoon.
   When I was young, I worked a lot, fetched water from the well, watered the
cows, cultivated the fields in order to get my millet, gathered grains from the
trees, pounded millet, I am a su¯da¯n woman. The work of watering was during
the dry season, then we were near Achram. It was up to us, the women to do
that work, we watered a lot. We watered the cattle, the goats and sheep, the
donkeys, we pounded the millet, we cooked, prepared the couscous, herded the
goats if there was no shepherd, all that work we did in one single day. For sure, I
was a na¯nmiyye [tent-slave woman]. The times I worked like that are long ago, I
worked until I got faint, I have sons and daughters to do that work now. All that
work I did for Allah.
Author/Research Assistant: When did you marry? [M’Barke ignores the question]
Author/Research Assistant: [louder, as M’Barke was hard of hearing] When did you
marry? [Now most people around start giggling, this is when M’Barke gets angry]
M’Barke: When did I marry? It takes a long time you ask too much. What will that
be about? You don’t know and I don’t know. You are impolite. You ask for
things that nobody ever asks for. I told you I am mad, I just know ten and ten.
And you will get headaches of asking all your questions. You [two, author and
research assistant] are young, I told you, you are young. The youth has its time.
You now are writing, and I don’t know what you are writing. The young women
stay with their parents until they marry, or they get a child without marrying.
I am tired of telling, my tongue is tired, I told everything I know.
   [Once M’Barke had denounced our failure to meet the very special conditions
of respect applying to slave women, our awkward silence made the situation
gradually ease off. The peculiar hierarchy of two young men intrusively asking
questions of an old woman considering herself deserving of more respect, but not
disposing of the means to achieve this position in discourse, was re-established.]
   My first child was born during the drought when the people had nothing to
wear [1942-43]. One of my sons is in Nouadhibou, he is a mason, until some
years ago he always sent some money to me, but that has stopped nowadays.
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All other children keep here all the time. We have our fields around here. We
have fields behind dams and also behind the small dams [constructed two years
ago by the project]. We have been here for a long time, but in the time we
cultivated the fields with our masters, the fields were not here. The fields here in
Khouba were initiated by us, we were three [su¯da¯n] families. Only later all the
others came here to join us, they came one by one. There have been people
from the L^aweysya¯t who had come here to cultivate fields, some from the Idewa¯š
and the Ta¯ga¯t. too. But the Tmoddek always destroyed these fields [the
dams]. All this was only done by the su¯da¯n of the Ta¯ga¯t. and the Idewa¯š. We will
stay here now. Every time one of them comes to make a field, we will send him
back and destroy his field. We will stay here forever. The people you see here
already have a well [constructed by an NGO]. We came here in the time the
old man who just went away was still young [a man of about 60-70 years, who
just had withdrawn from the conversation]. In that time, the only problem here
was that of water. There was no water here, only thirst. Every day we had to
make long walks with the donkeys, to fetch water from Djonâba. It was us who
proposed the well here, and Ahmed [a Tmoddek zwa¯ya], he works in Nouak-
chott, he got the well for us. He is an important person and works in an
institute. We want to have a big village here, we want to become a centre. The
well isn’t carrying much water, it should be deepened.
   We don’t have any sheep or goats, some of the people here have one or two,
these often are mnih. a [a loan in animals restricted to the usufruct] by zwa¯ya
people. We’d rather like to have goats, but we lack the means to acquire them,
you will help us. If we have a good harvest, we get more millet than necessary
for eating. Then we can buy animals. This is possible, but it is not my concern.
Zna¯ga
Valha
   Valha is a woman of zna¯ga origin born around 1960. Until some years ago,
she lived in a highly mobile camp specialised in the rearing of goats and sheep
on the Tagant. This camp experienced slow but continuous decay through
the ongoing drought conditions, which degraded the pastoral resources.
Valha now lives alone with her very old father and her twelve-year-old son in
S. She mainly lives off the money her husband, working as petty trader and
night watchman in Nouadhibou, sends to her. She runs some petty trading
activities and is engaged in some of the economic activities of the local
women’s co-operative. In addition she cultivates a small garden where she
grows vegetables for her own consumption and sometimes for sale.
Valha: I was born in a place near Kiffa in a region named Saba, it was in a camp. I
don’t have any sisters, but four brothers. My mother died early, when I had
reached the age of about twelve years. My father is still living, he is very old now,
and stays with me in my house.
   In my youth I had a lot of duties, I fetched water for my family with the
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donkeys, pounded millet, went to the Qur\a¯n school, spun wool, tanned hides.
The wool was spun only for ourselves, we made the tents out of the wool. To
make a layer of woollen cloth, you have to take a wooden stick, one just like a
pen, and turn it in your fingers to make a yarn out of the wool that you twist
with the other hand’s fingers. Before you can start to spin the yarn, you have to
beat the wool with some wooden sticks. Spinning is done by several women at a
time. During one day, a woman can spin between three and five rolls of yarn,
each weighing about one kilo. To weave a layer of woollen tent cloth of ten
meters [50 cm wide], you have to use about 7 kilos of yarn. The weaving was
done by a weaver and paid for. The women just spun the yarn.
   Fetching water was sometimes easy, sometimes tiring. It depended on the
camp being near to or distant from a well. The camp moved from one place to
another, sometimes it did so after ten days, or just after one night, and some-
times it only moved once a month. At the age of seven I started pounding millet.
My mother was a bit lazy, she then stopped preparing meals. Every day
I pounded two kilos of millet, it took me two to three hours of work, afterwards
I prepared the couscous. My mother spun wool and tanned hides, she also went
to the market places in Tidjikja and Moudjéria to sell goats and buy clothes,
millet, and tea. No, it wasn’t my father who sold the animals, I think he never
was good at commerce, he didn’t know the prices or didn’t know the places to
go to for trading.
   I don’t remember exactly when I attended Qur\a¯n school, I remember well
how once the master beat me, because I didn’t learn my lesson. I finished two
parts of the Qur\a¯n [two out of sixty h. izb]. Today I can read, but I don’t write.
At the time I was very interested in the [Qur\a¯n] school, but I had a lot of work
to do. It was my father who encouraged me to go there, but my mother
opposed him, she thought it would prevent me from drinking enough milk to
23grow fat. Today getting big is no longer important for young girls, but then it
was an obligation. Now I can read, but I don’t write. I haven’t gone far in my
studies.
   My father was always out with the animals, led them to pasture, milked them.
He did this work together with his sons. We had about 200 goats and sheep,
sometimes the herd grew in numbers, sometimes it diminished. I heard my
father tell he had once cultivated fields, but I never saw him doing that work.
   Previous to the big drought in 1969 we had 400 goats and sheep, of which
only 30 sheep and 60 goats remained one year later. 1970 was a good year and
we gained 100 new animals. With these 200 animals we left the Tagant in 1971
for the south, it was the first time we left the Tagant. That year my mother was
already dead. She never left the Tagant. There was no fodder to be found there
in that year. We stayed five months near Barkéwol before returning to the
Tagant. Some years later we stopped going back to the Tagant and kept in the
Aftout, for it made no sense to go up the Tagant when we knew it hadn’t rained
there. In 1986 we went further south than Barkéwol, we went to Sélibabi [most
southern town of Mauritania] to find pasture for the animals.
   Our camp was on the Tagant, we are people of the Tagant. We used to make
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24long migrations from the Oued el Abiod on the Tagant to the Assaba. The
number of tents in the camp always changed. It happened that there were up to
twenty tents, but often there were between eight and ten. There were just
these tents, all the people there were my parents, they were my mother’s
sisters.
   It happened that we had su¯da¯n with our camp. This was during the dry
season. It was always the same two families of h. ara¯t. ı¯n who came with us, in
order to fetch water and pound millet for the whole camp. They came from the
south and were not of our tribe. They were just looking for work. We paid
them according to the amount of millet pounded, for example one mu¯d of
millet per day was paid with 1,000 UM per month. Fetching water was included
in this salary. The h. ara¯t. ı¯n families were big, and all of them pounded millet, very
tiring work if you do it the whole day. We were between five and six tents in
the camp during that time, otherwise two families of h. ara¯t. ı¯n wouldn’t have been
enough to do all that work of pounding and fetching water. This arrangement
started when we met the su¯da¯n families on our way to the south in the
beginning of the hot, dry season. They always came to the same well near Foum
Gleita where we met. The su¯da¯n didn’t move around as we did, they either
cultivated their fields or kept close to the well. This arrangement with the su¯da¯n
families started in about 1980.
   I got married at the age of fifteen, it was the son of my father’s brother [wuld
^amm, patrilineal cousin]. He came from Nouadhibou on that occasion, where he
already was engaged in commerce. They didn’t ask me, I was still small at the
time. After the marriage I kept in the camp with my parents, and he went back
to Nouadhibou and sent money. I never left the tent of my parents, for my
husband didn’t want me to live with his father’s tent. He was in discord with his
father, because of the second marriage the father had entered into with a
woman my husband disapproved of. His father came here regularly, once a year
he visited me, in order to get some money and I gave it to him. You always give
money to the parents, even if they are not poor. A short time ago he came here
with his wife, on that occasion he died. Later his wife came again, and I gave her
money too.
   I came here to Achram in 1988. My father was ill and we looked for a
treatment here in the health station. Later he didn’t want to return to the camp,
he felt too old to move around all the time. So we stayed here. By that time
two of my brothers had already left our camp. In 1970 the first of my brothers
left and went to town, the second followed him in 1984. Today only one of my
brothers is still herding animals. Two of them now are traders and one is a
fisherman. When I left the camp and came here in 1988, there were only three
tents left with the camp. I took 40-50 goats and sheep with me. I lost nearly all
these animals during the drought in 1992. Today I have 12 goats again. It is a
long time ago, we distributed our father’s herd among us. Normally this happen-
ed with the marriage. The father decided on the share each child was given on
that occasion.
   My husband was in Achram already from 1983 on. He was engaged in trade
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here. But in 1993 his commerce worsened and he left again for Nouadhibou.
After one year he came back for two months, then he left again. He sends
money regularly, about every two months. He also sends me cassettes, so I can
get news from him. All this he sends me by people we know well.
   The time I lived in the camp I liked being there. Nowadays I know life in the
village. Before I just knew life in a camp and couldn’t imagine what life in a village
was like. Today I live well here. I wouldn’t return to the camp nowadays. Once, a
long time ago, my husband asked me to accompany him to Nouadhibou, but I
refused. I have never been there, and I don’t know the city. I’ve heard life is
difficult there: the food is very expensive and a lot of poor people come and beg
for money or food. But actually I’m thinking about moving there again . . . Here
I am running a small shop. All the merchandise is with me in my house. I buy
everything I sell from a trader in Achram, he gives me the merchandise on credit.
When I get money sent by my husband, I go to his shop and pay my debts. The
profit I make out of trading is just enough to buy something to eat. I don’t want
to get more out of it. I also work in the shop of the women’s co-operative. This
happens about once a year. The last time it was my turn, I worked for one
month in the shop and my share of the profit was 10,000 UM. I never worked in
the fields, I have a small garden to cultivate vegetables for my family and for sale.
Last year I sold for 2,000 UM, but this year I stopped selling, as I didn’t want to.
This year I grew tomatoes, onions and carrots.
Bı¯z.a¯n
Tourad
   As a school teacher Tourad is one of the major intellectuals of the region.
He went through what can now be considered a classical career in the public
sector. Although born in a still predominantly nomadic Mauritania, he spent
nearly his whole life in towns and villages. Having been educated almost
exclusively in French, he now mainly teaches Arabic to his pupils. While in
the early 1970s he adhered to the leftist movements in Mauritania, he later
converted to what he calls “tribal politics”. As a son of one of the region’s
most famous religious learned men, he is of noble origin. With regard to this
last point, however, the situation is in fact somewhat complex. The father
successively entered into several marriages, and Tourad was born of his
father’s late liaison with a h. art.a¯niyya, a freed slave woman. His mother in
those days was adored for her beauty, and married several times as well.
Today she and her present husband, a h. art.a¯ni, live together with Tourad and
his family. Having to care for his mother, Tourad, is constantly forced to
confront his split descent in daily life.
Tourad: I was born in D. in a camp . . . on a hill, but I have lived my whole life in the
city. I was born in a camp where my mother was, but my father was in town. It
was in 1954 and I never went to live in the bush. In 1969 I went to the collège
in T., I was fifteen at the time, until 1971 I was a pupil there. With the national
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strike [of the leftist students movement] that year, I was expelled from school, as
all participants in the strike were. That marked the end of my formal studies and
in the beginning of 1972 I was back in [his natal town].
   The strike had two objectives, first we wanted a rise in the state’s scholarships
and that all pupils should be boarders, i.e. should live in the school’s dormitory.
Second there were objectives related to the MND [Mouvement National
Démocratique] that concerned the nation. The pupils everywhere represented
the spearhead of the movement. We wanted an Arabisation of the schools and
a higher quality of education. I for example, I didn’t learn Arabic at school, in T.
we only had French teachers, and there was only one hour of Arabic a day. Thus
we only had five to six hours of Arabic a week, all the rest was in French. The
movement demanded that the French teachers be sent back home, we wanted
a real Arabisation, to make Arabic the official language in the primary and
secondary schools. Therefore we exerted pressure on the government and tried
to convince the population of our goals.
   At that time there was a dialogue between the leaders of the movement
[MND] and the government, it was Mariam Daddah, the president’s wife, who
built up serious contacts to some young leaders of the movement. This resulted
in the liaison between the government and the movement that split the latter. It
took eight to nine months to take place and finally there was a majority within
the movement to join Ould Daddah [Mokhtar Ould Daddah, Mauritania’s first
president after independence]. It was said the party should be exploited for the
sake of the country, but in reality the people have been corrupted. There still
are these two [political] factions nowadays. Those who were with Ould Daddah
are closely tied to Morocco, the former minority now is with the UFD [main
opposition party, Union des Forces Démocratiques]. Finally there is a third
fraction, composed of people like me, who left politics. I left politics in 1974,
ever since I have been affiliated to local politics, tribal politics. . . .
   After spending some time in [towns] B. and C. I went to Nouakchott to take
25an exam . I became a teacher. The first two years I was in towns in the interior
and near the river [Senegal], during this time I acquired the Arabic certificate.
Ever since I have been Arabic teacher, I am bilingual. Most of the time I teach
Arabic. Until some years ago I was transferred to a lot of places, mainly on the
Tagant. Every two to three years I went to a new place. Bilingual teachers were
in great demand, because with them you can economise by not having to
employ two teachers, a French speaking and an Arabic speaking one. . . .
Author: Did you never live under a tent?
Tourad: In my youth I never lived under a tent. But since I have been living here in
Achram, I regularly go out to the bush during winter. We spend four to five
months under the tent. We take some cows and goats with us. I have started
this habit since I have had my own family, since I married a second time in 1982.
You have to know, in the bush you can save a lot of money! There are a lot of
advantages in being there, for you can avoid many of the problems you have in
town. There is not the problem of bread, as there is no bread there, there is
much less the problem of meat, because sometimes there is meat to buy and
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sometimes not, also you won’t buy all these little things for the children, etc. All
this saves an awful lot of money. How long we stay out there is defined by the
amount of rain. One therefore could say our life is divided into two parts. But
our life is not that of most people here, I think it even is an exception that a
family lives like that. Normally you will find those people who always live in the
town and those people always living in the bush. In order to be able to switch
between the two modes you have to have animals. Those without animals can’t
live like that.
Research assistant: [present in the interview held in French] But there are also
people living out in the bush in order to cultivate!
Tourad: That is the bush of the cultivators! We are not like that, the people here
make the bush of the fields without having animals, that’s feasible. It’s even
widespread, as all people here are cultivators.
Author: But you are solely engaged in animals?
Tourad: We only are engaged in animals, most commonly we do not exploit the
fields. We have other people, we have parents who care for the fields, so the
problem is not imposed on us. Whenever the winter season is coming, we go
off to the bush and leave the question of the fields to our family. It’s my mother
who is always here, she occupies herself with the fields. She does this work on
her own. If there is a profit with the millet, I will take a part of the millet and she
will too. In fact, she worked in order to get millet, and it is my field she works on
as well, the land is my property. Thus it is quite usual that she will give me a part
of the harvest. . . .
Author: Your father, did he live under the tent?
Tourad: Yes, he lived under the tent for a long time, he lived there until he reached
the age of thirty or forty years. Until he became qa¯d. i [an official qa¯d. i paid by the
state] in A., he had always lived in this region. Until some time ago he had
everything, sheep, goats, even camels, houses, date palms, everything. But all
these things were gone before he died. First there was the drought, that
decimated the animals, then successively the problems began. The houses were
sold, the palm-trees too, and so on, until there remained nothing. I got nothing
from his estate, there was not a sou left when he died [in 1971, after ten years
of retirement from his office]. But for us Muslims this is good, a truly religious
man often does not leave material goods.
Author: And in your youth you didn’t herd the animals of your father?
Tourad: No, no, it was the time of slavery, of course! There were women and men
to care for the animals in those times, this was not the job of the big chiefs.
Author: And do you remember any number of slaves with your father?
Tourad: At that time I had hardly come to exist, I was a child, I knew nothing of it, I
didn’t occupy myself with it. There are people who do the work, people who
stay with my father in his family, they do everything, there are the ones who take
care of the camels, others take care of the cows and so on. All that relates to
these people didn’t interest me. Why should I care about them? Care about the
fate of people occupied with herding animals that don’t exist anymore? These
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people don’t exist anymore and neither do these animals, the father [Tourad’s
father] doesn’t exist anymore, so all this is of no interest.
Youba
   Youba is a son of one of the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar’s brothers,
who being themselves of noble origin by father and mother, in the first
decades of French colonisation had opposed their h. art.a¯niyya-born brother’s
ambitions towards the emirate (cf. p. 105-108). Youba, equally well born by a
h. art.a¯niyya, was less lucky than the famous ^amı¯r. Today he is not with the
rich and influential people of noble origin, but lives, after returning from a
long cycle of wage labour migration, in simple circumstances amidst the
su¯da¯n in A., one of the villages inhabited almost exclusively by su¯da¯n.
Youba: I was born in M. in 1949. My mother, an . . . was there because her mother
was from M. and the mother’s husband . . . was already dead at that time. My
father here is from the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. He married my mother here, I was
the only one to be born in M., all my other brothers and sisters were born here.
Today only we children, like my brothers and me remain. Father and mother are
dead.
   At the age of seven I went to school. I passed the CFD and went up to the
fourth class. Then I left school, and went to Nouakchott and started working there.
After some years there I came back here. Ever since I am here, I have been in
this village, I built this house, I built some dams, I cultivate this soil, that’s my
occupation.
   At the age of seven there were about 16 tents in my father’s camp. During
the rainy season we were on the Tagant, wandering around Daber, Kehmeit,
Bourraga and Achram [a second Achram on the Tagant]. During the dry season
we were down in the Aftout, most often the camps then were near Garaouel [a
permanent source]. All tents in the camp were of h. assa¯n, there were no ma^alimı¯n
26and no zwa¯ya, but there were servants.
Author: So did you count the servants within the 16 tents you mentioned?
 Youba: Yes I did, one counts the tents of the servants, these are tents, there are
27people living in there, one counts them.
Author: Yes, sometimes there are people who don’t count them, who tell that they
are just one family, together with their servants.
Youba: They are just a family as everybody’s. Look, if a servant has houses here, and
if you then start to count those houses, then do you count the servant’s houses
or not?
   The servants pounded the millet and they also fetched the water from the
wells or sources. They did this work with the help of donkeys. At this time, the
camps were always near the water places, they did all the work. They also
herded my father’s animals. He had two herds of goats and sheep. Each one
with more than 200 animals, most of them were sheep, both black sheep and
white sheep. These herds were herded by two servants. They were not paid,
they were ours. My father had about 120 cows, too, and 6 horses and 4 or
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5 camels, all of them males, they were just for riding. These herds were not
much work, even milking wasn’t, as during the rainy season [major lactation
28period] many of the females were given as mnih. a to poor people. There were
29also h. ubs , not many, only with a few people. All this is finished nowadays. All
these loans were for the poor people. You have to know them before giving a
loan, and if you don’t, you can ask somebody who knows about them. He will
tell you everything.
   Our family had four servants and four women. Each of them being together
with a woman had a tent of his own. There were three such tents with us. In the
whole camp there were five tents with servants. The h. assa¯n had thirteen tents.
There were h. assa¯n without servants as well, and sometimes our servants
worked for them too. Some of the h. assa¯n were poor, some only had two or
three cows, and a few goats and sheep, say 30-40. About five families had
nothing at all, another five were modestly poor, with only few animals, the rest
were better off.
   I passed my time at school in A. They had a kitchen and a house where the
children attending school lived and could eat. School lasted from October till
June. My father came to visit me and give me some money. I was his only son to
go to school, I had brothers bigger than me, but they didn’t go to school. There
are also brothers of my mother, and sisters too. At that time somebody who
had many animals didn’t like to send his children to school. The one who took
me to school was the ^amı¯r, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar [it was the ^amı¯r’s duty
to recruit the children for school]. He came to my father to ask for me, then my
father gave me to him. He didn’t come a second time, my father was a brother
of Abderrahmane. My brothers kept beneath the tent all the time, they did not
attend the school run by the state, they had their education with some zwa¯ya.
They learnt one quarter or half of the Qur\a¯n. They also rode camels and
horses, they did nothing but ride them, they never herded animals. There were
other people to do that, one of them is called Dedoud, another Messaoud,
another Ahmed, and one Laghlave. This is the one who is still here [with me].
   My father always had these big herds, from time to time he sold some animals
to somebody who took them to Senegal in order to sell them there and bring
back tea, cloth and clothes. In those times these transactions were profitable. In
the past money wasn’t like it is today, in former times you could buy a cow for
30only one Ougiya [UM]. We didn’t suffer shortage, we had a good life. The first
time we experienced shortage was 20 years ago, it was during the big drought
[1969]. Out of all the animals only 100 goats and sheep remained, together with
four cows, one horse and one camel. They all died. We stayed here in the
Aftout throughout the whole year. Yes, there were people moving to the south
in quest of pasture, and there were those staying here. At that time we didn’t
have anything to move with, with those animals remaining we couldn’t move any
more. My father was always here, in the Aftout and on the Tagant, he never left
this area. He has a lot of dams here and on the Tagant, the animals always found
pasture around here. The only reason why all the animals died was the drought,
the animals got diseases and died. There are a lot of diseases . . . After the
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drought we increased cultivating the fields. So we found a lot of millet. Every-
body did so, the shepherds too, they now are cultivators. My father died much
later, in 1979.
Author: So when did you leave for Nouakchott?
Youba: The time I left, Nouakchott still was very small, my mother was married by
another man . . . [a famous journalist at radio Mauritania, member of another
h. assa¯n tribe], so I started a training at the radio in 1962. I left the job after eight
months, there was no remuneration with it and no hope that my situation there
would change. In 1963 I joined the army, we earned 300 UM per month, but we
got food and accommodation for free. Two years and three months later I left
and started work as timekeeper with SACER, the company building the road
between Nouakchott and Rosso. Later I did another seven months with the
31SNIM in Nouakchott, until Haidalla took their house. This happened about
1980 or 1981, then I came here. In fact I didn’t spend the years of the drought
here. Everything I know about the drought comes from my brothers. They told
me what happened.
   In the city I found some money, but not much. Here it is better, much better,
one can find much more. There one finds nothing, there is nothing, there are a
lot of bandits around there nowadays. They don’t get work, they just steal, they
eat the theft. Here everything is calm. If somebody is working he will be better off
here than in Nouakchott. You know, all these Mauritanians that were in Dakar,
ever since they returned, there is nothing left to get in Nouakchott. Before it
32was always possible to get something, this now has stopped completely.
   I have a lot of plots here, dams and small dams. There are six on the Tagant
and seven or eight around here. All the plots we have are for our tent [h
˘
aima],
the family of A.M., I own them together with my brothers, some of whom are in
Nouakchott now. It happens that they come and cultivate here. We own a
quarter of the A. dam, which measures about 1,000 metres width to
1,000 metres length, eight mu¯d of seeds are needed to cultivate it, and the yield
33can be as much as 4-5,000 mu¯d. And there still are other plots, Amriche,
Aoudach, Asma^a, Jreif. Some of these are exclusively for our family. We
normally lend plots from them [to people needing land for cultivation], Amriche
for example is shared among thirty families cultivating there, and there are other
plots like that. We are not paid for lending them to all the people asking for
them. The habit of lending plots in return for a part of the harvest is only
practised by the Leg˙wa¯reb [a neighbouring zwa¯ya tribe]. We don’t do that, we
just give. The Leg˙wa¯reb, if they lack the facilities to cultivate, they have to get
somebody to do the work in their place. In order to do so, they provide him
with the necessary seeds, and he will later share the harvest with them.
   My harvests usually are between 200 and 300 mu¯d, it’s just enough to eat of
during the year. I can’t afford to buy more animals, although I would like to.
I have two sheep and two goats. My eldest son, who is now seventeen, doesn’t
cultivate with me, he is in Nouakchott.
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Exploring the Change
The Paradox of Manumission
   The biographic narratives reveal the image of a highly diversified, often
contradictory social landscape, where status positions are achieved and
maintained by making use of various sets of social practices and values. With
regard to the slaves struggling for enhanced autonomy and to gain social
recognition, the fundamental difference, as explored by Claude Meillassoux
(1986: 11), between the individual condition a slave experiences and his estate
is obvious. The game of ending slavery from the slave’s perspective is about
successively cementing practised condition into statuary definition (cf.
34Glassman 1991: 289). This is a paradoxical project as such, because the
condition always symbolises the individual’s relationship to the slave estate,
even if this might be vanishing over time. This ambivalence, which is
fundamental to any slave condition, reveals that the whole process of social
ascension is precarious for slaves. It is only possible through the tacit consent
of all people involved, and therefore is always open to reversal. In this regard,
it is true, there can be no real freeing of slaves, manumission merely repre-
sents a new condition constructed on the foundations of the slave estate (cf.
Meillassoux 1986: 121f.). The practice of a public, focused taboo as regards
the former slave’s origin that is at the core of either legalised or self-attained
manumission, finds itself subverted by the persistent knowledge of the event,
i.e. the true origin. The notion of h. ara¯t.ı¯n, which has come to mean “manu-
mitted slave” in the Mauritanian context, is the best evidence of this (cf.
p. 39). Although the former slave receives the legal rights of a free man, the
reference to his former estate, his slave origin, is a public matter. Claude
Meillassoux is perfectly right when stating that real freeing of slaves needs a
complete anonymity, the complete deletion of the slave’s past and origin:
Parmi les populations que j’ai étudiées, les véritables affranchis, c’est-à-
dire les esclaves ayant récupéré toutes les prérogatives et l’honneur des
francs, on ne peut les nommer, ne même admettre qu’on les connaît
comme tels, sans leur faire perdre aussitôt le bénéfice de la franchise dont
l’objet est précisément d’effacer à jamais le stigmate originel de la capture
ou de la naissance servile. De telles familles existent. (Meillassoux 1986:
122)
The fatal determination which the slave estate entails is evident. To one of
slave descent, any social status will in effect be a slave’s condition. The act of
manumission, the legal attainment of a free man’s rights bears a fatal double
bind: without knowledge about the personal dependency, the slave estate,
there can be no such socially powerful act as manumission. Manumission
thus always manifests what it is supposed to end, the knowledge and control
of origins, and the power of those possessing it. Of course, knowledge of
origins as a matter of power and control will vanish in time, or rather in the
course of generations, but as long as social categories such as h. ara¯t.ı¯n do
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prevail, there is only a shift from specific, personalised to abstract, social
knowledge of descent. Nevertheless today’s struggle for social ascension and
integration is real and ongoing, thus some ways out of the impasse have to
develop. Neither demographic change nor the instruments of legal manumis-
sion can keep up to the pace set by social change (cf. chapter eight).
   As much as the fundamental category of estate is needed to apprehend the
circularities of slavery and manumission, any attempt at understanding the
institution whilst neglecting the dynamics of the slave’s condition must fail.
Being a slave follows the logic of a perverted dialectic of estate and condition.
There can be no slave estate (and use of slaves) if in practice the humanity of
the slave were not recognised, i.e. if there were not a slave’s condition
partially neglecting the inhuman logic of the estate, associating the slave with
a legal commodity (cf. Meillassoux 1986: 9f.; Finley 1968: 308). This condi-
tion, on the contrary, could not be upheld without the master’s permanent
option to withdraw from practising condition and to apply estate. This is
only one aspect of the condition-estate relationship, one which does not
consider temporal and spatial evolution. Maintaining slavery and thus the
slave estate requires the maintenance of the hegemony of the social system.
The initial violence of the slave appropriation has to be transformed into
structures of domination, preserving the slave estate through the social
control of space in time.
   Most probably the change in the topology of social dependence during this
century has been the most determining threat to slavery. Colonisation ended
the territorial and political hegemony of the masters and thus called into
question the founding element of the structural violence needed to maintain
the slave estate. If a slave had the option to go where nobody knew him, then
unlike manumission truly liberation took place. This logic provided the
decisive incentive for some West African slave populations to leave their
masters shortly after colonisation had become effective (cf. Klein 1988 and
351993c, Roberts 1988; Cooper 1979: 118). Besides this fundamental, abrupt
end to the slave estate, change was induced on a small scale level. Colonial
forces, especially in Mauritania, were far from exercising an evenly distribut-
ed control of the local territory. Far more their power ripped strategic
patches of territory out of the indigenous people’s control. Thus the master’s
web of social control was infected by white patches of an anomic type,
inflicted by the colonists. It was first in the few nuclei of modern (colonial)
urban areas where the control of the other’s origin failed to work properly,
due to the lack of reliable references induced by increasing anonymity. The
process would not have been possible, however, without offering a material
basis the new existence could be based on. Wage labour performed this
36function (cf. Roberts 1988). With these patches becoming more and more
numerous and consolidated, leaving the territory of slavery did not even have
to be permanent. Shifting between the different spheres of social hegemony
became possible, with a new, free-type status achieved in the new social
context, and the individual backed with the means to defend it even on
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hostile ground. The pertinence of this new topology of dependency is the real
threat to slavery, for it challenges its framework, or in the terms proposed by
Patterson, its outer dialectic:
There is an inner dialectic, by which the basic forces of slavery are
revealed: master against slave; power against powerlessness; alienation
against disalienation; social death against social life; honour against
dishonour. This inner dialectic, however, works itself out as part of a
wider, outer dialectic: that of the dynamics of the relationship between
slavery, seen as a single process, and the total complex of processes which
we call society or the social formation. It is this outer dialectic which, in
the last analysis, determines the outcome of the struggle within the inner
dialectic. It determines, for example, whether master or slave wins;
whether powerlessness is what it appears to be or something else. (Patter-
son 1979: 47)
In the internal logic of the slave estate, there has never been space for system-
atic counter-power from the slaves. Although there always was slave
resistance, the better conditions achievable for the slave depended on the
master’s grace. Manumission thus, according to Islamic jurisprudence, was
conceived as “a pious act that was good for the master’s soul” (Patterson
1982: 227). Honour in the unchallenged master-slave relation thus always has
37to be on the master’s side. The slave as the “social outsider” (Finley 1968:
308) is by no means considered to contest the master’s honour, hence this
fact has to be enacted in interaction in order to constantly reproduce the
structures of social representation. The case has strong analogies to the play
of honour and shame in the North African Kabyle society as instructively
described by Pierre Bourdieu. This play is a deeply relational one and to step
out of the relation, i.e. end it by force, is to stop performing honourably,
hence to dishonour oneself. Handling insults by a social outsider under these
circumstances is a tricky matter, for one who is honourable has to ignore any
actions an amahbul, an impudent, shameless man undertakes – annoying as
they may be. Responding publicly would mean the noble’s acknowledging an
inferior’s ability to insult him, hence making responsible for his action
someone conceived as principally irresponsible for his own behaviour. To
solve conflict, or better to get rid of harassment, the noble can appeal for
mediation by a third party, e.g. by a relative of the amahbul (cf. Bourdieu
1972: 15ff.). The most important aspect of behaving honourably in the
Kabyle society thus is to maintain the public fiction of the non-provocative
character of any amahbul action, to maintain as distinct the spheres of social
life.
   Many aspects of this interplay between deviant and honourable behaviour
can be traced within the master-slave relation. The production of honour for
the master depends on the reproduction of the social dichotomy of honour
and ignorance, of master and slave behaviour. This relation is found at the
basis of the fictive paternalistic ties between the two parties, which define the
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slave as a legal minor, and the master as being responsible for him (cf. Ould
Cheikh 1993: 182). To a considerable extent this fiction works. The slave has
no honour to lose when offending anybody, he thus can even enact his social
opposition to the master by speaking of the unspeakable, e.g. publicly
referring to matters of sexuality (cf. Tauzin 1989b). Conflict with another
party raised by a slave is handled much like those involving an amahbul. The
slave, the legal minor, is irresponsible, hence his master, obliged to watch the
slave, has to compensate for the damage. This legal rule, in fact very much
resembling an owner’s responsibility for damage inflicted by his livestock,
could be made work to the advantage of slaves. There are several narratives,
especially from Mauritanian colonial administrators, that slaves adopted the
habit of changing masters by cutting or biting off a piece of their hoped-for
new master’s ear. Their old masters thus were obliged to hand over the slave
38in compensation to the mutilated individual. The slave’s non-honour, hence
the non-responsibility of his behaviour is most clearly demonstrated here; the
mutilated bı¯z. a¯n is not supposed to inflict any punishment on the slave who
has injured him, but is to be given justice by the slave master (cf. Ould
39Mohamed 1988: 57). This interplay of honour and shame could be juggled
successfully, as long as the triangulation of the relations between nobles and
slaves worked out. But the slave is an outsider of a different kind than the
amahbul. While the latter will always remain part of the society, this is not
necessarily the case for the slave, nor is it always necessarily his wish.
   A slave running away from his master explodes the paternalistic framework
which at this very moment is revealed to depend on the master’s ability to
watch his slave. It is not the master’s individual honour the fleeing slave thus
challenges, as he can be compared to animals getting lost, but he does
threaten the slave society’s paternalistic ideology. Individually, a master
could ignore a slave’s flight despite the economic loss this might entail, but
such a decision hardly results from individual reasoning. The masters’
reactions have to meet the exigencies of coping with the undermining of slave
control resulting from the slave’s ultimate disobedience. Dealing with deviant
behaviour such as slave flight is not a matter that produces honour, it is
simply beyond the fictive social ties of paternalism and hence beyond the
spheres of honour. Getting a slave back means re-entering the grounds of
honour and re-establishing the master-slave relationship which is the precon-
dition for the production of symbolic goods like honour. Nevertheless,
catching an escaped slave and forcing him back ultimately dismantles the
relations of power poorly veiled by the paternalistic practices following the
initial violence of slave raid and trade. Slave punishments too were designed
to maintain the system in moments of latent crisis of the masters’ hegemony.
Individual loss experienced by the masters through the mutilation or killing
of slaves was not enough to enable slaves to publicly demonstrate some sort
of power. There are reports of slaves being mistreated, and most brutal
punishments were inflicted on slaves who had tried to escape. One such
practice is reported by an old slave recaptured after an attempt at flight from
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his host Rgayba¯t tribe. Back with his masters, he was mounted on a camel not
watered for a long time, and his legs bound together beneath the animal. The
camel was watered, and its expanding belly dislocated the slave man’s hip
40joints, hence disabling him for the rest of his life (cf. Caratini 1989: 102).
   Whenever the outer dialectics made the master-slave relation change to a
degree that meant that masters had less power to threaten fleeing or other-
wise disobedient slaves, the slaves’ power in bargaining about their condition
grew considerably. This is why, though there was no consistent colonial
41anti-slavery policy (in some regards, colonial policy was indeed reactionary),
colonisation brought a new pace to changes in slave conditions. While during
colonial conquest many French commanders had behaved much like
42indigenous conquerors, colonial administrators following them frequently
developed a taste for enmeshing themselves in the game of local tribal politics
(cf. Féral 1993). In the eyes of the colonised this made the new rulers appear
to be nothing but new masters superimposed on the old ones during the
initial years of colonisation. They also introduced a new “master’s lifestyle” –
but not necessarily one more desirable for the dependents. This new style can
be seen at its most imaginative in the term “esclave du commandant”. Such
was the common designation for people living in the “villages de liberté”,
installed by the French during their conquest of the western Sudan as early as
1849 to attract dependent people, and build up an unfree labour-force (cf.
43De Chassey 1984: 92; Ould Cheikh 1993: 187). More significant to the
change in master-slave relations were the French military posts, introducing a
new element into the rather limited bı¯z. a¯n urban sector, and hence rapidly
restructuring the topography of urban settlements (cf. Ruf 1995: 138f.). These
urban nuclei provided new patterns of social life, which, based largely on
wage labour, provided slaves with a real alternative to their previous state of
44life, or at least the model of one.
   Under these circumstances masters had to cope with a double contestation
of their power. Colonisation called into question both the slave condition
and the foundations of the slave estate. While coercion as a medium of
maintaining the master-slave relation on the individual level might have
worked for a long time due to the limited extent of colonial power, it broke
down as a general means of upholding slavery, once many slaves lived in
areas where it was relatively easy to withdraw from the direct control of their
masters, an opportunity obviously used in the Tagant region (going by the
complaints of local notables; cf. note 35, this chapter) and the south-western
zones of the colony (cf. De Chassey 1984: 93f.). As only a limited number of
slaves absconded, those continuing to stay near their masters, or at least
maintaining relations with them, probably had good reasons to do so.
Economically, leaving meant taking considerable risks. Wage labour oppor-
tunities emerged in relevant numbers only after the independence of Mauri-
tania. Until then the bulk of opportunities of working for money was located
45in the cities and the plantation sector of Senegal. Seasonal migration
patterns of both slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n give a hint that instead of an abrupt
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interruption of ties with the masters, many preferred their slow and mutual
46change. To comprehend this option, the discussion of the relations of
honour between slave and master has to be taken up again.
   While the slave was unable to challenge the master’s honourable position
within the master-slave relationship, the slave’s existence was the precondi-
tion for unfolding the space for honour manifested in the distinct lifestyles of
slaves and masters. A slave staying close to a master now became ever more a
deliberate choice, and as a consequence slaves had the means to bargain about
their condition. Symbolically maintained, the master-slave relation gradually
transforms itself into an affair of mutual interest. Here it is the paternalistic
ideology surrounding with slavery that provides a whole stock of representa-
tions, including a configuration where strong slaves confront weak masters
but do not abandon the interplay of honour within the master-slave relation-
ship. Involving the slave in the relationship, admitting him into a role as actor
means acknowledging him some honour, recognising him socially. This
practice marks the breakdown of a rigid distinction between master-slave
relations on the one hand, and patron-client ties on the other (cf. Patterson
1979: 36). Increasing slave autonomy within the dominant ideological
framework up to the point of being accorded manumission, i.e. a status
transformed from that of slave, (^abd), into manumitted slave, (h. art.a¯ni), is
revealing in this regard. Although it might result from an inverted power
relationship between slave and master, the act of manumission is able to
maintain the fiction of the master as the dominant actor, the one providing
the most honourable action. Direct submission is replaced by relations of
patronage and guidance, wala¯\ (cf. Patterson 1982: 241ff.). These relations can
be enacted publicly to the honour of both, slave and master, whereas the
struggles leading to status transformation are of no public concern, and no
47matter of honour.
   These tracks channelling changes in the master-slave relation enacted
within the paternalist ideologies framework are one fundamental reason why
the formerly uncertain practice of social taboo on social relations of depend-
ence is condensing more and more into a real “culture of amnesia”, creating a
48sort of mutual muteness aimed at respecting each others’ honour. Achiev-
ing such consent on keeping silence on matters of status, and especially
relations between estate and condition, in fact means joining an accelerated
process of subversive status transformation. To be sure, the step is gradual,
for in private most will go on knowing about their own, and many others’
slaves, but already the manner of speaking of these in public is changing, and
the empathy of the interests involved is dwindling. It is much like a Maurita-
nian proverb, used by my research assistant, Khalifa Ould Kebab, to charac-
terise the ambivalence in master-slave relationships in the face of the slave’s
flight: “Don’t try to get back someone fallen into a torrent.” There is no way
to withhold a slave who has decided to leave; instead one must prevent any
such decision, for otherwise one would also be swept away by the stream, i.e.
experience another defeat. This of course is a h. art.a¯ni’s view. But it refers
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clearly to the mutual character of the consensus on keeping public silence on
the subject of former master-slave relationships. Again Khalifa Ould Kebab:
“If for example you see a white family now paying some su¯da¯n to work on
their fields and they didn’t do that before, this will mean that they don’t have
su¯da¯n any longer, i.e. their su¯da¯n aren’t with them any longer. You know
this, because otherwise they wouldn’t have paid somebody for the work. If
ever they have somebody to do this work for them without payment, they
wouldn’t choose to give away their money like that.” Changing status, or
rather changing the individual master-slave relationship, is not a public
concern; it will always have to remain a private affair, for otherwise it would
not work within the framework of honour. In the context of rural life and
most close face-to-face relationships privacy in fact is a lure. Changing the
master-slave relationship privately under such conditions does not mean that
nobody will know what is going on, but that there will be an unspoken
agreement not to allude to the subject publicly. Again it becomes evident that
changing the slave condition is not the locus of collective action, but rather is
a matter of individual bargaining on relations of power and honour.
Getting Free
   When Badeyn left his adoptive bı¯z. a¯n mother, he did so upon his individual
decision, for he had no option of regaining his former condition of being
treated like a free-born child. This surely was not the result of a changed
attitude of his fictive bı¯z. a¯n mother, to whom he still has an emotional
attachment, and who cried about the fact Badeyn had learned of his origin.
Neither was it a consequence of the adoptive mother’s new husband behav-
ing like a “bı¯z. a¯n without colour”, i.e. behaving “whiter” than most other bı¯-
z. a¯n. It was rather due to the impasse Badeyn himself now had to face in local
society. Individually his condition perhaps could have changed for the better
with passing time and new constellations in the coming at home, but socially
and in his own mind, he never would have had a chance to escape an exist-
ence as a mere slave child, having no legal, i.e. parental ties with his host
49family. What else was there for an ambitious young man to do, than rely on
what most probably is at the core of h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity, and what Ann Mc-
Dougall (1988: 379) called the h. ara¯t.ı¯n “work ethic”? In fact, in most of my
conversations with h. ara¯t.ı¯n work was a major topic, but then it was in many
of the conversations with bı¯z. a¯n as well. What differed was the emphasis laid
on the subject and the work-related topics stressed (see chapter five).
   Badeyn leaves his mother with virtually nothing in his hands – and nothing
but uncertainty ahead. To go out and look for a job to rely on is an astonish-
ing biographic pattern if evoked by a member of a society in which the
corollary of social security first and foremost is achieved through family and
affiliate networks. Neither were available to Badeyn. He had no parents to
rely on (they all died in the epidemic when he was a small child), nor had he
direct access to affiliates, e.g. closely associated members of his tribe, for he
had to leave his masters, i.e. the supporters of his tribal affiliation, without
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approval. Although this cannot be proven empirically, he presumably really
had nothing else to rely on, than to sell his labour power to gain his – now
independent – living. The self-made h. art.a¯ni at this moment of personal
history thus bears startling resemblance to the Marxian proletarian who is
defined by being free both of means of production, and free to sell his labour
power (cf. Marx [1867] 1983a: 182f.). The difference is that he had not been
deprived of his property in means of production, for a slave never had this,
but at best precarious rights of use over land and animals.
   Of course, again I have to note, this case is at the margins of the master-
slave relationship, but only in that it reveals the most extreme edge of what
the basic configuration of a self-manumitted slave’s condition is. Badeyn is
well aware of his deprivation, he remarks that he was without any “arms” to
support him when fired for the first time from his job as a mechanic at the
local development project. Later, when the project was gradually closing
down after the expatriate experts had left, again the question was raised of
who of the 65 employees would have to leave first. Again he presented the
50image to me of being without “arms” in the project to help him (the šarı¯v
who once helped him to get a job had moved to another place a long time
before). Already foreseeing my next question he reiterated that in this
locality he was completely alone, for he had no family to rely on. Affiliate
support was weak because he had married into a foreign tribe, thus lacking
nearly any local support except for solidarity from a small h. ara¯t.ı¯n communi-
ty among which there were many members of his own tribal origin. At the
time I doubted that he would be among the first dismissed, for I knew him to
be a well trained mechanic; but as often was the case, he was right, not me.
   It was always work which determined Badeyn’s life – for the good and the
bad. Getting a particular job offered access to specific resources, among those
the creation of new affiliations, thus reversing the pattern revealed in some bı¯-
z. a¯n narratives (cf. Moustava’s job in a Boghé shop and Youba’s first job at
Radio Mauritania). The first stage in the long and multi-faceted working life
of Badeyn marked the break with all his former relations. Working as a
washer in an army camp was wage labour without any allusion to traditional
bonds. Away from his home area, Badeyn had time to grow out of his former
condition, perhaps a prerequisite for his later return as a camel herdsman for
a “friend of his”, who in fact is one of the major bı¯z. a¯n of Badeyn’s tribe.
Discussing the various aspects of different jobs was a never-ending topic with
Badeyn, who turned out to be a sort of practical labour encyclopaedia. The
narrative in fact represents only a part of his knowledge. Building a well in
different soils, herding camels or goats, healing men and animals by tradi-
tional means, cultivating any sort of local plants, constructing clay houses,
baking the bı¯z. a¯n type of French baguette, or repairing a four-wheel-drive
Mercedes, Badeyn had at least one answer to any kind of question, hardly
any kind of work existed, apparently, he had not yet mastered.
   The way in which the commitment and necessity to work is decisive in a
h. art.a¯ni’s life becomes most evident in the history of Badeyn’s first marriage.
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Having had some good time working for the SO.NA.DE.R (Mauritania’s
national company for rural development) in his natal region, he married a
slave woman. Problems arose when the company closed down its local
operation and moved to Achram, some 60 km to the south (linked to the
place by a, then partially very sandy, and hence difficult track of 100 km).
Having both gained some experience on the job, and being in need of a new
remunerated job, Badeyn decided to leave for Achram. By chance he found
that a šarı¯v for whom he once had washed clothes was the leader of the project
garage. Having one “arm” at the right time at the right place turned out to be
helpful also for Badeyn. While on the job side, thanks to his self-elected,
work-mediated affiliation with some bı¯z. a¯n nobility he was lucky, this turned
out to be fatal to his small, young family. After living for some years as a sort
of monthly weekend commuter, he wanted to get his wife to move with him
to his work-place, Achram. This most normal aspiration failed due to the
woman’s slave estate. It was not up to the woman’s parents (whom Badeyn
had asked first, thus enacting bı¯z. a¯n customs to the full) to give consent to the
project, but her masters, whom he had asked second. As long as she stayed
close to her masters, Badeyn’s wife could live under conditions much like
those of formally manumitted h. ara¯t.ı¯n, but her masters’ attitude changed
when threatened by a slave willing to leave with her husband for a place
60 km as the crow flies south, and out of their tribal territory. Direct control
of the slave, profit from work delegated to her, and control of her children,
legally property of the masters, in this case would have been seriously
weakened. And when the passing of a couple of years’ time had not changed
the masters’ mind, Badeyn had to found a new family, marrying a true
h. art.a¯niyya of the local Ahel Swayd Ah. med tribe.
   Getting free in Brahim’s case reveals both similarities and contrasts to
Badeyn’s case. Brahim grew up in a slave family, thus he took on his mother’s
status and belonged to the mother’s master. His father continued to belong to
his own master. Neither of the zwa¯ya masters were bad; they let the slaves
marry and left them on their own much of the time (an attitude by no means
shared by all bı¯z. a¯n, as can be seen in the narrative of M’Barke). As his family
was relatively well off, Brahim even had time for traditional education during
summer. This is remarkable, for his father died as early as 1970, i.e. before
Brahim began his learning. Later, after colonel Ould Haidalla’s announce-
ment of suppressing slavery, the master formally manumitted the whole
family – on their request – by a written contract, and without claiming
51compensation.
   It is Brahim’s mother, Zeyneb, who alters this image: things have not
always been so harmonious, for her master’s family was in need of slave
labour for a long time, but above all female slave labour. In the course of her
life Zeyneb managed step by step to change the scope of obligations towards
the master. First, after marrying, she could limit work in the master’s
household to the summer season, while during the rainy season and winter,
she cultivated with her family. In the summer the master’s family was most in
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need of support, because fetching water was hard work, with water-places
often distant from a camp moving in quest of ever-rarer pastures. Milk at this
time of the year also was running out, so that dishes prepared with millet
became much more important to the pastoralists’ diet, hence demanding
much (female) work of pounding and preparation. Finally Zeyneb’s personal
involvement in the master’s household work ended with her having daught-
ers old enough to be sent to the master to replace her. Only then was she
able to stay with her husband all year long in the adabay, the sedentary camp
of the su¯da¯n located near the fields, still contributing to the master’s income
by sharing the harvest with him.
   The career of the slave men differed significantly: they left the master much
earlier for such spurious reasons as “not being able to bear the work with the
52master any longer”. They were primarily engaged in cultivating the fields,
and apart from sharing their harvest with the master, interest in male slave
labour seems to have been low when compared to female slave labour. This
might be specific to the case under discussion, for the master’s herd obvious-
ly had already declined before the severe drought in 1969 decisively decimat-
ed its numbers, which in turn reduced the amount of predominantly male
tasks of watering and milking animals, especially large animals. Therefore it
can be argued that agricultural revenues had gained in importance to the
master’s household, even before the long drought challenged the region’s
pastoral production system. At any rate agriculture, together with the
gathering of wild plants, was an important asset to the subsistence of the
slaves themselves, and hence helped to keep the costs of slavery low. As a
consequence of the decline of pastoral productivity, the master’s son prefer-
red work as an employee, a shop manager for one of the well-off members of
his tribe, to reconstituting the father’s herd. While the master’s son left the
rural area to work for a wage, Brahim’s family continued and even increased
their agro-pastoral activities – and continued to share their harvest with the
53master’s family. In addition Brahim, his father and his brothers had started
doing paid work for some other bı¯z. a¯n to their own benefit. Herding,
following a widespread rule, was paid for with one goat every two months
and ten days, and watering small stock and cattle was remunerated in animals
as well. As these were respected as a slave’s individual belongings (until the
slave’s death), these activities demonstrated the limitations of the slave men’s
commitment to the master’s income. Times apparently were not too bad. The
family, though lacking a father, was able to constitute some herds and hence
some wealth by their own work. Brahim, the youngest of all of his mother’s
sons, was free to leave during summer for his Qur\a¯n studies.
   Although there seems to have been no clearly defined rule about sharing
external revenues with the master, to state that the masters never profited
from their male slaves working on a wage labour or otherwise remunerated
basis, would be to ignore the characteristics of the master-slave relationship.
This is revealed in the passage concerned with those su¯da¯n already working
abroad. Should they come home, they were supposed to give something to
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their master, but according to Zeyneb it didn’t matter if they did not meet
this exigency. Brahim in a way reinforces this impression when describing
the flux and reflux of goods between his master and himself. The master
provides merchandise like the darra¯^a, the traditional men’s dress mentioned
earlier, while the slave/former slave provides millet when he harvests; helps
cultivating the master’s fields, herding animals and in this case even negoti-
ates assistance from the project for the construction of a small dam. Whereas
the slave contributes to the master’s undertakings by means of his labour
power and its outcomes, in certain situations the latter provides goods
acquired by market exchanges. In view of the different attitudes expressed by
slaves with regard to sharing harvests and wage labour benefits or animal
possession, however, another reason for this pattern can be advanced. The
output of harvests is much easier to measure and control than individual
54property in money or animals.
   Throughout their lives, Brahim’s family was engaged in increasing their
independence from the master and his family. The first and major medium of
performing autonomy was to increase spatial and symbolic segregation. The
increasing affluence of su¯da¯n to the adwaba (sedentary settlements of slaves
and h. ara¯t.ı¯n) marked their at least seasonal physical separation from the
master’s family and camp. Residing sedentarily near the fields meant
furthermore a lifestyle distinct from the master’s. Although this difference
manifested itself gradually, for both nomadic camps and adwaba in those
days (some still now) lived under the same type of tents, bred animals and
occasionally moved around, the ascriptive features associated with both
camps and adwaba reveal a difference in the conception of these spheres of bı¯-
z. a¯n and su¯da¯n. The latter are immobile, always bound to their fields, while
the former are mobile, and follow their animals’ needs for good pasture.
Getting out of the camp thus meant taking a part in shaping this dualistic
representation of the su¯da¯n as cultivators and of the bı¯z. a¯n as pastoralists,
despite the fact that many su¯da¯n worked as dependent or hired herders and a
number of poor bı¯z. a¯n already to a considerable extent engaged in agriculture
55(cf. p. 267-270).
   While separation in space was a major medium of increasing independence
in the case of Brahim’s family, the aim was not to disrupt these ties, but
rather to alter them gently. Their action fits most neatly into the concept of
aspiring to enhancement of estate by means of a step-by-step improvement in
their conditions (cf. Glassman 1991: 289). Therefore their strategy in terms of
space is not to move out of the range of control of their master, as Badeyn
did, but to move to a well-known place at its borders. However, Brahim’s
relative independence from his childhood on, is not to be misinterpreted as
the family being independent of their master’s will as a whole. Zeyneb’s
narrative reveals very clearly the hardships slave women had to face when
trying to increase their independence. As the master already was a kind one,
he let his woman slave marry “officially”, i.e. she was allowed to enact some
ceremony and he respected the marriage and accepted that it entailed some
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56change in the practice of slave labour. Zeyneb’s commitment to the
master’s household’s work from this event on was limited to the dry hot
season and she had the right to live together with her husband under her own
tent, and hence to constitute a proper family residence effective at least for
some parts of the year. It was a most important achievement to be able to live
57an honourable life, i.e. close to the ideal presented by the masters. This
arrangement, which also served to reduce the costs of maintaining a whole
slave family throughout the year, could only be changed further in Zeyneb’s
interest by having her daughters replace her. Although Zeyneb’s condition
changed, her estate could not be improved. She was still personally in charge
of providing the labour power claimed by the master. Nevertheless, this
configuration marks a breaking point in the balance between slave condition
and estate, for it now is the mother who mediates the master’s access to her
children. As a reminder, one of Zeyneb’s major arguments why she stopped
living with the master was the existence of her children: “I then stayed with
my children, until today. We continued to work our fields. We had our
work. I did not return to the master, why should I?”. This type of downsiz-
ing control over the slave women’s offspring via the formation of a nuclear
family might have happened in earlier generations too, but with the installa-
tion of the segregated patterns of mobility, reinforced by an increased
economic autonomy through cultivation and breeding of small stock, and on
the other hand the decline of the master’s economic resources, the slave
families’ potential to withdraw their children from the master’s exigencies
grew considerably.
   The importance of not confusing slave condition and estate becomes
evident with the incident accompanying the death of Brahim’s father.
Directly after he had died, the master appeared to get back the father’s
animals, part of the master’s legal property, as he is the inheritor of his slave’s
belongings. There are different aspects to be considered in this action. The
master might have been in a difficult economic situation forcing him to take
this action, for Brahim’s father died in 1970, i.e. directly after (perhaps in
consequence of) the heavy drought. Had the master not been in severe need
of reconstituting his own stock of animals, perhaps he would not have relied
as heavily on his dead slave’s animals. A second idea is less speculative. None
of those concerned really wondered or complained about the master’s
intervention, for all declare it was his right to do so. There is no obligation of
the father’s master to sustain his male slave’s family, because these are the
property of the wife’s master (cf. Abd el Wahed 1931: 297). Once the father
had died, his master no longer had any sort of relation with this family. So if
there ever was one, now there was then no longer any question of bothering
about disturbed relations towards this slave family, nor of bothering about
their survival in a difficult economic situation – this was the task of the slave
58wife’s master.
   Treating a slave man merely as a slave, i.e. as a slave “who is not guarded”
does not mean giving up the prerogatives resulting from the slave estate; they
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are just postponed. Regression from condition to estate could be enacted at
any time, e.g. in the case of the master in need or entering into conflict with
his slave. The pursuit of this logic reveals another fundamental crux of any
benign slave condition: it is individual up to the point that it depends on the
very relation of a (living) master and a (living) slave. What else but the slave’s
death could better symbolise both the end of the slave’s struggle for better
conditions and the end of the master’s obligation to meet these individual
59exigencies? Thus acting as Brahim’s father’s master did did not offend
anybody. This is why nobody bothers about the event, there is no respect to
be expected for the dead non-person the slave is. Brahim’s family was always
aware of the threat resulting from the precarious legal situation their
property was exposed to. Rather unusually for a pastoral society, Brahim
claims that from his youth on, every member of the family had his own
animals, marked by separate brands. This is nothing less than the attempt to
construct a niche in the de-socialising framework provided by the denial of
kinship, and thus legal personhood, to slaves. Even a marriage, concluded and
publicly celebrated with the two masters’ consent, does not imply any of the
common social or legal rights free people attain by this contract (cf. Abd el
Wahed 1931: 294-98; Meillassoux 1986: 128ff.). A slave marriage is not only
bound to the masters’ consent as its prerequisite (the masters replace the
missing legal parents), but to its continuation. The due slave marriage is valid
until revocation by one of the masters (see also the failure of Badeyn’s first
marriage). Herein lies the fundamental difference between marriage among
free and unfree. For the former the first marriage is a means to step out of the
parents’ household and patrimony, i.e. to leave this sphere of control (cf.
Tauzin 1984a: 89), but for the latter it is nothing more than a reallocation and
60reconfirmation of their relation of dependency towards the master.
   While in everyday practice slave families attained a condition enabling them
to maintain patterns of family life much like those of their bı¯z. a¯n masters,
they could not completely reproduce the household-economic model these
were based on. Instead of building a family patrimony, the slave families were
forced to manage their rights to belongings individually on a level not
experienced among free bı¯z. a¯n. Among slaves living under conditions like
Brahim’s family’s, goods were gained individually and – at least legally – had
to be treated alike. Inner-familiar co-operation was drastically constrained
by the fear of the master being able to take goods arbitrarily. In case things
would come to the worst, the situation had to be handled to the family’s
advantage. The clear-cut dispersal of belongings among the individual
members of the family, which resulted from the individualistic mode of their
appropriation, was manifested through the application of distinct brands to
the animals. This measure fitted neatly into a strategy aimed at securing the
family’s belongings as well as possible. The many limitations arising from the
slaves’ legal situation threatened above all the assets of dead slaves. Whereas
this intra-familial organisation of belongings could diminish the risk of
collective expropriation, it cemented the constraints on collective accumula-
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tion as well. Because slaves were denied social parenthood, their kin had no
rights in heritage. It was the masters who were the legal guardians of their
slaves and thus had the right to appropriate their dead slaves’ belongings (cf.
Teffahi 1948: 13f.). This is why Brahim takes so much care to explain that he
never got animals from his father, but earned all of them on his own. The
logic of accumulation in a household economy based on redistributive
arrangements between the generations is thus turned upside down in the
context of slave families struggling for enhanced autonomy. Rather than have
the young work as long as possible for the joint patrimony, and eventually
give them a share (cf. Caratini 1989: 54), the slave elders are interested in
seeing the young accumulate on their own as early as possible, while they
resign control of these resources themselves. Although this most refined
version of economic slave existence might be untypical, it is revealing of the
main direction the attempts of slaves took when trying to fix spheres of
61autonomy within the legal framework of bı¯z. a¯n slavery.
   An analysis of symbols serves to stress this aspect. Bı¯z. a¯n mark their animals
only with a tribal sign. Within bı¯z. a¯n families property is organised individu-
ally as well, but these distinctions are not revealed through the use of distinct
brands; branding furthermore is reserved for the big animals which wander
around without constant observation (cf. Caratini 1989: 52, 96ff.). The logic
behind this differentiation in symbolism is evident. Free people’s property in
animals is threatened by the outer world, i.e. animals have to be identifiable
on objective grounds if lost or stolen. The tribal brand informs potential
thieves whose revenge they will have to fear, or more simply facilitates
inquiry after lost animals. Only very rich families thus have their own brand
in addition to the tribal marks (e.g. different branches of the emiral family).
Within the bı¯z. a¯n family, and usually within the unit of nomadisation, the
animals are known individually by their many characteristics, hence there is
62no need to introduce a symbolism of property on this level. The case of
slave families owning animals is different, as revealed by Brahim. They are
unable to defend themselves or their belongings directly against intrusion
from the outer world. Due to their estate they are legal minors. In any case of
conflict exceeding the narrow boundaries of their camp, they have to rely on
their masters to be defended in the tribal context, and be able to negotiate
conflicts. The slaves’ animals, whenever necessary, thus bear first and
foremost the brand of their masters’ tribal affiliation. The power to manage
conflicts with the outer, intertribal world could only be achieved by this
appeal to the masters’ symbolism. Those brands slaves occasionally introdu-
ced on their own are of an altogether distinct character. They are located in
the interior of privacy, not the outer social world. They distinguish family-
members, not tribes and fractions. These brands therefore symbolise both the
slaves’ subsumption under the symbolic world of their masters, and the range
of their social actions, effectively limited to self-enacting a further variety of
the masters’ conception of their estate relegating them to be social outsiders.
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Chapter 3
Slave Women
Tent Slaves and Female Slave Affection
The true and profound emotional affection the relationship of slave women
with their masters can be laden with, is obvious both in the narrative of
Zeyneb and of M’Barke. M’Barke’s commitment to her master’s family led
her to introduce herself already indirectly, by the reference to her master and
his status: “I am not of the people of Khouba, I am a h. art.a¯niyya for the Ahel
D. of the Tmoddek and they are backed by Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar [the
former ^amı¯r of Tagant].” M’Barke presenting herself as a h. art.a¯niyya for her
master’s family leaves no doubt that she still is a slave woman, a h
˘
a¯dem. Her
commitment to the masters’ fate seems perfect, as she adopts the euphemism
commonly used among modern-time masters when speaking of those still
regarded as their slaves, rather than claiming to be a free h. art.a¯niyya, as almost
all interviewees did in their introduction. M’Barke virtually seems to have no
1words of her own; having lived such a long time in the universe of her
masters she adopted their phraseology in trying to cope with the change in
her own situation.
   Formally this uniform image is confirmed with her saying later: “For sure, I
2was a na¯nmiyye [tent slave woman].” Rather than being a confession the
statement conveys pride. Not all slaves were tent slaves, not all slaves were so
close to their masters as these. Probably life was much better under such
conditions than being completely at the margins. But M’Barke’s pride in
having been a na¯nmiyye is located also in another sphere. Being a tent slave
means being different from her masters. She was a su¯da¯niyya, a slave woman
because she was obliged to do all sorts of work all day long; this marks the
difference between her and her masters. Speaking of her work, she remem-
bers her own life, not her master’s. A decisive break in her life as na¯nmiyye
appears with her stopping work, hence at the times she became faint, later
blind and had her children replace her. Her work was the obligation of her
life, which she devotes to Allah. No masters can interfere with this retrospec-
tive interpretation, can deprive her of her own definition of honourable
devotion contrasting with the masters’ attitude. Although never leaving the
framework of her deep commitment towards her masters, and never oppos-
ing her masters, M’Barke is neither able nor willing to withhold the ambiva-
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lence of her condition when conceptualising her own life in her account. This
certainly is due to the many dishonouring experiences in her life, the most
prominent of which is her being denied marriage, fundamentally negating her
3social personhood. Presenting herself as being a h. art.a¯niyya “for” the Ahel
D. is revealing, her sociality is bound to her allocation within the master’s
family, but paradoxically this is precisely the place where she is inflicted with
social deprivation. Affection and deprivation are inseparable and come part
and parcel from the masters. The ambiguity of affection and rejection, of
inclusion and exclusion hence is the fundamental experience of living this
configuration of master-slave relations.
Slave-Master Milk Kinship
M’Barke’s engagement with the master’s family, stated in her initial presenta-
tion to the strange visitor, is much more than putative. She is of the same age
as Khalil, her master, and as a baby M’Barke drank of Khalil’s milk, i.e. she
was suckled by his mother, and thus became his milk-sister. Zeyneb’s case
differs slightly, but is characterised by the same mechanisms of integration.
She too was committed to doing reproductive work for her master, thus
freeing the master’s wife from the most menial work. Although she does not
identify herself with her master to the extent M’Barke does, the master still is
the major category of reference: “Yes, I am like them [her masters], I married
after they married. My husband sometimes stayed with me and my masters,
sometimes we also went to his masters. We were always together and never
separated.” This is a revelation as it marks just what it is supposed to hide,
the precarious character of her condition of being like the masters. Despite
not being able to be equal to the masters, she knows very well how to be like
them, or more precisely, how to be like the mistress whom she serves and
observes throughout the day. The aim of her life thus is clear: to adopt some
of the most significant aspects of a noblewoman’s behaviour. The most
prominent of these, and undoubtedly one of the most visible, is the with-
drawal from specific tasks. This habit of achieving the status of a “big”
woman, i.e. a woman of elder status, is not unique to Zeyneb, for already her
mother, she tells, did not work much, she merely fetched water and stayed
near the fields. This probably was the case at the time Zeyneb and her sisters
reached the age at which they could replace her mother’s work for the
masters. Although she stresses the ambivalence in the relations to her
master’s family by enumerating many of his good sides as well as the
problems remaining for her own family, it is clear that there are complex,
affective ties towards the master’s family. There has been and still is an
intimate relationship between the two, and there are ties manifest, cross-
cutting the fundamental hierarchy between the freeborn noble master and his
slave. Both Zeyneb and M’Barke gave accounts of their relations with their
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master’s family in terms of milk-parenthood. Zeyneb suckled her master’s
son, thus becoming his milk-mother, and M’Barke was suckled by her
present master’s mother, and therefore is his milk-sister and her milk-
daughter.
   Getting parents by milk is strongly reminiscent of the fictive integration of
slaves through the masters’ paternalist ideology, expressed by labelling slaves
as children and legal minors, but the differences are crucial. Milk-parenthood
is a tie actively established out of consent between two women. In the cases
at hand, it implies on the one hand a freeborn noblewoman and on the other
her slave woman. Unlike transferring existing social categories into a differ-
ent context, i.e. using kinship terminology to hint at slaves and masters,
milk-parenthood is contracted intentionally, and the reciprocal legal rights
involved are known, and even more important, controlled by the women
involved. The great import of this institution will become apparent from the
following overview of the legal aspects and the definition of milk parenthood.
   Milk-kinship, rid. a¯^a or rad. a¯^a, as it is called in classical Arabic (rza¯^a in
4h. assa¯niyya), is common among all social strata, either bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n, and
until today frequently practised throughout Mauritania. It is established by a
woman breast-feeding another woman’s infant. The relationship thus
established between the two children is rationalised by Islamic jurisprudence
as a shared (milk-)descent from the same father, i.e. the woman’s husband at
the time of breast-feeding. This is because women’s milk is considered to be
caused by the men’s fluids, a point of view which clearly superimposes
patriarchal conceptions of parenthood onto this female-controlled resource
5of parental ties. Milk-kinship entails marriage restrictions analogous to
blood-kinship. Having once drunk from the same woman’s breast results in
being considered as milk brothers and sisters, and having the woman as
milk-mother. These relations are the most intimate within the framework of
milk parenthood, which also considers more distant levels of parenthood (cf.
Héritier-Augé 1994). Legally the institution’s range varies according to the
interpretations provided by different schools of jurisprudence. The Risa¯la
elucidating the ma¯liki school of jurisprudence, the one prevailing in North
and West Africa, defines marriage restrictions due to milk-parenthood, either
with regard to the offspring of the breast-feeding woman and her husband:
Sont prohibées pour vous . . . vos mères qui vous ont allaitées et vos sœurs
de lait . . . Quand une femme allaite un nourrisson [étranger], les filles de
cette femme et les filles de son époux, nées avant ou après, deviennent les
sœurs du nourrisson. Mais il est permis au frère par le sang de ce dernier,
d’épouser les filles de cette nourrice. (Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî 1983:
179, 193)
The restrictive aspect of milk brother- or sisterhood is obvious in the
h. assa¯niyya terminology: a brother or sister by milk is called meh. rem (sing.), i.e.
forbidden to marry, or relative of a degree prohibiting marriage (cf. Taine-
6Cheikh 1990: 89, 110; Taine-Cheikh 1989c: 400ff.). Besides its legal implica-
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tions of marriage restriction, the institution is important to the practice of
social life. Being related by milk offers girls and boys the opportunity to
communicate with members of the other sex, of different social status, and of
the same age in public as intimately as with brothers and sisters of their own
7blood. An important asset in a gender segregated society, laying especially
severe restrictions on public communication between young men and women
who are potential spouses. A problematic aspect of the institution is that not
all relations of milk-parenthood might be known when a marriage is con-
cluded. The consequence is relationships entered into which only later,
through a third party’s testimony, will turn out to be incestuous, and then
have immediately to be dissolved (cf. Héritier-Augé 1994: 157). These cases
8can lead to serious mental stress, hard to cope with. Another point is that
intensive practice of joint breast-feeding over several generations within small
communities could lead to marriage restrictions being so numerous, that
milk-kinship turned out to be a social nuisance (cf. Cleaveland 1995: 47).
   To my knowledge little has been published on the topic of milk-parent-
hood and the most detailed studies available focus on the impact the institu-
tion has on marriage prescriptions practised by the Saudi-Arabian urban
population, among whom the institution is described as vanishing (cf. Altorki
1980; Héritier-Augé 1994: 149). Occasionally the topic surfaces in local
studies providing further insights such as the sensitive discussion of the
emotional dimension of milk kinship by Carol Delaney (1991: 157f.). Until
today dependent drawa woman continue to breast-feed children of the
dominant šurva in the Moroccan deep south. This unidirectional flow of
milk continues to create intimate and enduring bonds between families
cross-cutting social hierarchy (cf. Ensel 1998: 80-87). With regard to Mauri-
tania Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1993: 186) highlights that the complex
and ambiguous sentimental ties ancient slaves had to their masters were often
strengthened by milk parenthood, as well as shared affiliation to an age-set,
^asr. Timothy Cleaveland, in a study on Oualâta, cites an informant who
thasserted that milk-kinship during the 19 century was important in facilitat-
ing social access between non-kin males and females, including the slaves
often living in the same (urban) household (cf. Cleaveland 1995: 46). Ann
McDougall (1988: 378) provides indirect evidence when stating that for slave
women in the Adrar “Even in the late 1940s, their best options were still the
‘traditional’ ones: becoming a favored concubine, family wet nurse, or in rare
cases, the wife of a noble or a well-off hartani.” This type of slave woman’s
involvement in the master’s household is also reported by Poulet (1904: 11,
cited in Martín 1991: 44), a former French administrator in Mauritania. He
mentions that in early colonial times, bı¯z. a¯n women rarely breast-fed their
children, but took a wet-nurse among their husband’s slaves. The practice is
9common and carried on even until recent times, but its frequency seems to
be diminishing. Throughout the 24 interviews I carried out with su¯da¯n and
bı¯z. a¯n women, Zeyneb was the only one to tell of a slave nursing a noble-
woman’s child. There are multiple explanations for this phenomenon. First
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there might be a lack of intimacy, hindering the women from telling of this
experience. Although this is possible, various other reasons might be more
feasible. Both bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n tend to limit the extent of interrelations and
intimacy with each other admitted to in their accounts, and hence are both
likely to obscure such sorts of slave contributions to the master’s household.
As revealed in the previous chapter, increasing autonomy on a large scale was
linked to increasing spatial segregation. Legally married slave women
attained this level of autonomy often following the birth of a child. Co-resi-
dence during the period of breast-feeding, a prerequisite to establishing
milk-kinship, thus became more seldom, or from the opposite angle, more
10easy to avoid than before.
   Understanding the practices and strategies related to milk-kinship between
masters and slaves is difficult, due to the lack of direct empirical evidence.
Conclusions can only be drawn from the transposition of the general
characteristics of milk-kinship into the context of a master-slave and more
specifically mistress-slave women relationship. Probably one of the best
descriptions of social practices related to milk-kinship is presented by
Édouard Conte (1991: 74). Milk-kinship in the beginning of Islam, as it
transpires in reports from the prophet Muhammad’s surroundings, had a
profoundly ambivalent character. It either served to extend matrimonial
alliances or aimed to hinder them, depending upon its association with
sanguine or elective parenthood. The more complementary than contrasting
character these two different strategies of alliance have, becomes evident in
the light of bı¯z. a¯n practices. Matrimonial relations were often rather unstable
in bı¯z. a¯n society, divorce and re-marriage were – and still are – frequent and
not socially disregarded. Under these conditions especially women had to
seek security within a stable support group. This was provided above all
by their own family, to which they returned in case of divorce, but solidarity
could also be found within the circle of milk-kinship (cf. Cleaveland 1995:
1147), which was more stable than the unsteady matrimonial alliances. It was
the mothers who decided which relations of milk-kinship were established,
and hence it was they who had the power to prevent specific matrimonial
alliances of their children. Besides intentionally precluding later marriages,
milk-kinship was most frequent among close kin and people living in great
intimacy, and therefore also restricted options to pursue close-range matri-
monial alliances, such as e.g. the preferential marriage with the patrilateral
parallel cousin (cf. Héritier 1994: 316f.).
   With regard to slaves, milk-kinship might have been treated less rigorously
than among noble families. Discerning the vertical extension of milk-kinship,
including the ties to the breast-feeding woman’s husband, is a rather complex
matter (cf. Altorki 1980). How bı¯z. a¯n treated these relations with regard to
their slaves, living at best within precarious marital relations, and with slave
men who by definition were unable to fulfil the social role of a genitor, is an
interesting question I am unfortunately unable to elucidate neither on the
grounds of Islamic jurisprudence, nor on the basis of empirical data. In social
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practice, the lack of the male element might have been less important, and
rather strengthened the character of milk-kinship as an exclusive form of
female alliance implying milk-sisters, milk-brothers and milk-mothers but no
milk-fathers. This degree of relation also is the one unanimously presented as
implying the right to treat non-kin publicly as intimately as one’s own kin
(Interview Ahmed Ould Aly, qa¯d. i 24.12.1995, cf. note 7, this chapter).
Milk-kinship between masters and slaves as a means to facilitate everyday
interaction within the intimate space of a tent might be one aspect of the
complex. But given the fact that the possible intimacy is an outcome more or
less remote in time, implying more the children of opposite sex than their
12parents, it seems to be at best a secondary issue. More important is the
intimacy relations of milk-kinship establish between two women, in this case
a noble and a slave woman. Becoming the ally of her mistress, much like
other noblewomen involved in milk-kinship is a means for a slave woman to
become more equal. Breast-feeding and establishing a – although secondary –
legal parental relation is to act socially like the mistresses. It means leaving
the framework of the slave existence as eternal non-kin and social outsider,
and hence achieving social ascension. This is the major outcome of a slave
woman’s relationship with her noble milk-daughters and -sons. These bı¯z. a¯n
members of the master’s family have to treat their slave milk-mother with
respect, much like a kin-mother, and to respect rules of social intercourse
with regard to their slave milk-sisters and -brothers as well. Becoming a
parent by milk does not mean stepping out of slavery, although it does
provide the chance of improving one’s condition decisively. One achieves
individual respect and the right to enact recognised social relation, otherwise
withheld from slaves. However, as the case of M’Barke shows, these
achievements did not necessarily coincide with the end of all aspects of social
13deprivation resulting from the slave estate.
   There are two distinct contexts explaining this transformation of the
master-slave relationship. As shown in the different slave narratives affective
ties – although remaining ambiguous – developed frequently between slaves
and masters. This affection could result, if not in manumission, in the master
wanting to have his slave treated with respect by his successors. Revealing in
this respect are stipulations concerning slaves to be found in bı¯z. a¯n last wills.
In one such case a mistress was reported to have assigned her six slaves the
status of a h. ubs, a pious endowment that brought about a legal state of
indivisibility bound to various regulations of usage (Interview Abderrahmane
Ould Ahmed, zwa¯ya, 13.7.1995). This decision forced the woman’s four
inheriting children at least not to sell off single members of this slave family
but to keep their ownership collectively bound to it. The spirit of indivisibili-
ty resulting from their status as h. ubs, however, did not prevent the slaves
from being assigned to work for individual heirs, and hence from being
separated at least from time to time. The relevance these kinds of post-
mortem arrangements had in changing the status of slaves is also highlighted
by the numerous regulations Islamic jurisprudence developed on the topic of
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post-mortem and contracted manumission (cf. Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî
1983: 221ff.).
   Quite a different aim could be achieved through the practice of mistress-
slave woman milk-kinship ties, once matrimonial relations between male
masters and female slave offspring are in focus. Noblewomen letting their
infants be nursed by their slaves, or themselves nursing their slaves’ children,
induced both close social ties and matrimonial prohibitions, a highly ambiva-
lent result: the slaves are recognised as equals in a distinct sphere of social
relations, for they are prohibited from marrying in the same way as free
people could, but this similarity only applies to female slaves. The interdic-
tion on female hypogamy in bı¯z. a¯n marital relations prohibits women from
marrying men of lower social rank. Although nowadays occurring in a few
cases, a marriage of a bı¯z. a¯niyya with an ^abd still is socially most inconceiva-
ble and has far-reaching consequences (cf. Bonte 1987a: 64; Villasante-de
Beauvais 1995: 657f., 666). For a bı¯z. a¯n woman realising such a liaison this
step will mean changing sides and opting for living among the su¯da¯n. It was
far more likely for the bı¯z. a¯n men to enter into a marital relations with slaves.
Within a rather limited range, milk-kinship established by noblewomen with
their women slaves was able to preclude such alliances, as either marital or
14sexual relations of the milk siblings became incestuous. Extended relations
of milk-kinship between masters and slaves, besides creating intimate bonds,
also strengthened segregation between the social strata in the second genera-
tion. Bı¯z. a¯n women wishing to preclude their sons from marital relations with
particular slaves, had, in the establishment of relations of milk-kinship, a
means to expand their control well beyond the first marriage, concluded
under the parents’ auspices, and most likely to fulfil the norms and values of
preferential marriage providing equal status through matri- and patrilateral
15ties (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 678f.).
   Establishing milk-kin ties between masters and slaves in this perspective
becomes more a move in the game of handling gender relations within bı¯z. a¯n
society. Slaves, either female or male, had to pursue alliances with their
masters in order to enhance their condition within the slave estate. Slave
women had two options, albeit opposing ones laden with ambivalence. Either
they became the slave master’s favoured slave and a sort of concubine, and
hence sought support from a free man, or they allied themselves with the
mistress, became a wet-nurse, and entered the female world of alliances the
16bı¯z. a¯n women mediated by milk-kinship.
Concubinage
Concubinage in its common sense is a vaguely defined term, bearing
pejorative connotations. Primarily it denotes a more or less fixed extra-mari-
tal (sexual) relationship between two people of different sexes. The subject
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has a long history; it is dealt with at some length by ancient Greek and
Roman law and even before. Concubinage was a means to circumvent
problems resulting from misalliances especially between free people and
slaves. Islamic jurisprudence, while giving the slave master the right to share
his woman slave’s bed, later took up this last point. Concubinage was in this
context regarded as a distinct legal status, lower than that of married women,
17which could be attributed to slave women (cf. Abd el Wahed 1931: 296ff.).
Sexual intercourse, however, did not of itself create a relation of concubinage
18(although it could in specific circumstances). If as a result of a sexual
relationship a freeborn man and a slave woman a child was born and recognis-
ed by the master to be his, the slave woman was assigned the status of umm
walad, mother of a (free man’s) child. This status gave her well defined rights
clearly superior to those achieved by concubine status. Though still a slave,
the woman through this act attained a legal status providing her with signifi-
cant rights. She is no longer to be sold, and the master is bound to renounce
making profit out of her, or exploiting her in any other way. Furthermore
she, as well as all her children not originating from the master, had to be
manumitted by the time of the master’s death. On the other hand, the latter
got the right to enjoy her, and to claim all his rights towards her children.
These remained – following their mother – bound to the slave estate until
manumission became due with the death of the master (cf. Ibn Abî Zayd
Al-Qayrawânî 1983: 225ff.; Abd el Wahed 1931: 301f.; Fisher/Fisher 1970:
99f.).
   In theory this seems quite nice, but there were numerous circumstances by
which the obligations resulting from concubinage could be avoided. The
most important obstacle to obtaining the status of umm walad was getting
the master to acknowledge his paternity. Although slave women were in no
legal position to dispute their master’s testimony, the question under which
circumstances a denied paternity will be accepted or not constitutes an issue
analysed in detail by the Ma¯liki school of Islamic law (cf. Ibn Abî Zayd
Al-Qayrawânî 1983: 227). The masters’ obligation to recognise his offspring
from concubinage was more or less a question of morality. Denying the fact
simply meant that you owned your own children as slaves or at least, that
you had nothing against them living as your slaves. The extent to which the
question was tainted with hypocrisy becomes even more apparent in the
blatant gender bias in the attribution of the status of umm walad. Everything
was fine if the child was a boy, but if it was a girl, both mother and child
remained slaves (cf. Abd el Wahed 1931: 256ff.; Lovejoy 1983: 216; Lovejoy
191990: 180f.).
   With regard to bı¯z. a¯n society the question of concubinage is a controversial
one. Some authors deny the institution existed, while others advance the
opposite view (cf. e.g. De Chassey 1977: 82). The problem with these
statements is the lack of underlying empirical studies, and hence the little
they tell about what kind of relations existed between bı¯z. a¯n masters and their
slave women. One definite case of concubinage, reported from an ancient
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thurban centre in the Adrar in the first half of the 20 century, however,
increases insights into bı¯z. a¯n practices of concubinage. There a notable bought
from some Rgayba¯t a slave woman who had been kidnapped in the Trarza, to
install her as his concubine in the town of Ouadâne (cf. McDougall 1988:
368f.). What seems at first glance a typical case of concubinage is hardly an
indicator of practices of concubinage in bı¯z. a¯n society. The social as well as
economic milieu of the few small Adrar trade towns differed in many
respects from life in bı¯z. a¯n pastoral nomadic society. The bı¯z. a¯n trader who
bought the slave woman and wanted her to become his concubine in his
second residence thus reproduced a pattern of slavery more common among
the Saharan urban trading communities than among the overwhelming
20majority of the pastoral nomadic bı¯z. a¯n. Besides this singular and atypical
case, another argument for the significance of concubinage in bı¯z. a¯n society
can be developed from the lack of distinct phenotypes for bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n.
Being black is neither a characteristic unique to slaves and their descendants,
nor does it denote inferior status. Many noble bı¯z. a¯n are black, a most
prominent example being the former ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould
Bakkar. Some tribes, such as the Šurva of Oualâta and Néma, are as black as
21their Bambara neighbours (cf. Miské 1970: 111). More detailed, due to its
recognition of the aforementioned arbitrary attribution of the status of umm
walad, is the position of James Webb, focusing on the historical period from
1600 to 1900:
Many female slaves were the concubines of their owners. The male
progeny of these master-slave unions were Bidan, if the union was legiti-
mized by freeing the slave woman as usually seems to have been the case;
22female offspring had slave status. (Webb 1984: 159)
Compared to this conviction, the almost opposite view held by Abdel
Wedoud Ould Cheikh is somewhat startling, and the contradiction thus
raised needs further exploration:
Soulignons encore que la société nomade maure, ignorant généralement la
polygamie, n’a guère connu l’usage d’esclaves concubines et l’emploi des
eunuques dans la garde des harems, et n’a donc jamais, semble-t’il,
pratiqué la castration sur ses serviteurs. (Ould Cheikh 1986: 55)
Another statement that fits in this second line of argumentation is made by
th René Caillié, an early 19 century French traveller, who lived for about five
months, disguised as a scholar seeking Islamic education, among the Brakna
bı¯z. a¯n. In his later fascinating eye-witness report Caillié (1830: 128f.) portrays
the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t, the bı¯z. a¯n women, as proud and powerful, and – apparently
without having noticed any exception to this rule – concludes that they
23would never allow their husbands to have a concubine besides them. A
more or less public practice of concubinage hence seems less to be bound to
the existence of the institution as such, than to the balance of power implied
in the society’s gender relations. An argument stressed by observations made
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by Aline Tauzin (1989b: 77), who depicts the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t as being most
concerned about possible relations between their husbands and the slave
women. Therefore the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t watched the attitude of the slave women
towards their children – a slave child enjoying better treatment from his
mother than his siblings might indicate the noble, but obscured origin of his
father. Although practised, institutionalised concubinage was socially
inconceivable; the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t’s concern about their husbands extra-marital
sexual relations reveals adultery to have been a real concern, no matter what
status the women implicated had. This becomes evident from the consequen-
ces such an affair could have: a wife becoming aware of her husband commit-
ting adultery had the right to – and often did – leave him to return to her
24parents. A husband wanting his wife to come back hence had to present her
numerous gifts in order to calm down her anger, and bring her around (cf.
Tauzin 1984a: 89). The question whether concubinage between masters and
slaves existed therefore has to be reformulated. As an institution, following
the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence and paralleling a marital relation,
concubinage, or the attribution of the more far-reaching status of umm walad
25was very likely to have been marginal in bı¯z. a¯n pastoral nomadic society.
There was no consensus on the institution among bı¯z. a¯n women and men. As
it had already been the case in pre-Islamic times, concubinage – or here more
precisely the attribution of the status of an umm walad to a slave woman –
remained a kind of a last resort saving masters from the pain of having a child
of theirs be a slave. However, only boys tended to evoke this sort of mental
anguish that would entail bı¯z. a¯n masters to claim fatherhood.
   The various institutions of concubinage, now understood in a wider sense,
designating varying forms of legitimised extra-marital sexual relations as they
were handled in many Sahelian rural societies (cf. Meillassoux 1986: 135;
Olivier de Sardan 1983: 141), were a solution to a specific problem of free
men in slave-holding societies: namely how to manage sexual relations
between free men and slave women. Its application was a matter of specific
circumstances, and – much like the concubines of royal and other courts (cf.
26Meillassoux 1986: 191ff.) – likely to be a matter of social standing. Disput-
ing the frequency of bı¯z. a¯n concubinage therefore provides no direct means
to apprehend the impact of sexual interrelations among masters and their
female slaves, but rather the number of these to be kept in secrecy, or
resolved by this or other means compatible to the social framework. One
major bı¯z. a¯n solution to the problem was successive marriage, resulting in the
27complete liberation of the slave woman and her children:
Question: Mais est-ce que le maître peut avoir des relations sexuelles avec
sa h
˘
a¯dem [slave woman]?
Answer: Oui, bien sûr, il peut coucher avec elle et avoir même des enfants;
mais il ne le reconnaîtra jamais, car pour cela il faut qu’ils soient mariés.
Par exemple, si le maître est marié et que la h
˘
a¯dem habite avec eux dans la
maison, ils peuvent avoir des rapports sexuels, mais toujours en cachette
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de l’épouse. Si la h
˘
a¯dem a des enfants, il peut considérer que ce sont ses
enfants à lui mais il ne le reconnaîtra jamais parce qu’il n’y a pas eu de
mariage légal; il va dire que sa h
˘
a¯dem a couché avec un autre. Alors, si le
propriétaire n’épouse pas sa h
˘
a¯dem, ses enfants seront en même temps ses
^abı¯d et ils seront même hérités par ses fils légitimes. Le mieux dans ces cas
c’est qu’il l’épouse, après l’avoir affranchie bien sûr; comme ça les enfants
de sa femme h. art.a¯niyya auront les mêmes droits que les autres. (Interview
with Bullah Mint Zenvu¯r, bı¯z. a¯niyya (h. assa¯n), Kaédi 8/9 October 1991;
cited in Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 670)
The central role attributed to marriage for the legitimation of sexual relations
between the male masters and female slaves apparent in this statement by a
bı¯z. a¯n woman is reflected in bı¯z. a¯n terminology as well, but there are some
ambiguities that have to be highlighted. Marriage could mean different things
depending on whether it concerned free or slave women. This becomes
apparent once the different meanings of the term gˇa¯riyye are explored.
According to a contemporary bı¯z. a¯n interpretation, a gˇa¯riyye appears to be a
slave woman who has formally recognised sexual relations with her master,
despite the latter being married (cf. Brhane 1997a: 73f. and personal corre-
spondence 2.12.1997). In this light, the gˇa¯riyye appears to be nothing more
than a concubine whose “lower than married women” status fits neatly into
the framework drawn by legal orthodoxy, which allows the men polygamous
relations and thus contradicts the monogamous practices resulting from the
bı¯z. a¯n gender relations described by Bullah Mint Zenvu¯r (cf. Interview above).
More traditional meanings, probably less influenced by contemporary
re-evaluation and codification of Islamic jurisprudence, however, attribute a
different significance to gˇa¯riyye. According to Catherine Taine-Cheikh
(1989b: 312, 346) the term designates a concubine, a slave spouse, a slave
woman married by her master, and thus refers to a whole range of ascending
statuses slave women could achieve and had to struggle for when seeking
social promotion by becoming a gˇa¯riyye. The goal slave women entering
such relations had was clear. They did not want to remain concubines, but to
be married by a bı¯z. a¯n man. This is also stressed by the meaning of the verbal
28derivative gˇowre, meaning “marrying one’s slave”.
   The emphasis su¯da¯n women laid on marriage as prerequisite for establish-
ing gˇa¯riyye is further accentuated by the h. art.a¯niyya¯t and h˘
edma¯n (slave
women) terminology relating to the issue. Rather than using their masters’
term, they prefer to speak of being a šedu¯ni, i.e. “being married by the
masters”, which is used explicitly in the plural (personal correspondence with
Meskerem Brhane 2.12.1997). While the conditions stated by the marriage
contracts in these circumstances could differ from those concluded among bı¯-
z. a¯n (and hence discriminated against the slave women, as can be seen below),
the terminology strongly suggests that marriage was the central institution
slave women aspired to in order to achieve full social recognition of their
master-slave (concubine) relationship. Marrying in this context, however,
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meant different things to bı¯z. a¯n men and slave women. As Bullah Mint
Zenvu¯r (cf. interview above) stressed, a man manumitted and married a slave
woman because of his concern for the fate of his children resulting from this
liaison. For the slave woman, becoming a gˇa¯riyye meant less marrying a
single bı¯z. a¯n man, and establishing an individual, lasting relationship, than
ultimately leaving the slave estate by merging into the circles of the powerful
29in bı¯z. a¯n society.
   Notwithstanding that the framework outlined so far makes it possible to
recognise and legalise sexual relations between masters and slave women, it
remains subject to the bı¯z. a¯n practice of monogamy. At any time, and with
very few exceptions, there can be only one legitimate spouse, irrespective of
the woman’s initial status. Establishing a new relationship, might – as in the
case of concubinage – precede the end of an existing marital relation, and thus
have to be done in secret. Secrecy, however, is not an issue in sexual relations
between male master and slave women only. It is just as much a feature of the
extra-marital sexual relations of men and women of any status; and these are,
as I will limit myself to suggesting, quite probable to occur in any society.
   Only very recently has attention been drawn to an institution peculiar to
bı¯z. a¯n interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, revealing both of the bı¯z. a¯n
will to respect social norms and of problems arising from this will which are
only resolved by a sort of legal safety valve applicable to sexual relations
30parallel to the primary legal framework. Sarriye means a “secret, clandes-
tine marriage”, derived from the original meaning of “secrecy, confidence” in
standard Arabic (cf. Wehr 1976: 404). It is concluded much like a regular
marriage, as it involves two testators and a qa¯d. i, who will compose a written
testimony of the act, but differs in its secrecy. The aim of the ceremony is to
preserve honour, and hence to avoid illegitimate children resulting from the
secret sexual relations. Sarriye by these means can resolve various problems
arising, among others, from the fact that emotional affinities are of minor
importance within the framework of preferential marriage patterns. Sarriye
can also bridge divergence in status or age of the spouses, and can help men
to handle monogamy a bit more “flexibly”. Nevertheless the institution does
not definitely challenge the bı¯z. a¯n practices with regard to marital relations.
In the case of a secret spouse becoming pregnant by her secret husband, the
latter can divorce his present wife, and turn the secret marriage into an
official one (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 681ff.). This setting, in which the
principle of successive marriage succeeds in superseding all institutions
31paralleling marriage whenever the issue of legitimate offspring is concerned,
fits again neatly the scenario of the liberation of master-slave woman off-
spring, as outlined by Bullah Mint Zenvu¯r (cf. interview above). Rather than
by attributing the legal status of a concubine to the slave woman, the master
will legitimate his future children by manumitting the slave woman, and
32marrying her.
   Much like the arbitrary role men take in the attribution of institutional
concubinage, sarriye is revealed to be a means used by men to deceive their
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spouses, and to enter the fields of polygamy. While the men gain within
sarriye, the women engaging in it offend the women’s consensus to uphold
monogamy, a commitment which also has a prominent place in the oral
marriage contract (cf. Ould Ahmedou 1994: 121f.; see also note 24, this
chapter). This female consensus has developed from shared interests.
Bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t have to defend and manifest their status and power within the bı¯z. a¯n
gender relations and matrimonial alliances. To this closed circle, a h. art.a¯niyya
offered sarriye by a bı¯z. a¯n man is an outsider and will remain unable to enter
the net of solidarity developed by the community of bı¯z. a¯n women. Never-
theless, being legally married provided an important step in social ascension
to a slave woman, for besides her being manumitted together with her
children, the latter would follow the status of their father. The essence of the
bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t statement that a woman concerned with matters of status depend-
ing on marital relations first of all has to consider the fate of her children,
rather than her own (Interview with Bullah Mint Zenvu¯r, cited in: Villasan-
te-de Beauvais 1995: 671), reveals the impact strategic considerations have on
the establishment of matrimonial alliances no matter whether su¯da¯n or bı¯z. a¯n
are concerned. H
˘
edma¯n (slave women; sing. h
˘
a¯dem) and h. art.a¯niyya¯t there-
fore are likely to have subjugated themselves more often to sarriye, gˇa¯riyye
and other similar inherently risky relations with bı¯z. a¯n than the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t,
the free women, who had much more to lose than to win from such alliances
(cf. Tauzin 1989b: 89).
Status and Split Origin
All legitimate children of a bı¯z. a¯n men follow his status irrespective of the
mother’s. This patrilineal structure of parenthood is the precondition for
such institutions as concubinage, and on a larger scale, the incorporation of
dependent and slave women into the free and noble strata of society. While
formally there is nothing to distinguish siblings with the same father but
different mothers, in practice the knowledge of both paternal and maternal
descent was a latent issue in any discourse on nobility, and hence remained
33preserved. This becomes most evident in situations where descendants of
mothers of different status but with one and the same father enter into
competition. A competition frequent among brothers of different mothers,
especially within the h. assa¯n tribes, and their emiral lineage (cf. Interview with
34Bullah Mint Zenvu¯r in: Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 671). A prominent case
of this type of factionalism is the rise of the last ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrah-
mane Ould Bakkar. He is famous for having been totally black and born of a
35slave woman, made h. art.a¯niyya on the occasion of her marriage. Following
the death of his father, Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed, in a battle against
French invaders, rivalry broke out between the different aspirants to the
office of ^amı¯r of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak tribal confederation, and lasted for
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more than a decade. The situation might have been complicated by the more
than fifty sons Bakkar had during the ninety to one hundred years of his life
(sons were listed to me each with his full name!). Finally, the strife crystalli-
sed around some main competitors with Abderrahmane and a few supporters
on the one side and several of his brethren of noble origin united on the
36other. Numerous are the narratives displaying the force and intelligence
Abderrahmane was endowed with, and which made him resist and lastly
defeat his treacherous rivals:
In those days Abderrahmane [Ould Bakkar] was pursued by his brothers.
These aimed to kill him because they wanted to take his place, they
wanted to hinder him from becoming mightier than themselves, or
perhaps they did it because of his inferior origin.
   One day they called upon him to come and see them. Abderrahmane at
that moment was somewhere in the bush, together with his wife. When he
heard of his brothers calling him for a visit, he knew they were calling him
because they wanted to kill him on that occasion. His wife told him he
would be killed by his brothers if he went to see them as they wanted.
Abderrahmane didn’t know what to do. He was unable not to go, for it
were his brothers who called him, and going there was impossible because
it meant being killed. Finally Abderrahmane went to the place indicated
by his brothers. On his way he saw a she-camel whose young camel had
managed to tear off the bag covering his mother’s udder, and was suck-
ling. Abderrahmane set out completely calmly to fix the bag back in its
correct position, and hinder the young camel from further suckling and
hence wasting his mother’s milk. During this operation he had been
observed by his brothers, who were already waiting for him. Abderrah-
mane’s conduct raised a dispute between them. When Dey [Ould Bakkar]
saw Abderrahmane, who was fully conscious of being under the acute
threat of being killed within the next few minutes, take his time to care for
a stranger’s she-camel, he told his brothers that Abderrahmane was a good
fellow, and therefore they could not kill him on that occasion. Finally he
convinced all his brothers of his opinion, even Ely [Ould Bakkar], who
was most opposed to Abderrahmane (Interview Mohamed Ould Mbarek,
h. art.a¯ni, by Khalifa Ould Kebab 17.1.1996).
There are many legendary narratives like this one, telling of the brave ^amı¯r
managing again and again to escape the assaults led by his hostile brothers.
Many aspects of the story seem symptomatic of the battle the young Abder-
rahmane striving for his father’s office had to fight. As a h. assa¯n, a warrior, he
had to prove his courage to assert his status (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985a: 368), but
this was not enough. An ^amı¯r had to behave honourably, even if this might
lead to his peril. Facing the dilemma his brothers had put him in, he therefore
chose the combination of honour and death over life in the dishonour of not
having responded to the call of his noble brothers. What makes him finally
defeat his enemies is his deep commitment to a lifestyle different from his
brothers’. To accept or not the date set by his brothers was carefully consid-
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ered by Abderrahmane, who took into consideration his wife’s opinion.
Naturally he opted for the obligations of honourable behaviour. Later,
already facing his death, his action develops without hesitation or uncertain-
ty. Caring for a stranger’s animal, and daily ration of milk, is depicted as
being self-evident for Abderrahmane. Confronting his brothers with this
peculiar type of honour puts them in disarray. They had agreed on killing
their brother in an ambush, on unequal grounds but in a fight between
warriors. Now facing a most cool-minded warrior, selflessly attending to a
herd-animal’s problem in a moment of extreme personal danger, the setting
changes. They not only have to kill a simple warrior, but one displaying the
virtues of a true leader, one who cares for other people’s goods and shows his
selfless bravery in a moment of severe danger. Though controversy over the
issue arises among the noble brothers, Dey Ould Bakkar is successful, and
37manages to postpone the assassination, overruling Ely Ould Bakkar, who,
neglecting the honour angle, simply wants to get rid of the rival.
   While the noble brothers engage in treachery and risk sliding into dishon-
ourable behaviour, Abderrahmane gives proof of his cool mind, and above all
of his abilities. Quite unusually for a person of high office and the most noble
38descent, he is uniformly presented by bı¯z. a¯n and h. ara¯t.ı¯n as the greatest
worker possible. There is no job he is not reported to have managed to the
highest perfection. He could cultivate, hoe the fields, milk, handle all kinds of
animals, etc. He was the fastest runner, the best rider, the best shot, the best
hunter, able to feed a whole camp with game etc. Obviously not all these
stories about the labour qualifications were invention, for Abderrahmane
once had herded sheep and goats for a bı¯z. a¯n called Haime. Later he often
made a joke of it when meeting the noble, but now poor, Haime by asking
him for his shepherd’s payment (Interview Khattar, zwa¯ya, 12.10.1995). Last
but not least Abderrahmane is presented as being highly intelligent. By this
virtue he was able to outwit his many enemies numerous times. One story
presents Abderrahmane, together with his wife and small baby, again in an
ambush, first noticed by the wife. Abderrahmane invents a ruse to get out of
the mess: he tells his wife to take his gun in his place, and give him the baby.
With the child in his arms and without a weapon he then approaches the
ambush where his hostile brothers again postpone the assassination. They
cannot shoot at him while he is not carrying his weapon, and they risk killing
not only him, but the baby too (Interview Mohamed Ould Mbarek, h. art.a¯ni,
by Khalifa Ould Kebab 17.1.1996). The double blood-price to pay and the
feud hence risked, meant much too much trouble to allow the situation to be
exploited. Behaving completely unconventionally, and offending the rules of
bı¯z. a¯n emotional management, once more saved Abderrahmane from death. A
father, whether su¯da¯n or bı¯z. a¯n, should never show affection for his children,
neither by taking them in his arms, nor by other means.
   The mythical accounts of the ^amı¯r’s life and struggle portray a person
outclassing everybody by his unique combination of physical and intellectual
skills, which is believed to result from the blending of bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n
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virtues. Children of a bı¯z. a¯n father and a su¯da¯n mother (who will be a
h. art.a¯niyya, if she is legally married), are thought to gain in physical strength
over their siblings of pure bı¯z. a¯n origin. “Normally he [the son of a
h. art.a¯niyya and a bı¯z. a¯n] will be solid, his eye is red, every time he looks at
something, he looks right at it, just like one has to look, without hesitation.
He will be harder then the other who has a h. assa¯n father and mother.”
(Interview Khaite Mint Mohamed, h. assa¯n, 21.10.1995) A h. art.a¯ni of the Ahel
Swayd Ah. med had an even more dramatic characterisation: “Such a son will
never be among the mediocre, he will always tend to the extremes. Either he
is of the best people you can imagine, or he is one of the worst. Both are
39possible.” (Interview Ely Ould El Abd, h. art.a¯ni, 5.2.1996) Despite these
advantages, the union of bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n has its risks, for it will be the father
who is responsible for teaching the children to meet the exigencies of their
parental status. The h. art.a¯niyya mother is considered to be too weak to be
able to lead her children, especially to control her sons in the way her noble
husband is able to do. While primary education of boys and girls is a
uniquely female affair in bı¯z. a¯n society, the slave woman who has ascended to
nobility obviously still is recognised and blamed for her lack of sociability.
   The life-stories of Tourad and Youba, two bı¯z. a¯n with a h. art.a¯niyya mother,
reveal many of the cleavages that have to be bridged in order to transform
40inherited status from the father into living a noble’s life. Tourad had a
considerable amount of success. To a large extent he has made his life on his
own. From his childhood on, he was committed to modernity, for apart from
being born in the camp of his mother, he never lived under a tent. Only
recently has he started to go to the bush, not to engage in pastoralism or
cultivation, but to find relief from life in town. His well-known and highly
reputed zwa¯ya father does not appear to have lent him a hand in his career.
Though Tourad obviously never lacked the material means to pursue his
school studies, there is no situation in which his father is reported to have
intervened in his career. As such this is not an exceptional constellation.
Among prominent clerics it was an obligation to leave the family and take up
studies with prominent religious teachers. This lifestyle reflects the devotion
of the student to his studies, but also the problems he faces in trying to study
effectively when constantly interrupted by his own family’s multiple needs.
Besides, the father was quite old. He died as early as 1971, and therefore
could hardly intervene during the most turbulent years of his son’s biogra-
phy. What raises some doubts about this being the single reason for Tourad
keeping rather mute on the subject of his father, is his emotional outbreak at
the end of his narrative. He does not want to speak of the former times, i.e.
those times he lived with his father, his animals and his slaves. For Tourad all
this has gone, the father’s property had vanished, the father is dead, all this
past is remote and of no significance to him and his life. This turn in his
narrative also raises further doubts about the causes of the mysterious
disappearance of his father’s large inheritance, and Tourad’s proclaimed pride
about this chance to lead a more humble and ascetic life. There are plenty of
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accounts of quarrels about inheritance. In most cases sons still young at the
death of their father are cheated by their paternal uncles. Analogous patterns
of conflict over inheritance might have arisen between brothers having
different mothers, much like the case of the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane. Being
young and of less noble origin (and far away for studies) in the case of
Tourad might have been a major reason for being unable to take part in the
game of pre-inheritance and inheritance.
   Today, though a school-teacher, involved in local politics, and a highly
respected person, Tourad lives somewhat apart, at the very margin of the
town, together with his mother and her h. art.a¯ni husband. Their relations are
at best ambiguous, and the distinction Tourad draws between himself and his
mother is marked. Portraying his seasonal, leisurely migration to the bush in
order to drink fresh sheep milk during the rainy season, he refers to living
under a tent as the way of life of the pastoralists. To him at first sight, there
are no other people out there under tents, and there is no legitimate reason
for there to be so. It is the objection by the research assistant, Khalifa Ould
Kebab, a h. art.a¯ni, that many people leave the cities and villages to live under a
tent near their remote fields, that brings Tourad back to the realities of
present day life, and the recognition that this is a the lifestyle of most rural
su¯da¯n, among them his own mother. The distinction made between “us” and
“them” is manifest. When Tourad and his family leave for the bush to enjoy
41life in the vicinity of well-fed, lactating animals , there are just others
working in the fields: “we have other people . . . parents who care for the
fields . . . we go off to the bush and leave the question of the fields to our
family. It’s my mother”. The ambiguity of performing a bı¯z. a¯n master’s and a
family-member’s discourse in parallel when speaking of his closest relatives is
striking. Behind the progressive attitude (naturally Tourad insists on always
including the number of su¯da¯n tents in the total amount of tents in his former
camp) surfaces a struggle for personal identity based on the notion of a
cleavage between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n. As such, the mother becomes somebody
“other”, a special and distinct branch of the family. This rationalisation of
family relations into master-slave or patron-client relations is manifest in the
arrangement held between son and mother with regard to the joint exploita-
tion of the fields. Tourad stresses that he is the proprietor of the land, and in
effect his own mother, together with her new husband, appear to be working
almost as his sharecroppers. If there is a surplus, both give Tourad a part of
the harvest. These conditions are just the same as those practised among the
local bı¯z. a¯n landowners and sharecropping su¯da¯n. Although Tourad, by living
together with his mother, shows his responsibility for her, and hence is far
from obscuring his maternal origin, he is at pains to demonstrate that he is of
another kind than her, and has developed into a full-blooded bı¯z. a¯n.
   Youba’s actual situation and his career are of quite another kind. He lives in
an almost exclusively su¯da¯n village. There are no material signs to distinguish
him from his h. ara¯t.ı¯n neighbours. His house, though one of the better off, is
much like those around it; there are no signs of any luxury, or at least
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42affluence within the household. His biography reads much like a h. ara¯t.ı¯n
one. After some basic school education, Youba leaves for the big city to enter
the wage labour market. Finally, tired of this life, he returns to the hinter-
land, builds a house and starts to cultivate. Nevertheless Youba is no h. art.a¯ni;
after all, going to school and passing the CFD-exam was a rarity in his times.
The problem here is that Youba did not attend school of his own free will,
but was the one of his fathers’ sons who had to go when the ^amı¯r came to
recruit children for the French school. While he, as the eldest son of his
mother, went to this kind of boarding school, his elder, more noble brothers
continued their leisurely life filled out with camel riding and little Qur\a¯n
43education. After school, and still in the prosperous years before the big
drought, there seems to have been no good place for Youba beneath his
father’s tent. Rather than staying, he prefers to leave and start some unpaid
practical training at the national radio station, an opportunity mediated by
his mother, who had married an influential journalist there. Some months
later, having given up hope of the job being paid, he prefers to enlist with the
army as a simple soldier. Later, after leaving the armed services, he profits
from his schooling when looking for jobs. He is able to work as a checker
and hence can avoid the most menial tasks, which are above all performed by
su¯da¯n. Despite this small success, the city does not provide him with more
than a modest living. Youba decides to go back and start cultivating. In
44building his house among h. ara¯t.ı¯n belonging to his father’s tribe, he decides
to affiliate neither with his bı¯z. a¯n parents by the father, nor is there any tie left
with his mother, who now lives far away with a new husband.
   Among the h. ara¯t.ı¯n Youba stands out for two reasons. He still has one of
his father’s former slaves with him. And despite all his efforts to appear a
good cultivator, Youba can hardly hide the fact that Laghlave, the slave
sitting besides him, is the backbone of his personal agricultural commitment.
Unlike any h. ara¯t.ı¯n, Youba – as an heir of his father’s belongings – has a share
in the rights to many fertile plots behind dams his father once registered with
the colonial administration, and which now form part of the collective
property of the h
˘
aima (h. assa¯niyya: tent), i.e. the emiral family. Therefore
Youba is among those deciding about the distribution of plots, but has no
individual ownership rights that would allow him e.g. to sell a plot.
   Though representing contrasting life-stories rather than similar ones,
Youba and Tourad have much in common. Both lack social ties, i.e. ancestry
through their mother. The case of the “successful” Tourad with his “unsuc-
cessful” mother, and Youba with quite the opposite constellation of winning
and losing, shows mothers and sons living a life detached from each other.
Tourad’s mother becomes a h. art.a¯niyya and enters client-like relations with
her son (who nevertheless acts like one and consequently supports her).
Youba’s mother, devoted to and successful in her life as a highly esteemed
spouse, is much too involved in her new affiliation to give her son any more
significant support after the aborted attempt at the national radio. Both
45mothers live a life determined by the status of their present husbands. For
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their sons, who inherited a noble status from their fathers, they are unable to
provide uncles and aunts corresponding to status so they remain segregated
46from the father’s family. Divorce, as can be concluded in the case of
Badeyn, the slave without knowing it, had most serious consequences for
support that depended on the affection of one woman (in this case the
adoptive mother). Slave women who ascend to the status of h. art.a¯niyya¯t
through being married by a bı¯z. a¯n, and later choose to return to their natal
milieu, endanger rather than help their sons in the struggle to fill out the
status inherited from the father. Such mothers, when entering a subsequent
new marriage with another freeborn man, are very likely to have to leave
behind the past of their former marriage, including their sons. These in turn,
if they want to assert their bı¯z. a¯n status, have to keep a distance from their
mother, for their alliances too are in the present, and are self-attained. This
constellation might throw a light on the prominent place the wife of Abder-
rahmane Ould Bakkar takes in the two narratives presented. In the settings
described, she is the only person whom he can entirely trust and rely on.
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Chapter 4
The Demography of Western Saharan Slavery
An aspect of bı¯z. a¯n slavery deserving particular attention is the demographic
significance of slaves in bı¯z. a¯n society. Available data on the slave trade in the
western Sudan strongly suggests an increase in slave sales towards the interior
of Africa subsequent to the closing of the Atlantic trade and new waves of
enslavement in the course of several gˇiha¯ds. Bı¯z. a¯n, strongly involved in the
trans-Saharan slave trade, and having a significant resource – salt – at their
disposal, entered the trade in slaves along the desert-edge and across the
Sahara, and acquired slaves on a new scale. The use of slaves within the
western Sahara varied according to a wide range of variables. Demographic
data underscores the assumption that h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya had different
interests in slaves, and consequently acquired them in different numbers and
for different purposes. As demographic material differentiating between men
and women at the desert-edge is scarce and elusive, hypotheses on gender
differentials between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n are difficult to prove with regard to
historical times. Colonial records and contemporary demographic data,
collected in a number of villages in the region of Achram-Diouk, and
focusing on status as well as sex, however, provide insights into how relations
of power affected, and continue to affect su¯da¯n women differently from
su¯da¯n men.
Africa and the Slave Trades
Expressing the significance of African slavery and slave trade in numbers is a
difficult, but crucial undertaking in the attempt to gain a proper understand-
ing of the impact this practice of social deprivation had on African societies.
Difficulties in such an approach arise for numerous reasons. African slavery
and slave trade was not a monolithic system, but composed of different,
partially overlapping and interdependent elements. Many African societies –
though not all – practised slavery, and slavery itself, though sharing major
common features, was subject to highly varying practices. The use of slaves
could range from a marginal to a predominant characteristic of the society
concerned. The African slaves’ conditions varied too. In some cases they
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Table 1: Estimations of Atlantic, Oriental and Inner-African Slave Trade
 Estimates (thousands)
 
Destination
aManning
(1500-1900)
bManning cAusten
(1500-1900)
dAusten
(650-1910/20)
Atlantic 12,000 10,000 11,500  
Orient 6,000 5,000 6,700 17,000
Africa 8,000 15,000   
    dead in Africa 4,000    
a: Manning (1990b: 257).
b: Manning (1990a: 171). Unfortunately there is no information regarding the time-
span covered by this estimate.
c: Calculation of the slaves traded into the three trade systems from about 1500 to
1900 on the basis of data provided by Ralph A. Austen (1981: 136), which
corrected former estimates upwards (cf. Austen 1979: 65ff.). More recently the
volume of the so-called “Islamic” slave trade (trans-Saharan, Red Sea, and Swahili
Coast) was corrected downwards (cf. Austen 1992: 229, 235).
d: Austen (1981: 136). While trans-Saharan trade according to this estimate ended in
1910, the Red Sea and Swahili Coast trade continued until 1920.
lived much like their masters, while at the other extreme they had to work on
plantations. As using slaves depended on having the means to acquire them,
African slavers depended on an inner-African slave supply. Both war and
trade were sources of new slaves. Throughout West Africa, a trade network
developed. Communities which specialised in the trade with slaves and other
commodities were supplied by warriors specialised in living off the produc-
tion of this human commodity. Although they concentrated entirely on the
inner-African market, the development of this association of trading and
raiding societies cannot be explained without reference to external incentives
and influences. Africans not only became slaves of other Africans, but also
constituted the stock traded to two other major regions of slave use: the
1Americas and the Arab-Oriental world.
   The question to what extent the Atlantic slave trade and the subsequent
population drainage, or else inner-African factors contributed to Africa’s
current underdevelopment is a highly sensitive issue given its political
connotations, and is until today disputed among scholars (cf. Klein 1990;
Manning 1990a,b; M’Bokolo 1998; Rauzduel 1998). One important means to
apprehend the dimensions of the distinct but interconnected slave trades are
estimates of the number of slaves traded. These figures, although still
tentative, and equally subject to theoretical assumptions, make it possible not
only to differentiate between internal and external factors, but to unravel the
dynamics arising out of the interaction between the distinct slave trade
systems (cf. Table 1).
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   The numbers estimated for the three major trade destinations, the Atlantic,
the Arab-Islamic Orient, and the sub-Saharan African continent, are subject
to different levels of error tolerance. While the estimates of the Atlantic trade
proved to be quite robust, and rely on a number of sources (cf. Curtin 1975a,
b; Richardson 1989), they are already much more spurious for the Oriental
trade, where evidence is generated both directly and indirectly (cf. Austen
1981, 1992). The African trade in fact is almost undocumented, and the few
estimates provided by Patrick Manning (1990a,b) therefore remain contested.
Despite these many limitations, the numbers presented in Table 1 reveal
that all three slave trades were of significant size. The transatlantic slave
trade, rather short-lived and with a major peak between 1700 and 1850, drew
about twelve million Africans off the continent. Although the estimates of
the Oriental trade are less certain, evidence is strong enough to state that a
number of slaves, comparable to those of the Atlantic trade, were brought
from sub-Saharan Africa to the north of the continent and southern Asia.
This continuous flow continued over a long time-span from 650 to 1900, and
only came to a peak during the nineteenth century. The average annual rate
of slaves entering the Atlantic and Oriental trade thus differed considerably;
24.7 thousand slaves taken to the Americas per year opposed to 13.4
thousand transported annually to North Africa, the Near East, the Red Sea
2and South Asia (cf. Austen 1981: 136; Manning 1990a: 83). Slavery and the
slave trade within sub-Saharan Africa probably preceded the Oriental trade,
but had many different configurations.
   The scholarly debate on this topic focuses on the impact external factors,
i.e. the Atlantic and Oriental trade, had on African societies, and hence
African slavery. Patrick Manning’s computer simulation of African demog-
raphy suggests the strong impact the Atlantic slave trade had on the evolu-
tion of the population of the western African coast, while the oriental slave
trade, mainly fed by the Savannah and Horn, only slowed down population
growth. While these estimates have some plausibility with regard to the
overall number of slaves and population development, they nevertheless rely
heavily on several theoretical, and hence debatable assumptions used to build
the simulation model, and fail to explain the many variations in the slaves’ sex
ratio and the regional variations of slave density occurring within the
3time-span observed (cf. Klein 1992: 39ff.; Manning 1990a: 81ff.).
   Tracking the interdependencies between the distinct slave trade systems
and African slavery from the desert-edge perspective of the western Sahara is
fascinating because the region was involved in both the trans-Saharan and the
Atlantic slave trade, and was a destination of the African slave trade as well.
The trade of slaves from sub-Saharan Africa might have antedated the Islamic
th conquest of North-Africa from 667 AD on, but only from the 11 century
does direct evidence of slave trade on the western Saharan route, linking the
western Sudan and Morocco exist (cf. Austen 1981: 31). This route, however,
although better documented than those to the east which were less involved
in the gold trade, was never the most important in the trans-Saharan slave
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trade. Slave caravans leaving Timbuktu, which was for a long time the major
4slave market in the western Sudan, and heading to the markets of the north,
could choose one of several trajectories. For those caravans leaving for
Morocco, one major route passed through the trade towns of the Mauritanian
Adrar (cf. Schroeter 1992: 188). From there slaves could either be sold into
the bı¯z. a¯n slave markets, or be transported further north to the Oued Noun
and the major Moroccan slave markets, like Marrakech. The network
character of the trans-Saharan trade, in which commodities were traded along
a multitude of trade routes intersected by entrepôts of varying importance,
5and operated by short as well as long-distance traders, adds a further
difficulty to the elaboration of estimates of the number of slaves traded in
this context. Although still tentative, available data nevertheless is instructive
as it shows that the trade in slaves from the western Sudan towards Morocco
th evolved dynamically. While during the 18 century about 2,000 slaves per
year were brought to the latter destination on various trade routes, their
th number grew during most of the first half of the 19 century to 3,000 slaves
and rose after a period of decline in trade to 5,000 slaves per year from
61876-1895 (cf. Austen 1992: 227).
   The western Saharans’ direct involvement in the Atlantic slave trade was of
minor importance. Annually about 1,000 slaves were transported from the
western Sudan to the isle of Arguin, where the Portuguese (and their succes-
th sors) ran a trade post from the middle of the 15 century on, which in many
aspects still paralleled the trans-Saharan trade. Later Arguin fell into decline
and frequently changed possessors. Its role was taken over by Saint-Louis,
which was founded in 1659 and gained in importance from the early
th 18 century on (cf. Ca da Mosto 1967: 17f.; Lovejoy 1983: 35; Ruf 1995:
96ff., 107). In fact the post at Arguin had only tapped the western trans-Sa-
haran trade route running from the western Sudan through the Mauritanian
Adrar northwards to the Oued Noun (cf. McDougall 1992: 61), as well as the
coastal route linking the Mauritanian Adrar (the departing point for the trade
7with Morocco), and Senegambia. Although in no way opposed to selling
Africans across the Atlantic, and actively engaged in selling slaves to the
French colony (cf. Saugnier/Brisson [1792] 1969: 270), the bı¯z. a¯n commitment
to the Atlantic trade remained marginal compared to the volume of the
western Saharan slave trade and the numbers of slaves traded in Saint-Louis.
This pattern persisted until the end of the Atlantic slave trade. The few slaves
bı¯z. a¯n occasionally sold to Saint-Louis seem to have been largely the spin-off
from their trade in slaves on the coastal route, and on the way to Morocco
(cf. Webb 1995: 89; Curtin 1975a: 183). Throughout the era of the Atlantic
slave trade in Saint-Louis, the Senegal River remained the major route linking
the town with the slave-producing areas of the interior. Price differentials
between Saint-Louis and the river were so high that the slave traders first
established temporary, fortified posts along the river (e.g. at Podor and
upriver in the region of Gajaaga), where in order to cut costs, the slaves were
acquired and stocked until the ships were able to go upriver. Subsequent to
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1730 this pattern of trade was replaced by direct trading with African
middlemen (cf. Curtin 1975a: 174f., Searing 1993: 59f.).
   The marginal role the bı¯z. a¯n had in the slave trade to Saint-Louis is largely
due to the specific economy and ecology of the Senegal valley, which in some
areas resembles much a riverine oasis. Already a short time after the Atlantic
slave trade had started in the area, only a minority of slaves traded to this
destination came from the coastal area and the states of the middle and upper
8Senegal River (e.g. Fuuta Tooro and Gajaaga). The major zones of enslave-
ment had already moved east to the Bambara states of Segu and Kaarta
th during the 18 century, thus creating new east-west slave trade networks
which were most prominently run by juula communities, and to some extent
by bı¯z. a¯n from the Hodh too (cf. McDougall 1995: 224). With the establish-
ment of the Atlantic trade much of the lower Senegal River valley moved into
new patterns of trade and production. The need to feed the slaves in the
various entrepôts, together with demand from Saint-Louis, caused a market
for local provisions like grain to develop. These exchanges, realised by means
of imported commodities, added to already established relations of exchange
9between agriculturists of the valley and pastoral nomads of the north. This
development created in many of the riverine areas a demand for labour
leading the region to import rather than export slaves (cf. Searing 1993: 29ff.;
1060f.). The tendency towards an increase in the region’s production and
exchange was reinforced with Saint-Louis not only having a demand for
grain but also other local products, of which gum arabic was the most
important. This commodity, obtained from the Acacia senegal tree, rapidly
became a crucial resource in the developing European textile industry, and
th hence in the early 19 century grew to be the city’s major trade item, thus
11overtaking even the slave trade. Within this evolving trade, more valuable
than the slave trade had ever been, the bı¯z. a¯n were the most important
12suppliers (cf. Curtin 1975a: 216f.).
Saharans in the Senegal River Valley
   Throughout the centuries in focus here, the political topography of the
lower and middle Senegal River valley remained fragmented into Wolof and
Fulbe states on the left bank and the Trarza and Brakna emirates on the right
bank. All of these profited from the increase in trade. Tolls were levied on the
slave traders, especially by the left bank rulers, and local commodities
exchanged against import products ranging from iron bars to guns and cloth
(cf. Searing 1993: 72). The evolution of new patterns of trade and production,
constantly rearranged by shifts in the major export commodities, laid the
material basis for a continued struggle over the political structure of the
region. James Webb, arguing from a long-time perspective of ecological
degradation in the north, interprets the increasing bı¯z. a¯n hegemony the valley
th experienced in the course of the 18 century as an outcome of a general
southward movement of the Saharans (cf. Webb 1995).
   Looked at more closely, the political history of the valley proves difficult to
118        Chapter 4
 
 
Table 2: Slave Exports from Senegambia to the Atlantic, 1700-1800
 Estimates
Period Lovejoy Richardson
1700-10 18,400 a22,230
1711-20 30,900 36,260
1721-30 22,500 52,530
1731-40 26,200 57,210
1741-50 25,000 35,000
1751-60 22,500 30,100
1761-70 14,400 27,590
1771-80 12,400 24,400
1781-90 22,100 15,240
1791-1800 7,000 18,320
Totals 201,400 336,880
Estimates are based on Lovejoy (1983: 50); Richardson (1989: 17).
a: Richardson makes use of a different chronology (1700-09, etc.). This was ignored,
for the change does not significantly affect the comparison.
fit into a unidirectional scheme. A first attempt to expand Saharan hegemony
to the south and well into the Senegal valley had already occurred in the
th second half of the 17 century. In the war of Bubba (Šurr Bubba, ca. 1645-
75), as it later was called, Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n tried to spread a revival of Islam, by
uniting the community of Muslims and ending tribal and political fragmenta-
tion, both to the north and to the south of the river Senegal. At first the
movement quickly gained adherents among Saharans, and popular support in
the south where to missionaries were sent. These successes and the move-
ment’s aim of interfering with secular administration raised resistance among
established chiefs and leaders. Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n responded by shifting to military
action. He declared a gˇiha¯d in accordance with legal guidelines (cf. Gomez
1985: 548), and deposed several western Sudanese rulers, among them those
of Fuuta, Kajoor and Waalo. They were replaced most often by people both
loyal to the movement and affiliated to the former leading dynasties. The
reformers’ influence was secured by surrounding the new leaders with a staff
of advisors from the zwa¯ya elite. When after his successes in the south Na¯s.ir
al-Dı¯n turned back to the north and tried to expand his power there, military
resistance grew further. A number of h. assa¯n groupings, but zwa¯ya too,
opposed the reformer’s claims. The balance of power shifted, and Na¯s.ir
13al-Dı¯n was killed in battle in 1674. Several successors to his office tried to
maintain the already vanishing movement, which was defeated definitively in
1677 (cf. Curtin 1971: 14ff.).
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   Little is known about the initial reasons leading to Šurr Bubba. One
explanation might be an ecological crisis at the time, a supposition gaining
some plausibility from southward migration processes of Saharan popula-
tions and millennial undertones within the reform movement (cf. Curtin
1971: 16; Ould Cheikh 1985a: 852ff., 1991a: 200ff.). Boubacar Barry (1972)
was the first to embed the conflict in the wider context of Senegal valley
economics and politics, and suggested that it was the result of the incipient
competition between trans-Saharan and Atlantic trade. Subsequently several
scholars have questioned this interpretation as presenting too neatly an
opposition between French and African trade. What remains is the evidence
of nascent French economic interests in the valley, developing precisely at
that time. The report of the contemporary observer Chambonneau (cf.
Ritchie 1968) gives a detailed account of how Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n aimed to install
himself as the major intermediary among all parties involved in trade in the
valley, rather than using his power of control in order to interrupt exchanges,
including the trade in slaves. The movement incited by Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n thus can
be seen as a first attempt to construct a unified political entity cross-cutting
the diverse ethnic and political entities of the Senegal River valley, and take
control of its emerging economic and trading potential (cf. Ruf 1995: 108-
14115).
   While the reformist movement failed to alter social structures on the left
bank, the conflict contributed to the building of new patterns of zwa¯ya and
h. assa¯n identity, as well as to new patterns of relationships among these groups
15in the Gebla (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985a: 535). The century following the event
witnessed an increase of bı¯z. a¯n influence in the valley. Both the Trarza and
the Brakna emirate managed to expand their area of hegemony further south:
partly by the power to prey upon their southern neighbours, but more often
16by a variety of alliances, they secured themselves a more direct control over
several of the region’s major grain producing areas. The aim was twofold.
The agricultural resources provided a crucial complement to the pastoral
nomads’ animal-based diet, and geopolitical dominance secured to a large
extent control of the trade running through the valley. However, as Ray-
mond Taylor (1997) has convincingly argued, this socio-political evolution
was paralleled by a rise of internal conflicts. The authority of the ^amı¯r and
h. assa¯n chiefs became undermined, as they were less and less able to develop
their hegemony among the many local groups which once constituted their
dependents. The latter gained in power once they were able to tighten their
grip on local economic resources, and to exploit h. assa¯n dependency on allies
17in the many factional rivalries (cf. Taylor 1997: 149-194). Bı¯z. a¯n predomi-
nance in the valley and on the left bank, which had already become more
th fragile during the first half of the 19 century, virtually ended with the
French expansion in Senegal, which started in 1855 when Waalo was conquer-
ed under the rule of Governor Faidherbe (in office from 1854-61, 1864-65;
cf. Taylor 1997: 197).
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Origins and Numbers of Western Saharan Slaves
   Compared to the evidence of bı¯z. a¯n contribution and involvement in the
oriental and Atlantic slave trade, little is known about the origin of the
western Saharan slaves. Speculations have often focused on the question
whether the bı¯z. a¯n appropriated the majority of their slaves via the slave
market, by slave raiding, or by the submission of a preceding strata of black
agriculturists. Given the large number of slaves traded through the western
Sahara, and given the large number of slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n within bı¯z. a¯n society,
the following statement of Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh sums up the most
probable point of view:
C’est, me semble-t-il, au commerce et non, comme on l’entend parfois
dire, à la razzia, qu’il faut imputer, pour l’essentiel, la présence au sein de
la société maure d’une large communauté d’esclaves et d’anciens esclaves.
   Certes, il a dû y avoir de nombreux rapts isolés, et l’insécurité entre-
tenue par la razzia maure chez les paysans noirs des régions limitrophes de
leurs parcours a laissé à cet égard des souvenirs encore vivants. . . . Le
substrat de peuplement noir des régions aujourd’hui désertifiées – et
probablement parmi eux, surtout les îlots de sédentarité –, ainsi que le
commerce transsaharien, ont été les pourvoyeurs les plus importants des
nomades en esclaves. (Ould Cheikh 1993: 183)
This differentiated portrayal of bı¯z. a¯n slave origins is valuable, because it hints
at the fact that as the bı¯z. a¯n means to acquire slaves probably were not
uniform, the various slaves’ conditions were not either. This view is con-
firmed by the analysis of the different slave occupations in bı¯z. a¯n society (cf.
chapter five). What nevertheless remains unresolved is the question how, and
in what numbers, slaves were acquired and distributed in the western Sahara.
As African slave populations, like most others, suffered from very low
fertility rates, and were frequently diminished by other spin-off effects, e.g.
by manumission, they were unable to reproduce themselves (cf. Klein 1983:
1873ff.; and 1992: 69, Meillassoux 1983: 51f.). To maintain a given slave
population, most African slave holders thus had constantly to acquire new
slaves. An evaluation based on rough population estimates for the late
th 18 century western Sahara provides the following numbers: of a total slave
population of about 41,750-55,667 slaves living along, and to the south and
south-east of the Adrar-Tagant axis, the numbers of new slaves needed to
compensate for a net demographic loss of about two percent would have
been between 825-1,113 slaves per year. A higher net loss of five percent,
calculated on the same basis, would have needed an annual import of 2,087-
192,783 slaves (cf. Webb 1995: 67).
   Carefully as these numbers have to be treated due to their highly specula-
tive nature, they nevertheless stress that considerable slave imports were
crucial, not only to constituting a slave population in the western Sahara, but
also to maintaining it. Slaves imported into the western Sahara originated
th from a variety of sources. From at least the 14 century, desert and North
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African horses were traded directly for slaves from the western Sudan. By
this time horses, which could not be bred and were short-lived in the Sahelian
20climate, had become a core element in Sudanese warfare. The horse and
slave trade was distinct from other trading activities, as horses were essential
to the raiding and capturing of slaves. Horses thus were both the means to
assure military supremacy, and to produce new slaves to be exchanged for
new horses. Producing and exporting horses, on the other hand, due to this
rather rigid interlink, was driven by the interest in slaves, for the warriors
largely lacked other commodities (cf. Webb 1995: 69f.). The number of slaves
traded according to this pattern was substantial. Cavalries in the western
Sudanese kingdoms numbered thousands, and pure Barbary horses often
th cost 15 slaves a piece. Late 17 century Waalo, with a cavalry of roughly
213,000 horses, thus exported an estimated 500 slaves per year to the north.
   A second major source of slaves were the western Sudanese and Saharan
trade networks. To acquire slaves, the Saharans had to offer commodities
needed, and largely lacking in the western Sudan. Desert salt was the most
important single item of this specialised economy, which had developed
th th already between the 9 and 12 centuries (cf. McDougall 1983). Unlike the
horse and slave trade, salt in many areas of the western Sudan became a
currency, and hence could easily be exchanged for all types of commodities:
22cloth, grain, slaves, gold, and many more. Slaves, however, were of major
interest to the desert merchants transporting salt from the desert mines and
entrepôts to the trade towns of the western Sudan. High-value rock-salt was
produced in a few desert mines, and amersal, an earth-salt of minor quality,
was scraped from local salt ponds. Control over the resource was centralised,
and production could be adapted more easily to market fluctuations than
agricultural and pastoral production dependent of seasonal and climatic
variation. The centre of exchanges focusing on salt and slaves in the era of the
Segu Bambara State (1712-1861) lay in the trade towns of the Middle Niger
area, located at the southern end of eastern bı¯z. a¯n transhumance routes. The
trade thus fitted into, and was backed by the seasonal encounters Saharan
pastoralists had with local agriculturalists. Both groups exchanged comple-
mentary products like milk and dung on the one, and grain on the other hand
23(cf. McDougall 1992: 62ff.; Roberts 1987:46ff.). The evolving trade net-
works were capable of persisting, and adapting to new circumstances because
they resulted from the composite of many interests, actors, and a variety of
commodities. Short distance local trade and trade from one caravan stop to
another was performed alongside highly specialised long-distance trade.
   Numbering the evolution of bı¯z. a¯n slavery is possible only from the times
of colonisation on, as precolonial accounts give only a glimpse of the phe-
th nomenon. According to one such account from a late 18 century observer,
slaves were so common throughout the western Sahara, that he noted “An
Arab must be poor indeed, not to have at least one negro slave” (Saugnier/
Brisson [1792] 1969: 99). Later visitors and explorers confirmed the state-
ment. Slaves were numerous, and assigned a whole variety of occupations (cf.
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chapter five). Despite this apparently high level of slave population, several
th th factors indicate that the 18 and 19 centuries witnessed a considerable
increase of bı¯z. a¯n slavery, or to be more precise, the increase of relations of
dependency, many of which fit into a straightforward concept of slave
relations, while others tend to fit better into what could be called tributary
relations. Southward expansion of bı¯z. a¯n hegemony led to the integration of
many right bank and some left bank cultivators of the Senegal River valley
into relations of dependency with bı¯z. a¯n overlords. These relations were not
static, but were altered by the actors’ agency. While many groups were still
forced to pay considerable amounts of tribute, and to provide services to
their masters (sometimes tribute was paid to both bı¯z. a¯n and western Suda-
nese overlords), others managed to accumulate wealth, started to develop an
agro-pastoralist lifestyle, and became powerful and feared allies of their
former bı¯z. a¯n masters, rather than continuing to be their dependents. These
changes in status and lifestyle often took the shape of adopting a new ethnic
identity; black Africans of the valley became successively bı¯z. a¯n. Several bı¯z. a¯n
groups strongly involved in the western Sudanese trade became resident
there, began to integrate themselves into their host community too, and
hence managed to shift from “white” to “black” (cf. Taylor 1997: 68ff.; Webb
241995: 30, 35f.). Within the Sahara, these changes were less marked. Some
tributary groups managed to change their status as well, and a number of
groups called h. ara¯t.ı¯n seem to have constituted themselves as sort of warrior
tributaries, or as skilled workmen too. In the case of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n living in the
oasis, the basis of the tributary relations some h. ara¯t.ı¯n groups lived in may
have been remnants of an initial “better than slave” status that had resulted
from the collective subjugation former indigenous cultivators had experi-
enced from nomadic pastoralists. But in the context of centuries of domina-
tion, and with the inflow of manumitted slaves into these groups, the politics
of identity and dependency are likely to have evolved significantly. The
actual shape that the relations of dependency of either slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n
took, resulted from an ongoing struggle, rather than being perpetuated past
25arrangements.
th    In the 19 century major political events reframed the topography of
political and military power in the Sahelian belt of West Africa. The gˇiha¯d of
Uthman dan Fodio in the first years of the century in the central Sudan, and
26of al-Hajj Umar, who seized Segu in 1861, as well as the later wars of
Samori Ture (in the 1880s), shaped new patterns of increased, and profession-
alised, enslavement. Had the spirit of Muslim reform initially been a
guideline to at least the spiritual leaders of these movements, it soon deterio-
rated in the face of the need to maintain and equip the troops. Slave raiding,
regardless of the Muslim or pagan origin of their prey, was the resource at
hand to pay off the bill for horses, imported firearms and the like. While the
West African market became flooded with slaves, the Atlantic slave trade
th went into decline. Since the late 18 century abolitionist movements had
succeeded in having an increasing impact on their respective governments.
The Demography of Western Saharan Slavery        123
 
 
After a heavy decrease in the preceding decades, the slave trade on the
Senegambian coast came to an end in the 1840s. This however neither
stopped the use of slaves nor the trade in slaves on the continent. During
their conquest of West Africa, started by mid-century, the French participat-
ed actively in enslavement and slave trade. Slaves constituted the majority of
the French invasion army, and slave booty was used as a major reward for
these forces. The internal slave trade was brought to an end only by the end
of the century when the conquest was accomplished (cf. Klein 1990: 241ff.;
Last 1974: 3ff.; Lovejoy 1983: 154f.; Mahadi 1992: 114; Meillassoux 1986:
257ff.).
Assessing the Trade in Slaves
   What remains controversial in the debate involving the evolution of
enslavement, slave trade, and slavery outlined here, is how to interpret the
interrelations between the different branches of the evolution portrayed, and
to some extent, the numbers of slaves involved. Patrick Manning (1990a:
140ff.) argues on the basis of price theory that the rapid decline in demand
th from the Atlantic made slave prices drop in the course of the 19 century.
The profitability of slave use within Africa thus grew, and incited internal
demand to compensate for the lost external demand. The second half of the
th 19 century, witnessing this evolution, became somewhat the heyday of
African slave societies, with their brilliant courts, vibrant trade and impres-
sive cities. Other scholars, however, deny that the end of the Atlantic trade
had such an impact on the interior slave trade, and consequently on the
evolution of prices there. The increase of slave use in the interior is interpret-
ed as being a result of internal factors, not external ones (cf. Lovejoy 1983:
154).
   Confirmation of either point of view proves difficult. To evaluate the link
between Atlantic and internal trade, it should be pointed out that those slaves
who could no longer be sold to the Atlantic coast effectively entered the
interior market. This increase of supply, which according to the above-ment-
ioned hypothesis of Patrick Manning should have incited a considerable
drop in slave prices, is contradicted by data for the first half of the
th 19 century, which does not account for any such evolution, except for
short periods in some coastal areas (cf. Lovejoy/Richardson 1995: 279ff.,
285). Any comparison of prices, however, only indirectly indicates the
number of commodities traded. A whole set of reasons is possible for the
prices in the interior maintaining their level, e.g. a rise in internal demand
may have compensated for the decline in external demand. Far more illumi-
nating therefore are direct indications of the numbers and characteristics of
the slaves traded in the various directions. Most striking in this context is that
the Atlantic trade had preferences in slave gender complementary to the
Oriental, and most of the internal slave trade. About two thirds of the slaves
shipped from the African continent to the Americas between 1811-1866 were
27male (cf. Eltis 1987: 256). These preferences were well reflected by higher
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prices for slave men paid at the Atlantic coast. In the interior market, as well
as in the Oriental trade, prices for female slaves were most often higher than
for male slaves. Most marked was the differential for young women and men,
ranging between men costing 80 percent of the women’s price and women
being four times as expensive as men. Commonly slave women cost between
a third and a half more than slave men, but differences became much less
28pronounced among older slaves (cf. Lovejoy/Richardson 1995: 279). These
indicators of slave gender preferences are substantiated by accounts enunciat-
ing that female slaves were more important than men both in the internal
and Oriental trade (where they made up two thirds of the slaves exported; cf.
Klein 1983: 72f.; Klein 1990: 240).
   It is by this complementary structure that the interior market and the trade
on the Atlantic coast became connected. Paul Lovejoy has calculated that
between 1805 and 1850 the number of slaves traded from the central Sudan to
the Atlantic coast can been estimated at 75,000-124,000 slaves, of whom
2995 percent were prime males (cf. Lovejoy/Richardson 1995: 269). However,
what remains unexplored is what happened when this external demand for
prime male slaves broke down. As prices in the interior for male slaves stayed
low, profit from this trade, and hence interest in it, are likely to have been
marginal. It might have been this tendency that became a reason why free
men were slaughtered rather than enslaved during slave raids in the second
th half of the 19 century. Such reports have often been used as a proof of the
slave markets’ pronounced gender preferences, and consequently of female
slaves dominating within the internal and Oriental trade (Lovejoy/Rich-
ardson 1995: 281ff.). Opening up this narrow focus provides a more
differentiated image. Preferences for female slaves, most clearly pronounced
with regard to young women and girls, did not withhold male slaves from the
market altogether. Those men massacred in the slave raids of the late
th 19 century were the free men, hence those most likely to resist enslave-
ment. Slave men in the same event were simply captured and later resold
along with slave women and children, as well as free women and children.
Therefore the economy of slave raiding and trading depended not only on the
logic of demand and supply, but on the patterns of production as well. From
this point of view, free men, in the eyes of the slave raiders and traders, seem
to have been more difficult to transform into slaves, i.e. to subjugate to the
30will of slave masters, than women, children and slaves. The marketability of
31slaves depended largely on their presumed mood and capabilities. Slaves
threatening their future masters with their propensity for running away, such
as “the male slave called k’etara shimge – ‘the one who crosses the fence’ –
because of his great height and strength” (Dunbar 1977: 162, original empha-
sis) only attracted poor prices. They were a headache for the traders too, who
often put them into chains to prevent flight.
   Slave use was another determinant of slave prices. Several authors note that
slave prices in the interior of West Africa rose in those regions where either
agricultural or artisanal production became a major domain of slave use,
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especially in the course of the increased commodity production during the
th 19 century. Demand for slave men, and consequently prices paid for them
on the slave markets, are likely to have risen too, as slave men were needed
32for the emerging new sectors (cf. Klein 1983: 72). The rather one-sided
price differential between slave women and men reported from the interior of
West Africa therefore might be a result of contemporary observers focusing
33largely on the export market, namely the prices paid in the Oriental trade.
th In 19 century Damagaram, in the south of today’s Republic of Niger, slave
prices varied according to market location, and hence the assumed destina-
tion of the slaves. While in original Damagaram, where agricultural produc-
tion relied heavily on slave labour, adult slave men attracted higher prices
than women, the latter were much more expensive in Zinder, one of the
major export markets frequented by Tuareg involved in the trans-Saharan
slave trade, and renowned for its preference in slave women (cf. Dunbar
1977: 161f.).
   Increased demand for slave men nevertheless did not necessarily alter a
trade pattern favouring female slaves. The soldiers of the western Sudanese
slave armies are reported to have been rewarded for their services with slave
women, who were supposed not only to serve the soldiers, but to cultivate
34for them – and hence to feed them (cf. Klein 1983: 80ff.). Many of the slave
men living in slave settlements and paying their masters fixed agricultural
tributes, lived together with slave women (cf. Meillassoux 1983: 59ff.).
   Giving a slave man a woman was always a means for the master to secure
the goodwill of the former. The aim of breeding slaves is likely to have been
part of the masters’ strategy too. An overall low fertility among slave women,
 35and the negative growth which many slave populations experienced,
provide no rationale for the individual master to dismiss this option altogeth-
er. These numbers only underline that there were few slave children, or else
that few slave children survived, and not that there were no slave children at
all. Again market conditions are likely to have influenced the masters’
th interests. During the 19 century slave prices were low, so low that acquiring
slaves on the market was less expensive than breeding them (cf. Meillassoux
1986: 285ff.). The end of the slave trade during the first years of the
th 20 century altered this situation. Now masters had to rely almost exclusive-
ly on biological reproduction to obtain new slaves. This rationale, manifest in
present day strategies of manumission, is very well expressed by the state-
ment that a slave master would be crazy to manumit his female slave, for this
act would entail giving up not only the rights in her person, but in all her
children (Khalifa Ould Kebab).
   In conclusion on the historical evolution of bı¯z. a¯n slave demography two
major hypotheses remain, although the scarcity of data leaves much room for
contestation (cf. McDougall 1995). Gender preferences of pastoral bı¯z. a¯n slave
masters involved in domestic slavery are likely to have matched those of their
western Sudanese fellows, which means they opted for the acquisition of
 36slave women rather than slave men. Contradicting patterns nevertheless are
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likely to have occurred. Wherever the production of marketable goods, such
as gum arabic, dates, and grain, as well as the organisation of caravan trade
became a major concern, male slave labour was to be employed on a larger
scale. The rise of these different economic sectors within the Sahara and at
th the desert’s edge throughout the 19 century, together with the low prices for
male slaves on the slave markets, therefore are likely to have fuelled the
diversification of bı¯z. a¯n pastoral economy into different, complementary
branches linked by master-slave relations. Slavery became the most promi-
nent means to organise both social hierarchy and economic specialisation. In
this respect, slavery easily fitted into a social landscape marked by a multi-
tude of relations of dependency, such as patron-client ties, spiritual leader-
ship, and military supremacy. These patterns of social hierarchy provided a
framework which enabled slave masters to draw analogies between the
various relations of dependency, including slavery. Nevertheless slaves, and
to a large extent slave descendants, remained apart from the social body.
Analogical reasoning saved the masters from confusing dependents of free
and slave status.
Numbering Su¯da¯n
While the foregoing paragraph tried to elucidate the demographic importance
of bı¯z. a¯n slavery in historic times, the present one focuses on the recent past,
and contemporary data. The last official Mauritanian population inquiry to
publish numbers distinguishing bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n goes back to 1965. Then the
bı¯z. a¯n were estimated to make up 70-60 percent, and the su¯da¯n at 30-
40 percent of only the bı¯z. a¯n society, i.e. the Mauritanian population without
the black African ethnic groups. More detailed numbers can be deducted
from a survey of the literate (either Arabic or French) population older than
twelve years. According to these estimations h. assa¯n make up 15 percent of bı¯-
z. a¯n society, zwa¯ya 36 percent, zna¯ga 5 percent, and artisans (igga¯wen and
ma^alimı¯n) 2 percent. The su¯da¯n together constitute 42 percent, with h. ara¯t.ı¯n
representing about 29, and slaves 13 percent of the total bı¯z. a¯n population (cf.
De Chassey 1984: 452f.; Davis 1997: 96).
The Colonial Records
   Further demographic information comes from the colonial period, when
the administration registered all inhabitants by both tribal and social affilia-
tion. For the “cercle du Hodh” in 1957 the su¯da¯n were estimated to make up
49 percent of the total population. The further south bı¯z. a¯n tribes lived, the
more su¯da¯n were attached to them. While the almost completely sedentarised
Awla¯d Mbarek consisted to about 80 percent of su¯da¯n, a northern, small
37camel-rearing fraction of the Idebussa¯t. had only a share of 11 percent su¯da¯n.
Data on the population of the whole Assaba region from 1950 presents a
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more balanced relation. Here 45,265 (68 percent) bı¯z. a¯n live together with
3821,252 (32 percent) su¯da¯n (cf. Munier 1952: 40).
   For the region under study here a fairly complete inventory of population
in the district of Moudjéria in 1950, which covers a large part of the area of
Achram-Diouk, offers very detailed insights (cf. Table 3). Among the local
tribes, the su¯da¯n make up an average of 33 percent. Inner-regional variation,
however, is strong, ranging from 14 percent su¯da¯n among the Kunta Awla¯d Sı¯di
Haiballa I to 62 percent in the adabay of Moudjéria. Another significant
characteristic is the rather low percentage of 26 and 27 percent su¯da¯n in the
tribal groups of the Abakak and Kunta, compared to 39 and 47 percent su¯da¯n
among the Tarkoz and Messu¯ma. One explanation might be that the latter
two are zwa¯ya tribes, a number of which are known to have relied more
heavily on slave labour in the past than their h. assa¯n fellows (e.g. the Idaw^I¯š
Abakak). The limited range of this explanatory scheme, however, becomes
apparent, once the exceptions to it are taken into account. The Kunta,
although having only a very low percentage of su¯da¯n in their midst, do not fit
into the status category of either h. assa¯n or zwa¯ya properly, but have gained a
reputation for both groups’ virtues alike. On the one hand there are tribal
traditions drawing heavily on the religious prestige of their eponymous
ancestors which allow the group to be commonly classified as zwa¯ya (cf.
Withcomb 1975, Batran 1979). On the other hand, besides these roots of
piety and learning, the Kunta were a major actor in the military confronta-
tions of the last few centuries. In this, much like the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d of
the Assaba and Hodh (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1997: 592ff.), they gained a
39reputation for zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n virtues alike.
   Even more pronounced is the demographic imbalance occurring between
su¯da¯n men and women, with the latter making up as much as 58 percent of the
total su¯da¯n population. Variation among the individual tribal fractions is
strong again, and ranges from a sex ratio of 71 to 49 percent women, again a
constellation that cannot be explained consistently in terms of the assumed
patterns of h. assa¯n or zwa¯ya master-slave relations. The great number of
su¯da¯n women is the more surprising, as the data concerns population patterns
almost five decades after the slave trade came to an end, which also meant the
end of the option to buy slaves according to gender preferences, and hence to
be able to create a bias in the sex ratio of the slave population. The most
feasible explanation for the greater numbers of su¯da¯n women is an already
manifest outmigration of su¯da¯n men while su¯da¯n women continue to remain
behind with the bı¯z. a¯n. This evolution was noted already by colonial adminis-
trator Gabriel Féral (1983: 138), who ruled the Assaba district successively
during the 1940s and 1950s. In several cases bı¯z. a¯n even continued to enlist
slaves in the colonial registers who had left them long before, for admitting
this fact would have meant dishonour to them.
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40Table 3: Population in the Moudjéria District, 1950
  
bı¯z. a¯n su¯da¯n
Total population
 
 
tribe
fraction
Men
Women
Children
Total
Men
Women
Children
Total
 share
su¯da¯n/
total
pop.
share
su¯da¯n
women/ 
su¯da¯n
Abakak
Ahel Soueid
Ahmed
459 439 387 1,285 94 145 103 342 1,627 21% 61%
Ahel Soueid
Baba
91 103 111 305 42 49 58 149 454 33% 54%
Aoueissiat
Mama
60 61 58 179 25 32 22 79 258 31% 56%
Aoueissiat
Hamoud
88 51 98 277 19 43 44 111 388 29% 69%
Legouanit 163 142 191 496 40 63 68 171 667 26% 61%
Oulad Ely
N’Tounfas
278 244 179 701 114 142 58 314 1,015 31% 55%
Total Abakak 1,139 1,040 1,024 3,243 334 474 353 1,166 4,409 26% 59%
Kounta
Haiballa I 466 446 450 1,362 74 84 59 217 1,579 14% 53%
Haiballa II 52 63 55 170 17 26 17 60 230 26% 60%
Oulad El Bah 108 106 105 319 12 29 18 59 378 16% 71%
Oulad
Tenakayas
190 214 198 602 52 65 73 190 792 24% 56%
Askéras 69 56 67 192 47 46 61 154 346 45% 49%
Ahel Elewa 79 74 97 250 21 25 36 82 332 25% 54%
Legraiers 55 59 69 183 62 84 95 241 424 57% 58%
A. Mhmd. Ould
Sidi Elemine
83 71 125 279 10 20 18 48 327 15% 67%
Zenaktas 208 214 152 574 76 99 96 271 845 32% 57%
Oulad Sidi
Ahmed Bouhjar
64 78 32 174 57 56 71 184 358 51% 50%
Total Kounta 1,374 1,381 1,350 4,105 428 534 544 1,506 5,611 27% 56%
Torkoz
Oulad Sidi
Ahmed
340 338 361 1039 140 197 262 599 1,638 37% 58%
Leghouareb 204 149 124 477 95 151 114 360 837 43% 61%
Sidi Reyoug 147 120 128 395 54 115 97 266 661 40% 68%
Total Torkoz 691 607 613 1,911 289 463 473 1,225 3,136 39% 62%
Messouma
Moctar 101 78 57 236 63 94 102 259 495 52% 60%
Hamady 88 75 77 240 52 64 53 169 409 41% 55%
Total Mess. 189 153 134 476 115 158 155 428 904 47% 58%
Isolated
Adabaye
Moudjéria
63 82 84 229 105 140 134 379 608 62% 57%
Ahel Cheikh
Ould Meni
216 193 140 549 147 160 142 449 998 45% 52%
Ahel Obat 122 105 70 297 78 112 72 262 559 47% 59%
TOTAL 3,794 3,561 3,415 10,810 1,496 2,041 1,873 5,415 16,225 33% 58%
Total 1947 3,589 3,598 2,968 10,155 1,420 2,040 1,778 5,283 15,393 34% 59%
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   It could be asked whether the figures provided by colonial documents
might be put in question for being biased. Indeed the administrative popula-
tion registers were developed for the purpose of colonial rule and did often
not rely on inquiries on the ground, but depended on information from local
chiefs. Nevertheless the data from 1950 seems to be quite accurate, as it
reflects knowledge generated and confirmed over several decades of colonial
administration. Questions remain with regard to the correct appreciation of
sex-ratios among su¯da¯n. It might be supposed that administrators interested
41above all in the tax on livestock failed to assess scrupulously the population
in some independent adwaba, i.e. su¯da¯n agricultural settlements. There su¯da¯n
men might have had less reason for migration than while living among bı¯z. a¯n.
The data available on the adabay of Moudjéria (subsumed under the ambigu-
ous category of “isolated” tribal groups), however do not confirm such a
hypothesis. While this settlement, developing around the local French
administrative residence, offered the largest employment opportunities to
male workers, i.e. su¯da¯n men throughout the region, the sex ratio among the
numerous su¯da¯n living there was most close to the average sex ratio of all
other tribal groups (57 versus 58 percent). Sex ratios in rural adwaba expe-
riencing even more control by the bı¯z. a¯n therefore are unlikely to have
42contradicted the patterns found in Moudjéria. Within this context it seems
noteworthy to hint at the opposite imbalance among the bı¯z. a¯n, where the
men, in contrast to what might be expected, slightly outnumber the women.
Although the administrative register cannot be regarded as a source attentive
to migrational movements and therefore might underestimate their number,
it has to be reminded that the data from 1950 presents a situation hardly to
43compare with the present one. Today the Mauritanian rural hinterland has
become characterised by men of all social strata emigrating to the urban
centres and above all women, elders and children staying back home.
   The data of 1950 is most accurate in the sense of being an exhaustive census
of the district’s population by means of registering every inhabitant as a
member of one tribe or fraction. It is therefore able to limit the distortions
arising from a territorially-based assessment of population data, which would
cross-cut these territorially mobile social entities of nomadic society. This
advantage is opposed by the difficulty of constructing and maintaining a
“tribe” as a fixed unit of observation. The bı¯z. a¯n qabı¯la not only used to
change its territory of nomadisation, but size and memberships too, thus
44challenging the records. Finally the heavy migrational movements triggered
off by the droughts of the recent decades, concentrating about one third of
the national population in the capital Nouakchott, brought an end to both
the further viability and practicability of this method of gathering population
45data.
Contemporary Rural Population
   In the quest for an estimate of the importance the various status groups
have in contemporary rural areas eleven villages and neighbourhoods of one
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big village were studied to gather data for something akin to a census of these
socially heterogeneous settlements. The results presented in Table 4 are
unconventional in so far as they do not rely on interviews with all the people
concerned. Given the sensitivity of the information required most crucially –
namely servile and dependent status – a large-scale, open inquiry focusing on
this topic would have firstly been a vain effort due to false information by the
respondents. Second, and much more seriously, any such procedure would
have raised resistance and opposition to further cooperation with my work.
Third, as much of the population is still highly mobile, wandering around
various fields and village-based houses, moving to pastures, and migrating
seasonally to the cities, inquiry on the ground, seeking a nominal population,
incurs further serious problems. Information therefore was gathered from
several paid informants, who in many cases in turn sought assistance among
further informants. The result was census data based on the number of
households considered to be permanently settled by the informants. The
depth of information yielded by the informants varied strongly from one case
to the other. Several informants withdrew their initial consent to the project,
others limited their information so as to avoid touching on any sensitive
matter. This happened in one third of the total projected case studies. Data in
the remaining eleven cases varies too, due to the informants’ differing ability
and willingness to provide information. Figures are most accurate for male
household chiefs, while women’s status failed to be indicated in several cases,
or available data remained superficial. In these cases the more ambitious goals
of research were abandoned rather then forcing the male informants to
release information they were apparently less ready to provide, and in some
cases obviously less familiar with. Nevertheless in a number of cases supple-
mentary data concerning various aspects like property in land and animals,
migration and children could be gathered and provided valuable background
information.
   Depicting status categories in a matrix as in Table 4 seems to contradict
a perception of these as dynamic social constructs, emerging in social and
economic interaction, and thus to give a static description of bı¯z. a¯n social
hierarchy – an image which was hardly ever appropriate, and completely
disregards the actual diffusion into new meanings of many social labels.
Indeed one might argue that distinguishing between ^abı¯d and h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and
additionally “slaves liberated during their lifetime” as is done here, is futile,
for these people all share by and large the same situation. Most probably all
of them would describe themselves as h. ara¯t.ı¯n to any outsider. Insiders on the
other hand continue to know personal histories, and thus origin and status in
many cases. While this knowledge is withheld in much of today’s everyday
interaction, it is maintained for occasions where it might become important,
such as marriages. Another reason to maintain distinct categories is that
many h. ara¯t.ı¯n insist on being a h. art.a¯ni by birth, and having no servile
predecessor, or as in some more dubious cases, to descend from a h. ara¯t.ı¯n
grandfather. To many of these, it is of crucial importance to distinguish
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Table 4: Frequency of Status Group Members in Different Villages
 
village sex
absent
^abı¯d
liberated
h. ara¯t.ı¯n
zna¯ga
šurva
zwa¯ya
h. assa¯n
aothers
missing Tot.
Achoueibir M 8 5 3 4 7 0 3 9 0 0 39
 W 0 4 0 14 6 0 4 9 0 2 39
Hella M 39 14 3 37 16 7 14 33 10 5 178
 W 2 29 6 39 26 3 15 33 16 9 178
Idabouzeid M 7 3 4 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 46
 W 3 6 1 0 0 1 35 0 0 0 46
Achram I M 14 0 2 11 2 0 11 4 3 0 47
 W 3 4 0 15 3 0 11 6 2 3 47
Achram II M 5 6 48 12 0 0 8 6 0 0 85
 W 1 5 9 54 1 0 7 8 0 0 85
Achram III M 8 1 5 3 0 0 25 0 3 0 45
 W 4 2 7 1 0 0 26 1 3 1 45
Leklewa M 12 8 16 26 0 1 16 0 0 0 79
 W 5 19 20 14 0 0 14 0 1 6 79
Labde M 3 8 7 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 31
 W 0 14 5 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 31
Téjal M 13 12 15 15 0 0 0 0 0 1 56
 W 0 40 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 56
Legned M 13 0 0 28 2 0 4 1 0 0 48
 W 2 0 0 40 2 0 1 3 0 0 48
Leqraye M 2 0 27 1 0 0 46 46 7 2 131
 W 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 129 131
Subtotal M 124 57 130 150 27 8 159 99 23 8 785
 W 20 123 57 196 38 4 115 60 22 150 785
Total  144 180 187 346 65 12 274 159 45 158 1,570
a: igga¯wen, ma^alimı¯n and kwa¯r
themselves from those h. ara¯t.ı¯n who acquired this status only recently, and in
correspondence to its folk etymology, meaning “freed slave”, especially if
doubts persist whether this was achieved via a formal act of manumission.
Trying to represent this distinction put forward by many interviewees, I will
introduce here the category of “liberated”, meaning people actually claiming
to be h. ara¯t.ı¯n, but having achieved this status during their lifetime, i.e. not by
inheritance. This of course is an arbitrary distinction, as any manumitted
slave becomes h. ara¯t.ı¯n. The aim is rather to give a hint at the pace of what
could be called “h. art.a¯nisation”, the disappearance of people of formal slave
estate in recent times. Here again the data is to be treated cautiously. While
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the informants frequently distinguished clearly between liberated and h. ara¯t.ı¯n
as far as men were concerned, they did so much less often with regard to
women. These, if not classified as slaves, are often directly subsumed under
the label h. ara¯t.ı¯n, clearly representing the euphemistic use of this term
referring to all su¯da¯n, i.e. slaves, liberated and h. ara¯t.ı¯n. In this respect the
numbers presented reveal the limitations of the data in some case studies
(especially Achoueibir, Achram II), rather than slave women’s achievements
in their struggle for social ascension. Another category quite uncommon in a
description of bı¯z. a¯n social hierarchy are the šurva. While a tribal confedera-
tion of this name does exist, in this case the term is employed only for people
of proclaimed šarı¯fian descent, disregarding affiliation to either h. assa¯n or
46zwa¯ya tribes.
   The study focuses on households, and hence ideally couples rather than
individuals. However, it should be noted that there are cases in which these
are led by only one person. This configuration is revealed by the category
“absent”, representing the men or women missing from the households. This
distinction shows that throughout all villages, many more women lead a
household on their own, and without support of a husband, than men do.
The overall number of 124 households lacking a man (vs. 20 lacking a
woman) constitutes about 16 percent of the total number of households. This
number is effectively still a low estimate of male absenteeism in the rural area.
It only recognises cases in which either member of the couple is deceased or
47divorced. Many men, however, are absent from home for long periods,
mainly in the dry hot season, or even permanently due to migration. The last
official national population census in 1988 thus witnessed a continuous rise
of female heads of households, with the average frequency being 25.3 percent
in rural households (maximum 39.1 percent in the rural sedentary settings)
and 36.8 percent in urban households (maximum of 45 percent in the squatter
areas of Nouakchott; cf. Davis 1997: 115; Simard 1996: 83, 103).
   The different villages and neighbourhoods have quite distinct characteris-
tics. Achoueibir is a small village inhabited by h. assa¯n of one tribe and a few
zwa¯ya families. Hella is the settlement of the former emiral camp of the Ahel
Swayd Ah. med. The name of this village, which corresponds to the word for
an emiral camp in h. assa¯niyya (h. ella), is reminiscent of this more glorious
past. Although by definition a h. assa¯n settlement, quite a number of zwa¯ya
from a wide variety of tribes have moved to Hella. All cases from Idabouzeid
to Achram III represent neighbourhoods of one big zwa¯ya village neighbour-
ing Hella. While Idabouzeid and Achram I are inhabited by su¯da¯n and
zwa¯ya, and also a number of h. assa¯n in the case of Achram I, the majority in
Achram II is constituted by su¯da¯n. In Achram III the zwa¯ya have only one
h. assa¯n woman living among them and only a few su¯da¯n live in this quarter.
Leklewa again is a smaller zwa¯ya village, with one fifth of the population
being bı¯z. a¯n. Labde is a small and recent settlement of su¯da¯n from Achram,
i.e. of zwa¯ya affiliation. Téjal is a similar case, but of su¯da¯n from a h. assa¯n
tribe. Legned finally represents a settlement of h. ara¯t.ı¯n from the Ahel Swayd
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Ah. med, who claim to descend not from slaves, but to have always been an
autonomous body of h. ara¯t.ı¯n within the tribe. Leqraye finally is a medium-
sized village inhabited by many, diverse tribal groups, constituting small
neighbourhoods, and comprising su¯da¯n and zwa¯ya as well as h. assa¯n.
   This short overview illuminates how diverse the social landscapes in the
settlements under study are. While the cases clearly differentiate along such
classical categories as zwa¯ya/h. assa¯n, or bı¯z. a¯n/h. ara¯t.ı¯n dominated villages, this
typology proves unable to apprehend the full scope of social formations.
Clues to an understanding of the villages’ social topography are given rather
by the exploration of a varying set of factors. One such strain is the evolution
of relations of dependency distinct from one tribe to the other. A glance at
the highly diverse tribal histories including the still recent sedentarisation
shows how bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n individuals and groups reconfigured their
relations differently. While tribal cohesion was in most cases strong enough
to make at least a considerable number of su¯da¯n settle with their former
masters, it was the later management of su¯da¯n aspirations by the bı¯z. a¯n that
was decisive to whether su¯da¯n left to build their own villages or remained
with their former masters. Besides different types of master-slave relations
prevailing in bı¯z. a¯n camps with distinct professional and economic specialisa-
tion (cf. chapter five), it is first of all tribal access to land that today shapes
both old and new relations of dependency (cf. chapter seven). As the
demography of bı¯z. a¯n slavery proved to be characterised by a marked
preference for slave women and thus underpinned the perception that slave
men and women were incorporated differently into society, it remains a
major question whether the data on status affiliation in the area of Achram-
Diouk gives evidence of these patterns living on until the present.
The Demography of Rural Su¯da¯n Women
   A major differentiation with regard to the shape of gender relations in the
eleven villages of the region of Achram-Diouk under study here occurs
between su¯da¯n of either h. assa¯n or zwa¯ya affiliation. While the ratio of
women and men across all categories from slave to h. ara¯t.ı¯n is balanced in the
villages and quarters where the majority of su¯da¯n are affiliated to zwa¯ya (e.g.
Achram II, Leklewa, etc.), this is not the case where su¯da¯n are of h. assa¯n
affiliation. In these villages and quarters su¯da¯n women clearly outnumber su¯-
da¯n men, but this imbalance does not represent the number of women actually
living without a husband. Some su¯da¯niyya¯t (su¯da¯n women) are in fact
married to bı¯z. a¯n men, but their number is far from balancing the effects of
the portrayed female overhang. The reasons why so many households (the
number of which is probably largely underestimated in the present study)
simply lack a man vary. Many women stay alone after the death of their
husband, while others decide to continue to lead their own household after
divorce (cf. note 48, this chapter). The marked differential in the sex compo-
sition of the many su¯da¯n households is remarkable for another reason. It
48applies to the second major subordinate group, the zna¯ga too, and proves
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to be a phenomenon more pronounced with respect to subordinate groups,
and less prevalent among bı¯z. a¯n of either zwa¯ya or h. assa¯n status. The number
of the su¯da¯n women actually leading a household alone in the permanent
absence of a man ranges in the h. assa¯n dominated villages from 20 percent in
49Hella, to 42 percent in Achram I. Ratios in the zwa¯ya dominated villages
generally are lower, Idabouzeid and Achram II have null or almost null
percent of the su¯da¯n women leading a household alone, Labde has about
10 percent, Leklewa 13 percent, and Achram III stands out with about
30 percent. In most villages the respective ratios among the bı¯z. a¯n (zna¯ga
excluded) are lower: about 10 percent in Achoueibir and Hella, 16 percent in
Achram II, about 20 percent in Idabouzeid and Achram II. Exceptions are
revealed by the cases of Achram I and Leklewa, both with 26 percent of
bı¯z. a¯n women single head of household. While in Achram I even more of the few
su¯da¯n women (42 percent) as compared to the bı¯z. a¯n women live alone, the
situation is the complete opposite in Leklewa. Here 13 percent of the women
of the large su¯da¯n community live without a male counterpart. Achram I
therefore presents a case where both bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n women face problems
with marital insecurity, while in Leklewa this is a more serious problem for
the bı¯z. a¯n than the su¯da¯n women.
   Reasons for this situation are specific to each case in question. While in
Achram I those factors leading to a surplus in women, and consequently of
unmarried or widowed women, apply to both su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n, with an even
stronger emphasis on the former, they apply in Leklewa foremost to the
bı¯z. a¯n, and thus contradict the general trend. The two villages differ not only in
being either h. assa¯n or zwa¯ya. While in Achram I there live a conglomerate of
bı¯z. a¯n from diverse strata, and su¯da¯n of h. ara¯t.ı¯n status from the Ahel Swayd
Ah. med, in Leklewa the bı¯z. a¯n are of a small, formerly predominantly pastoral
nomadic faction, who in order to obtain some control over cultivable land
had to quarrel with, and dissociate themselves from the elite of their Legwa¯t.it.
tribal body. The su¯da¯n in this case found both a sort of ally in the bı¯z. a¯n, and
access to new plots for cultivation. Achram I therefore represents a case of a
quarter with low social cohesion, and no direct link to natural resources,
whereas Leklewa marks the case of su¯da¯n gaining in many respects, and bı¯z. a¯n
experiencing an ambiguous situation both with reference to natural resources
(the gains in land cannot compensate for the losses in the pastoral sector), and
probably more importantly in symbolic terms, by the experience of margin-
ality.
   Why h. ara¯t.ı¯n of h. assa¯n affiliation more often have their households led by
women without a male partner, while those of zwa¯ya affiliation do not,
remains open to speculation, unless further evidence confirms the findings
developed from the survey, and increases the insights into reasons. The
motives for women leading a household on their own are manifold. While in
the different quarters of Achram a considerable number of zwa¯ya women
simply are not married, but nevertheless live on their own, the majority of
the h. ara¯t.ı¯n women in the same situation in Legned are old and widowed. As
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marriage patterns with regard to marital age and other demographic factors
do not differ significantly among the status groups, habits of integration of
old people may vary from one village community to another.
   In view of the scarce resources of the region of Achram-Diouk being the
major reason for rural emigration and the male seasonal migration to the
cities, different constraints on the access of the two different h. ara¯t.ı¯n groups,
those with a zwa¯ya and those with a h. assa¯n tribal affiliation, to local resourc-
es can be discerned as another factor responsible for sex imbalance and
households led by women alone. Indeed, as will be analysed below (cf.
chapter seven), zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n in the region practise different modes of
land tenure, and attribution of land to dependent people. In addition, some
tribes are better off with regard to control over land than others.
   A more pronounced, and often permanent male migration out of the rural
area necessarily influences marriage patterns. Older, divorced or widowed
women who already have several children may face more problems than
young ones in contracting a new marriage with one of the few men in the
area willing and able to pay for a marriage. This is the predominant constella-
tion in Téjal, where many women living alone have children still going to
school, and very few are old and widowed. Many young women nonetheless
leave for the cities in order to get the right husband there, and only later
come back. An overaged population, resulting from the migration of many
men and some women at their most active age, leads to disproportion in the
number of men and women, and many women being unmarried. As men
normally are much older than women in bı¯z. a¯n marriages, the number of
widowed women in a community is likely to increase in correlation to its
mean age. All these points emerge as being dependent on the evolution of the
rural area’s attractiveness to young residents. Obviously su¯da¯n perceive
fewer opportunities in the rural area than bı¯z. a¯n do, or else the cities are more
attractive to su¯da¯n than to bı¯z. a¯n. This is revealed by the male absenteeism
among the former being generally stronger than among the latter. The reason
for this unbalanced and uneven evolution of rural demography has to be seen
in the various settings of social and economic deprivation experienced by
either su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n in the rural villages. Relations of dependency between
su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n, and the gender aspects of this relation, vary from one
community to the other. Hence the greatest number of su¯da¯n women
actually without a husband is found among the h
˘
edma¯n (sing. h
˘
a¯dem), the
slave women of Hella and Téjal. Here low women’s status appears as
inhibiting to marriage. Second, in a few cases the absence of marriages still
results from the bı¯z. a¯n social practices of domination that denied slaves the
50right to marry. A lack of economic opportunities leading to the young
men’s rural exodus thus is at the basis of further social deprivation experi-
enced by women, and here especially the women of low status remaining in
the rural hinterland.
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Sex, Gender and Servile Demography
One major thread links the demography of servile groups in and beyond
Africa throughout the centuries, and until the present. The relations of
dependency manifested in slavery, and more recently in patron-client ties,
have always been, and continue to exploit gender as a means of domination
(cf. Glassman 1995). Women and men living in conditions of servility
experienced different modes of domination. This only partially resulted from
slave women and men being acquired for different purposes and uses, and
thus being more or less valued throughout West Africa. The deprivation of
kinship which slaves had to experience meant different things to women and
men respectively. Consequently, masters adopted different practices to
exploit this important means of domination with regard to slave women and
men. The greater hardship slave women experienced compared to slave men
when they struggled for increased autonomy from their masters, as inferred
above from the life histories of women and men who experienced slave
relations (cf. chapter two), can be traced in the demographic material present-
ed in this chapter. Both the colonial census (cf. Table 3), and the contem-
porary study of villages in the region of Achram-Diouk reveal that women
are more often bound to the slave estate than men. Manumission in recent
times, i.e. the opportunities of enhancing one’s status (though the data here is
less precise for the women’s cases), has also been achieved by many more
men than women (cf. Table 4). The figures for the h. ara¯t.ı¯n seem to alter this
image, for they show a greater number of women than men belonging to this
category. The number of h. art.a¯niyya¯t, i.e. h. ara¯t.ı¯n women, is likely to be
overestimated in Table 4 and Table 5, because data provided for women
was less precise than for men. The delicate question of whether a woman
classified as “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” had achieved this status through her parents, or had
achieved it by manumission, was less often possible to confirm. Any person
whose status was in doubt in the present survey was classified as belonging to
the highest possible status group. However, the total number of 56.8 percent
h. art.a¯niyya¯t is less dramatically biased in favour of the women than one
would expect. It is indeed quite close to the sex ratio of either the artisans or
the h. assa¯n. Such relations can already be expected to result from the high
ratio of male migration among the h. ara¯t.ı¯n.
   A major objection to this conclusion can be derived from the nature of this
very data. It provides only a glimpse of sex ratios in recent times, and it
displays a great variation among the villages and neighbourhoods. As the
relations of dependency were subject to massive changes throughout this
century, and probably throughout the preceding ones too, conclusions on the
basis of this data on the nature of gender relations and sex ratios in earlier
times run the risk of portraying the past in terms of the present. There are
factors in the evolution of slave relations in bı¯z. a¯n society which probably
favoured an increase of the masters’ pressures to preserve their rights in the
women slaves. After the end of the African slave trade during the first years
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Table 5: Status Affiliation of Women and Men
51 (Data from Ten Villages in the Region of Achram-Diouk)
 Men
(row percent)
Women
(row percent)
Total
(column percent)
^abı¯d 57 (31.7%) 123 (68.3%) 180 (15.8%)
liberated 103 (64.4%) 57 (35.6%) 160 (14.0%)
h. ara¯t.ı¯n 149 (43.2%) 196 (56.8%) 345 (30.3%)
zna¯ga 27 (41.5%) 38 (58.5%) 65 (5.7%)
šurva 8 (64.3%) 4 (35.7%) 12 (1.0%)
zwa¯ya 114 (50.2%) 113 (49.8%) 227 (19.9%)
h. assa¯n 52 (46.4%) 60 (53.6%) 112 (9.8%)
aothers 16 (42.1%) 2 (57.9%) 38 (3.3%)
Subtotal su¯da¯n 309 (45.1%) 376 (54.9%) 685 (60.1%)
Subtotal bı¯z. a¯n 217 (47.8%) 237 (52.2%) 454 (39.9%)
Total 526 (46.2%) 613 (53.8%) 1,139 (100%)
a: igga¯wen, ma^alimı¯n, kwa¯r
th of the 20 century, these women had become the sole source of new slaves.
Manumitting slave women, unlike manumitting slave men, had the conse-
quence of giving up rights in their progeny. While the exact impact this
change in the outer dialectics of bı¯z. a¯n slavery had is difficult to discern, its
relevance as a factor contributing to a change in bı¯z. a¯n master-slave relations
has to be affirmed. Nevertheless, its occurrence, which by now is almost one
hundred years past, did not alter the gendered structure of bı¯z. a¯n slavery
altogether. It rather solidified structures already present. Slave women
became an important source of slave reproduction not only with the end of
the slave trade in the region. Although the demography of the bı¯z. a¯n slaves is
likely to have been negative, like those of the other African slave populations,
slave women had children, and these continued to be slaves. Other factors,
such as e.g. the gendered structure of slave labour, and the ambiguities in
slave women’s and men’s divergent options for status enhancement, as will be
shown in the next chapter, also shaped relations between slaves and masters.
They were the reason why the control of slave women by the masters was
stricter and tighter than that of slave men.
   It is not intended here to assume that the gendered experience of the slave
condition in recent times is identical to that of the past. Rather the conclusion
to be drawn from the present data is that gender, i.e. the changing configura-
tions of gender relations in bı¯z. a¯n society, has been essential to the definition
of master-slave relations. The rise of slave emancipation and manumission
did not alter this configuration. As it was possible to show in this chapter,
those relations of power and dependency embedded in gender relations were
not directly challenged by the emancipation project. Also today, men have
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better chances than women to formally surmount servile estate. Maintaining
women’s servile estate is a strategy for many bı¯z. a¯n who wish to preserve
their mastership. The denial of manumission remains a powerful means in the
hand of the bı¯z. a¯n masters, because it enables them to maintain relations of
domination and symbolic supremacy over these women, but in some respects
over their men and their progeny too. This is true although the emancipation
of the servile and dependent strata has achieved many successes to date, and
continues to move on as the growing number of h. ara¯t.ı¯n and liberated slaves
shows. With regard to this process, the analysis of gender relations proves to
be crucial in discerning where the new emerges, and where the past continues
to shape the present.
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Chapter 5
Gender and Status in the Topography of Work
Gendered Labour
Work is most prominent in the narratives of Zeyneb, a h. art.a¯niyya of slave
origin, and M’Barke, still bound to slave estate (cf. p. 62-69). The su¯da¯n
women work in the master’s household, and they work on the fields. They
do all kinds of work: work which is “not normal” for women, because
conceived as being – according to bı¯z. a¯n categories – men’s work, and typical
female work. They herded goats, watered animals, cultivated and pounded
millet, prepared food, collected wild plants, breast-fed the mistress’ children,
and much more. All this work M’Barke claims to have done “in one day”, i.e.
to have worked without interruption. Very much the same image is transmit-
ted by a number of bı¯z. a¯n oral traditions on slavery. These stories tell the fate
of slave women, almost crushed by the load of work their masters oblige
them to do (cf. Tauzin 1993: 71ff., 1989b). What goes almost unrecognised is
the gender bias of these stories: there are none presented at any rate telling of
1male slaves working under conditions similar to those of female slaves.
These observations hint at another domain of gender-specific conditions of
slavery. The question is: to what extent did gender and status differentiation
shape the topography of work?
   Broaching the topic with the broad intention of tracing gender distinctions
within bı¯z. a¯n slavery, one has to be aware of several limitations any such
attempt necessarily faces. The historical depth of available empirical data is
limited. Besides the life-stories at the core of this study, there are only a few
sources speaking of slaves and slave occupations in former times. Women’s
work, either free or slave women’s, in these sources (as in many others) very
often remains neglected, if not obscured. Nevertheless some statements and
accounts give a general idea of the primary occupations and the (work-)
places of slave women and slave men in historical times. Wherever appropri-
ate to illustrate contrasts, those activities which were predominantly assigned
to slaves are compared to those of free people, hence illuminating the division
of male and female labour and spaces, as well as the social connotations of
distinct kinds of work.
   The question whether there were practices of a gender division of labour
not only among free members of bı¯z. a¯n society, but among slaves too, is
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crucial for an understanding of the relations of domination, and therefore will
be analysed in detail throughout the present chapter. Slaves by their estate
had their sociality negated and as virtual non-members of society had no
right to be treated in accordance with the gendered patterns in use among the
2free. As a consequence, the practice of a strict gender division of labour not
only for the free, but for the slaves too, would open up for the latter a social
field – gendered patterns of work – on which to act as social beings like the
free. Conversely, the denial of respect for the gender attributes of particular
tasks is a means by which masters could force slaves to enact their own
de-gendering, or else de-socialisation, and thus highlight and reproduce the
fundamental difference between masters and slaves. One might now argue
that the practice of slavery, especially in a household context like in bı¯z. a¯n
society, never succeeded in being a total institution, and that therefore the
exclusion of slaves from society remained largely part of the masters’ legal
fiction of this institution. I share this point of view (which can equally well
be held with regard to plantation slavery), but would like to reframe it. Slaves
were well aware of the de-socialisation they experienced when performing
tasks not complying with the patterns of the gender division of labour in use
among the free (cf. the bitterness M’Barke expresses when telling she had to
herd animals, i.e. to do typical male work; cf. p. 68). The location of slave
work in the right gender domain thus becomes an open ground for dispute
defining the master-slave power relation, and the slave’s ascension to a
condition more respectful of his sociality. The thesis explored here moves
beyond stating the development of a distinct kind of gender division of
labour among slaves. The argument put forward instead is that the master-
slave relations slave women and men experienced through their work were
structured differently. Slave women and men, for a number of reasons, were
effectively assigned different spheres of (sometimes overlapping) duties.
These distinct experiences, and the resulting different social relations with
their masters, meant that slave women and men resided not only in different
locations of the social and symbolic world, but also assigned them different
3locations on the territorial topography of the slaveholding society.
   Discerning the gender characteristics of work, and especially of slave work,
is crucial to an understanding of slavery not only in bı¯z. a¯n society. The much
greater demand for slave women as opposed to slave men observed in West
African and Arab Muslim societies, and the primarily female slave population
witnessed among the bı¯z. a¯n (cf. chapter four), raises the question whether
these gendered patterns of slavery had any distinct impact on the work
performed by slaves in bı¯z. a¯n society as well. It goes without saying that the
import of slaves, i.e. of slave labour, transforms the social organisation of
work in the enslaving society. Masters and mistresses may withdraw from
4manual work, and shift to other occupations, or have more leisure. Intro-
ducing slavery, ending slavery, ups and downs in slave supply and the size of
slave populations, as well as other economic factors affect the distribution of
work among members of different social strata and gender attributes of
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work. Patterns of slave labour, as well as those of the free members of
society, are not fixed categories, but are dynamic and change over time.
Response to new conditions, as will be shown, was often quick. Enslaving
societies in this respect were not static. The bı¯z. a¯n, as well as other Sahelian
slave holders, knew very well how to profit from their slaves, and increase
their number for this end. However they also managed to face the decline in
slave supply that was inflicted on them by the French colonisation of the
th 5Mauritanian territory at the beginning of the 20 century.
   The following paragraphs examine labour within bı¯z. a¯n society from two
different angles. First the major lines structuring the gender division of
labour among both bı¯z. a¯n and slaves are developed. In a second step this
analysis is detailed by sector-oriented studies of work, elucidating where
slaves and other dependent strata were put to productive work in bı¯z. a¯n
6society, and how other social strata were related to these tasks. Although
this section of the present chapter will focus mainly on the “visible” work
beyond the household, which is generally represented as male work, women
– above all slave women – appear working in these sectors too. They make up
an important part of the workers in the agricultural and pastoral sector.
Finally the interpenetration of different ideologies, of a gender division of
labour, and of labour segregation by social hierarchy is analysed.
Slave Women’s and Free Women’s Labour
   Elucidating female slave work is a difficult task, for much of it remains in the
7obscurity of the many duties of household-labour. Historical eye-witness
accounts, little interested in any kind of women’s work, at best neglected to
pay much attention to the issue. And, until recently, the social sciences took
8much the same attitude. Contemporary interviews face the problem that
verbalising the supposedly self-evident, but in fact manifold and complex
tasks daily household labour consists of, is difficult both for the interviewee
and the still unknowing interviewer. Therefore only limited means exist to
explore past work. An ethnographic approach to labour first of all relies on
(participant) observation, and thus refers to the present (cf. Beck 1988: 23f).
In the context of dismantling slave work in the household, which – although
remnants persist – by and large is an outdated phenomenon in Mauritania,
further restrictions arise from the slave interviewees’ interest in limiting the
representation of their recently surmounted humiliation as regards work, as
well as the master interviewees’ interest in downplaying their personal
involvement in practices of slavery. Besides remaining silent on the topic, two
major distortions appear in the narratives, idealisation and denunciation of
past master-slave relations. Despite these limitations some major female slave
tasks can be traced.
   Probably the first account providing some details on the life of slaves in bı¯z. a¯n
society comes from Saugnier, a Frenchman shipwrecked on the western
Saharan coast in January 1784. He noticed free women had to serve their
husbands, but in effect rarely did so, as most had a black slave woman
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relieving them of this duty. The slaves’ condition was far from good. While
working in the household, the slave women were constantly ordered around
by their mistresses (cf. Saugnier [1792] in Saugnier/Brisson 1969: 88, 94f.).
   René Caillié (1830), who made his five month long trip to the Brakna bı¯z. a¯n
in 1824, started in Podor, a French trade post (“escale”) on the northern bank
of the river Senegal. He headed north-east for several days, until he met a
camp of slaves of the ^amı¯r of Brakna. These slaves, living together in
families, cultivated millet and were headed and supervised by an old zwa¯ya.
To honour his host, this chief commanded that Caillié be given some
“sanglé”, a porridge prepared from pounded millet and water called ^aiš in
h. assa¯niyya. Who prepared the dish is not mentioned by Caillié, but probably
it was done by a su¯da¯n woman. However, it was another circumstance that
attracted the attention of the young Frenchman: the whole slave camp lacked
9the milk that among freeborn had to accompany ^aiš. One of the slaves
Caillié met at this occasion was a woman of Wolof origin. She told him in her
native language – which Caillié spoke well – that the rich bı¯z. a¯n sent slaves
10each year to sow and cultivate millet. Once the harvest was finished, they
would return to the camps of their masters. Visiting the fields, Caillié saw the
slaves weeding with hoes, a technique he supposed to be one of bad cultivat-
ors, for it only turned the ground superficially (cf. Caillié 1830 53f.). While
Caillié failed to detail whether specific tasks were carried out by men or
women, the account is important, for it proves that already in the first half of
th the 19 century slaves were living as couples in seasonal adwaba, and jointly
cultivated millet on plots flooded by the rain. The presence of a slave woman
aware of her Wolof origin suggests that these slaves perpetuated, or at least
profited from their ancestral customs of cultivation (cf. Caillié 1830: 58, 85f.,
1195ff.).
   The measures necessary to fatten the young bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t to make them
conform to the bı¯z. a¯n model of female beauty was often conveyed to slave
women. Being charged with the task of fattening these girls meant the slaves
were, exceptionally, put in a position of considerable authority, and they
forced the young bı¯z. a¯n girls to drink enormous amounts of milk and other
foodstuffs using all means at their disposal. They pinched their victims until
they bled, beat them and worse. Less unusual, and hence less noteworthy was
the slave women’s contribution to work in the household, e.g. the churning
of butter in a goat-skin (cf. Caillié 1830: 99ff.; Meyer 1959: 53; Interview
Benne Mint Ahmed, h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995). It was the slave women’s duty too
to fetch water for their masters’ requirements, as well as for the animals
remaining for various reasons in the camp. This often collectively performed
walk to a well or pool of rainwater had a light-hearted quality, encouraging
the unwatched slave women to enjoy their temporary liberty by singing and
dancing together (cf. Caillié 1830: 168).
   Most of the tasks described in the historic accounts reappear in the
contemporary life-stories of women of slave origin I gathered in the region of
Achram-Diouk. Their primary occupation – at least for a period of life – was
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with the masters’ household. As best portrayed by M’Barke, the focus of the
slave women’s duty was to relieve the mistresses of all menial and repetitive
tasks. Therefore slave women had to pound millet and prepare meals, fetch
water, care for young and sick animals remaining within the camp, spin and
weave wool, and so forth. The amount of work entailed in many of these
tasks varied throughout the seasons. Consumption of millet was drastically
reduced, if not stopped completely during the various animals’ main lactation
period (cf. Caillié 1830: 100f., Oxby 1978: 153). While the amount of millet
pounded diminished, the processing of milk increased, e.g. zebde (butter), or
šnı¯n (sour milk mixed with water) had to be prepared. The hardship of
fetching water too was determined by the season’s being dry or wet. How
much time had to be spent collecting firewood also depended on a variety of
factors. The more arid the region the masters’ camp was in, the more difficult
it was to get hold of the necessary amount of wood suited to being burnt near
the tents and for cooking. Different cooking habits, too, influenced the
distribution of tasks within the household. While in historic accounts some
pastoral nomadic bı¯z. a¯n living in the north are described as eating only once a
day (cf. Saugnier [1792] in Saugnier/Brisson 1969: 124), this austerity was
more easily overcome where climatic conditions were more favourable, and
agro-pastoral production and trade more developed (cf. Vincent 1860: 486).
th   During the 20 century the avenue of newly emerging patterns of pastoral
production and consumption led to further change. The rise of rice from a
luxury side dish to a major staple food is but one example of this evolution.
Rice, in the cities nowadays mainly prepared for lunch, has the advantage of
needing no pounding and being much quicker in preparation (cf. Ould
Cheikh/Bonte 1982: 34ff.; Ruf 1995: 136ff.). While seasonal variation could
reduce the amount of slave women’s work, the need for female support never
stopped, and could always be extended by transferring work formerly done
by the mistresses to the slave women. This is why some tasks in different
reports are presented either as female or slave tasks (e.g. taking down and
setting up the tents; cf. Saugnier [1792] in Saugnier/Brisson 1969: 83: 143;
Bourrel 1861: 529). To meet the mistresses’ expectations, and relieve them
permanently of all kinds of undesired manual work, the slave women had to
keep close to their tents all day long. They left only if in charge of a specific
duty outside the camp. The slave women’s ability to withdraw from the tent
could be diminished by the imposition of specific tasks like nursing and
12watching the mistress’ children, which needed her permanent presence.
   Another complex of slave women’s work is independent of a direct
commitment to the masters, but related to their own physical reproduction.
Although it is one of the masters’ main duties to feed their slaves (cf. Schacht
1964: 128; Lewis 1990: 6ff.), this obligation in a number of cases was met only
partially. René Caillié (1830: 84f.) tells of an old slave woman who procured
him porridge in exchange for some of the milk she had from a cow her
masters had given her to live off. However, as Caillié does not fail to remark,
the masters had taken care to choose a very bad animal. Slave women
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regularly collected ^az, a wild grain used as a substitute for millet, but con-
sumed regularly only by slaves. The masters preferred millet porridge (cf.
13Bourrel 1861: 41f.; Caillié 1830: 58, 85). It might have been that the slaves’
knowledge of substitute food provided by wild plants and roots was much
more developed than the masters’. Saugnier reports that he was only able to
cope with his permanent hunger by using a part of his time out in the bush
herding to look for this kind of food, and eventually secretly barbecue a
sheep he took from his master’s herd (cf. Saugnier/Brisson [1792] 1969: 38).
Much later the Dahoméan human rights activist Louis Hunkanrin (sentenced
to detention in the 1930s in Tidjikja and other Mauritanian towns) made the
failure of the slave masters to feed and clothe their slaves one of the most
prominent of his many complaints concerning the persistence of slavery in
14Mauritania (cf. Hunkanrin 1964: 33, 36).
   Slave women leaving their masters’ camp to cultivate millet or dates along
with slave men, and often together with their children, left the narrow circle
15of chiefly reproductive work in the household and camp, and became in-
volved in the production of material goods directly benefiting their masters’
income. For these reasons the female slaves’ contribution to work beyond the
ideological boundary of feminine work is discussed alongside the description
of agricultural labour in the section on agricultural labour (cf. p. 158-161).
   Giving an impression of the free women’s occupation, proves difficult
because the ideal of noble femininity propagates inactivity. This ideal, how-
ever, is a relative measure which can only be defined in terms of a comparison
to the range of activities someone is abstaining from, and compared to a sort
of social average. A look at the most important female slave tasks reveals,
however, that not all tasks arising in the context of household work in like
manner have to be omitted for the sake of noble femininity. Tasks like
collecting firewood, fetching water, pounding millet etc., are less compatible
with a noble’s life than e.g. spinning and weaving, often performed in female
groups. This becomes apparent in the following accounts:
When I was young my only work consisted of showing the su¯da¯n to make
tents and how to work with the wool. Of course then it was only the
su¯da¯n who did this work. There were some bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t doing this work too,
but I never shared this occupation. I only made some mats. (Interview
16Loughaye Mint Driss, zwa¯ya, 18.9.1995)
To prepare the food there were slaves; in those times there were a lot of
slaves, every family had one, they brought the water and did much other
work . . . There was a slave to assist our mother with the upbringing of the
children. (Interview Benne Mint Ahmed, h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995)
In those days I always remained sitting. It’s no good for me to work with
my hands. I come from a family where this is unusual, therefore it would
be no good if I would be the only one to work with the hands. . . . My
daughter too does not pound millet. At least as long as I stayed with her.
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Actually I don’t know if she works, because she is not here. She lives in
the city now. Normally there she must have a maid to do the work. . . .
Working on the fields is no good to me, but my husband and sons work
17there. . . . I don’t need to do other work like sewing [leather] pillows or
weaving mats. We have money to buy these goods. (Interview Khaite
Mint Mohamed, h. assa¯n, 21.10.1995)
When bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t, i.e. freeborn women, had to face situations constraining the
amount of slave labour at their disposal, the hierarchy inherent to female
labour became obvious. One such case is reported from a Rgayba¯t house-
hold, still living together with its slaves in the 1980s. The tent, residing in the
Zemmour region on the northern edge of today’s Mauritania in February,
consisted of a couple of already somewhat advanced age, one young slave
man, two slave women, a slave girl of about eight and a slave baby. The
married sons of the family had migrated to the cities, and worked as traders.
All the slaves were occupied with herding, although the amount of livestock
was modest. The young man left the camp every morning with the 20 camels,
the two women herded the 30 sheep divided into two small herds, and the
girl took care of the 10 goats. The chief of the family decided every morning
where to graze the animals throughout the day. His wife, assisted by a young
relative of her husband’s, prepared the food – even for the slaves (cf. Caratini
1989: 101). Rather than accept Sophie Caratini’s interpretation, stating this
configuration of master and slave occupations to reveal the end of slave
practices among the Rgayba¯t, I suggest the case illuminates how free women
manage to sustain difference between themselves and the slave women. The
locus of this battle – in fact reflecting much of the changing circumstances
master-slave relations are nowadays subjected to – is both the nature and the
location of work. The free women stick to the camp and even remain within
the tent, while the slave women go to the pasture. Hence they refrain from
joining in herding, a practice which the Rgayba¯t are denounced for, and
which makes them the targets of mockery from other bı¯z. a¯n (cf. Caratini
1989: 95).
   The tent is the domain of the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t. It is their possession, and they
have the know-how, as well as the responsibility to manufacture and repair it.
Localising isolated, female spots distinct from the vast entity of the outside
world assigned to the men produces a gendered map of space. Distinguishing
the tent’s shade from the brightness of the outside world reminds one greatly
of the practices producing shifting boundaries of gendered spaces analysed
by Pierre Bourdieu (1972: 45-69) in his ethnographic study of the North
African Kabyle house. Homologous distinctions are reproduced on different
levels. Once the focus is on the house itself, the front is the locality of the
men, and the back belongs to the women. In addition many of the house’s
elements and utensils are either attributed to the women’s or the men’s
world. But the situation is inverted when the focus changes, and the house is
set in relation to its environment. During the day, the house becomes the sole
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domain of the women. The men have to avoid going in, in order not to give
rise to suspicion. This dichotomy is one of private and public life, day and
night, fire and water. Through the shifting boundary, the house represents
ambivalence, it is both female and hybrid, female-male.
   Identifying social spaces and associating them with distinct material
localities emerges as an ambivalent project. Stating the tent to be the locality
of the women and the outer world to be the men’s is both right and wrong. It
would be neglecting the nature of social organisation to classify such distinc-
tions as invariable and static. To have the boundary shift between private and
public, between the male and the female spaces, is essential to make this
distinction work. Both domains are interdependent, and constituted from
their opposition to each other. Complete separation, ending the encounter
producing difference, would make the distinction senseless. A shifting
boundary has also been localised by Sophie Caratini (1989: 111ff.) in her
interpretation of the symbolic meanings of the bı¯z. a¯n tent. The frontier of in
and out, male and female, represented by light and darkness, can shift from
distinguishing the exterior and the interior of the tent to distinguishing its
front and back. This is the case when visitors are received in the daytime, and
hence the distinction of outside/inside is incorporated into the tent’s small
universe. While during daylight privacy is compressed either into the tent or
its back, once the night has fallen, it expands to the tent’s surroundings.
   The darkness of the night is also important in another way. In its shelter the
young women and men can gather and have fun without offending the rules
of social conduct. The night also is used to resolve dilemmas: when young
couples do not constitute their own tent immediately after marriage, the
woman continues to live with her parents. As the man by bı¯z. a¯n customs is
advised not to meet his father-in-law, he would hardly ever have an opportu-
nity to meet his spouse. This absurd scenario is circumvented by the woman
installing her bed at some distance to her parent’s tent. Once the night has
come, she will leave the tent and spend the night with her husband, until he
18leaves at sunrise.
   Slaves living in a small tent, and not in the master’s, were not uncondition-
ally allowed entrance into the privacy of the master’s tent. They are only
allowed to enter the tent and step on the mats if the man was outside, and
their duty located within the tent (Caratini 1989: 111ff.). Getting into the
tent, and even more so being accorded a place within it, was a major step
forward in a slave’s struggle to be treated like the free – and distinguish
19themselves from slaves not granted these privileges. Getting into the tent
first of all was a slave woman’s concern. Its success was bound to the patterns
of integration analysed above as slave woman-free woman relations (cf.
chapter three). Establishing intimacy and maintaining it among slave women
and free women necessitated allowing for close co-residence. Slave women
nursing their mistresses’ children, and hence establishing milk kinship, had to
enter the tent to be able to do so. When replacing the free women’s reproduc-
tive labour, the slave women had to follow a time schedule largely independ-
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ent of their master’s will. Slave women thus were not only able to obtain the
free women’s confidence, and to learn much about what it meant to behave
like a noblewoman, but achieved rights to locate themselves within the core
20locality of femininity.
   Facing the subversive side-effects of entrusting slave women with a wide
range of female tasks, and having them reside most closely, the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t
had to rely on other means to produce difference between themselves and the
slave women. As revealed by the case of the Rgayba¯t family above, attribu-
ting different kinds of work also serves to establish difference between slaves
and masters. Just like the shifting boundary of male and female spaces,
distinguishing slave from noble work is the outcome of a relational undertak-
ing. A noblewoman who has all her slave women go out and herd, will not be
compromised by herself working in the household. A different case is that of
a noblewoman like Loughaye Mint Driss (cf. above, p. 144), who abstained
almost completely from working herself, but reproduced her supremacy by
her knowledge of the tasks enabling her to instruct and supervise the slaves.
   Besides these relational modes of defining noble and slave work, some fixed
patterns of honourable or dishonouring work evolved. Pounding millet is the
most prominent task incompatible with living a noblewoman’s life. Conse-
quently avoiding pounding plays a major role in today’s struggles for status
enhancement. The narrative of Valha (cf. p. 69-72), a woman of zna¯ga status,
is intriguing on this point. While the zna¯ga women, who in this case lived
without support from slave women, did everything considered to be wom-
en’s work, from cooking to fetching water, they later managed at least to
delegate the tiring pounding and fetching water. During the dry season the
camp was joined by some h. ara¯t.ı¯n families. The women of these engaged in
pounding the zna¯ga families’ millet for payment. As pounding was a female
task, but the payment of the h. art.a¯niyya¯t had to be effected in cash generated
by the men’s trade in livestock, introducing this new division of labour
manifested a new definition of gender relations among free men and women.
Pounding millet is today even more a symbol of inferior status as contracts
applying to household maids make obvious. These are paid fairly poorly on a
monthly basis (about 2-4,000 UM in the region of Achram-Diouk), and get
food and accommodation. Despite comprising all other work in the house-
hold throughout the whole day, the contracts generally exclude the pounding
of millet. If it is to be included, another 2,000 UM have to be paid (Interview
Khaite Mint Mohamed, h. assa¯n, 21.10.1995). However, money seems not to
be the sole objective in this arrangement, as many maids refuse to pound at
21all. Facing these problems, and with the modern, motor-driven mills
 22proving to be cheaper than rarely available manual pounding, most people
nowadays eat ground millet – despite the many negative features attributed to
23it.
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Slave Men’s and Free Men’s Labour
   Slave men, as already revealed in the life-stories, had a variety of jobs. Most
prominent were cultivation of millet, date-palms, and herding. As the
different bı¯z. a¯n groupings’ commitment to these distinct branches of produc-
24tion varied, the major duties of slave men differed too. With the bı¯z. a¯n being
either pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, or even traders, the slave men’s
occupations could vary between herding, a seasonal combination of herding
and cultivation, just cultivation, work in the caravan trade, and other jobs.
The following paragraphs explore the slave men’s work and elucidate how
these correspond to their respective social, ecological and economic context.
th th    The accounts of the involuntary shipwrecked 18 and 19 century visitors
to the western Sahara provide a concurring image of male slave labour.
Therefore, male slaves’ most important occupation in the northern region of
bı¯z. a¯n territory was herding. Without any delay and almost without appren-
ticeship they had to leave the camp with either sheep and goats, or else
camels, lead them to pasture, guard them throughout the day, and get back to
the camp by sunset. Poor bı¯z. a¯n possessing no slaves sent their own children
with the herds. One difference was made between the free and the slaves:
while the former got breakfast, the latter had to leave the camp with an
empty belly. However, also adult free men would herd, as Saugnier recounts
in an earlier passage of his narrative (cf. Saugnier/Brisson [1792] 1969: 34, 37,
89). Sometimes the bı¯z. a¯n took precautions with regard to their newly
acquired and inexperienced slave herders. Alexander Scott, shipwrecked in
1810 and held in captivity for six years, had to herd sheep and goats. On the
job he was accompanied, advised and supervised by one of his masters’ three
daughters (cf. Scott [1821] in Barbier 1985: 81f.). Follie, after having been
sold and resold several times, entered service of a rich man, who started
treating him much better than his predecessors and led him to his small
village in what is now south Morocco, north of the Oued Drâa. While Follie
described his job as herding camels, his account seems rather to be of some-
one guarding some newly sown plots from being invaded by the surrounding
camels. These, untypically for grazing camels which are at their happiest
roaming over vast pastures, were hobbled and thus unable to move far (cf.
Follie [1785] in Barbier 1984: 76ff.). Besides herding, however, the slave men
also had to join in a number of domestic tasks. The number of duties and the
lack of relief from endless work, combined with poor feeding made Brisson
complain to his master about his misery: “I make faggots, I churn butter, I
tend the flocks, I pull up roots, I prepare camel’s hair for your wife to spin, I
till the earth, I do everything in a word that you require of me.” (Brisson
[1792] in Saugnier/Brisson 1969: 437)
   A different impression of male slave duties is given by René Caillié (1830:
98ff.). Among the Brakna he saw camels primarily herded by h. ara¯t.ı¯n or
zna¯ga, and only rarely entrusted to slaves. The latter were rather responsible
for leading the cattle to pasture, and for driving them back to the camp in the
evening. Late at night, around 10 p.m., they had to milk them under the
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supervision of the bı¯z. a¯n. Children, either free or slave, are not mentioned as
working. Agricultural labour, according to Caillié, absorbed a considerable
number of male slaves. This is largely due to the location of his stay. Unlike
the shipwrecked men, Caillié’s trip led him to places within the šema¯ma, the
southern Mauritanian area with major agricultural potential on the border of
the Senegal river. To the north-east of his starting point Podor, he visited
places like Aleg, where the cultivation of millet was common on the large
plots inundated by rain (e.g. seasonal lake of Aleg). Additionally, he travelled
during the cultivation period, and thus experienced the season with the
fewest demands on herding labour, but the largest exigencies upon agricul-
ture. Besides cultivation, the collection of gum arabic was a slave task too.
Beginning in mid December, slaves were sent to form a small camp near the
gum-trees and start the harvest. Again supervised by some zwa¯ya, the slaves
had to work all day and were equipped only with a leather bag containing
some water, and a second one to receive the gum. Getting back at sunset,
they had the milk of one cow provided by their masters for food; the supervi-
sing zwa¯ya had the milk of two cows and some millet. The supervisor was
paid by having the right to the yield of every sixth day of harvest. Sometimes
impoverished zna¯ga joined the work. These had to pay half of their harvest in
25order to get the concession to collect gum (cf. Caillié 1830: 133ff.).
   Even more pronounced is the report of Ah. mad al-Amı¯n aš-Šinqı¯tı¯ (whose
name was transcribed as Ahmed Lamine Ech Chenguiti by his translator). In
the late nineteenth century Trarza, gum was harvested by slaves, sent out for
this purpose by their masters who had come to the regions with dense stands
of gum-trees. Should a slave fail to deliver the amount of gum desired by his
master, he risked getting a sound thrashing. The collection of gum was not
restricted to the Trarza region, but took place in all southerly regions from
the east to the west (Ech Chenguiti 1953: 116f.). Much the same was observed
by the midshipman Bourrel (1861: 522f.) who travelled from Podor to the
Tagant in 1860, hence revisiting some of the places already described by
Caillié. He noticed the zwa¯ya sent their slaves to collect gum arabic, and later
exchange it at the “escale” for guinée cloth and even millet. From this trade,
as well as their numerous herds and the cultivation of millet, he assumed the
zwa¯ya had developed a level of affluence unknown to their h. assa¯n fellows. In
the zwa¯ya camps millet never lacked, and milk was drunk more than once a
day. This industry was possible due to large numbers of badly treated slaves.
Among the h. assa¯n on the contrary, slaves could achieve some respect from
26their masters and even rise to be considered as counsellors.
   Another important, above all male slave occupation was the cultivation of
date palm groves, numerous in the Adrar and Tagant. With the objective of
27expanding this activity, slaves were imported in large numbers. Most of
these slaves brought to the capital of the Tagant, Tidjikja, were renowned for
being of Bambara origin (cf. Ech Chenguiti 1953: 138).
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Domains of Work
Herding Labour
   Given that many noble bı¯z. a¯n withdrew themselves from any direct implica-
tion in the daily obligations of herding, and many of their slaves had an
important share of their work-time assigned to tasks other than herding, the
question arises how and by whom the pastoral sector was run. One report
from the early 1950s is highly instructive on the social organisation of
pastoral labour in bı¯z. a¯n society. Abdallahi Ould Cheikh Sidiya, the successor
of the great marabout Cheikh Sidiya (Šayh
˘
Sidyya), at that time owned
500 camels, 500 cattle, 2,000 sheep, some donkeys and a few horses. These
animals represented about one third of all his tribe’s animals. The camels,
divided into eight herds (two constituted of lactating she-camels, the
remaining six designated for stockbreeding), were guarded by families of
specialised herders, who had passed on their skills from father to son. They
were paid by the right to use one she-camel out of every ten guarded, one
young male camel and two pieces of guinée cloth, paid every year, and some
use-right in milk. The camel herders, though to some degree autonomous,
were supervised by a chief herder, responsible for the general management,
veterinary care, castration, the general orientation of pasture allocation and
many other related concerns. Most of the camels were herded far from the
camp of Abdallahi, who had to remain immobile due to his many political
and religious obligations. The cattle, divided into ten herds, were guarded by
black shepherds, either slave and h. ara¯t.ı¯n. The cattle were normally watered at
the same well as the camp of Abdallahi, or another one nearby. These herders
too were supervised by a chief herder, but were remunerated only by the
right to use a third of the cows’ milk. While selling milk is dishonourable to
noble bı¯z. a¯n, the herders were allowed to produce and sell butter to raise their
profit. This was considered legitimate, because the profit was meant to arise
from the labour-input and not from the milk. The sheep and goats were
guarded by bı¯z. a¯n who originated from the šayh˘
’s tribal confederation and
were his tla¯mı¯d. (religious disciples). These shepherds, again supervised by a
chief, but unlike the camel shepherds revocable, were remunerated with half
28of the milking sheep designated to meet the main camp’s needs, half of the
wool, butter and hides produced. These goods – often subject to dispute –
were distributed by the marabout himself to avoid quarrelling. The ^amı¯r of
Trarza, Ahmed Ould Deid, living in much more modest material conditions,
hence following the precepts of h. assa¯n morality, owned 100 camels, 50 cattle
and two herds, i.e. about 400 sheep and goats. These animals were guarded by
shepherds subject to about the same conditions as those of šayh
˘
Abdallahi. In
contrast to the famous zwa¯ya, the ^amı¯r received numerous lactating animals
as mnih. a, i.e. loans of use-rights (cf. Dubié 1953: 138ff., 173).
   This pattern of a limited contribution of slave labour to pastoral produc-
tion, is contrasted by the presence of men from other dependent strata in this
sector (cf. Bonte 1998a: 3f.). This division of labour appeared to be predomi-
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nant in the Tagant region too. During the 1950s and 1960s Weddou Ould
Jiddou (Interview zwa¯ya 17.4.1995) managed several huge herds, and was
heavily engaged in the region’s trade in animals to the Senegalese markets of
Louga and Dakar. Nowadays he still manages the region’s largest herd of
cattle, consisting mainly not of his own, but of animals he took into his care
for payment. Weddou Ould Jiddou stated he had had only one slave herder
during the better times, but six paid ones for his sheep and goats, and another
two paid herders for the cattle. A fact he much regretted, because as he said,
with a twinkle in his eyes, the slave was more profitable than the paid
herders, but unfortunately slaves had already been much too expensive to
29buy.
   On various occasions the marked social differentiation among bı¯z. a¯n
pastoralists has been stressed. Variation is such that estimates relating to
average pastoral households and their economic assets contain no evidence
(cf. Ould Cheikh 1990: 71). My own findings confirm the statement that
there hardly ever was anything like a “standard” type of pastoral household
and herd. Rather there were large disparities in wealth within each camp, met
by a number of redistributive practices, and involving relations of dependen-
cy and clientage. Some approximate estimation of a securely self-sustaining
pastoral household derived from the interview information might advance a
30number of 10-40 cows and one herd of small stock, i.e. 100-200 animals.
   In his narrative, Youba reported his father to have been the biggest
animal-owner in his camp. Before the big drought he had two herds of sheep
and goats, approximating to about 400 animals, 120 cattle, 6 male horses and
4 or 5 male camels. Of the approximately overall thirteen h. assa¯n tents in the
camp, five were reported to have been extremely poor and another five to
have had only modest possessions, i.e. about two or three cows and between
30 and 40 goats and sheep. The remaining three families, among them
Youba’s father’s, were the better off. This uneven distribution of possession
was reflected in the number of slaves possessed as well. Only a few h. assa¯n in
the camp owned slaves, or at least had them live within the camp. It was again
Youba’s father who owned the largest number of slaves: three slave tents, i.e.
slave families belonged to him (cf. p. 76). The emphasis Youba put on the
issue of the slaves constituting tents, i.e. true families, besides proving his
sensitivity on the matter can also be interpreted as a hint at a distinct slave
condition in this mainly pastoral context. Male slaves, given major jobs which
like herding involved a high personal responsibility, were often treated
differently from those held closest to the slave estate. A master wanting his
male slave to be pleased and grateful e.g. could buy him a slave woman to
marry (cf. Brhane 1997b: 26; Oxby 1978: 196). In doing this, he could secure
31himself both the slave’s gratitude, and his offspring. Once confidence was
established between the master and his slave, the latter could be entrusted
with a major part of the care for the animals with much less risk than an
32unruly slave renowned for his voracity for meat.
   Trust is a major factor in the organisation of pastoral labour. This is true if
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herding is organised within the nuclear family, and is even more important if
work is executed by slaves or hired herders. One major means to secure the
herder’s devotion to the herd owner’s interest is to have him participate in
the gain acquired through herd growth. While members of the family as
co-owners and potential heirs more or less naturally fall into this category, a
similar commitment can be obtained from strange herders. Regular payment
and irregular incentives in animals help the herder constitute his own herd –
among his master’s or contractor’s herd. Herding both together is a fairly
certain way to have the herder do his work properly. Trust however cannot
persist without continuous confirmation (cf. Beck 1988: 390ff.; Spittler 1983:
67). This applies to all herders, either relatives and strangers. Herding is a
complex task involving much decision-making, and therefore easily becomes
the object of divergent opinions and quarrelling. Furthermore, different
animal species require a different intensity of guarding and care, and hence
have different requirements in terms of ad-hoc decision-making and personal
qualifications of the herders. Finally, the herd-owner can practice a large
variety of controls, ranging from delegating as few strategic decisions as
33possible, to leaving the herder almost a free hand. All these distinct levels of
differentiation are revealed in the large bı¯z. a¯n herd-owners’ practices in
organising herd labour.
Cattle
   In the case of Abdallahi, cited above, only the cattle were assigned for
herding to either slaves or h. ara¯t.ı¯n. Herding cattle among the bı¯z. a¯n – as
unanimously stated by all my informants – except in very few cases never
34implied any other work than watering and milking. The cattle are supposed
to leave in the morning for the pasture, graze, and come back at dusk. Cattle
have a definite sense of orientation and easily locate appropriate grazing
grounds. Milking takes place late, about two hours after sunset. Only calves
were known to have been herded in order to accustom them to pasture and
protect them from wild animals (Interview Messaoud Ould Soueide, ^abd,
17.12.1995). The guarding of full-grown cattle only happened in the case of
danger from wild animals, or severe drought and the cattle being very weak
35(Interview Boueibou Ould Amar, h. art.a¯ni, 1.11.1995). They then were at
high risk of getting stuck and dying in the clayey mud that develops with the
first rains of the rainy season. Responsibility and decision-making by the
herders within this type of herding is almost null. The most prominent and
hardest work – watering and milking – is easy for the master to control and
hence can be given to any slave no matter what his motivation. Watering,
except in the cold season (January-February) is needed every day, and
requires about 27 litres per day per animal during the dry season in the
Tagant region (cf. Toupet 1977: 236). If open water sources were lacking, it
was the herders’ duty to dig the well needed to water the cattle (cf. Ould
Hamidoun 1952: 57). This most menial work however, with the increasing
scarcity of slave labour due to flight, liberation and migration, could be
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passed on to a specialised labourer, paid per watered animal on a monthly
basis (Interview Laghlave Ould Mahmoud, h. art.a¯ni, 13.4.1995). Pastoral
management in these constellations remained solely the masters’ or the
owners’ responsibility, but the decisions these made with regard to pastoral
nomadic movements were framed by the more or less limited mobility of the
watering labour.
   Whatever the relative ease of cattle rearing, circumstances could entail the
division of cattle herds and the use of herders far away from the owner’s
camp. While in former times this seems to have rarely been the case and only
36been used by people poor in cattle or labour power, sedentarised life
nowadays produces the urgent need to send cattle to distant pastures, and
keep only some lactating cows within the vicinity of the village. This job is
nowadays done for a number of the bigger herd owners who originate from
the traditional nobility by some of their former slaves living in adwaba on the
Tagant. Payment is due in cash in the case of a herder caring for a large
37number of cattle, probably composed of animals from various owners. In
the case of cows sent for care to former slaves now living in adwaba, payment
is more likely to be embedded in the various, more or less reciprocal exchan-
38ges taking place between former masters and slaves.
Camels
   Caring for camels bears characteristics almost the opposite of those of cattle
rearing. Camels are extremely mobile. Rather than following a lead animal,
and exhibiting a distinct sense of customary attachment to their habitat, as
cattle do, camels behave much more like wild animals, and display a highly
individualistic spirit. Being both a browsing and grazing species, camels
nevertheless tend to favour fodder from shrubs and bushes, which they are
able to browse on despite their many thorns. In order to browse on these
plants, highly dispersed in the Saharan and Sahelo-Saharian zone, the camels
scatter around the pastureland, and do not keep together in a herd. These
animal preferences put the camel-herder into the dilemma of either allowing
optimum grazing conditions for the herd, at the risk of losing animals, or on
the contrary applying a strategy of maximum security against loss, but
39reducing the quantity and quality of the grazing. Camel herders thus have
to strike a balance between the divergent interests – and regularly set out to
trace lost animals (cf. Beck 1988: 223; Spittler 1983: 51ff.).
   A major qualification of a herder able to maintain and increase a camel
herd, besides knowledge of the condition of often remote pastures, wells etc.,
40is his ability to read tracks and get back the lost animals. Once the owner
does not move around with the herd himself, the herder far away for weeks
or months is in a position of high responsibility. His decisions amount to a
strategy which in turn is decisive to the fate of the herd. The pastoral
management system developed by Abdallahi (cf. above) is revealing of this
constellation. All his camel herders are employed on an irrevocable basis and
inherit this occupation, hence their familiarity with all aspects of camel care
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from childhood on is assumed; and since trust is not enough to ensure that
the system works, having a chief supervisor replaces control by the owner.
The degree of involvement in camel-herding here becomes a major factor
determining the organisation of herding. If only a few camels are owned,
these are likely to be herded for remuneration by specialised herders. Only
when camel-breeding becomes the major activity, does the development and
appropriation of the knowledge needed become a real concern. Once the
exigencies of labour input exceed the potential provided within the family,
41strange, but qualified herders have to be acquired rapidly. These differences
explain the overall limited contribution of slaves to camel herding, as well as
the few cases where they did engage in this activity. Slave men among the
camel-holding branches of the Rgayba¯t were rarely sent to herd camels far
distant from the camp; they much more often had to herd the animals which
were kept in the vicinity of the camp and returned there every night. If ever,
only second generation slaves, enjoying a high level of trust from their
masters, and having given proof of their knowledge, were employed to go off
on their own with a camel herd. This occupation represented the peak of a
slave man’s career, putting him ahead of those slaves only allowed to leave
42the camp within the distance of a day’s walk. Once performing such a
responsible task, otherwise performed by a dependent, but free herder, e.g. a
zna¯ga or ruined h. assa¯n, a slave became difficult to replace (cf. Caratini 1989:
120). The case throws light on the fact that ascension of slave men to sensitive
tasks was possible, but on the whole remained limited. Slave men in this
configuration had to compete with other qualified herders, more suited to
entering into a trustful, patron-client relationship with the herd owner
(Borricand 1948: 89f.). As a temporary help, or to guard animals near the
camp slaves, as the most universal workers, could be employed without
difficulties. Then even slave women could be assigned to herd camels (cf.
Basset 1913: 656).
   In regions such as the southern Tagant and Aftout cattle, as well as sheep
and goats, constituted the most important stock due to the region’s infesta-
tion with flies transmitting tabu¯rit (Trypanosomiasis), a disease similar to the
sleeping sickness affecting camels (cf. Ech Chenguiti: 1953: 131; Toupet 1958:
81, Interview Mahmoud Ould Mnih, zna¯ga, 4.2.1996). Here slave men too
could achieve the position of a highly recognised and trusted herder, but the
nature of cattle and small ruminant herd labour made them less indispensable
than among camel pastoralists. Pastoral specialisation constrained both
masters and slaves. One small, in those times still exclusively pastoral group-
ing of the Awla¯d ^Alı¯ Ntu¯nva h. assa¯n specialised mainly in cattle rearing,
started diversification of its livestock in camels in the 1950s. This new
strategy however did not alter the group’s organisation of pastoral labour.
This mainly was performed by a few strongly attached slave families and
some zna¯ga clients, while provision with millet was the duty of slaves living
in the tribe’s adabay. Rather than taking any risk by starting to herd them-
selves, the h. assa¯n entrusted the newly acquired camels to some specialised
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herders of an alien tribal group (Interview Ma^arouf Ould Eleyatt, h. assa¯n,
26.3.1995). Other bı¯z. a¯n pastoralists organised diversification according to the
same pattern. A zna¯ga grouping of the Kunta Awla¯d Sı¯di al-Wa¯vi, rich in
sheep bred for sale on the meat markets of Senegal before the big drought,
43had the large number of camels in their possession herded by a small
specialised group of five to six families of the same tribal confederation,
called Ahel Lbil (people of the camels). The possessors claimed to hardly ever
have seen their animals. The remuneration for herding consisted of one
young camel per year (normally a two year old male) and of course the use of
the camels’ milk (Interview Mohamed Ould Abass, zna¯ga, 5.12.1995).
   Today camel husbandry, both within the region of Achram-Diouk and by
local owners, is of minor importance. Most big herds are owned by rich
traders or other successful participants in the market economy, some of
44whom are h. ara¯t.ı¯n. These herds represent capital investments and are led by
paid herders. As these are the only ones to move around with the animals,
and sometimes there is support from a four wheel drive car, the herds are
highly mobile. They move around all of Mauritania, but are concentrated to a
large extent in the country’s south. If there is a lack of pasture, they also
easily cross the national borders, hence pursuing strategies at the core of
nomadic pastoralism since time immemorial, but now professionalised and in
contrast to the shrinking range of mobility the few remaining pastoral
nomadic households are able to maintain (cf. RIM 1986: 9f.). While in former
times payment for herds larger than 30 animals in most cases was due in form
of the traditional young male camel, nowadays monetary remuneration is
45prevalent. This capital investment type of herding needs to employ already
highly qualified herders, and hence opens up a specific labour market. In my
personal experience, most of these herders are of zna¯ga origin, but there are
pauperised h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya too (cf. Bonte 1998a: 3f.), as well as h. ara¯t.ı¯n or
46not formally manumitted slaves, now working to their own benefit. The
case of close-range camel herding, as practised by a few bı¯z. a¯n within the
region of Achram-Diouk, is different. Here even complete novices to camel
herding are employed, and therefore are submitted to an apprenticeship led
by the experienced owner and chief herder. While the routine work in this
constellation is done by the paid herders, exceptional tasks, like looking for
animals lost for a longer time and transferring animals to distant pastures in
times of drought still are executed under the direct guidance of a skilled
family member (Interview Mohamed Sid’Ahmed, zwa¯ya, 12.9.1995).
Sheep and Goats
   Sheep and goats are considered in bı¯z. a¯n society to be much the same, an
attitude revealed by the use of the generic term “lg˙nem” (best translated as
small ruminants, or else small stock; cf. Pierret 1948: 118) subsuming any
composition of the two species in one herd. Although sheep and goats have
different characteristics – goats are browsing and sheep grazing animals –
47they often are kept together and led to pasture in one and the same herd. In
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the past, however, many pastoralists specialised in either black or white sheep
(n^a¯j), while goats were less frequently kept. The white, or white and black
spotted “fulani” sheep is a good meat producer and primarily was bred for
sale to the meat markets of Senegal. The black, long-haired sheep provided
the raw material for the traditional woollen tents, and was a better milk-
producer. Goats (lma¯^iz), most of which are of “Sahelian” race, are lighter
than sheep (cf. Ould Cheikh 1990: 70). With the ongoing drought the
48emphasis on sheep was reduced, and the breeding of goats was intensified.
Goats are more robust and less susceptible than sheep, and especially cope
better with the heavy impact droughts have on grazing pasture. Their range
of activity is larger than that of sheep (ability to climb up shrubs), they
browse on even the woody parts of plants, and they manage to digest a much
larger variety of vegetation residues, up to artificial cellulose products like
49cardboard. Goats also need less attention, for if the worst happens they
manage to get back at dawn on their own. In a nutshell, goats are considered
more intelligent than sheep.
   Herding small stock needs constant attention and surveillance. The herds,
consisting of up to 200 animals, are large, and a single sheep or goat is easily
lost. Jackals are a considerable threat; they might track lost animals, or
approach the herd without being noticed and kill one or several animals.
Another danger comes from bad water, which a good herder should be able
to spot (cf. note 52, this chapter), and herbs and plants harmful or poisonous
50to the animals. Sometimes the negative effects depend on the season, e.g.
tigengilit (Indigofera Senegalensis), if grazed on when in blossom, provokes
severe and frequently deadly inflation to the small ruminants’ digestive
51organs. Animal prosperity too depends on some curative practices. Several
times a year sheep and goats have to be provided with salt. In the region of
Achram-Diouk several natural salt deposits are within reach of a one or two
days’ march. Salt cures were most often applied once at the end of the rainy
season and another time at the end of the dry cold season, before tempera-
tures rose. A third, facultative salt cure could be applied at the beginning of
the rainy season when animals were not watered from wells but surface water
of minor quality. The treatment is supposed to minimise the risk of infection
by diseases (Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. art.a¯ni, 12.4.1995).
   Despite the considerable responsibilities a herder has to bear, herding small
ruminants is considered above all children’s work. Almost any member of bı¯-
z. a¯n society, either bı¯z. a¯n or su¯da¯n, is able to claim to once have herded sheep
and goats in his youth. This episode in life ends with the engagement in a
more specialised activity. H. ara¯t.ı¯n and slaves most commonly shifted to
cultivation after having participated for the first time in the Ramadan, the
religious month of daytime fasting, while the bı¯z. a¯n ended their most often
temporally limited careers in herding by taking up one or several professional
occupations. Herding small ruminants is well suited to child labourers,
52because it is separated from the more heavy work of watering. This duty is
delegated to some adult, then often responsible for the watering of several
Gender and Status in the Topography of Work        157
 
 
herds of sheep and goats and perhaps some cattle or camels (cf. the narrative
of Brahim, p. 59-66), as well as for their milking (cf. Ould Hamidoun 1952:
58). Herding small ruminants however was not limited to children. As the
case of Abdallahi shows (cf. p. 150), free adult people too could engage in
this activity (and sometimes make use of either child or slave labour). Like all
livestock, small stock required professional care to develop to their best. This
could be provided by either skilled free or slave adults, qualification being
not necessarily related to status. The big drought in 1969 decimated the over
20 large herds of small stock in the possession of the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane.
Having to secure and later reconstitute his animal belongings, he put two of
his most professional herders, a bı¯z. a¯n and a slave man, in charge to set out
with the remaining animals on an emergency migration to the Assaba. There
they stayed until the next rainy season started (Interview Mbarek Ould
Koueriye, ^abd, 21.12.1995).
   Free people herding were generally rewarded for their services. Confiding a
herd to a poor member of the tribe or other affiliates was a means to let these
people earn a part of their living, and enabled owners of large herds – besides
other strategies such as loans of use-rights – to accumulate animal capital
beyond the limits set by their own labour resources. Different arrangements
were made with regard to the different animal species. While herding cattle,
according to the accounts gathered in the area of Achram-Diouk, rarely was a
concern to the local pastoralists, and hence did not raise the question of
defining remuneration, the watering of cattle demanded a good deal of labour
during the dry season. With the rapid expansion of a wage labour sector in
the cities after the Second World War, attracting many men of servile origin,
this task became increasingly remunerated. Some more or less fixed tariffs
applied to the herding of sheep and goats. In the minimum case the herder of
a complete herd (between 100 and 200 head, rarely more) received one
young, most often male animal every two months and ten days. If herding
was done by an adult, the payment could be raised up to a ewe with a lamb
and an additional piece of guinée cloth. Occasionally gifts were given as
incentive to good herders. Milk, as reported in the region of Achram-Diouk,
was free to the herder, while in other circumstances different arrangements
were possible (cf. p. 150, the case of Abdallahi’s herds). Slaves, although
remaining unpaid for their work, in some cases profited from gifts in animals,
provided by their masters as a sort of encouragement to work (Interview
Laghlave Ould Mahmoud, h. art.a¯ni, 13.4.1995).
   Sedentarisation in villages and small rural towns has brought about a
considerable change in herding practices. As individuals nowadays rarely
own enough animals to make up a herd, most animals are sent out with some
village herder, paid 20 UM a month per goat or sheep. As the job is full-time,
and the earnings low (with a herd of 100 animals about US$12.50 per month),
the herders are often children or teenagers. Almost anybody obliged to
confide his few, but consequently the more precious animals to these herders
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only has complaints about this arrangement. The herders are accused of not
caring about the animals, which get lost and frequently eat harmful plants.
Cultivation
   The perhaps earliest, but still one of the best descriptions of the cultivation
of millet in the southern part of the western Sahara is given by René Caillié
(1830: 117ff.). On his trip from Podor to the area around Aleg, he observed
slaves and zna¯ga set out in November to start sowing. Cultivation took place
on plots formerly flooded either by rain or the river Senegal. Slaves origina-
ting from one camp also kept together in one community while cultivating.
All fields were clearly demarcated, and the harvests kept apart. Cultivating
techniques were simple, and apply in much the same manner today. A large,
sharpened wooden picket is used to dig holes of about 12-15 cm depth. These
are filled with a few grains of millet, before the hole is again covered with
sand or earth. Once the seedling emerges, the surroundings of the plants are
weeded by the hoe, to facilitate the growth of the millet plants. However, this
often is the only supplemental activity, and frequently weeds continue to
grow between the rows. Once the millet spikes are out, the most wearying
period in the cultivation cycle begins. From dawn till dusk cultivators stay in
the fields to shoo away a myriad of birds by shouting, clapping and throwing
53stones and pieces of dry clay with a sling. During the night watching
continues to save the plants from the ravages of wild animals and livestock.
54Harvest finally takes place in May. The men cut off the spikes and throw
them onto the ground, from where they are collected and sorted according to
maturity onto different heaps. After some days of drying the men thresh the
spikes with a wooden stick, and the grains are winnowed. For this the grain is
sprinkled onto the swept ground, so that the wind can blow away the light
residual debris. Grain is stored either by putting it into leather sacks, taking it
along with the camp and selling the surplus as described by Caillié, or by
building a granary of dried clay bricks, or by storing it underground. In the
latter case a hole was dug in the ground, the millet put in, and everything
covered with earth. This method of storage was best suited to hide cereals
55away from enemies and animals.
   While the major cultivation techniques remain almost unchanged until
today, the practice of agriculture has expanded considerably during this
century, and especially after the big drought. René Caillié (1830: 118)
reported that the cultivating slaves he met on the formerly submerged banks
of the river Senegal, favoured “poor” soils, bare of primary vegetation,
because this saved them from initially clearing the land (an observation
leading him to accuse the natives of laziness). Nowadays most fields not
totally submerged by flooding first have to be cleared and prepared for
56cultivation with the hoe. Sowing is prepared by the picket, and in sandy
soils the hoe is used to dig small holes for the seeds. Besides weeding, hoeing
in between the rows of millet plants also serves to break up the surface of the
clay soil, and thus minimises evaporation. Once the seed-bearing spikes are
Gender and Status in the Topography of Work        159
 
 
out, cultivators move to their field (or one of them if they cultivate several
fields). These are often distant from the villages (up to 5-15 km, sometimes
even more), but temporarily living in a tent or hut near the fields greatly
facilitates guarding plants from nightly destruction by livestock, and the
57chasing of birds. Finally, the spikes are cut with a knife and threshed with a
simple wooden stick.
   What has changed in the course of the century have been improvements in
the use of rainfall. The construction of large dams (French: barrages) across
some of the slightly inclined seasonal watercourses made possible the
58artificial flooding of large areas of cultivable land. After at least two weeks
of flooding following the last rainfall (usually in October or November), the
dams are opened, either by digging a hole in them, or – with modern type
dams – opening a concrete outflow. Sowing and the subsequent tasks follow
the pattern described by Caillié. The large dams enhance the security of local
crop production, because their large areas of influx minimise some of the risk
induced by the highly uneven territorial distribution of rainfall in the
northern Sahel (cf. Wüst 1989: 87). Later this century, after the big drought,
this technique of flooding was complemented by the construction of small
dams (French: diguettes). These constructions, known throughout the Sahel
as a medium to increase water retention of agricultural soils and reduce water
run-off erosion (cf. Rochette 1989), represent an improvement of rainfed
agriculture. They are constructed and owned individually, whereas the
majority of large dams are constructed, maintained, and owned collectively
by up to hundreds of participants. The agricultural cycle behind the small
dams begins earlier than behind the large dams. Once the inundated surface
starts to dry up, sowing begins. This can be as early as in July. For the crop to
grow well, further rain is needed. While the harvesting of fields behind large
dams takes place at the end of January and February, millet grown behind
small dams in rainfed farming can already be harvested in December.
Another technique of sowing in rainfed farming, now only rarely applied in
the Aftout and Tagant region, but more common in the more humid south of
Mauritania (e.g. around Kaédi), is to sow already before the first rains. This
technique depends crucially on the soil being sandy, and above all on the
right amount and timing of rain, for an inundation of more than 24 hours will
kill the young shoot. Subsequent longer periods without new rain have the
same effect (Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. art.a¯ni, 12.4.1995).
   A recent change transforming farming practices is the increasing number of
cultivators. While in former times only slaves, h. ara¯t.ı¯n and some zna¯ga were
reported to have cultivated, nowadays many bı¯z. a¯n cultivate too. This is a
major consequence of their impoverishment, manifested by their loss of
animal capital during the big drought in 1969 (cf. chapter six). What persists,
despite economically induced compulsion to have similar living conditions
and work, is the different degree of identification with agricultural labour.
Su¯da¯n identify themselves foremost as cultivators, while bı¯z. a¯n – although
nowadays presenting themselves as cultivators too – often stress the limits of
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their engagement in agricultural labour in a quest to redraw cultural boun-
daries maintaining the difference between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n (cf. chapter eight).
For this reason, the description of agricultural work presented here is derived
from its ideal-type as presented by the su¯da¯n.
   Cultivation nowadays is both men’s and women’s work, and children of
course make an important contribution too. Nevertheless, subtle distinctions
aim to maintain gendered domains of work. Ideally, digging holes for the
59seeds is done by a man followed by his wife, sowing two or three grains
into each hole before closing it with a kick of her heel. Some tasks, especially
the construction of large dams and small dams, harvesting and threshing, and
less often weeding, are presented as male tasks (cf. Toupet 1977: 265f.). In
daily practice, however, this proves to be something of a patriarchal, male
ideology. Almost all tasks nowadays are performed by women too. Often
there are only women working on the fields, a situation clearly brought
about by the impact of male migration. Only tasks requiring a considerable
labour power, like the construction of large dams, weeding, and especially
harvesting and threshing, are performed principally by men. Friends or else
paid labourers undertake to do the work in one or a few days, thus profiting
from their joint forces. Women in these circumstances are responsible for
preparing meals and tea. If a woman is the head of a household, e.g. because
her husband has migrated or died, a son of hers or a brother most probably
organises this work, while the woman herself is responsible for organising
60and most of the continuous work. Menial work, requiring less quick and
concerted action, such as e.g. the initial clearing of the fields, is done by men
61and women together. It becomes evident that the gender division of
agricultural labour, as primarily performed by the su¯da¯n, is much less driven
by the alleged heaviness of the work, than social conceptions governing the
availability and organisation of work. Women work alongside their husband
and family on the fields, but do not join in the event-driven, collective
work-sessions that remain a male domain (the case of course is different for
exclusively female productive associations and gatherings, and nowadays
female co-operatives).
   The main staple cultivated is millet in its variant species. While azra^a is the
generic term applying to all varieties of millet, a large range of varieties is
distinguished according to the appreciation of taste and maturation time.
Millet with small grains (mutri; Pennisetum typhoideum) is mainly cultivated
in the Senegal river area and the southern regions, but rarely in the Tagant
region. The most appreciated variety of sorghum (azra^a), to be distinguished
by its larger grains, is called taqalı¯t (Sorghum gambicum). It has a maturation
period of five months and needs the least amount of water or inundation of
all varieties. Other, faster growing varieties with about three months until
maturity are bišna (Sorghum cernuum), and a species of “white” taqalı¯t,
called ašweyt.ra taqalı¯t. Other crops cultivated are several varieties of melons,
called vundi in h. assa¯niyya (distinguished according to colour and the
edibility of the grains), which are fast-growing and do not demand as much
Gender and Status in the Topography of Work        161
 
 
labour input as millet and sorghum. Apart from these there is a variety of
beans (adlaga¯n; Vigna siniensis) best known under the French name “niébé”
62throughout West Africa (cf. Toupet 1977: 259).
Pheniculture
   Pheniculture in Mauritania on its present scale has largely been shaped by
recent evolution. Despite the vast majority of the country being located in a
Saharan climate, only a limited number of oases are older than a century. The
cradle and nucleus of bı¯z. a¯n pheniculture is without doubt the Adrar region in
the north of today’s Mauritania. Here wild palm trees, or more probably
palm trees which had not been cultivated, antedate the formation of tradi-
th tional bı¯z. a¯n society, which started in the 11 century and took a decisive turn
th in the 15 century (cf. McDougall 1985a: 16ff.; Oßwald 1986: 251ff.; Ruf
1995: 102ff.). Some outlines of the history of the Adrar emirate, drawn up by
63Pierre Bonte (1985a,b), suggest that in this area a mainly agriculturist group
with only limited involvement in pastoralism and now called Bafu¯r subsisted
and used to collect fruits from the wild palm trees. The major region of these
activities seems to have been in the south and south-west of the Adrar
mountains – those regions nowadays having the biggest date-palm oases.
Independent of these centres of agri- and pheniculture there were several
much smaller oases specialising in the trans-Saharan caravan trade. The oldest
and most famous one is Awdaghust, conquered by the Almoravid movement
th in 1054-55, but abandoned for the first time already during the 15 century
(most probably for reasons of insufficient water supply; McDougall 1985a:
64 th 10ff.). Old oases in the Adrar are Abwer, founded during the 8 century
th th but now abandoned, Ouadâne (12 century) and Chinguetti (13 century),
th both of which nowadays are in a steep decline. From the 15 century on the
patterns of Adrar settlement changed. The formerly independent Bafu¯r came
under the hegemony of expanding local zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n tribes, of which
the zwa¯ya acquired the property rights in land, and hence established their
dominance. Cultivation and pheniculture expanded from that time on, and
became integrated with caravaning activities and pastoralism into a local,
th diversified economy during the 17 century. However, a significant increase
th in production was only achieved as late as from the middle of the 19 century
onwards, a period by which large numbers of slaves had been imported in
order to plant and maintain the vast majority of date-palm groves the Adrar
still is famous for (cf. Ech Chenguiti 1953: 119, 138).
   Unlike the Adrar, date-palm cultivation in the Tagant seems to have been
from the beginning closely associated with the formation of trade-towns.
Tradition says the first Tagant date-palm grove was established at Talmeust
(Talmust) as early as about 1450, or according to other traditions in the first
th half of the 16 century by the Kunta (Du Puigaudeau 1993: 76). This tribal
confederation acquired control of the desert salt mine at Ijil in 1766/67 and
subsequently developed a huge trade network including several towns on the
65Tagant. Among these is Rachid. Situated some 40 km north-west of Tid-
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jikja, the town is located on the slopes of an imposing valley densely planted
with palm trees. Its foundation may have taken place as early as 1564 (cf.
Dubié 1953: 198), but is more likely to have taken place either in 1722/23 or
1765. Kasr el Barka, another Kunta settlement and date-palm grove, was
founded even earlier in 1689/90, hence marking the influence the Kunta tribe
had during this period on the development of Tagant urbanism and trade, as
well as their commitment to date-palm plantation and agriculture. Tidjikja,
today capital of the Tagant district, was founded in 1660 or 1667. It is
populated by members of the Idaw^Alı¯ whose ancestors had emigrated from
Chinguetti in the Adrar after some inner-tribal conflict. Palm shoots they had
taken along their journey formed the nucleus of the important palm groves of
the wa¯d Tidjikja (cf. Amilhat 1937: 63, 116; McDougall 1987: 47ff., 1990:
249ff.; Ould Khalifa 1991: 393; Webb 1995: 51).
th    Tîchît might date from the 8 century as well, but more probable is the year
1153-54 presented in the Tîchît chronicle (cf. Jacques-Meunié 1961: 58). The
town, although lying some 200 km to the east of Tidjikja, and hence on the
northern edge of the Aouker, is commonly subsumed among the Tagant
oases. Being a major market in the trans-Saharan trade, its date-palm groves
always remained secondary, due to environmental restraints. Nowadays
shrinking water resources are leading to an increasing salinisation of
66groundwater (cf. McDougall 1990: 250; Du Puigaudeau 1993: 204). Other
pre-colonial attempts to spread date-palm cultivation from the Adrar, such as
e.g. the attempt to introduce date palms in the Trarza, failed (cf. Vincent
1860: 450; Webb 1984: 144). A new era of date palm cultivation began under
French colonial rule. From the 1920s on strong incentives were given to
create new plantations. The following decades consequently witnessed the
rapid expansion of date-palm cultivation in the Adrar and Tagant, as well as
its introduction to the Assaba (cf. Tables 7 and 8). However successful in
quantitative terms this policy was, it was hardly able to induce sustainable
growth to the taste of the administrators for two reasons: first despite some
material incentives, many plantations resulted from direct coercion by the
colonial administrators (cf. Féral 1983: 121; Ould Khalifa 1991: 706ff.), a fact
which probably goes far to explain the often mitigated interest many bı¯z. a¯n
had in the maintenance of these date-palm groves. Second, creating new
plantations meant increasing the demand for manual labour – by and large
provided by the dependent strata. These, however, were hardly willing to
endure an ever increasing load of work while at the same time recognising
new opportunities of emancipation (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 778ff.).
   Associating date-palm cultivation with the cultivation of millet is possible,
and most fascinating because both are counter-seasonal activities. While the
main millet cultivation activities in rainfed farming take place from July until
late February, caring for the date-palms, with the exception of producing and
planting new shoots, happens between March and July (cf. Du Puigaudeau
1993: 80f.; Toupet 1962). However, as much as this association might
represent an ideal use of the scarce agricultural resources at the desert-edge,
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the hardship this agricultural cycle bears for the labourers is obvious. Adding
further obligations to their duties was hardly possible. The extent of agricul-
tural diversification by gardening and the cultivation of wheat and rye in the
shade of the date-palms, common in other intensive-use oases, remained
67rather restricted in the Tagant oases. While competition for labour resourc-
es among the different sectors of agriculture was minor, intensive date-palm
cultivation indeed conflicted with the needs of pastoral production. A bı¯z. a¯n
proverb from the Tamourt en-Naaj puts the case as follows: a good h. art.a¯ni
can care for either 50 palm-trees, or 50 camels (cf. Grosser/Ibra Bra 1979: 37).
The crucial point here is that the water needs of both animals and palm-trees
are highest at the same time. Pastoral production and pheniculture therefore
complement each other on the basis of specialisation into different branches
of production rather than integration into a single mode of exploitation of the
natural resources at the desert’s edge. However, an association of date-palm
cultivation with pastoral production was possible on the premise of minimi-
sing labour input. The necessity of watering date-palm trees, which surely is
the most constant, time-consuming and tiring work in the context of pheni-
culture, is much disputed. In the Tamourt en-Naaj, the most fertile valley on
the Tagant, all the su¯da¯n I asked stated with confidence that they never
watered the date-palms except in the very first year – and thus contradicted
the above-mentioned saying provided by a bı¯z. a¯n from the local notability.
Research on date-palm productivity under irrigation by a motor pump,
carried out by a SO.NA.DE.R employee in the early 1980s, however, proved
a considerable increase in date output as well as enhanced quality (Interview
68Abdallahi Ould Briké, zwa¯ya, 9.4.1995). With what intensity date-palms
are put to use therefore is likely to have always depended on their owners’
main economic interest. H. ara¯t.ı¯n and slaves associated with or belonging to
highly nomadic masters, who only owned a handful of trees, might have kept
their presence in the date-palm groves to a strict minimum. Rich bı¯z. a¯n,
owning both palm trees and animals, as well as having a large amount of
dependent labour, could engage in both sectors. Their su¯da¯n specialised
either in a combination of pheniculture, farming and gardening, or else
69herding or a combination of herding and millet farming. Those su¯da¯n
involved in the oasis sector and living almost permanently in the towns could
establish much more stable communities than their fellows associated with bı¯-
70z. a¯n following a nomadic lifestyle. Like the su¯da¯n regularly cultivating
millet, those in the oases were able to develop and maintain a thorough
knowledge of cultivation techniques. This location of agricultural know-how
among the su¯da¯n is universally agreed upon by observers in the first half of
the century (cf. Féral 1983: 271ff.; Du Puigaudeau 1993: 81ff.).
   Little is known about the living conditions of the slave population in the
th western Saharan oases. However, the events reported from 19 century
Tidjikja, Atar and Oujeft, where the local notability wavered between killing
their slaves for supposed witchcraft, and the need to sustain the labour force
crucial to maintaining and running the already expanding oasis system, reveal
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that bı¯z. a¯n dominance was contested (cf. Ech Chenguiti 1953: 138). The
reason why witchcraft was not similarly detected and prosecuted in pastoral
nomadic groupings seems to be that bı¯z. a¯n action in the oases was concerted,
and focused on the goal of getting rid of the threat by the magical forces
supposed to be located within the slave population. This polarisation
71effectively led the bı¯z. a¯n to perceive their slaves as a social entity. The
problem seems to have been precisely that danger from slaves became more
difficult to identify with individual slaves once these formed large communi-
ties. Looking for deviant behaviour likely to be an indicator of possession
was much easier in the small pastoral groupings with intense master-slave
72relationships. The emergence of the nucleus of group formation where
bı¯z. a¯n no longer cared about dominating their individual slaves, but about
maintaining the community’s domination is reflected by the collective action
the zwa¯ya of Tidjikja undertook to get rid of the problem. Rather than
relying on their own spiritual forces, a remedy which should have been at
hand for the Idaw^Alı¯, renowned for their spiritual authority, the bı¯z. a¯n
residents of Tidjikja preferred to undertake an attempt at cross-cultural
mediation. Counter-magic, performed by a Sudanese magician, was supposed
to outweigh bı¯z. a¯n Islamic spiritual authority among a group of slaves hard to
assimilate. A second glimpse of evidence is the occurrence of distinct social
groups associated with date-palm work. The ^ag˙za¯zı¯r or h. umriyı¯n are
73date-palm cultivators in Tidjikja.
La catégorie des haratin de Tijigja n’est pas homogène. Les Idaw ^Ali y
distinguent en effet les houmriyin (terme qui signifie rouge, à mi-chemin
entre le blanc et le noir) intégrés au clan, à la fraction et à la tribu depuis
74Abwayr et Tabelbalet, donc avant la fondation de Shinqiti. Ces clients
ont de ce fait une considération légèrement supérieure aux haratin, sans
que rien d’autre de particulier ne les en distingue vraiment. Il reste vrai
qu’ils ont le teint légèrement cuivré et moins foncé que les abid (“esc-
laves”) et les haratin (“affranchis”) qui ont, eux, le teint franchement noir.
(Ould Khalifa 1991: 281)
The difference in resemblance in the relation between h. umriyı¯n and h. ara¯t.ı¯n,
subtly constructed by Abdallahi Ould Khalifa for the h. umriyı¯n of his natal
town Tidjikja, is much the same Odette Du Puigaudeau (1993) enunciates in
her description of the ^ag˙za¯zı¯r she observed in the same oasis during the late
1930s. The h. umriyı¯n are like the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, for they experience similar relations
of dependence and perform much the same occupations, but nevertheless
enjoy higher esteem. This is expressed by their closer, though not unlimited
integration into the tribal structures dating back some 800 years. Finally the
ideological reconstruction of social hierarchy is confirmed by reference to
immobile ethnic categories. The h. umriyı¯n are of “reddish” phenotype, a
characterisation placing them right in the middle of the scale of nobility,
75ranging from black to white. Leaving aside for the moment the ideological
implications of this interweaving of status and origin, the case of the
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h. umriyı¯n and of the ^ag˙za¯zı¯r provides evidence of a group of date-palm
cultivators whose origin is no longer traced back directly to slave ancestry. A
considerable share of the wealth a number of bı¯z. a¯n obtained from their
date-palm groves therefore did not rely on slave labour, but was mediated
through tributary, or else patron-client relationships with partially autono-
76mous cultivators (cf. Moussa/Ould Maouloud 1997). These labourers,
although always remaining highly dependent upon a bı¯z. a¯n aristocracy, which
77for a long time was able to safeguard its exclusive ownership in land, were
probably the first to develop a mainly sedentary, agricultural lifestyle and
communities of their own. Once colonial administration had started to
slightly shift the balance of power among bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n, many of the slaves
and h. ara¯t.ı¯n chose to move to villages they had constructed in the vicinity of
the date-palm groves (cf. Dubost 1924: 464).
Caravan Trade
   From the very first documents describing the western Sahara, trade is
reported to be a major activity in the region. The famous Muslim traveller
Ibn Bat.t.u¯t.a on his journey from February 1352 until December 1353 visited
the desert salt mine at Tag˙a¯za¯, apparently a most miserable place with no
trees, a mosque built of rock-salt slabs and roofs made of camel skins. There
slaves of the Masu¯fa dug for the salt, two slabs of which were loaded on each
camel and transported to Oualâta. Already at Tag˙a¯za¯ salt could be exchanged
for gold, but the exchange rate was much more advantageous at Ma¯lı¯, another
24 days’ march for an energetic traveller (cf. Levtzion/Hopkins 1981: 282ff.).
th Centuries later, probably in the course of the 18 century, a new trade
pattern supplanted this barter of salt for gold. Instead of north-African
traders residing on both shores of the Sahara and constituting distinct
“white” communities, Saharans themselves engaged in trade and exchanged
Saharan salt for grain from the Sudan. Historian James Webb (1995: 52ff.)
argues that this shift results from ecological degradation within the western
Sahara, the southward movement of which he named the “desert frontier”,
confronting the Saharans with an increasing demand for grain. Consequently
the volume of Saharan salt export to the Sudan increased, and the emphasis of
78trade shifted from salt for gold to salt for grain. While an increase in the
exchanges of salt for grain is probable in this era, it would be misleading to
ignore the pastoralists’ involvement in such exchanges from the very
beginning of their occupational specialisation. Dependence on trade and
other means of exchange is a common pattern found among pastoral nomadic
societies, who are all obliged to complement their high-protein, milk-based
diet with carbohydrates. Hence besides the trade of salt for gold, which the
North African Arab sources were most interested in, there were probably
various relations of exchange including salt among desert pastoralists and
sub-Saharan agriculturalists (cf. Bollig/Casimir 1993: 543.; McDougall 1983;
Ruf 1995: 64f.).
   While the barter of salt for grain fell rapidly into decline in the western
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79Sahara after colonisation early this century, up to the present day within
the central Sahara, some Tuareg groups rely on organising caravans, exchan-
ging mainly salt for grain in the south (cf. Ritter 1986; Spittler 1989a, 1989b).
Organising caravans for long-distance trade with large amounts of heavy-
weight freight commodities, such as slabs of desert rock-salt and millet from
the western Sudan, depends crucially on access to means of transportation.
Within the Sahara, and even far into the Sahel, the camel is the first choice
80among local animals of burden. Work related to caravan trade thus is
devoted to two distinct sectors. First the breeding and maintaining of a large
number of transport camels, and second all tasks related to forming and
maintaining the caravan itself. On the trans-Saharan tracks sometimes not
only watering-points but grazing were lacking as well. Consequently, the
81caravaners had to cut the fodder needed throughout the journey in advance.
Once on the way, the animals had to be packed and unpacked every morning
and evening, while during the day they had to be led. The number of workers
needed for these tasks depended on the difficulty of the terrain. Estimates for
th the 19 century advance a number of four or five camels per man. As the
camels moved around during the night while grazing, they had to be looked
for, and driven together each morning. Occasional watering, too, was a task
requiring much labour. Further, firewood had to be collected, and meals to
th be prepared. During the 19 century all this was slave work (cf. McDougall
1985b: 102, 108; 1992: 73f.).
   Travelling in a caravan did not necessarily mean riding on camels. Slaves
accompanied the caravan on foot, and only in a situation of extreme difficulty
were they allowed to mount (cf. Panet 1968: 104ff.). But enduring the
hardship of walking from sunrise till sunset is not restricted to people of low
social status. Riding camels are precious. Taking them along on a caravan
journey already means exposing them to great fatigue and risk. In order to
preserve their precious animals’ condition, many caravaners used to walk the
entire day, or to restrict riding to a part of the day or else to special purposes
such as scouting (indeed these patterns of caravan travel still are applied by
the few caravaners remaining; cf. Asher 1993). Women – except slave women
naturally – who used to travel with caravans only as passengers of a kind,
were rarely forced to walk (cf. Panet 1968: 104ff.).
   The management of the caravan trade was highly diversified. The large
caravans, often consisting of several hundred camels, travelling between the
salt mines and the trade-towns, were composed of a multitude of individual
caravaners. Members of a whole variety of tribes as well as major traders and
poor nomads with no more than two camels walked side by side. While
participation in the trade generally was open to a wide range of Saharans,
continuous engagement on a large scale necessitated control of various
resources: camels, pastoralists, caravaners, and trade managers. The latter
became crucially important when many merchants became sedentary in the
th course of economic expansion in the 19 century. The Haidara family was
famous for its big trade business run by several brothers and having its
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pivotal point in Tîchît. These had their slaves not only do all work related to
camel breeding, oasis cultivation, loading and unloading, but also assigned
some of the most experienced in the business the responsibility of trade
agents. These slaves were entrusted with the management of salt transport
and trade, both in the Sahara and the Sahel. With their business developing
well, the family settled a number of slaves in Banamba, where they had to
farm and look after their master’s business the whole year round (cf. Mc-
82Dougall 1985b: 111 and 1992: 75).
   Participation in the caravan trade increased the slaves’ chances of enhancing
their status and condition. By travelling and working with the pack camels
the slaves could acquire a lot of skills, training them to eventually undertake
caravaning without supervision. With providing transportation services, i.e.
pack camels and caravan workers, becoming a distinct business among the bı¯-
z. a¯n, a supply of reliable and trained labourers was crucial for the system to
run. Once travelling by camel caravan, slaves frequently got opportunities to
83do some small scale business to their own profit. Much like the qualified
herders, and other, similar workers, the slave caravaners seem to have been
rewarded for their services by manumission. Possible arrangements were
contracts allowing the slaves to buy their freedom, manumission as a reward
for special services, or contracted as linked to the death of the master (cf.
McDougall 1985b: 108ff.; Coquery-Vidrovitch/Lovejoy 1985: 17f.). The
latter case was observed by Mungo Park ([1799] 1969: 179). On his travels at
th the end of the 18 century he met a Bambara who had been the slave of a
bı¯z. a¯n. Having travelled along much of the central Saharan trade routes on behalf
of his master, he converted to Islam and became manumitted upon the death
of the latter at Djenné. He then successfully established himself as a trader of
salt and guinée cloth.
   The present description proves the caravan trade, and especially the trade of
salt for grain, and later of salt for slaves, to have been a complex economic
activity, dynamically tying together a whole variety of economic sectors:
pastoral pack-animal production and salt-mining in the Saharan zone,
agricultural grain production in the Sahelian zone, and the maintenance of an
84inter-regional network of traders. Acquiring labour was crucial for the
traders to run the system and expand (cf. McDougall 1992: 72). In pre-colo-
nial Saharan society the only labour-force meeting these needs was depend-
ent labour. It remained the only means to exploit and control labour disper-
sed among, and moving in between so many locations from a single place.
These conditions of work, in turn, shaped a specific variety of dependence,
one implying much reciprocity. With the dependent workers often living or
being far away from their masters, direct and brutal coercion could not work
as a means of control. More subtle strategies had to be used. Slaves managing
and supervising trade activities at their masters’ place were both a means to
cope with the need to be present at different places at the same time, and to
install a hierarchy among slaves. Nothing is known about the relations of
first rank slaves and those at the bottom of the scale, but the attraction of
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ascension is very likely to have sustained the masters’ hegemony. Those
slaves residing far from their masters’ control, as well as from his means to
secure them, had to be granted some autonomy, and an economic means to
subsist, or even the opportunity to accumulate wealth. This tendency of at
least a considerable part of slave use within the Saharan trade to resemble
patron-client ties more than master-slave relations is confirmed by another,
specific socio-economic structure of production evolving in the western
Sahara. Influential religious personalities attracted disciples, the tla¯mı¯d. . These
people, to a large part of modest, or dependent status, most often engaged in
productive activities profiting the šayh
˘
, who in turn provided protection and
assistance in case of need. Associating oneself with the šayh
˘
meant being
associated with his baraka, the divine benediction, and thus elevated one’s
own social standing. In the central Sahara, the use of tla¯mı¯d. to conduct
th caravan trade is already reported from the late 17 century of a Kunta
85 th merchant family. By the 19 century this practice became widespread along
the southern Saharan border. No longer only trade, but pastoral production
and agriculture, too, came to be subsumed under these – like slavery –
“supra-tribal” relations of social and economic dependency (cf. McDougall
861985b: 106f.; Stewart 1973: 112ff.).
Slaves of the Court
   Just as slave men could ascend to highly responsible tasks, and later gain
manumission within the caravan trade, a few slaves became the trustees of the
87h. assa¯n elite, or at least held positions of considerable esteem. Among the
Ahel Swayd Ah. med, an old slave woman of the family of the former ^amı¯r of
88Tagant keeps and plays the t.bal up to the present day. This big drum once
was beaten to lead the warriors in battle and to organise life in the camp, as
well as on important occasions and festivities. Playing this highly important
instrument was not restricted to slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n. The igga¯wen, the
musicians within bı¯z. a¯n society, used to play it in their performances too, and
it was up to them to accompany and encourage the warriors in battle with
music (cf. Guignard 1975: 172ff.). However, slave women from the main
camp of the deceased ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, the h. ella, vividly
remember themselves playing the t.bal, and accompanying it with solo and
group singing on many occasions like marriages or the reception of visitors.
These women played the big drum in a peculiar mode only a few were
89capable of (Interview Doueige Mint Dvih, ^abd 21.12.1995).
   H. ara¯t.ı¯n, and on some occasions slave men too, could become the trustees
of h. assa¯n chiefs, or even an ^amı¯r. One very prominent case is that of Abdi
Ould Embarek. This former slave of a subtribe of the Idaw^Alı¯ of Tidjikja
was a close associate of the ^amı¯r of Tagant, Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed. As
his “right arm”, or in other terms his factotum, he was responsible for
collecting the coutumes the French paid for the trade in gum arabic on the
Senegal river, the tributes of various dependent tribes in the Gorgol, Brakna
and Tagant, as well the tributes his own tribe, the Idaw^Alı¯ of Tidjikja, had to
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pay to the ^amı¯r (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 581, Frèrejean 1995: 314). Having
represented the enemy and oppressor within his own tribe, Abdi Ould
Embarek changed sides once the French started their invasion of the Tagant.
Now associating his fate with that of the French, his aim became to weaken
and defeat the ^amı¯r Bakkar, and to gain an influential position in Idaw^Alı¯
politics. Several years later he succeeded in this attempt, and the French, who
had rewarded him with one fifth of the former Idaw^I¯š date palm grove in
Tidjikja, named him general chief of the various local tribal fractions of the
Idaw^Alı¯. For a long time Abdi remained vital to French local policy and
economy. He provided knowledge of the conflicts and contradictions raging
among the Idaw^Alı¯, helped the French exploit these, and was able to supply
many of the vital goods they needed to maintain their staff (cf. Ould Khalifa
1991: 581, 648ff.).
   French documents on Abdi and events related to him are almost mute on
the issue of his status. Only Commandant Frèrejean (1995: 285, 314), who
together with Xavier Coppolani led the invasion of the Tagant and who
became one of the first to cooperate with Abdi, gives a few sketchy remarks.
According to his view, which was probably strongly influenced by his other
bı¯z. a¯n counsellors, Abdi Ould Embarek was “l^affranchi de Bakar”, i.e.
Bakkar’s manumitted slave. However, it remains unclear whether Abdi had
formally gained h. ara¯t.ı¯n status prior to his services to the ^amı¯r of Tagant, or
had been manumitted by the latter. The colonial documents I was able to
consult provide no direct evidence on the issue. Wherever they refer to Abdi
Ould Embarek as a “haratine” or “affranchi” this is as likely to be the
common euphemism the French administrators used to employ for slave as
90to reflect Abdi’s true status. Nevertheless, the background leading to
Abdi’s association with the former ^amı¯r of Tagant hints at him already being
a h. art.a¯ni. Apparently his brother had been murdered by alien tribesmen, thus
forcing Abdi to seek protection from the ^amı¯r (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 595) –
a step hardly conceivable for a slave.
   The issue of a dependent of slave origin gaining so much power indeed
entered into the discourse of those factions predominantly originating from
the tribe’s notability opposing Abdi in his office. In a letter from a council of
Idaw^Alı¯ notables held in 1938, concerning the opposition the signatories
express towards Youba Ould Abdi, the son of Abdi Ould Embarek who then
91held the office of general chief, one major argument is the inappropriate
origin of the latter. Besides being accused of collecting illicit dues, he is
considered to be the son of a former slave (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 693). This
statement, rather than being taken as a reliable assessment of Abi Ould
Embarek’s status, is highly instructive of how the idea of a more or less
distant slave ancestry underlying the concept of h. ara¯t.ı¯n can be exploited by
bı¯z. a¯n as a means to secure their symbolic supremacy.
   Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, the last official ^amı¯r of Tagant, who died on
the 19 September 1982, was renowned for having several h. ara¯t.ı¯n entrusted
with responsible tasks in his vicinity, and also for having h. ara¯t.ı¯n among his
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counsellors (cf. Toupet 1977: 179). These people were feared, for they were
free to do almost anything they liked without risking punishment or losing
protection from the ^amı¯r. Other members of h. assa¯n tribes used to have a h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n entourage too. Abdel Wedoud Ould Mamma (Interview 31.10.1995, h. as-
sa¯n), of a prominent lineage of the L^aweysya¯t, passed most of his time before
entering the colonial army in the company of three h. ara¯t.ı¯n renowned for
being good shots and hunters. Abdel Wedoud Ould Mama described these
h. ara¯t.ı¯n as having a special status. H. ara¯t.ı¯n, he explained to me, was just their
name, they were not the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of somebody or the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of a tribe, but a
group living like the L^aweysya¯t throughout the year in the Aftout close to
the Tagant plateau.
Gender, Status and the Locus of Work
Male slave labour in the various accounts emerges as being significantly
different from female slave labour. Slave women were compelled primarily to
work in the household. Besides a variety of tasks they had to fulfil under the
direct auspices of their mistress or master, they frequently had to work
outside the camp as well. Slave men – although they could also be given any
task – were habitually entrusted with distinct, and often multiple, specialised
tasks, some of which relied upon the slave’s ability to act responsibly and
take decisions in the master’s place. Contrary to what might be assumed of a
pastoral society, the slave men were not solely, and in many areas not even
primarily put to work in the pastoral sector and to relieve their masters of
work as herders. Many were employed as cultivators of millet fields and
date-palm groves, as well diggers, collectors of gum arabic, and in many other
capacities. A few slave men even rose to become assistants in the caravan
trade or advisors to h. assa¯n chiefs.
   There are many differences slave women and men experienced in the
domain of work. These result from a complex interpenetration and interac-
tion between two distinct and contradicting ideologies: the gender division of
labour applying to bı¯z. a¯n society, and the use of de-socialised and hence
de-sexualised slave labour within this society. As has been revealed in the
preceding paragraphs, and is summarised in Illustration 1, labour is a major
field where gender relations between bı¯z. a¯n women and men articulate. Both
genders are associated with distinct tasks, which in turn are located in specific
localities. While women’s work is related to the tent, or at least the camp,
men’s work leads to areas beyond these boundaries. Many of the tasks fit
neatly into this scheme of “in” and “out”: women process milk, they spin and
weave within the tent, while trading and herding often require the men to
92leave the tent and camp for long trips. Albeit that the production of
difference is most obvious in the occupation of distinct locations, it is not
restricted to this field, but applies to the modes of interaction between the
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sexes too. This is the more important, as several male occupations evolving in
bı¯z. a¯n society have less clear-cut characteristics, and simply are not located
entirely in the exterior. Qur\a¯n masters used to live and teach, i.e. to work
within the camp (though sometimes they had a separate tent). The male
h. assa¯n elite, having a much less steady pattern of life and work, besides hunting,
coercing tributes and waging war, passed a considerable amount of time
within the camp as well. Different occupations closely connected to the
individual’s rank within the social hierarchy thus demanded different modes
of articulating gender relations. Much like the articulations of a bourgeoisie
93(cf. Bourdieu 1979), or as in the process of feudalisation, the symbolic
world of gender differentiation among the bı¯z. a¯n nobility was directed
towards the enhancement and refinement of its signifiers (cf. Elias 1988,
1990).
   Women struggled to develop their femininity in patterns of a complex mix,
involving ideals of inactivity and obesity, and the practice of a few, most
often collectively performed tasks requiring only minimal physical input (cf.
p. 144f.). While the top ranks concurred in the most refined expression of
their standing, quite a few women failed to meet these standards. Having to
share in more or less numerous tasks conflicting with the ideal-type of
femininity out of economic need, they had to re-shape and adapt their modes
of producing and expressing femininity. Women of modest origin or wealth,
who like Valha (cf. p. 69-72) had to pound millet, care for animals, and much
more, were women largely lacking feminine appeal, according to dominant
categories. Consequently they found it hard to acquire many of those highly
prized female qualities, such as e.g. seductiveness, which – again noblewomen
– considered to develop from the ideals of feminine beauty. Far from
representing female submission to male dominance, women’s discourses
portray these qualities as essential to the maintenance of female influence and
control over men (cf. Tauzin 1984b: 100ff.; Simard 1996: 113). Femininity
itself by these mechanisms becomes directly linked to affluence on two
distinct levels: access to food and servile female labour. Women able to
transform these goods into symbols of femininity demonstrated their power
in gender relations beyond the field of symbolic representation. Physically
embodying a considerable amount of the group’s capital, these women
demonstrated their ability to maintain control of and access to these resourc-
es.
   Slave women in this social configuration became a crucial element, not only
because they purveyed the basis on which an inactive and obese ideal of
noble femininity could develop, but because the control over slave women
became a substantial element in the struggle over the shape of bı¯z. a¯n gender
relations. This interference of female slavery with social relations among
bı¯z. a¯n, and hence the symbolic reproduction of society, is a major clue to
understanding both the importance of female slavery in the past, and the
94issues of today’s gender relations.
   Slave men did not interfere with gender relations among bı¯z. a¯n as slave
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Illustration 1: Gender and Status Implications of Work
Desocialisation
All Kind of Work / Menial Tasks
Nobility
Specialised Work
Manliness
• Warfare
• Islamic Scholarship
• Herding
• Cultivation
• Manual Labour
Few and
Self-Determined
Tasks
Femininity
• Administration
  of Slave Work
  and Household
• Household Work
• Cultivation
• Manual Labour
Free Men Free Women
Slave Men Slave Women
women did. One reason for this is the different structuration of what might
be called manliness in bı¯z. a¯n society with regard to the bı¯z. a¯n ideal of feminin-
95ity. Looking at male h. assa¯n, zwa¯ya, zna¯ga, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and ^abı¯d, their differ-
ence is marked first of all by segregated professional characteristics that do
not correspond to a rank of manliness, or male attributes. Rather than
unfolding a unifying ideal portraying what virtues make for a real bı¯z. a¯n man,
these stereotypes remain moulded into the framework of distinct status
group identities closely linked to professional specialisation. Behaving in a
“manly” way therefore comes to mean distinct things to h. assa¯n, zwa¯ya and
zna¯ga. H. assa¯n ideals of manliness are distinct from zwa¯ya manliness, and
96again are distinct from zna¯ga manliness. Although some general consensus
97about basic male virtues exists, e.g. male cowardice is ridiculed, and a man
of a “great tent”, i.e. of a good family, should be generous rather than stingy,
the pivotal point of reference for men is less manliness than honour, symbo-
lised by status, and success in meeting the exigencies of good conduct
inherent to statutory affiliation. Therefore either small and big h. assa¯n or
zwa¯ya or else good and bad herders were distinguished (cf. Marchesin 1992:
36), but not more or less manly ones. Hence, a h. assa¯n beaten, and therefore
forced to resign from his status and to become zwa¯ya was affected in the first
place by the devaluation of his h. assa¯n ideals of conduct, disregarded in the
98zwa¯ya host community he then had to adapt to. Slave men in this configu-
ration were in a rather ambivalent position. With regard to work, the quality
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of their masculinity was not, or only slightly affected. Unlike slave women,
99slave men experienced no systematic devaluation of their gender identity.
Although they could, and sometimes effectively were assigned tasks contra-
dicting their gender identity (cf. Klein/Robertson 1983: 10; Brisson [1792] in
Saugnier/Brisson 1969: 437), the greater part of male slave labour fitted into
the segregated scheme of male occupations, and therefore slave men could
refer to their work as a means of producing and reproducing their male
100identity.
   The patterns of everyday interaction among men of various statuses
supported this process too. Men of all strata, whenever eating together, share
101and used to share the same dish, which is separate from the women’s.
Although social hierarchy enters this field of cross-hierarchical interaction
whenever service is needed, e.g. meat has to be cut, hands rinsed with water
for washing and the like, its relational character permits the maintenance of
the image of integration. In any situation the one in the group of lowest
standing and age has to do the job, regardless of whether he might be a young
noble or a slave youngster.
   Differences in dress are less marked among men than among women of
different social strata as well. Already Bourrel (1861: 23) noticed in the mid
th 19 century slave women wearing clothes more suited to work than the
bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t’s melhava, a large veil consisting of five to six metres of guinée cloth.
Among men, the today common darra¯^a then still was a luxury item only a few
could afford. Instead a more modest and narrower garment was worn –
obviously without significant differentiation between slave and free men.
Analogous differences are prevalent until the present day. As any visitor to
the country quickly realises, outward appearance and clothing is one of the
most misleading indicators of a man’s social status and origin. The difference
in the significance clothing has in the production of social differentiation
between men and women, however, does not result so much in an opposition
of diversity and uniformity, although such differences still occur among
bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n women. More important is that women have to wear the
melhava (veil) correctly, i.e. it has to cover the hair (but not the face), the
102whole body, and reach close to the ankles. This, however, is almost
impossible while working manually, e.g. in the fields. While work and
clothing were important in constituting and representing the difference
between noble or slave women in former times, distinct occupations and
individual affluence continue to influence distinguishing patterns of dress
among women of different status until the present day. An analogous
preoccupation with devout dressing cannot be confirmed for men of differing
status. Although also not ideal for manual work because of its wide shape,
the darra¯^a can be tightened with a belt, or in the company of men even be
taken off to save it from damage. Again women working manually found it
more difficult to meet the gendered ideals of good conduct than men who
additionally profited from working frequently in gender-segregated loca-
103tions, where much less restrictive clothing customs applied.
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   This male slave self-confidence, however, faced negation within a distinct
field of social interaction. The bı¯z. a¯n rule of female hypergamy brought about
a fundamental difference between slave women and men. While the former
could be married by free men, slave men were most definitely excluded from
alliances with women other than of their own status. While slave women,
consistent with the conception of a patriarchal society, could be assigned
certain seductive qualities competing with those of the bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t by the free
men, slave men simply did not enter into any such consideration or competi-
tion. While the slave women’s struggle for re-socialisation was intertwined
with the struggle for reconstitution of their gender identity (a prerequisite to
subsequent recognition as concubine, milk-mother etc.; cf. p. 94-105), and
hence operated in the field of work as well as the symbolic world of gender
identity, the locus of the slave men’s struggle to reduce de-socialisation was
exclusively focused on work. Indeed, the slave men experienced a deep
paradox. While being able to meet the exigencies of gender symbolism much
better than slave women, they found themselves excluded to the utmost in
the field of practising gender relations. A slave man, properly speaking, could
never gain the social rights of paternity. The de-socialising impetus of slave
estate, which de facto denied kinship ties to slaves turned the patriarchal
conception of descent upside-down, and hence inflicted the most serious
blow to the slave men. Slave children were to live with their mother, at least
until a certain age, but there was no consideration whatsoever of the slave
father. While slave men were deprived of the recognition of fatherhood, slave
104women were recognised as biological mothers of their children. Social
motherhood, in as far as it meant granting them rights in their children, was
more or less definitely denied to them, but could be gained in another field:
milk-motherhood. Milk-kinship ties transferred the affective relations
established through parenthood-analogous practices into a legal framework.
Although dismissing the material obligations arising from real parenthood,
milk-kinship produced analogous social rules of respect – one major concern
105of slaves’ struggle for recognition as social beings (cf. p. 94-99).
   Slave men, to gain social paternity, had not only to be manumitted them-
selves, but had to marry a free woman, e.g. a h. art.a¯niyya, too. This configura-
tion of master, slave and gender relations is the pivotal point in many h. ara¯t.ı¯n
and slave narratives. It is manifest in statements like “any h. art.a¯ni who
marries a slave woman would be a fool, for he never would gain paternity
over his children” (Khalifa Ould Kebab), and the grievance expressed by
M’Barke (cf. p. 66-69). However constraining these implications of slave
ideology were, it would be to depict a rather leaden portrait of bı¯z. a¯n slavery
if reduced to these specific moments. Mobility, and in this case above all
spatial mobility, was a means to cope with these adversities. If slave women
were unable to separate from their masters, slave men who desired to share
their lives had to move – at least temporarily. A proverb from the Tuareg (a
pastoral-nomadic group of the central Sahara, sharing quite a lot of character-
istics of the bı¯z. a¯n) is quite instructive on the matter: “whoever has a slave
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106woman has a slave man” (Oxby 1978: 197). Tuareg masters, too, preferred
to give strange slave men who joined their slave women an extra portion of
food (for they otherwise would have relied on that of the woman), and have
them do some odd jobs in return. Slave men of high esteem, e.g. good
herders, experienced different treatment. Rather than let them engage in
affairs which might have led them to leave their master and join their slave
spouse’s master, these valuable slaves were advised to form engagements with
slave women by their master. The latter thus could choose an ideal spouse,
one highly likely to always live within the same camp as the master – and his
107slave (cf. Oxby 1978: 193ff.).
   Drawing on and highlighting the gender differentials implied in the use of
slave labour among the bı¯z. a¯n provides a clue to a comprehensive understand-
ing of some major social relations tying slaves into society, while nevertheless
rejecting their social integration. Different modes of making use of female
and male slave labour, resulting from the masters’ need not to challenge their
own conception of a gender-segregated society, are fundamental to an
explanation of different modes of slave control. Slave men, more likely to be
far from the camp, could not easily be put to work effectively and closely
watched at the same time. Within such a configuration of the master-slave
relationship, the use of coercive means, i.e. hurting slaves, tended to be a last
resort to restore authority. Slave women on the contrary experienced control
most of the day, and there are numerous descriptions of bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t terrori-
sing their slave women. This polarised image is useful in challenging a much
too undifferentiated portrayal of slave conditions, and in opening up a
perspective which introduces gender relations and the structuration of space
into the study of slavery. Transforming the gendered patterns of slavery
revealed so far into a new stereotype, however, would deprive this approach
of its very qualities, and would be misleading. Such an attempt would mean
neglecting the many in-betweens of master-slave relations highlighted by this
analysis of slave work. There were slave men doing women’s work and
vice-versa (cf. Klein/Robertson 1983: 10; Brisson [1792] in Saugnier/Brisson
1969: 437), and some social institutions, such as milk-kinship provided a
means to overcome the restrictions on interaction between non-kin of the
opposite sex, such as slave men and mistresses (cf. Cleaveland 1995: 46).
Perpetuating a static image, furthermore, means disregarding the dynamics of
slavery as relations of dependency evolving within society, as well as trans-
forming it. Besides being present in the demographic evolution of bı¯z. a¯n
slavery these dynamics are also manifest in the evolution of the bı¯z. a¯n econo-
my, focused on in the following.
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Chapter 6
The Historical Dynamics of Bı¯z. a¯n Economy
The bı¯z. a¯n economy has evolved significantly in the course of history, and
these changes were decisive to the development of distinct configurations of
master-slave relations. Fundamental to much of the economic process in the
western Sahara were the trans-Saharan trade and the trade along the desert
edge. Based on the exchange of complementary products, these trades
established and maintained links between the pastoral and agricultural
populations. The configuration of these patterns of exchange and commerce
was affected significantly by the arrival of European merchants on the West
th African coast. First came the Portuguese, who during the 15 century
established a trade post at Arguin on the west Saharan coast near today’s
Nouadhibou. The trade in gum arabic in the Senegal River basin from the
th th17 century on grew to what was almost a commercial boom. The 19
century finally saw a general increase of marketing and trade throughout the
whole western Sudan and the Sahara, and witnessed the evolution of complex
interrelations between different trade sectors and trade networks (cf. Mc-
Dougall 1985). Colonial expansion, which had started in the western Sudan
th by the middle of the 19 century, and reached the territory of today’s
th Mauritania by the turn of the 20 century, brought about the decline of
several branches of trade and production, but also created new opportunities.
While social and economic change during the early decades of colonisation
was slow, it nevertheless seriously undermined the relations of production
th that had developed in the course of the 19 century. This evolution was a
crucial step towards the quicker and more drastic changes in both economy
and social relations that started in the 1950s, and took a decisive turn in the
wake of the big drought of the 1970s, which introduced a period of increased
aridity lasting until the present.
Gum and Guinée
Throughout the centuries, the economy in the western Sahara underwent
many transformations. While it here is of minor importance whether these
changes occurred in response to an increasingly arid environment (cf. Webb
178        Chapter 6
 
 
th Map 2: Western Sahara and Senegal River Valley in the 19 Century
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1995), or rather followed a socio-economic rationale (cf. Ruf 1995), it is
important to remember the magnitude of these changes, and how deeply they
influenced bı¯z. a¯n society, and consequently bı¯z. a¯n relations of hierarchy and
dependency.
   Trade had always played an important role in the economy of the western
Sahara, but for many centuries, the pastoral nomadic inhabitants of the area
played only a minor role in the most prominent trade in the area, the trans-
Saharan trade. During its heyday, described by Arab authors like Ibn H. awqal
(writing in 378/988), and Ibn Bat.t.u¯t.a (writing in 756/1355), the trade across
the Sahara indeed much resembled trade across the sea (cf. Ibn H. awqal and
Ibn Bat.t.u¯t.a in Levtzion/Hopkins 1981: 43ff.; 279ff.). There were commercial
towns lying on each shore, linked by camel caravans coming and going. This
metaphorical representation of the Sahara lives on. In Arabic sa¯h. il has the
meaning of “seashore”, and the designation Sahel, used today for the arid
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1stretch of savannah below the Sahara, is derived from this term. In the trade
towns south of the Sahara North African traders lived in “white” communi-
ties. Together with their counterparts north of the desert they managed a
considerable share of the Sudanese kingdoms’ trade across the desert. The
Saharans in between had no active role in this business, which focused on the
exchange of Sudanese gold, slaves and a number of other items for luxury
commodities of North African origin and desert salt. The nomadic pastora-
lists were not the entrepreneurs of the trade, but provided caravan transport
2facilities, and occasionally profited from raiding. The development of trade
in the western Sahara, meeting the demands of the internal markets, and no
longer centred on the external markets, took a decisive turn upwards by the
th 3mid 15 century. An east-west axis of trade across the western Sahara
emerged, linking the Portuguese trade post at Arguin via the Adrar and
Tîchît with Oualâta and Timbuktu in the east. Along this route new poles of
urbanity, small trade towns bearing the nuclei of Islamic scholarship devel-
oped, and more and more the western Saharans themselves became involved
in the management of the trade business that before had been the domain of
4North African migrants (cf. Oßwald 1986: 251ff.).
   Why the shift in trade occurred and the North African trade communities
disappeared is difficult to ascertain on the basis of the few existing historical
records. As regards the western Sahara and the westernmost trans-Saharan
trade routes, the evolution is likely to have been a consequence of the
competition from the Portuguese. These pursued an offensive strategy to
develop their trade at Arguin and to break the monopoly of the North
African traders. To achieve this goal, they either bought typical North
African goods on the Moroccan shore and transported them to Arguin, or
5else manufactured and sold substitutes for these commodities. Later, with
the expansion of the Portuguese trade system along the West African coast,
another factor influencing the nature of the trans-Saharan trade came into
play. The establishment of a factory in Sao Jorge da Mina (Guinea) in 1471
laid the basis for diverting a part of the Sudanese gold to the south. Conse-
quently, with the production of gold in the Sudan remaining constant, and
with the trade of the new Portuguese establishments expanding rapidly, less
and less gold entered the Saharan and trans-Saharan market. Both this
competition and the decline of the Sudanese gold supply to the north are
likely to have engendered the withdrawal of the North African traders
primarily interested in gold. Yet another major event fits neatly into this
scheme of interpretation: in 1590 troops of the Sa^did rulers of Morocco –
after several earlier attempts had failed – conquered Timbuktu, the most
famous trade town of the western Sudan, and centre of the gold trade. The
Sa^did attempt to develop direct control over the gold trade, and to tap the
Sudanese gold resources directly, however, failed. Neither the gold mines,
located much further south, could be conquered, nor the decline of the
trans-Saharan trade on the western routes be stopped. Rather the conquest of
Timbuktu accelerated the process of dilapidation already under way by
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destroying the local political structures of the Song˙ai empire. The remnants
of the conquerors, soon cut off from their Moroccan homeland, were unable
to establish a regional territorial hegemony (cf. Oßwald 1986: 188ff.; Ruf
1995: 98ff.).
   A major commodity traded along the desert edge and within the Sahara at
these times was cotton cloth. Formed into bundles of varying size, it was a
prime currency along the desert edge, and within the Sahara, as well as in the
6Sudan. Other currencies were rock salt from the desert, and, though less
important, cowrie shells, in use throughout West Africa as well. Cloth
entered the western Saharan inner market from many directions. One origin
was North Africa, another one the European trade posts at the coast, and
finally, and for a long time most important, the western Sudan. Many parts of
the Sahel were well suited for cotton cultivation. Spinning and weaving are
good counter-seasonal activities to agriculture, and are mentioned for the
th 7Sudan from the 8 century onwards. Cloth of all these different origins was
traded simultaneously in Tîchît, the trade town which for a long time was the
pivotal point of the bı¯z. a¯n salt trade (cf. Hopkins 1973: 48, 68ff.; Oßwald
1986: 379f.).
   The home market of the western Sahara got a decisive boost in the second
thhalf of the 17 century when gum arabic (after it had first reached the Euro-
thpean markets during the 16 century) began to be needed in large quantities
8by the emerging European textile industry. Exports of this exudate of
acacia trees growing wild in the southern parts of the western Sahara were
9shipped mainly by the French and the British. Their trade registers reveal
th that exports of gum arabic almost doubled between the early 18 century and
the 1780s. They doubled again during the decade of the 1830s, and thus
reached an amount of 2,000 tons per year (cf. Webb 1995: 100ff.). The export
of gum arabic was directly linked to the import of guinée cloth. The bı¯z. a¯n
rarely bartered their gum with the Europeans for any other commodity than
indigo-dyed cloth of Indian origin, called “guinée”, usually measuring
1 m in width and 16.5 m in length (cf. Cleaveland 1995: 163). Substitute
products from Europe were rejected by the bı¯z. a¯n traders and consumers, and
thachieved a significant share in the market only by the end of the 19 century.
The marked bı¯z. a¯n preferences for guinée of Indian origin was a bane to the
traders in Saint-Louis. It took one or two years to receive deliveries from
India, and orders therefore had to be made on quite uncertain estimates of
future gum harvests. As the harvests could fall far below the estimates, or
exceed them greatly, the ratio of guinée on the market and the gum available
hardly ever matched and made prices vary strongly. These variations increas-
ed the risk traders had to cope with in this otherwise profitable trade (cf.
Webb 1995: 124).
   A proper knowledge of the trade in gum arabic is crucial to an understand-
ing of the economic development of the western Sahara, not only because this
product dominated virtually all commercial activities of the French colony at
Saint-Louis by the 1830s, but also because this resource was almost com-
The Historical Dynamics of Bı¯z. a¯n Economy        181
 
 
pletely under the control of the bı¯z. a¯n, who had begun to exploit it as a high
value export commodity by then. The trade took place at different entrepôts,
called “escales”, on the river Senegal. There traitants, as the African interme-
diaries were called, awaited the bı¯z. a¯n with guinée cloth they had received on
commission from the French merchants based in Saint-Louis. Most of the
cloth was bartered for gum arabic, and the majority of transactions took
place during the time of the “grande traite” lasting from the first of January
or February until the end of July (cf. Ould Ahmedou, M.S. 1990: 8ff.; Webb
1995: 119). This trade proved to be quite profitable not only to the European
traders and traitants, but to the bı¯z. a¯n too. In 1718, the value of one metric
ton of gum arabic was 2.63 pieces of guinée (equivalent to an index of 100).
This ratio moved more or less steadily up until it reached its climax at a rate
of 70.61 pieces of guinée per metric ton of gum in 1838 (index 2,397), and
then started to decline (cf. Table 6).
   As a consequence of this development in the terms of trade, clothing made
of guinée became less and less expensive in the western Sahara. There the
market responded by an ever-increasing demand: the quantity of guinée
imported to Senegambia, of which the largest part (83.1 percent) was destined
for the trade with the bı¯z. a¯n, rose in index numbers from 100 in 1718 to 339 in
1735, and reached 110,373 in 1838, i.e. during the year when the terms of
10barter were at their climax (cf. Curtin 1975a: 316, 321). This evolution was
in no way forced upon the bı¯z. a¯n; on the contrary, it was their demand for
cloth that dominated the market: when in the 1740s the bı¯z. a¯n gained control
over the regional trade in grain with the French at Saint-Louis, they forced
the latter to pay with cloth, and nothing else. Whenever foreign traders did
not meet the expectations of the bı¯z. a¯n, the latter demonstrated their power
by switching either to other traders, e.g. the English or the Dutch on the
coast, or by temporarily withdrawing their gum from the market altogether
(cf. Webb 1995: 114). Only later, from the 1830s on, i.e. when gum prices
were at their highest, did the bı¯z. a¯n develop a demand for grain in exchange
thfor their gum. This trend continued for the rest of the 19 century. Demand
for grain in the lower Senegal valley rapidly exceeded local production, and
grain had to be imported from the upper river (cf. Hanson 1990: 207ff.; Webb
111995: 118f.).
   Unlike the desert salt mines, the exploitation of which was localised and
easy to put under centralised control, the low-density acacia forests were
scattered over a vast belt stretching from the Gebla to the southern areas of
the Aftout and Hodh. Ownership of these territories, and hence control over
access to pasture and other resources, were held and controlled by the zwa¯ya
tribes, whereas the h. assa¯n only held use-rights as well as rights in tribute and
allegiance based on their military and political dominance (cf. p. 201f.). The
client groups, who were not necessarily of zna¯ga status, but could have rather
diverse origins, also needed access to pastoral resources. Their relations of
dependency were often multilateral. They frequently included not only
h. assa¯n overlords but both zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n superiors (and often several of
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Table 6: Estimated Net Barter Terms of Trade, 1718-1849
 (Value of One Metric Ton of Gum Arabic Expressed in Pieces of
 Guinée Cloths)
 Guinées Index
1718 2.63 100
1723 4.85 184
1739 6.03 229
1745 3.44 131
1776 14.30 544
1783 27.98 1,069
1788 31.88 1,212
1823-27 51.50 1,958
1830 41.12 1,563
1833 63.05 2,397
1839 70.61 2,685
1849 50.25 11,911
12Webb (1995: 114)
© 1994. Reprinted by permission of The University of Wisconsin Press
them), as well as ties to Fulbe and Wolof leaders on the left bank of the
Senegal valley, all of which secured access to land and protection. These
multiple relations of dependency, however, did not necessarily weaken the
th position of the dependents. During the 19 century some of these groups
attained a significant size, and accumulated considerable wealth. Aware of
their power, they managed to exploit conflict between the different branches
of the h. assa¯n nobility, and notably the different factions within the emiral
lineages, in order to strengthen their own position and minimise tributes (cf.
Taylor 1996: 149ff.).
   Compared to these inherent weaknesses of h. assa¯n power, the zwa¯ya
control of land seems to have been much more solid. René Caillié (1830:
149ff.) reported that zna¯ga who wanted to collect gum on zwa¯ya land had to
pay half of their harvest as a tax. Though zna¯ga occasionally made use of this
opportunity, their overall commitment to gum harvesting and trade seems to
have been limited. Rather than selling gum, they were described as selling
milk and other agro-pastoral products at the escales. The organisation of the
trade was definitely in the hands of the zwa¯ya; they managed the caravans
bringing the gum to the escales, and they negotiated the barter of gum for
guinées and other commodities. This monopoly enabled them to channel a
large part of the gum sold to the escales through their own hands. Besides the
trade in gum at the escales, a small local trade with gum persisted. Not all
collectors were able to move to the escales themselves, and hence sold their
gum to merchants passing by on their way to the escales, or sent it there with
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a trustee. The h. assa¯n role in the trade was limited to the provision of security
during the months of the river trade – an activity for which they demanded
and received “coutumes”, annually negotiated taxes paid by the European
traders. Despite the gum being a widely accessible resource in the Gebla and
other southern parts of the western Sahara the gum business became central-
ised to the profit of the zwa¯ya. Their control over local resources and trade
networks enabled them to manage the majority of the trade in gum, and
hence (besides the coutumes paid to the h. assa¯n) to control most of the guinée
cloth, as well as of the other import products flowing into the western
Sahara.
   The influence this development of a zwa¯ya industry had on bı¯z. a¯n society
was first emphasised by Constant Hamès (1979). According to his argument,
the rise in gum trade led to the commodification of bı¯z. a¯n economy, and laid
the basis for a new mode of production, the proto-industrial production of
gum arabic by slaves. While the number of slaves traded, and entering the
western Sahara grew, the profits from trade and taxes in the gum economy
facilitated the development and consolidation of the zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n social
dichotomy. Ever since this argument was elaborated, the question whether
the increased production of gum arabic was made possible by a growing
body of servile labourers remains contested. James Webb (1995: 98) argues
on the basis of a calculation of the effective need of labour force for the
harvest of gum arabic, that there was virtually no need for further slave
13workers. Other scholars, however, stress the role the gum economy had for
the enlargement of the servile strata among the bı¯z. a¯n (cf. Hanson 1992: 111;
McDougall 1995: 228f.). As far as an increased production of gum depended
on the control of a greater number of dependents, acquiring more slaves had
an economic rationale for the individual wanting to have a larger share in the
gum trade. In turn, profits from the gum trade could be invested in many
ways, one of them being the purchase of slaves.
th   In the second half of the 19 century the volume of the gum trade remained
high, and new acacia forests in the east became more easily accessible to the
European traders and their representatives when an escale was opened farther
upriver at Medine in 1866 (cf. Hanson 1996: 68ff.). This evolution helped
compensate for an incipient decline in productivity of the acacia forests
located to the north of the lower and middle Senegal valley. This evolution
was largely due to over-harvesting in response to the economic incentives
raised by the gum boom. The acacia trees were weakened by the many
wounds inflicted on them to increase the exudation of gum arabic, and hence
became more vulnerable to environmental stress. Increased herd sizes as an
outcome of increased wealth, and pastoralists staying longer in the vicinity of
the groves, put further strain on the trees. The dying of many acacia trees –
which in this perspective is rather the outcome of human agency than of
climatic change – reduced the protective cover of the soil, and thus created a
th vicious circle already leading to desertification during the 19 century (cf.
14 thHanson 1992: 111). In the early 20 century, the gum production in the
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western Sahara, as well as the world market prices, quickly fell into a decline.
The role of the world’s most important supplier of gum arabic was taken
over from the western Sahara by the Sudan. There extensive plantations of
acacia trees had been put to production (cf. Webb 1985: 150).
The Colonial Challenge to Pastoral Economy
Marketing Meat
th   The start of the 20 century brought major changes to the desert-side
economy. While income from the trade in gum decreased rapidly, new
requirements developed, and those already established – namely the demand
15 thfor cloth – persisted. By the end of the 19 century, the importation of
16green tea from Morocco had started, and seen a splendid success. To
complement this drink, which soon became the bı¯z. a¯n’s favourite, lots of
17sugar had to be imported too. Colonisation brought about another heavy
burden for the bı¯z. a¯n. Colonial taxes were introduced, and had to be paid in
cash. In order to adapt its imposition to the local, pastoral-nomadic context
in Mauritania, no capitation (the standard colonial tax in the territories of
French West Africa) was imposed. Instead the major tax was levied in cash
per animal. As tribes and fractions were taxed collectively through the
intermediary of their chiefs, and the administrators relied on estimates when
calculating the number of animals to be imposed, there was considerable
room for manoeuvre to be exploited by both parties. Colonial administrators
could reward closely allied tribes and punish more or less dissident ones,
while tribal chiefs could try to downplay the numbers of their tribes’
livestock, but also profit from their position and tax some people more severe
than others. By calling this tax zekat, the French alluded to the Islamic tithe
for the poor (zaka¯t). Agricultural production initially was taxed too, but this
levy, called ^ašu¯r and supposed to make up one tenth of the harvest, was
18suppressed in 1940 (cf. Toupet 1959: 103; De Chassey 1984: 70f.).
   The main question emanating from this obvious gap between income and
expenditures is: how was it filled? Besides the declining benefits from the
gum trade, the main resource that could either be directly turned into cash or
bartered by the Saharans was livestock. A shift in the nature of trade and
export from the Sahara took place with the rapid evolution of a meat market
thin Senegal in the early 20 century, centred around Louga. Mauritanian meat
at this time began to feed directly the rapidly growing population of the
Senegalese cities and the prospering peanut-basin, where production for the
19world market had started by 1848. This evolution transformed Senegalese
20society considerably. Migrants, among whom were many former slaves,
were attracted from various regions of West Africa, as well as from the
Senegal valley which lost ever more of its former prosperity. The peanut
boom caused the locus of the export trade to shift to the south, and the
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construction of the Thiès-Kayes railway (1907-23) further reduced what
remained of the trade on the Senegal river.
   These various factors meant that grain production in the valley became less
profitable, and that less grain was marketed locally. The little grain still
traded, for the peasants had to pay the capitation too, was now often sold to
the south where the Senegalese peanut basin was. Additionally the people of
the valley started seasonal and permanent migration into the peanut basin
area, thus further weakening the potential of local agricultural production.
The consequence was the region’s increasing dependency on imported
foodstuffs like rice, which was paid for with cash income generated by
21migration. Within this changing economic framework, which had taken
th pace by the turn of the 20 century, the pastoralists of the desert edge were
better off than the cultivators: the terms of trade involving animals versus
grain and import products developed over long periods to the advantage of
22animal production (cf. Ould Cheikh/Bonte 1982; Delaunay 1984: 63ff.).
   The evolution of these new patterns of production and consumption was
23not immediate. The transformation of the Senegal valley into a reservoir for
a migrant labour force, largely accomplished by the early 1920s, was catal-
ysed by several major events. A famine occurred in 1904-05, and a second one
in 1913-14. As the regional agricultural production in the valley was already
weakened, the effects of the famine were especially severe. The years from
1905-08 witnessed slaves leaving their masters in various parts of West
Africa. The most prominent case is that of the Banamba slave exodus, where
an approximated 20,000 slaves left their masters (cf. Roberts 1988: 288ff.). In
the central and upper Senegal valley, relations of dependency were less
abruptly challenged and few slaves left their masters. The years following the
first famine until the famine in 1913-14 did not lead to a recovery, but
brought further deterioration of the environmental conditions. The valley
experienced a slow, but continuous decline of its population. Migration, both
seasonal and permanent, became common for free-born, slaves and ex-slaves.
This trend was dramatically strengthened by the famine of 1913-14, which
24was even more severe than the one of 1904-05. Although many slaves seem
to have stayed with their masters, the relations of dependency were drastical-
ly challenged. Many masters were no longer able to fulfil the most basic of
their obligations, that of feeding the slaves. As a consequence, these received
permission to care for themselves, to migrate, or cultivate on their own.
When in 1914 the French began recruiting for the First World War, this was
another option for slaves to escape famine and dependency. Among those
25enlisted, men of servile estate made up at least 75 percent. Those who
survived the butchery on the European battlegrounds were rarely ready to
accept further relations of dependency at home. Often having acquired
specific skills, and speaking French, they had good chances of entering the
colonial administration. Needless to say, these veterans also brought with
them new concepts of society, of liberty, equality, fraternity, challenging
26both traditional and colonial authority (cf. Clark 1994: 61ff.).
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   The most immediate repercussions of the evolution in Senegal and the river
valley were felt in southern Mauritania, as the French had come to call their
th 27new possession by the turn of the 20 century. The Senegal river never had
the character of a linear frontier. Populations from both sides had shifted
from the left bank to the right bank of the river and vice versa in the course
of history (cf. Leservoisier 1994a: 129; Schmitz 1996). Difference among the
ethnic groups living along the river was constituted in the course of interac-
tion, and through complementary relations of exchange. The interpenetration
of the different ethnic groups, as well as the shift of ethnic affiliation some
groups performed, reveal that the river valley was (and still is) an arena for
the articulation of a complex social entity, and cannot be apprehended
through dichotomous categories. This explains why those bı¯z. a¯n who were
most closely integrated into the economy of the valley and its society were
more severely affected by the region’s decline than the large majority of
bı¯z. a¯n, who mainly lived off their pastoral resources. These groups, which in the
th course of the 19 century and its heyday of trade had developed an increasing
demand for an external grain supply, now had to face the stagnation and later
28decline of the grain surpluses marketed in the valley. The pacification of the
Mauritanian territory by the colonial forces was a crucial prerequisite for the
bı¯z. a¯n pastoralists to respond to this situation. Slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n were sent in
increasing numbers to fertile areas in order to cultivate grain for their masters
and patrons (cf. p. 223-225). While in former times warfare and raiding had
often rendered such attempts unprofitable, they now were essential to the
achievement of two goals: providing supplementary grain, and establishing
ownership-rights in fertile land. The latter point became the more important
in the south. Fulbe agriculturalists and pastoralists, who had been pushed
th southwards and across the river by the bı¯z. a¯n during the 19 century, started
29from the end of that century on a remigration that lasted until the 1960s.
They took advantage of the weakening of the bı¯z. a¯n influence on the right
th bank at the end of the 19 century, and especially after the installation of the
30colony. This remigration led to the revival of ancient territorial claims,
conflicting with more recent use-rights of bı¯z. a¯n, who meanwhile had
31occupied these areas. These conflicts over land were a matter involving the
colonial authorities, who directed their attention, besides inquiring into the
historical legitimacy, especially towards signs of effective land-use (cf.
32Leservoisier 1994a: 69ff.; Schmitz 1990a; Santoir 1993).
   The pacification of the Mauritanian territory (at least of its southern parts,
for resistance in the north continued until the 1930s), also had an impact on
the development of new patterns of pastoral production. The increased
security from raids helped the bı¯z. a¯n pastoralists to respond to the growing
demand for meat from the Senegalese markets and to produce and export
more and more animals. The number of cattle in the bı¯z. a¯n herds rose, as beef
was especially highly valorised in Senegal. However, within Mauritania,
cattle rearing is limited to the south of the country, with the southern Tagant
constituting the northern boundary of the cattle zone. Changes in the
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composition of the herds in response to market incentives thus required a
spatial reorganisation of the bı¯z. a¯n nomadic pastoralists too.
   Another element decisive to this development was colonial policy, which
introduced the principle of free access to pasture for all herders. Deliberately
negating all tribal use-rights, and seeking to minimise the grip some impor-
tant tribes had on the natural resources, this policy was a means for the
colonial administration to demonstrate its power. On the ground, however,
this policy never came to be fully effective, for the French wanted to
associate tribal authorities with low-level colonial administration, and in
33many respects relied heavily on these intermediaries. Nevertheless, the
proclaimed ideal, and the few steps toward it, gave many herders, and
especially those of the dependent strata, greater opportunities to shift their
regions of nomadisation. Ever since colonisation Mauritania had witnessed
the southward migration of various tribal groups formerly established in the
north. Though such migrations had occurred throughout the history of the
western Sahara, they now became more generalised, as this evolution was
closely intertwined with decisive and long-lasting economical and political
changes. With the shift of their area of nomadisation the pastoralists from the
north converted step-by-step from camel to cattle rearing, which was better
34adapted to the wetter climate and the animal diseases in the south. In-
creased security from raiding enabled the pastoralists to reduce the size of
their camps and to build satellite camps. Sending out only a few herders with
animals of one species rather than concentrating all livestock species together
in one camp gave a greater flexibility to respond to the animals’ needs. By
this strategy, as well as an overall concentration on less mobile cattle rearing,
the main camps’ area of nomadisation was considerably contracted (cf.
35Toupet 1977: 300f.; Bonte 1987b: 204; Borricand 1948: 90ff.).
   Much of this new trade in meat and import products remained under the
control of some specialised zwa¯ya tribal groups residing in the few bı¯z. a¯n
trade towns. They could profit from their long-established relations of
patronage to acquire animals and other commodities from the pastoral
production of their dependents at favourable conditions. The expansion of
trade, however, did not only strengthen the old commercial elite, but con-
fronted these strata with profound changes in the structure of trade – a
challenge which by far not all bı¯z. a¯n of this group could meet. The changing
economic environment weakened old bonds of hierarchy and dependency,
and the trading business became accessible to people from lower social strata
too. Animals were traded on any scale, and as it was a long way from e.g. the
Tagant to Louga, often several intermediaries were involved. The common
practice of delayed payment and credit in trade with animals, which by some
clever arrangements circumvented the Islamic prohibition of interest and
usury, further increased the opportunities individuals of modest personal
wealth had to enter the trade. Many started on this basis to assemble a
number of animals directly from the pastoralists, and to pay them with the
36revenues from their trip to the south. The story of Hammodi, a h. art.a¯ni
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from the Adrar “who made it” is but one case of how some of today’s great
Mauritanian fortunes were generated in commercial activities, often centred
around the marketing of meat, and in close contact with the interests of the
colonial administration (cf. D’Hont 1986: 157; McDougall 1988: 369ff.; Ould
37Cheikh/Bonte 1982; Ould Khalifa 1991: 815ff.).
   Bı¯z. a¯n herders had one major objective in marketing their animals. It was a
means to acquire grain, and was able to complement the other major export
commodities of the western Sahara: salt and gum arabic. But direct bartering
of animals for grain was limited by the cultivators’ lack of interest in
livestock rearing. Direct inter-ethnic exchange between agriculturalists and
pastoralists therefore more often centred around the barter of complementa-
ry products, such as milk and manure for grain, as the case of Fulbe pastoral-
ists in central Mali shows (cf. De Bruijn/Van Dijk 1995). While such ex-
change systems were practised by transhumant bı¯z. a¯n of the Hodh (cf.
Roberts 1987: 47), they were less practicable for those bı¯z. a¯n of the interior
whose areas of nomadisation or transhumance were too far from the Senegal
valley to allow for longer periods of residence in the south. In this case, as in
38the traditional caravan trade of salt for grain, the commercial transaction
had to take place in a centralised place and within a short space of time. This
type of trade was made possible with the stocking of grain (millet) in major
trade towns along the valley. All types of traders, French commercial houses,
traitants from Saint-Louis, and “Moroccan” Awla¯d Bu¯ Sba, bought grain
directly from the peasants, who in turn thus had a means to acquire import
products and cash. Credit was frequently granted by the traders, and enabled
them to hold down producer prices and increase profits (cf. Ould Cheikh/
Bonte 1982: 41). Additionally the traders were able by this means to channel
a considerable part of the region’s marketable surplus grain into their stocks
immediately after the harvest, thus effectively reducing the amount of grain
pastoralists could directly barter for with the cultivators.
   For the pastoralists the town-based traders had the decisive advantage of
providing all the commodities they needed (grain, import products, money)
in one place. With the presence of a market for livestock to serve the Senega-
lese demand, the monetisation of exchange developed quickly. Animals were
turned into money, which then was exchanged for millet, cloth, tea, sugar,
39and other commodities. These exchanges involved different traders, for the
meat and the grain business were operated separately, a division eased by the
flexibility of monetised commercial transactions. The individual pastoralist,
wishing to turn his male animals destined for slaughter into grain and other
commodities, thus had to engage in a series of subsequent transactions with
different traders (Interview Bettarmo Ould Cheikh, zwa¯ya, 8.2.1996; Benne
Mint Ahmed, h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995). Pastoralists well acquainted with the valley
also used to buy the grain they needed in cash directly from the peasants, and
thus avoided contributing to the profits of the grain traders (Interview Sid
Mohamed Ould Efatt, zwa¯ya, 15.2.1996). Direct bartering of pastoralists
with cultivators did occur too, but was of minor importance in the Senegal
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40valley, where the monetisation of commercial transactions expanded rapidly.
The dominating position the trade in this area had, together with the practical
reasons outlined, relegated barter persisting in the remote areas to minor
41importance.
   Besides this diffuse and small-scale export of animals, which covered only a
part of the trajectory to the markets of Senegal, there were well-organised
large-scale exports too. Weddou Ould Jiddou, a zwa¯ya (Interview 17.4.1995)
of the Tmoddek reported how before 1969 he used to travel twice a year to
Louga, an undertaking he started in 1946 (the year of the election of Horma
Ould Babana as representative of the Mauritanian colony to the French
national assembly). Together with five or six companions Weddou Ould
Jiddou led between two and three hundred small ruminants from the Tagant
via Kaédi, where they crossed the Senegal river, to Louga. There a bı¯z. a¯n
42butcher and trader was ready to buy all the animals. The money gained by
the considerable price differential between the Tagant (about 200 to 250 UM
43per animal) and the Louga market (about 500 to 700 UM per animal) was
partly converted into import products, namely clothing and tea, resold at
44home for further profit. Three camels were necessary to transport these
goods back home, where they were stocked under the tent, and quickly sold
and exchanged.
   The second case highlights the different objectives the marketing of animals
had. The long-distance direct trade with Senegal first of all sought to maxi-
mise the profits generated by the large price differentials for animals between
the Mauritanian interior and the Senegalese markets. This benefit could be
further boosted by the import of commodities like tea and cloth, the terms of
trade for which were much more favourable near the Senegalese coast than in
Mauritania. Specialising in this trading activity meant adapting to the animals’
needs on the journey (i.e. keeping them in good condition), as well as
returning home quickly, in order to increase the frequency of the trans-
actions. The transport of bulky and heavy commodities, such as millet or sugar,
contradicted this major objective. They could be obtained at low prices in the
Senegal valley, already half way home from the Senegalese meat market at
Louga, and therefore remained excluded from the activities of large scale
45traders such as Weddou Ould Jiddou. Additionally, transporting these
goods necessitated a great many transport animals, which in turn would have
further burdened the already difficult transfer of large herds to the Senegalese
markets. The pastoralists in turn profited from the traders frequenting their
camps by getting a means to procure cash and commodities without having
to displace themselves (Interview Sidi Mohamed Ould Dey, h. assa¯n,
27.8.1995).
   Whenever animals had to be exchanged for grain, small, decentralised
caravans left the Tagant and northern Aftout to go to the nearby market at
Kaédi. These caravans were accompanied by the animals (pack-oxen, camels,
and donkeys) necessary to transport the grain back home. They were consti-
tuted on an occasional basis, and rarely comprised the same people in
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subsequent years. Often just one member of a family, accompanied by a
slave, left to get the desired commodities. Modest amounts of tea and cloth,
46as well as money, could be obtained in Moudjéria or Kiffa , as well as the
other small towns where meat was needed to feed the colonial staff and the
inhabitants of the small towns (Interview Isselmou Ould Sidi, zwa¯ya,
8.4.1995). The lack of grain in these locations, together with the less favour-
able terms of trade, however, meant this opportunity was not very attractive
to the pastoralists.
Wage Labour and Migration
The Impact of Colonial Rule on Labour and Migration
   Colonisation introduced a new kind of labour into bı¯z. a¯n society, namely
wage labour. Within the Mauritanian borders the administrative staff, as
elsewhere, needed a large body of people to perform menial tasks. The
administration and its members offered jobs for personal servants, washers,
cooks, shepherds and many others. While skilled jobs, like interpreting, were
more often given to bı¯z. a¯n, the menial jobs were performed primarily by
su¯da¯n men, most of whom were still bound to the slave estate, but many of
whom managed to enhance their legal status and became h. ara¯t.ı¯n (cf. Mc-
Dougall 1988: 376, note 26; Ould Khalifa 1991: 284; Moussa/Ould Maouloud
1997). To some extent, colonisation meant job opportunities for su¯da¯n
women too, as many tasks involved basic household-work. That su¯da¯n
women were less able to profit from these opportunities with respect to
increasing their personal autonomy, resulted from the gendered structures of
domination in bı¯z. a¯n society. Su¯da¯n women engaged in paid work were often
“hired out” for these purposes by their masters, and the revenue directly
benefited the latter without altering the woman’s relations of dependency, or
allowing her to benefit materially. Besides prostitution, which is reported
47from the colonial cities, and the occurrence of which increased considerably
during periods of drought and economic depression, slave women had
another more promising option to enhance their social condition: they could
become the wife of a Senegalese tirailleur or even a French administrator. The
latter were not allowed to be accompanied by their family during the first
decades of the French rule on Mauritanian territory and therefore frequently
contracted marriages called “à la mode du pays” for the duration of their
48stay. Some of these colonial officials, but by far not the majority, did
acknowledge the offspring of these relations. The children thus could profit
from an allowance paid by the colony. The administrators’ former slave
spouses in general were manumitted by their temporary husbands’ paying an
indemnity to the bı¯z. a¯n slave masters. Often endowed with some property,
they were in a strong position when contracting a second marriage (cf. Ould
Khalifa 1991: 803f.; Meyer 1959: 90; Hunkanrin 1964).
The Historical Dynamics of Bı¯z. a¯n Economy        191
 
 
   The outcome of slave women’s liaisons with Senegalese tirailleurs was less
evident. Frequently the bı¯z. a¯n gave proof of their canniness in judicial
regulations, and managed not to free their slave women married to a tirail-
leur. Once the latter were posted to a new location, the bı¯z. a¯n claimed their
slave women back, thus putting the colonial administration, which had
guaranteed to maintain the bı¯z. a¯n property rights towards their slaves, in a
delicate situation. Reports from Senegal, whence many of the tirailleurs
returned after retiring from service in the army, revealed another threat. Back
home, the su¯da¯n women were often treated like slaves by their husbands.
Originating from black African ethnic groups to whom slavery was in no
way alien, the former tirailleurs saw no rationale to treat the su¯da¯n women
better than other strangers of such minor status (cf. McDougall 1988: 370f.).
   Migration to the colonial towns made up only a small part of the total
migration of su¯da¯n seeking employment. In the administrative centres, some
of which were newly established, while others were located in old bı¯z. a¯n
49towns such as Tidjikja or Atar, the number of jobs remained limited. Much
greater opportunities were offered by the Senegal valley, the Senegalese
towns, and parts of southern Mauritania, like the Gorgol region. Already in
the first decades of the century, a southward migrational movement of su¯da¯n
men, both of seasonal and permanent character, developed in Mauritania. In
Dagana, on the left bank of the Senegal, the colonial administrators comment-
ed already in 1925 on the influx of numerous su¯da¯n, as a response to their
mistreatment by brutal bı¯z. a¯n masters. The latter, however, were often able to
get them back under their control by making an appeal to the colonial law
apparatus, claiming fraudulent accusations (cf. Delaunay 1984: 72).
   In 1936, when control in the south of the Mauritanian colony had been well
established for decades, and came to be achieved in the north as well,
Capitaine Gilles, in a report on the Aftout of Kiffa, described how seasonal
wage labour migration was a fixed element in the life of many su¯da¯n men. In
one case from Barkéol el Abiod, the family of a su¯da¯n man living in an
adabay of the Aftout was expected to obtain a harvest of about 800 kg of
millet, an amount already representing the maximum for a single cultivator in
a year with medium rainfall. The su¯da¯n in the adabay in question owed one
half of this harvest, as well as hospitality to their bı¯z. a¯n patrons, when these
resided near the adabay for about one month. As a result of these obligations,
the family remained with about 350 kg when the bı¯z. a¯n left after their yearly
visit subsequent to the harvest. From this amount the cultivators had to pay
the colonial tax on agricultural production, the ^ašu¯r. Calculated at one tenth
of the harvest, the tax withdrew another 80 kg from the remaining millet. The
h. ara¯t.ı¯n family thus had to pay the whole amount of the colonial tax, i.e. for
their own and for their patron’s share, from its own half of the harvest! The
270 kg of millet remaining were just enough to meet the family’s needs for
about half a year. As these su¯da¯n were largely independent of their bı¯z. a¯n
patrons, and received only sporadic gifts like animals or cloth, the need for a
substantial amount of supplemental income is evident. In many other cases,
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the conditions were even less favourable for the su¯da¯n. They were threatened
in various ways, e.g. by unexpected claims from bı¯z. a¯n, or unjustified requisi-
tions tribal or fractional chiefs made when collecting taxes and levies either
50for the colonial administration or for tribal affairs.
   The document of Capitaine Gilles reveals how early those su¯da¯n who had
remained in the Aftout had become integrated into a new mode of produc-
tion dominated by a seasonal alternation of agricultural and most often
wage labour activities, whereas livestock-rearing was of minor importance.
As the su¯da¯n’s conditions of life were hardly enviable, many left permanently
for the south, leaving behind their feeble use-rights in land, and a colonial
administration fearing a deterioration in the net agricultural production.
Already in 1921, the counsel of Tagant notables expressed his concern about
slaves leaving their masters, and asked the commandant de cercle, Anselme
Dubost, to lend support to masters wishing to dispose of their slaves in the
same way they had for generations. The answer was somewhat tempered for
fear of abolitionist pressure from France, as Dubost declared that the colony
did not consider any of its inhabitants slaves. However, to comfort the slave
masters, the commandant added that nobody was permitted to leave the
region, nor the tribe and fraction, as long as the people concerned were not
51mistreated.
   Another case is documented for the 1940s, when about 100 slaves of the
Tarkoz in the district of Moudjéria were reported to have fled to the Gorgol
area. The bı¯z. a¯n masters submitted their problem to the local French adminis-
trator, but the latter only promised to inform his counterpart in the Gorgol
52district on the occasion of a future visit there. Over the years the situation
did not change considerably. Still in 1953, the council of the notables of
Tagant complained about the lack of labour power, i.e. the continued drain of
people towards the south, and sought remedies from the administration.
However, times had changed a bit, and the response of the commandant de
cercle remained terse. Whilst acknowledging the described fact of labour
emigration and the problems emanating from this kind of depopulation, he
did not console the bı¯z. a¯n by promising help. Instead he recommended, that
the bı¯z. a¯n enhance the living conditions of the workers, and claimed himself
53to have already given a good example and raised wages.
The Dawn of a New Era: from Colonialism to Independence
   Interview data illuminates the background and the motivation of both
seasonal and permanent migration from about 1950 on. Until independence,
almost all commercial activities of Mauritania were focused on the south,
namely the Senegal valley and the Senegalese cities, and on a smaller scale
Mali in the east. Wage labour employment opportunities on Mauritanian
territory had been almost inexistent besides the few jobs found in the small
administrative towns. All this changed rapidly when the construction of the
country’s capital Nouakchott, and of the mining industry at Zouérat, created
a large demand for workers in the early 1960s. Until then the su¯da¯n of the
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Aftout had continued to migrate in large numbers seasonally into Senegal. As
Ahmed Ould Aimar (h. ara¯t.ı¯n, Interview 29.3.1995) put it: “When the
fields were over, the people here [the su¯da¯n in the Aftout] wanted to go and
gain something else. In these times Nouakchott did not yet exist.” One
typical job in Dakar was to transport and sell water carried around on the
head in large canisters of 20 litres. Other frequent jobs performed seasonally
by su¯da¯n in Senegal were occupations such as butcher, shop-assistant, or
work with a trader of livestock. Often the su¯da¯n relied on bı¯z. a¯n permanently
installed in Senegal, and with whom they shared tribal or fractional affilia-
tion. This was especially the case for the many su¯da¯n who found jobs in the
numerous bı¯z. a¯n shops established in the Senegalese towns until the ethnic
conflict involving Senegal and Mauritania in 1989 (cf. p. 283f.).
   Today, however, most of the su¯da¯n interviewees are cautious on the topic
of assistance they received from bı¯z. a¯n. Many claim to have found work on
their own, and some indicated the fact that they did not work for bı¯z. a¯n, but
54for Senegalese. Those su¯da¯n who were a little bit better off, or able to raise
loans, could engage in petty trade. While many of those who succeeded
stopped going back home to cultivate, and established themselves permanent-
ly, some su¯da¯n of the Aftout developed seasonal petty trading. During the
dry season they left the area and headed to Kiffa, or further south-east to
Mali, in order to buy peanuts, to be resold in small quantities on the way
home. The money needed to start this transaction came from the marketing
of millet, and the profit was expected to cover the costs of clothing (Inter-
views Sidi Ould Salim, h. art.a¯ni, 25.7.1995; Ahmed Ould Breik, h. art.a¯ni,
11.4.1995; Ahmed Ould Aimar, h. art.a¯ni, 29.3.1995).
   Migration of su¯da¯n women did occur too, but was more limited in frequen-
cy and in range then men’s. In the interviews I conducted with su¯da¯n, the
migration of su¯da¯n women, then working as household maids in the cities,
appeared only after the big drought in 1969. Reports from the valley,
however, mention that su¯da¯n couples used to migrate there even before. The
55men helped at the harvest, and the women pounded millet and did handi-
crafts. The local Haalpulaar population was able to pay for these services
thanks to their cash income generated by migrant labour (cf. Schmitz 1993:
611). A quite similar case of rural-rural migration, over relatively short
distances, is mentioned in the narrative of Valha, who describes how her
family was helped to pound millet and do other tasks by su¯da¯n families, who
joined the pastoralists once the harvest was over (cf. the narrative of Valha
p. 69-72).
   Permanent migration of su¯da¯n had two major reasons. Some seasonal
migrants were able to succeed abroad, and decided to stop returning home to
cultivate every year, when this was no longer profitable or would have
endangered the permanent employment they had found. Others just preferr-
ed life in the cities, and therefore did not go back. Often the reason for this
decision was the relations of dependency the su¯da¯n had to endure in their
area of origin. Moime Mint El Abd (h
˘
a¯dem, Interview 26.12.1995), had a
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(slave) father who was known for being an unruly and violent man, one who
did not submit to the will of his masters and was rude to other people as well.
Having achieved a considerable degree of liberty himself, he was unable to
bear the mistreatment and beatings his wife experienced at the hands of her
masters. He ran away when Moime still was a baby. Others ran away when
they were adolescents, because – as Yarba Ould Emine (h. art.a¯ni, Interview
1.4.1995) told me – they could no longer bear the subservience of their
parents and the domination of the bı¯z. a¯n masters.
   The 1960s brought about the rapid expansion of employment opportuni-
ties. French policy towards and within the colonies changed considerably
after the Second World War, and became oriented towards the development
of Mauritanian economy and infrastructure. Additionally, natural resources,
like the iron ore deposits at the Kediet ej Jill, were explored, and later mined
56by international investors. Rosso, situated on the Mauritanian bank of the
Senegal valley, was a major transit town for Mauritanians wanting to go to
Dakar. When Nouakchott and the mining industry of the north began to
emerge, the flow of migrants passing through the small city began to split up
into one part heading to the north, and one part to Senegal in the south.
Much of the money the seasonal migrants earned was funnelled back into the
rural areas. There it was invested in animals, or, as many of the then still
young migrants admit, just squandered. These examples incited many other
youngsters to go and try their luck too. As they rarely found support for
such plans at home, the young men, many of whom were still boys, often left
in secret not only their masters, but their parents too.
The Impact of Drought
   The heavy drought of 1969 ultimately increased migration, which now
more than ever became a crucial necessity. The period of prolonged droughts
paralysed the rural and especially the pastoral economy. Bı¯z. a¯n masters were
often no longer able to support their dependents; feeding them was an
especial problem. When the drought decimated the herds, work in the
pastoral sector became rare. This did not only affect unpaid slave workers. In
the course of the increasing migration and successful emancipation of the su¯-
da¯n, many tasks, like the watering of cattle or the herding of sheep and goats
had started to be remunerated. While in the golden times of livestock exports,
57some of these jobs had been quite well paid, the consequences of the
drought put these rural workers, whose emancipation had weakened their
ties with their former bı¯z. a¯n masters and patrons, most immediately into a
58difficult situation.
   While the animals of most bı¯z. a¯n were already badly affected, and died in
large numbers, the situation was even worse among the cultivating su¯da¯n, a
large number of whom had invested in animals during the good years of the
1950s and 1960s. The reasons for this difference are multiple. Committed to
cultivation and migrant labour, many though not all su¯da¯n were less mobile
59than most bı¯z. a¯n. Consequently their livestock, even in years of good
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rainfall, experienced more deprivations than the bı¯z. a¯n’s. The su¯da¯n animals
were less well tended because labour was scarce, since it was already invested
in cultivation, migration, and work for the patrons. When the drought cycle
started these already physically more weakened animals became the first and
most numerous victims. The effects of the 1969 drought on the livestock on
the Tagant and in the Aftout were disastrous. Many pastoralists of these
regions used to nomadise only within a quite restricted area of about 50 to
80 km. During the drought, most of these pastoralists just remained at one
location, near a well, or in a valley. Of the former pastoralists now sedentar-
ised in the region of Achram-Diouk, amazingly few reported having under-
60taken emergency trips, e.g. towards the south, to save their animals. Many
explained their immobility by the arguments that the drought was omnipres-
ent in Mauritania, and that therefore there had not been any alternative for
them. Additionally emigration was described as being risky in itself. Many of
the pastoralists who had migrated southwards with their animals, so my
informants claimed, lost even more animals than those who remained in one
place. A more successful strategy to cope with the drought was only devel-
oped by two interviewees, both of whom were resolute, and experienced
pastoralists. They migrated with their sheep and goats, as well as camels, far
to the north into the Tiris region, where they reached Zouérat and Aoussard
in the former Spanish Western Sahara (thus crossing a distance of about
750 km as the crow flies!). This expedition helped them to maintain a large
enough part of their herd to continue their pastoralist mode of life when the
61drought was over.
   The consequences of increased aridity and massive sedentarisation after
1969 successively put an end to the region’s export of livestock from the
Tagant and northern Aftout. Only towards the mining towns of the north,
where prices were especially high, and the distance to cross for the Tagant
herders was comparatively short, did the marketing of meat persist. Today
sheep and goats brought along from the Hodh on the hoof or by truck are
even cheaper than those of local production. The overall rapid decline of local
pastoral production forced an unprecedented number of bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n,
both in desperate need of money, to migrate towards the cities. The rural area
needed cash, and the cities were the only location where it could be obtained.
Both young bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n left to look for assistance from rich and influen-
tial affiliates in the city, and opportunities to gain some money. It is from this
time on that many bı¯z. a¯n life histories begin to include periods of migration
purely to work in the cities.
The men, a large part of the men left [in 1969]. They went to Ivory Coast,
Senegal, sometimes Nouakchott. They went where they could find work.
. . . Su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n left, the young ones and the old. . . . They engaged in
trade, they opened up shops [small retail trade]. This is what they did in
all places, nothing but trade. This is what I heard. I do not know what the
people really did there, I just heard what they wanted to do there. How-
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ever, people who did not know how to trade had to look for work
instead. (Interview Laghlave Ould Mahmoud, h. art.a¯ni, 13.4.1995)
In many cases the outcome of “doing business” was quite modest. Only a
few succeeded and became part of the large bı¯z. a¯n trade community spanning
all of West Africa, and even parts of central Africa. The overwhelming
majority of migrants, however, was employed as badly paid assistants in
shops, established a small retail trade on the basis of credit, or engaged in
smuggling (especially between the former Spanish Western Sahara and
Mauritania). While the number of bı¯z. a¯n in these non-manual jobs still was
higher than that of su¯da¯n, quite a lot of bı¯z. a¯n (though most often of modest
origin), stopped submitting to status obligations forbidding them manual
work, and started to work e.g. in construction (Interview Abderrahmane
Ould Ali, zwa¯ya, 13.7.1995). New job opportunities arose when the state
invested in a national infrastructure, such as the “road of hope”, which was
built from 1975 on, and now links the capital Nouakchott directly with
Néma in the country’s east. Though a number of su¯da¯n still relied on
patronage from influential bı¯z. a¯n in order to get jobs, the latter were far from
able to help all su¯da¯n, nor could they satisfy the demands of the many bı¯z. a¯n
who were in a comparable situation.
   As a result of this flooding of the formal job market, the extraction of shells
from the dunes at the coast near Nouakchott became a fixed point in many
urban migration careers. This business, which certainly is among the most
menial one can imagine, is essential for construction in Nouakchott. As there
is no gravel in the capital’s sandy environment, it has been replaced by shells.
Exploiting the dunes is free to everybody, and serves as transitional occupa-
tion until better jobs are found. Interests in the rural sector in the meantime
often were (and still are) safeguarded by collective strategies. When several
members of a family migrate, one other member (quite often the youngest
62brother), is put in charge of maintaining all claims over land. While some
migrants are accompanied by their families, more frequently the men leave
alone. Women, children and elderly people remain in the villages and wait for
the migrants’ yearly visits and their assistance in cultivation.
Migration Patterns: from Running Away to Getting Back Home
   Material need, together with the rapid growth of the urban centres and the
emergence of better transport facilities, paved the way for increased migra-
tion not only of men but of women too. These no longer migrated only in the
company of their husband or of a male member of their family, but also on
their own. This certainly was further eased by nearly every family having
relatives living in one of the few Mauritanian cities worth migrating to. There
new job opportunities for women developed. Besides work as housemaids,
63the dye of cloth and the preparation of couscous became among others
major underclass urban women’s occupations (Interview Ghalim Ould El
Kheir, h. art.a¯ni 17.12.1995). What here remains unspoken, but is nevertheless a
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matter of fact documented since colonial times, is an increase of prostitution.
64Formerly especially marked in times of economic depression and drought,
it has now become a widespread phenomenon.
   In the course of this evolution, which deeply transformed the modes of life
and production in the rural areas, public acts of slave emancipation and slave
flight became more and more frequent. In 1974, a slave woman of one of the
region’s important h. assa¯n families ran away. One night she took all her
belongings, and together with her children, slipped away to the nearby track
(the tarred road now passing by had not yet been constructed). She caught a
taxi that brought her and her children directly to Nouakchott. The master,
after having learnt of the flight, followed his slave in another taxi, and traced
her in the city. After negotiating with the woman, he was able to return back
home with one son, destined to herd the sheep and goats. However, the
agreement did not last for long. Several days after he had been brought back
to the master’s small village, the slave boy managed to escape, and left for
Nouakchott in a taxi as well. Ever after, the relations between the slave
family and the master were ruptured. The slave woman continued for some
years to live in Nouakchott until she became ill. Seeking medical advice in a
hospital, she was told to go back to her natal region, there she was supposed
to recover from her ailment. The woman returned, but her stay in the vicinity
of her former master did not last. Assisted by some relatives she left her
home region once again and went to Nouadhibou, where she finally died
(Interview h. assa¯n, 9.12.1995).
   Another slave woman was forced to follow her mistress, a member of a
family descended from one of the Tagant ^amı¯rs, when the latter married and
left with her husband for a town in the east. There she had to serve her
mistress, and do the housework. During a visit to the Tagant, the slave
woman’s brother saw his sister working very hard, and the mistress mistreat-
ing and beating her. He persuaded his sister to flee, and together with other
su¯da¯n helped her to get to Moudjéria on a donkey. There she took a taxi to
Nouakchott, from where she never returned (Interview h. art.a¯ni, 19.12.1995).
   These two stories of slave women who escaped from their masters might at
first sight be anticipated as proofs of the persistence of slavery in Mauritania,
and for this reason may be welcomed by modern abolitionists on the one
hand, and condemned and doubted by those who deny the relevance of
relations of dependency resulting from master-slave relations for contempo-
rary Mauritania’s social topography on the other hand. Besides the factual
authenticity, which for the basic statements of both stories has to be taken for
given, both stories are above all stories about the changing relations of
dependency, about slaves physically and symbolically breaking out of their
domination by the masters. The stories thus reveal how the end of slavery
comes about, and not how slavery persists. As the power of the masters fails
to encompass the big cities, but is still present in the rural areas, the slave
women have to migrate permanently to enter an environment where they are
free of direct, personal domination. The reasons for this migration distinguis-
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hes them from the many other (permanent) migrants entering the cities.
Though in view of the decline of the rural sector few migrants ever have the
65chance to return back home, the slaves who have absconded are by and
large unable even to dream of returning home, be it only for a temporary
visit, for this would mean re-entering the sphere of domination, being forced
to re-negotiate the relations of dependency, and locate oneself in a local
society where one’s personal history is well known. Leaving the rural world,
though it has been disrupted in the course of the droughts, increased aridity
and desertification, imposes, in addition to all material problems, great
mental stress. People, the bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n alike, get ill from the cities, and the
remedy recommended unanimously – by medical professionals and common
sense – is a return to one’s region of origin. There, for the su¯da¯n the cure for
66their pains is obtained e.g. by a diet consisting first of all of dishes of millet.
Others stress the positive effects of fresh milk, and the green pastures during
67the rainy season, and thus affirm the conception deeply rooted in bı¯z. a¯n
society that illness results from an unbalanced food-intake (cf. Ould Ahme-
68dou, E.G. 1990: 95ff.).
   Besides its profound psychological rationale, there is another bit of truth in
the link constructed between food, health and the rural area, as medical
observations confirm. Despite the many difficulties of the rural sector,
nutrition there is still better, i.e. of higher nutritive value, than the typical
underclass urban food. Medical surveys in Mauritania proved child nutrition
in the most remote areas to be far better than that of small cities, and espe-
cially of the great urban slums, where the rate of severe malnutrition was
highest. These results are due to the fact that food is scarce both for poor
urban and rural populations, but access to high protein, vitamin etc. food-
stuffs like milk, meat and sometimes garden products is much better in the
rural areas than in the cities, where hungry children are given French
baguettes, and sweets (Guy Rousseau, GTZ Achram, personal communica-
69tion).
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Chapter 7
Small Dams, Large Dams:
Bı¯z. a¯n Land Tenure and Social Stratification
Ruins on the Tagant, as in other mountainous areas of Mauritania, bear
witness to a long history of cultivation. The numerous remnants of stone
built round houses and extensive terracing designed to enhance cultivation
indicate the presence of a former sedentary and agriculturist population, now
called Gangara.
   The cultivation of millet in precolonial times was not limited to the more
humid zones of the south, or the šema¯ma-region bordering the Senegal river.
The Tamourt en-Naaj on the Tagant, and some other important depressions
and valleys, together with the oases, were the locus of intensive agricultural
production, providing the pastoralists with a crucial complement to their
diet. Although the total amount of production in precolonial times cannot be
evaluated, the patterns of trade showing a pastoral population bartering
desert goods like salt and dates for grain reveal that the local production of
millet was too low to meet the needs in the north and centre of the western
1Sahara. This situation persists until today, although the bı¯z. a¯n increased
th their involvement in agriculture several times. During the 19 century, the
import of slaves not only freed many bı¯z. a¯n masters from manual work, and
benefited the pastoral sector, but led to the extension of both agriculture and
pheniculture. From the turn of this century on, French colonisation confron-
ted the bı¯z. a¯n with a policy aiming not only to fix (and thus to better be able
to control) the nomadic population, but to minimise the bı¯z. a¯n need for grain
imports (cf. p. 221-228). Finally the drought of 1969 transpired to be only the
beginning of a period of subsequent droughts and increased aridity, which
together with human action caused a severe degradation of natural resources.
Facing the changed environment and the loss of most of their animals, bı¯z. a¯n
who did not leave for the cities altogether, began to cultivate millet and
sedentarise in villages and small towns. While the evolution during the first
two periods matches neither in scale nor in speed the last one, a proper
knowledge of these past events is essential for an understanding of today’s
configurations of land tenure and property. Access to land and rights over
land, especially cultivable land in an almost desert environment, is at the very
base of social inequality in rural societies.
   Slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n both experience their subordinate position in bı¯z. a¯n
society through discrimination against them in matters of access to land and
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land tenure. To grasp this issue comprehensively, the following analysis
focuses on two domains. Besides the legal framework of land tenure in
traditional bı¯z. a¯n society, as well as in colonial and independent Mauritania,
detailed case studies from the region of Achram-Diouk will throw a light on
practices of land tenure and their change. These appear to be full of ambigui-
ties. While much of past domination lives on in today’s access to land, new
patterns of land tenure have emerged, reconfiguring the spatial representation
of social boundaries among su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n, tribes and fractions, as well as
women and men.
Land Tenure: the Legal Framework
Islamic Jurisprudence and Land Tenure in the Western Sahara
   Like other legal matters, the basic principles of the constitution and transfer
of ownership rights in land in precolonial bı¯z. a¯n society were laid out by
Islamic jurisprudence, and detailed by the ma¯liki school of law. At the core of
this legal framework is first the “opening” of land for subsequent appropria-
tion marked by the arrival of Islam in this territory, and second, the “vivifica-
tion” of land, which establishes and legitimises ownership rights. Only the
initial user is able to appropriate, and establish ownership rights in land.
These are maintained by sustained use, which is considered to leave its
imprints on the land. All other types of property exchange, be it by sale,
donation or appropriation through violence come after it (Ould al-Barra/
Ould Cheikh 1996: 158, 164). As clear as this principle seems, its practice
reveals many problems. Contemporary or recent claims can be put in
question by claims supposed to be more closely linked to the initial appropri-
ation. As factual authenticity can hardly be proved for times lying several
centuries back, conflicts over land are likely to arise and are legitimised by
2the same legal framework.
   To further elucidate bı¯z. a¯n land tenure, it must be noted that the interpreta-
tion of Islamic law was concentrated in the hand of the zwa¯ya, for their elite
was the only group disposing of the cultural and symbolic capital necessary
to legitimise such an undertaking. As they were also the prime agents of the
pastoral and trade economy, the zwa¯ya by this role were able to further
promote their own position, both symbolically and materially, with regard to
the other social strata. Legal judgements (h. ukm) and legal expertise (fatwa¯
3and nawa¯zil ), were a major domain for zwa¯ya Islamic scholars struggling to
deconstruct the illegitimate nature of h. assa¯n power and property. This image
was one which many zwa¯ya scholars liked to contrast to their own supposed
piety (cf. Oßwald 1993: 62ff.). Furthermore, as is the case in most other legal
systems, Islamic jurisprudence does not recognise the transient pastoral-
nomadic land-use as a basis for direct ownership in land: grazing animals do
not “vivify” land, nor do they imprint permanent signs of land-use. With
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regard to these prescriptions, the bı¯z. a¯n nomadic pastoralists therefore are
unable to constitute individual or collective ownership of the land they
exploit. Such rights, according to an orthodox interpretation of Islamic law,
are limited to agricultural use, or other modes of permanent, productive use,
such as the construction of wells, or continued farming.
   Despite the difficulties of fitting this narrow legal framework, grazing land
was subject to forms of appropriation recognised and approved as legitimate
by the bı¯z. a¯n jurists. The basis for this practice was the option provided by
Islamic jurisprudence to tolerate under certain conditions local tradition as
part of a customary law (^urf; cf. Oßwald 1993: 38ff.). Although these
regulations could not become a source of legislation, customary law allowed
the local bı¯z. a¯n jurists to legally recognise tribal territorial claims, and to
ascertain them in legal terms by linking the ownership of distinct locations
with the right to take into possession the pastureland in the vicinity. All these
varying levels of territorial control and land ownership were exercised by the
collectivity of the tribe, which in this respect assembled a number of pastoral
nomads sharing economic and political interests to control and exploit a
common territory.
   It is the hierarchy both among and within tribal groups which adds further
complexity to the practices of land tenure in precolonial bı¯z. a¯n society. In
general it was the zwa¯ya tribes which effectively appropriated pastureland
4and established ownership rights over both agricultural sites and wells. This
ownership, however, did not imply an exclusivity of use-rights. Many zwa¯ya
lived under the political domination of h. assa¯n tribes, and often paid tributes
to them (a condition turning them into zwa¯ya “of the shade” in contrast to
the independent zwa¯ya “of the sun”; Bonte 1989: 118). Out of this power
relation arose a number of customary rights, which gave the h. assa¯n the right
to use the bı¯z. a¯n land and wells. The h. assa¯n thus were able to live as pastoral-
ists side by side with the zwa¯ya, although they did not own the pastoral
resources they exploited. Analogous is the case of the tributary strata, the
zna¯ga and tla¯mı¯d. . Being free but socially inferior, these did not own land, i.e.
they were unable to constitute exclusive use-rights over pastoral resources.
The zna¯ga and tla¯mı¯d. , who sometimes constituted tribal groups, but often
just lived side by side with their patrons, therefore had to develop relations
with a powerful tribe which would grant them access to pastoral resources in
exchange for tributes. In the case of the zna¯ga the major patrons were the
h. assa¯n, while zwa¯ya clients were called tla¯mı¯d. (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985a: 533ff.;
Bonte 1987b).
   The tribal partition of land which predominated in pre-colonial western
Sahara was not one of clear-cut borders, but resembled more a collage of
5oscillating, partially connected and overlapping spatial entities, the mainte-
nance of which depended on collective, i.e. tribal action. Despite this eventful
history, until today, the legitimation of tribal claims to land follows a most
scrupulous interpretation of the principle of initial vivification that rules this
section of Islamic jurisprudence: distinct tribal property in land is traced back
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to its first appropriation under Islam, the event in history clearly marking the
beginning of all legal transactions, and thus the ultimate point of reference on
which to construct legitimate claims to property. For this undertaking to
succeed, a great many reliable testimonies have to be assembled, thus involv-
ing joint action and expression by the tribal body to affirm ownership in land
6(cf. Ould al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996: 176). It is this structuration of the
constitution of legal claims through a set of continued, collective social
practices (cf. Giddens 1992: 67ff.) that forms the basis of the persistence of
the tribal fragmentation of land rights until today.
   Within the tribal boundaries individual property in land is possible, but is
accessible only to members of the corresponding tribe. Exceptions occur
7rarely, as transfer of land to members of foreign tribes would weaken
internal tribal solidarity, and endanger the coherence of the discourse
constituting the tribe as a social and spatial entity, demarcating itself from the
8outside world.
The Transformation of Land Tenure under Colonial Rule
   Legislation in colonial Mauritania (as in the other West African colonies)
initially introduced the French legal code, and declared all conquered land
property of the colony. Recognising that this legal guideline had little to do
with the situation the administration had to face on the ground, the colonial
legislation from 1904 on became increasingly sensitive to the traditional,
collective structures of land tenure and ownership. This tendency culminated
in 1955, when the French conceded traditional rights in land supremacy over
claims by the colony. According to this law, it was the colony which had to
prove that land had been unused for at least ten years, and therefore was free
for appropriation, and not vice-versa (nevertheless all land still could be
expropriated by the colony in cases of public interest).
   The most important change colonial rule introduced to local patterns of
9land tenure was the establishment of land registers in 1925. These registers
were designed to account for rights in land in the different administrative
posts. Most often the tribes’ chiefs were listed as owners in these registers,
but they were meant not to appear as individual owners but as representa-
tives of their collectivities, i.e. their tribes, which for this purpose had to be
10rigorously classified into tribes and sub-tribes. The distinct, more or less
well-defined agricultural sites registered therefore had to be considered as
collective, and not as individual property (cf. Leservoisier 1994a: 87ff.).
   This procedure reveals the wish of the French administration to adapt
action to local, i.e. bı¯z. a¯n customs, and in this respect marked a departure
from their policy in most other colonies, such as e.g. in North Africa. Rather
than draw tribal territories on a map, they acknowledged – within certain
11limits – the fluctuating nature of nomadic habitat, together with respect for
the significance distinct places had (and continue to have) for the constitution
of tribal identity and territoriality. Nevertheless this measure modified the
nature of land tenure. Ownership rights were codified, and this definitely
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altered the negotiatory and sometimes violent mode of disputing and chang-
ing access to land that had prevailed in precolonial bı¯z. a¯n society. Addition-
ally, the administration, by this new practice, was able to exploit its power
and to attribute or withdraw ownership rights in response to cooperation
with, or hostility towards the colonial power. This was possible because the
French colonial laws defined the coexistence of French civil law and the
recognition of traditional land rights (cf. Leservoisier 1994a: 87f.). Colonial
interests thus could override rights defined by custom, as far as these had not
been registered. That this option was rarely applied resulted from the admini-
stration’s disinclination to increase opposition and conflict with and among
the bı¯z. a¯n tribes. Instead of voluntarily attributing land entitlements, the
colonial administration spent much time on assembling claims and proofs of
collective land ownership, in order to become a competent arbiter in bı¯z. a¯n
12disputes over land. Due to this complex intermingling of bı¯z. a¯n and colonial
interests, the constitution of the colonial land registers became an important
issue in local politics, involving the tribal elites in another struggle for
influence on the colonial administration, the generation of references, the
control of land, and finally the power to attract followers and clients (cf.
13below, p. 208-247).
Patterns of Bı¯z.a¯n Land Tenure
   The issue of inner-tribal hierarchy affects access to land in various ways.
First of all, tribally owned land, such as agricultural sites, is under the
collective ownership of the tribe’s members. These, however, are constituted
only by the free people of common affiliation. Associated members of the
tribe, such as zna¯ga and h. ara¯t.ı¯n, do not have the necessary genealogy, and
thus are excluded from sharing equal rights in land with the full-fledged
members. This hierarchical structure of tribal property in land has two major
consequences. Areas which have been under tribal control for long time are
in the hands of only a small group of families, forming the centre of the tribe.
These groups in turn have to maintain this configuration of land property
over generations. They achieve this end by keeping the property legally
undivided, and thus inalienable, although its exploitation takes place individ-
ually. This juridical procedure also has further advantages. It allows them to
omit the obligation to share inheritance, as defined by the šarı¯^a for individ-
ual property, which in the case of its application would entail fragmentation
of agricultural plots within the families holding rights in the land. Last but
not least, the described patterns of continued, collective ownership exclude
women from claiming rights in land which they otherwise would gain
through individual inheritance, according them half of their brothers’ share
14(cf. Ould al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996: 178).
   The concentration of direct land ownership in the hands of the bı¯z. a¯n tribes,
nowadays of both zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n status, is one of the most important
means by which relations of hierarchy and dependency among su¯da¯n and bı¯-
z. a¯n are perpetuated. Even more often than in the case of pastoral land, the
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users and owners of agricultural sites did not coincide. In precolonial times, it
was the slaves and the then still small number of h. ara¯t.ı¯n who cultivated.
Occasionally zna¯ga cultivated too, but the zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n rarely did.
   Breaking the bı¯z. a¯n’s stranglehold on land ownership has proved difficult
for the su¯da¯n up to the present. Slaves, due to their legal estate, had no rights
to constitute property. All of their work belonged to the masters, who in
turn were obliged to feed and clothe their slaves. These legal prescriptions
were fundamental to the definition of the slaves’ relation to the land they
cultivated. Even though many slaves lived in conditions characterised by
some autonomy, and e.g. did not give all of their harvest to their masters, but
have managed especially since the first decades of this century to give only a
fixed part (cf. McDougall 1988: 379), they nevertheless never could challenge
their masters’ rights over the land they cultivated. The same legal rule applies
to those cases in which slaves were involved in acts constituting the appropri-
ation of land, e.g. the clearing of bush, or the construction of dams. All such
work done by slaves constituted property only for their masters. The case is
different for the h. ara¯t.ı¯n. They could become landowners, but in the majority
of cases nevertheless failed in this attempt. Legally free, those h. ara¯t.ı¯n who
had gained this status by manumission, still had no means to sustain them-
selves. In order to get access to land for cultivation, they had to negotiate
with bı¯z. a¯n land owners, and to associate themselves with a bı¯z. a¯n tribe. To
develop and maintain even a limited access to land these h. ara¯t.ı¯n were thus
forced to submit themselves to the tribal social hierarchy, discriminating
against them as free women and men of secondary rank (cf. Ould al-Barra/
Ould Cheikh 1996: 162).
   As regards the cultivation of millet the most frequent arrangement between
bı¯z. a¯n land owners and landless, but cultivating h. ara¯t.ı¯n was as follows: the bı¯-
z. a¯ni land owner had to provide the seed, and the h. art.a¯ni the labour. The
harvest was shared equally between both parties. Besides these conditions,
many other arrangements were practised. Not all bı¯z. a¯n provided the seed,
nor did all h. ara¯t.ı¯n pay half of their harvest. What remained unchanged was
the fragile nature of h. ara¯t.ı¯n land access. While working as a kind of share-
cropper, they were unable to constitute proper ownership rights in the land
they cultivated. These remained with the bı¯z. a¯n, who additionally had the
option of withdrawing the h. ara¯t.ı¯n’s use rights to cultivate from one year to
the other. Those h. ara¯t.ı¯n who had no other means of sustaining themselves,
therefore heavily depended on maintaining good relations with their bı¯z. a¯n
patron. Other more favourable arrangements mediating land-access for
non-landowners did exist, but were restricted to dependent strata other than
the su¯da¯n, or were granted to poor bı¯z. a¯n. These arrangements established
long-lasting use-rights, paid for with only one tenth of the harvest or even
15less (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1991: 192).
   Despite these unfavourable configurations of land ownership and tenure,
h. ara¯t.ı¯n effectively could, and did become land owners. This was most
frequent in the south, and parts of the Aftout, which largely correspond to
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today’s Gorgol region. In parts of the Aftout, and notably in the Gorgol
plain, the bı¯z. a¯n tribal grip on land had been comparably weak due to long
periods of political instability and conflict, which saw the local h. assa¯n tribes
being defeated several times, and the area come under the political domina-
tion of the large and powerful h. assa¯n confederations of the Tagant and Hodh
(notably the Idaw^I¯š Abakak, the Idaw^I¯š Šra¯tı¯t, and the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d),
which made of the area another locale for their rivalries. The ecology of the
Aftout too is responsible for the density of occupation having been persist-
ently low for a long time. The pastures, which are abundant for some months
after the rainy season, are considered too “wet”, and infested by insects and
parasites by the pastoralists. The number of permanent wells is small, for
traditional techniques allow only the drilling of seasonal wells in the wa¯ds,
the seasonal watercourses in this area. Vast areas therefore remained vacant
for permanent occupation by immigrant h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and a number of slaves,
many of whom had left their former overlords and masters, and sought
16protection from regional zwa¯ya tribes. In many cases these bı¯z. a¯n granted
the su¯da¯n the right to appropriate land like free men according to the princi-
ple of vivification, and thus to act like real h. ara¯t.ı¯n. Today their acts of
appropriation are viewed as legitimate even by the local bı¯z. a¯n, who thus
acknowledge the h. ara¯t.ı¯n to be free men possessing all civic rights (cf. Park
171988: 62, 64; RIM 1986: 57; Schmitz 1987: 6ff.).
   Similar cases can be observed in other regions too. In the area of Ach-
ram-Diouk several h. ara¯t.ı¯n managed to constitute rights in land by clearing
and permanently cultivating it. However, as the most productive land was
already under bı¯z. a¯n control, the h. ara¯t.ı¯n plots occupy areas of secondary
rank. In other cases, h. ara¯t.ı¯n were granted land ownership or long term
use-rights by members of the bı¯z. a¯n elite. They could either buy land, e.g.
with the money they earned from migrant labour, or they became beneficiary
of a h. ubs. This latter state of property was intended to immobilise assets, and
render them indivisible and inalienable by establishing it as a sort of pious
endowment. Besides h. ubs destined to last forever, there were also contracts
limiting the duration of a h. ubs to the lifetime of either the beneficiary or the
benefactor. The attribution of land as h. ubs to h. ara¯t.ı¯n was especially frequent
for date palm plantations in the oases (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1991: 193;
18Toupet 1977: 275f.).
   A most controversial situation prevails in the Tamourt en-Naaj, the most
fertile valley of the Tagant plateau. There, as in other areas of intensive
agricultural exploitation and pheniculture, the bı¯z. a¯n took (and still take)
great care to prevent h. ara¯t.ı¯n from establishing ownership of land. One such
means are contracts stipulating the exploitation of bı¯z. a¯n land by h. ara¯t.ı¯n
workers, such as the mug˙arassa, defining rights and obligations arising from a
h. ara¯t.ı¯n planting date palms for a bı¯z. a¯n. While the latter in general provides
the seedlings, the well and the land, the h. art.a¯ni is responsible for planting and
watering until the first dates come to maturity (normally this means a delay
19of five years). Once this is achieved, half of the palm trees (but not the land
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20on which they are standing!), becomes property of the h. art.a¯ni. There are
several reasons why this last aspect of the treaty rarely became effective. The
time between the conclusion of the contract and the maturity of the date
palm trees was long, and many h. ara¯t.ı¯n became indebted in the meantime.
Once the contract was finally accomplished, its gains were was just enough to
pay off the debts. In other cases, dishonest bı¯z. a¯n took advantage of their
juridical knowledge, and developed a number of clever arguments to dispos-
sess the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of their reward (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 404; Ould Abde 1989:
39; Grosser/Ibra Bra 1979: 305; Toupet 1977: 276f.; Interview Ahmed Ould
21Aly, qa¯d. i, 24.12.1995).
   Despite these many vagaries and the obvious bı¯z. a¯n hostility towards land
ownership by h. ara¯t.ı¯n, some of the latter succeeded. Most of them came from
families claiming a long h. ara¯t.ı¯n genealogy, and appropriated their land by
vivification. To do so, these h. ara¯t.ı¯n, like those of the Gorgol region, had to
be accepted as free men, embracing all the corresponding rights, and hence
22able to appropriate land individually like the bı¯z. a¯n.
   Colonial policy, which wanted to replace traditional relations of depend-
ence by sharecropping arrangements, did little to alter the su¯da¯n’s limited and
fragile access to land. In the south their hand was strengthened in their
struggle to confirm their control of land when the colonial administration
recognised some adwaba as su¯da¯n communities paying their taxes autono-
mously. In a few cases, such as the adwaba of Mbout, Kow and Djadjibine,
the administrators even registered agricultural sites in the name of the
adwaba, and thus in the name of the su¯da¯n living there. At the same time,
however, the colonial officers recoiled from completely negating bı¯z. a¯n claims
on the land concerned, and registered it twice: once the su¯da¯n plots in a
separate register, and once the whole area as tribal territory of the bı¯z. a¯n,
represented by their chief. Until today the land ownership of the su¯da¯n
continues to be contested by the bı¯z. a¯n on the basis of this double registra-
tion. Su¯da¯n control of land is stronger in the Gorgol plain. There history
provided better conditions for individual appropriation, and the end of
individual and collective relations of dependency, as well as of territorial
control between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n (cf. Leservoisier 1994a: 287ff.; see also
23note 17, this chapter).
   The independent Mauritanian state issued a new law on land ownership in
1960, which by and large perpetuated the colonial laws, and the discrepancy
between legal ideal and reality on the ground inherent to these. All vacant
and unowned land was declared to belong to the state, but again traditional
claims to land, either by collectivities or individuals, were recognised. The
new state thus secured itself the same options for opportunistic arbitration in
matters of access to land as the colonial administration had before (cf.
Grayzel 1988: 317f.).
   A profound change in the state’s policy towards land ownership occurred
in 1983, 1984, and again in 1990. A new legislation was introduced, which
24had the individualisation of land ownership as its major objective. In its
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first paragraph this law stated all Mauritanians to have equal rights to be land
owners. By placing this statement in the most prominent place, the regime of
Ould Haidalla (1980-84) both recognised the difficulty the su¯da¯n and
dependents of the black African ethnic groups had faced so far with regard to
ownership of land. The new law thus created a crucial complement to the
formal abolition of slavery (effected on the 5 July 1980). It provided a legal
framework the dependent strata could rely on in their struggle. Besides this
rationale the new law was a challenge to the preceding legislation. For the
first time, the state recognised private property as the fundamental form of
ownership. Consequently traditional patterns of land tenure – which
persisted frequently under the guise of sharecropping arrangements – were
officially abolished, and vacant land considered to become state property. In
the case of controversy over the vacant status of a distinct site, it is again up
to the owner to provide proofs for his claims. Public interest also has priority
with regard to access to wells. All wells which are not located within individ-
ually owned land are declared to be of public interest and free for access.
Thus clearly marking a break with former legislation, a number of exceptions
were defined which assured the persistence of traditional rights in land in
many domains. The new law declared conformity with the šarı¯^a, and thus
respect for all claims to ownership that conform to this legal reference.
Further, all lands registered in the name of chiefs and notables were recognis-
25ed as being in collective, i.e. tribal ownership. Claims to land based on
traditional rights were considered sufficient to allow registration as individual
property or compensation, if this land had been appropriated by the state.
Parallel to the maintenance of these traditional patterns of land tenure, the
options for direct state intervention were enlarged. The state, wishing to
expand intensive farming of rice along the Senegal river, needed land for the
installation of irrigation perimeters. Land owned collectively and not
attributed to a legal cooperative thus could be declared domain land by the
state, and after a certain delay be concessioned out to private owners.
Another decree in 1990 further facilitated the granting of individual concess-
ions. It introduced a procedure permitting the state to mediate land access in
three subsequent steps, ranging from revocable use-rights to definitive
concession (cf. Crousse 1986: 91; Crousse/Hessling 1994: 91; Ould al-
Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996: 177f.; Park 1985: 70f.; Villasante-de Beauvais 1995:
1040ff.).
   The effect of the new legislation on land ownership and tenure is contradic-
tory. Its application was most pronounced in the southern regions of Mauri-
tania, where irrigation schemes were developed. In these cases the focus of
the application of the new law lay on the option to declare domain land, and
to subsequently concession out individual plots. This led to the expropriation
of many and in the majority black African farmers to the benefit of an
emerging agro-business, dominated by bı¯z. a¯n alien to the area under devel-
opment. A different situation prevails north of the Senegal valley and the
irrigation perimeters. In these areas the law effectively enhanced the emanci-
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pation of slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n, who now had a legal reference for their claims
on land appropriated by vivification (cf. Baro 1993: 287f.; Bonte 1994c: 85).
This objective of the state policy was underlined by a massive campaign
aimed at popularising the content of the new law. Not only state officials
were trained, but the National Radio developed special broadcasts to popu-
larise knowledge of the new legislation. Although details of the law are likely
to have remained unknown to many peasants, the campaign increased the
awareness of the changed legal framework among those concerned. While
rural bı¯z. a¯n vehemently rejected the new legislation (cf. Villasante-de Beau-
vais 1995: 1056) it marked a leap forward for a great number of su¯da¯n. The
predominant position bı¯z. a¯n had held until then when appealing to the state’s
justice clearly began to deteriorate as many of their claims had become
illegitimate.
   Another aspect is that the explicit reference to the šarı¯^a, and the accord-
ance of major aspects of the new law on land ownership with its prescrip-
tions (these references were deleted in the 1990 decree; cf. Villasante-de
Beauvais 1995: 1056), and the emphasis on the principle of vivification, were
in a certain sense self-explanatory to all su¯da¯n who had some knowledge of
the Qur\a¯n.
   The new law, declaring all Mauritanians to have equal rights with regard to
land, matched well the argument raised in the course of the official abolition
26of slavery, which had declared all Mauritanians to be like brothers. Put in a
nutshell, this signified for many su¯da¯n that they were recognised by the head
of the state as social beings, and hence legal persons like the bı¯z. a¯n. Finally the
su¯da¯n could hope to have no longer only obligations, but equal rights too.
This last aspect, which is related to the evolution of various configurations of
su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n access to land in an area of marginal agricultural potential,
will be analysed in the following case studies.
Case Studies
While so far only the legal aspects of land ownership have been described,
now the focus will be on the evolution of land tenure in central Mauritania as
revealed by historical documents on the southern Tagant and northern
Aftout, and case studies in the region of Achram-Diouk. The aim of this
undertaking will be to analyse how the collective, i.e. the tribal control and
ownership of land developed and responded to changing social and economic
configurations in the course of both colonial rule and independent Maurita-
nia. As outlined above, the development of a land register constituting tribal
ownership of land that was essential to translate and materialise the social
processes of tribal segmentation and factionalism (and later of the social
conflict between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n) into territorial fragmentation. Today,
these territorial representations of past social and political relations are
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becoming more and more cemented. Land, and not only cultivable land, is
becoming scarce due to its extensive appropriation in the course of sedentar-
isation, and the conversion from pastoralism to agriculture. In order to
understand the motives of today’s conflicts over land, which are primarily of
a socio-economic nature, the past, during which the present shape of tribal
land tenure emerged, has to be analysed.
Land for the ^amı¯r
   The colonisation of the Aftout and Tagant deeply affected the configura-
tion of power among the local bı¯z. a¯n tribes. In 1903 and 1904 the French
brought the Trarza and the Brakna region under their control by cleverly
exploiting diverging interests between h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya, and developing a
coalition with leading zwa¯ya. Aware of this threat to their hegemony, many
tribes of the centre and the north formed a bı¯z. a¯n coalition to stop a further
27expansion of the French colony. Well aware of this hostile potential
animated by the Idaw^I¯š confederation and the ^amı¯r of the Abakak, Bakkar
Ould Soueid Ahmed, the French set out in 1905 to invade the Tagant, the
28heartland of these h. assa¯n tribes, by military force. Xavier Coppolani, the
brains behind and leader of the French expansion to Mauritania, nevertheless
was convinced that once he had entered the Tagant, he would be able to
pursue his policy of “peaceful penetration”. Building on his diplomatic
abilities and good relations with numerous zwa¯ya, he thought it possible to
once again divide interests between the local zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n, and thus to
be able to install French domination with only minor military exertion, and
the consent of the zwa¯ya. This assumption later turned out to be only
partially right. In the beginning, however, the conquest of Tagant seemed
easy. The French troops advanced quickly and by brutally attacking the
29livestock of the bı¯z. a¯n, hit and weakened their enemies considerably. In a
series of battles the bı¯z. a¯n were defeated, and the ^amı¯r of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak,
Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed, then almost 100 years old, killed in the battle of
Bou Gadoum on the 1 April 1905. Soon after, the whole Tagant appeared to
30be under French control (cf. Frèrejean 1995: 262ff.).
   Troubles began for the French after their occupation of Tidjikja, the
economic centre of the Tagant. Initially the local Idaw^Alı¯ zwa¯ya (as well as a
number of other tribes, and even some fractions of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak) had
31been willing to cooperate with the French, but hostilities grew rapidly after
the French had installed their military post. Xavier Coppolani himself, much
praised for his knowledge of Islam by colonial authors, raised fierce opposi-
tion among the leading zwa¯ya of the town when he, an unbeliever, entered
the mosque and hence desecrated it. Furthermore the French bitterly lacked
food to feed their large garrison, and therefore put heavy pressure on the
residents of Tidjikja to provide large numbers of livestock. Additionally they
wanted fixed daily contingents of labourers, chopped down palm trees, and
did much more to seriously annoy the local population, which unlike the
32pastoral nomads of the Tagant, was unable to flee from these pressures.
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Map 3: Tribal Boundaries in the Southern Tagant and Northern Aftout
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Finally the people of Tidjikja responded to the French aggression by shifting
sides, and supporting the bı¯z. a¯n coalition against the French.
   Although the bı¯z. a¯n succeeded a little later in killing Xavier Coppolani
33during a nocturnal ambush, all their efforts to drive the French out of their
garrison failed. Greater success was achieved by the subsequent strategy of
guerrilla-like attacks and hold-ups. Operating from the north and supported
by the northern tribes and the Moroccan sultan, these raids caused the
French severe trouble for years. Economic needs, however, soon forced
many bı¯z. a¯n tribes which had fled from the French to the Adrar to return
home and to resign themselves to the French rule. Open resistance was thus
upheld only by a small number of northern tribes, and lost much of its
support among the Tagant tribes, preoccupied with the reconstitution of
their herds and the payment of colonial taxes. An important step towards the
definite colonisation of the Mauritanian territory was achieved by the
conquest of the Adrar (“colonne Gouraud” 1908-09), and the defeat of the
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coalition of bı¯z. a¯n forces led by the zwa¯ya scholar Ma al-Aïnin (dec. 28 Oc-
34tober 1910), based in Smara in today’s Western Sahara. Nevertheless
raiding by northern tribes, among which the Rgayba¯t were most prominent,
continued until the 1930s, and even beyond the establishment of full military
control of the Mauritanian territory in 1934 (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 541ff.;
565ff.; Désiré-Vuillemin 1997: 497ff.).
   Besides this perspective, largely based on colonial sources, and thus bearing
the imprint of the colonial point of view, an oral tradition of these events
persists among the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. Fortunately it has not yet been
completely eliminated by “modern” knowledge transmitted in school and
history books, which by and large paraphrase colonial history, and thus
block access to a bı¯z. a¯n-centred reevaluation of history. Although somewhat
breaking the bounds of this contribution, the following narrative, presenting
a quite distinct view of what happened during the colonisation of the Tagant,
will therefore be presented in detail. Its many subtleties and allusions reveal
not only its revisionist ambitions with regard to factual aspects of history,
but introduce bı¯z. a¯n modes of reflecting conflict and history. The following
section therefore is dedicated to its author, Mohamed Ould Mbarek, an old
h. art.a¯ni from the Ahel Swayd Ah. med.
In those times Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed had forbidden the French to
enter the Tagant. He then was very strong, and could face the French
directly. With his force he even could oblige them to pay him an annual
35tribute [the “coutumes” paid at Bakel] that was called al-kayyal. After
some years Bakkar became old. There was an iggı¯w [sing. masc. from
igga¯wen, i.e. griot] of the Šra¯tı¯t [the second branch of Idaw^I¯š, which was
36the Abakak’s fiercest enemy] who saw Bakkar, and who went to tell the
Šra¯tı¯t that Bakkar had become faint. That was how the Šra¯tı¯t became able
to withdraw the tributes of the French from the Abakak, and went to
move from Mbout and Kiffa to Kaédi where the French were. The
Abakak then went there too, and installed themselves side by side with
the Šra¯tı¯t. That was the moment when the quarrels between both began.
Before the great war between the Šra¯tı¯t and the Abakak started, the Kunta
came and helped Bakkar. With this help he defeated the Šra¯tı¯t.
   Some years later, the French started war with the Abakak. That was at
37Ras el Ma in the Assaba, the place where Bakkar died. There was his son
Houssein Ould Bakkar who saw that after [the death of] Bakkar they
could no longer fight against the French. Houssein therefore started to
make relations with them. Whenever necessary he made a list of the tents
[i.e. families] of the Abakak and took it to the French [to register them].
There was another brother, Ethman Ould Bakkar, who was against the
French, and against what Houssein did. He took a part of the Abakak and
left to fight them [the French] as Bakkar had done before. Every time the
French entered the Tagant, the party of Ethman started to combat them.
But Houssein helped the French in battle against Ethman. When finally
the party of Ethman was beaten, there remained people from the Tagant.
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Houssein meanwhile had become old too, and said he had no longer the
force to pursue these people into the Adrar. If there was anybody among
the Abakak who could do so and leave with the French for the Adrar,
then this person would become the chief of the Abakak. Everybody
stepped back and only Abderrahmane [Ould Bakkar] remained. He said
he would be ready to go to the Adrar, and he started to inform all Idaw^I¯š.
He managed to convince them that the French wanted to liberate the
Adrar, and he even got support from the Šra¯tı¯t. They left all together for
the Adrar, where Abderrahmane succeeded. The French then gave him the
emirate of Tagant. (Interview Mohamed Ould Mbarek, h. art.a¯ni, 5.7.1995)
This summarising narrative of the recent history of the Tagant emirate,
besides offering insights in the major patterns of tribal factionalism in the
area and within the emiral lineage, puts a strong emphasis on how the new
^amı¯r, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, gained legitimacy. Unlike his older
brothers, Houssein Ould Bakkar and Ethman Ould Bakkar, Abderrahmane
was recognised throughout the whole Idaw’I¯š confederation, i.e. even by the
Šra¯tı¯t, by the virtue of his military deeds, even though these had served the
colonial expansion. The success of Abderrahmane in combining tradition and
colonial modernity in his office in effect was so great, that some in the region
of Achram-Diouk now consider him to have been the only real ^amı¯r of
Tagant, and all of his predecessors only to have been major tribal leaders – a
view in sharp contrast to the critical interpretation proposed by Francis De
Chassey (1984: 62).
   The imposition of French colonial rule on the Tagant indeed sparked off
major changes both in the relations among the local bı¯z. a¯n tribes, and in their
control and ownership of land. Before colonisation, the h. assa¯n tribes had
lived off the tributes paid by the zwa¯ya tribes and the zna¯ga living under
their protection, but did not own the land they controlled politically and
militarily (cf. Bonte 1987b: 203f.). This configuration of different spheres of
production, land ownership, and spiritual and political hegemony was
profoundly challenged by the French occupation and subsequent demise of
h. assa¯n power. This evolution was especially marked among the Idaw^I¯š
Abakak. Already prior to the death of the old ^amı¯r Bakkar Ould Soueid
Ahmed, factionalism among the different branches of his successors had risen
considerably, and could no longer be controlled by his two sons Ethman
Ould Bakkar and Amar Ould Bakkar, who were responsible for the adminis-
tration of the office. Various “princes” and their numerous followers threaten-
ed tributaries and other dependents by raising voluntarily tributes. After the
death of Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed, the emirate of Tagant underwent a
severe crisis. Although Ethman Ould Bakkar nominally became ^amı¯r, his
power remained limited. Having failed to reunify the Idaw^I¯š Abakak and to
38defeat the French, he seems to have been unable to establish hegemony
beyond his own faction. As a consequence of this situation, Houssein Ould
Bakkar, who had been among the first Idaw^I¯š Abakak leaders to submit to
the French, and who took care to never fight against them, became a sort of
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intermittent ^amı¯r. His authority, however, remained limited too, as he
appeared prominent only in negotiations between the French and branches of
the Idaw^I¯š Abakak, who had ceased their resistance towards the French.
Thanks to his ability to perform this role, Houssein became not only the
39chief intermediary of the French, but was given a prominent role by the
40Idaw^I¯š Abakak too (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 566ff.).
   The political topography of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak was then seriously chal-
lenged by the rise of a new pretender to the office of ^amı¯r: Abderrahmane
Ould Bakkar. Still a young man, this son of Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed and
a slave woman had participated in, and personally performed several remark-
41able exploits in the “colonne Gouraud”, which had installed French
colonial rule in the Adrar by 1909. Having been a most impressive personali-
42ty, he soon became a favourite of the French, who in 1918 reintroduced the
43Tagant emirate to his profit. Within the Idaw^I¯š Abakak confederation,
where he managed to become a major chief and to attract a number of
followers, Abderrahmane faced fierce opposition, most pronounced among
his brothers of more noble maternal descent (cf. p. 105-108), who travelled in
vain to the governor at Saint-Louis to attempt to persuade him to revise his
44decision. On the Tagant, the official removal of Houssein Ould Bakkar
from his functions as a general chief of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak in favour of
45Abderrahmane took place in 1912. The French eased this dismissal for
Hussein by granting him the right to lead a tribal fraction of his own, and the
registration of a major cultivation zone on the Tagant – Kehmeit – under his
name. Houssein thus became the first h. assa¯n entitled to ownership rights on
46a Tagant agricultural site. Although these rights depended on the French,
the very nature of colonial power nevertheless meant that they became lasting
ones. By this evolution the h. assa¯n of the Tagant were able to transform their
vanishing political control of territoriality into direct land ownership. They
thus entered a domain which until then had been the monopoly of the zwa¯ya.
   At the beginning of his career Abderrahmane certainly was more nominally
than really ^amı¯r of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak. Although he depended on the
French colonial power to strengthen his own authority, he managed to
exploit it cleverly, and thus to give his rule a proper shape full of the symbol-
47ism of h. assa¯n virtues, crucial to leadership in this social environment. The
major asset the French provided to their favourite ally was to withdraw his
48most vigorous enemies from the scene, or simply to punish them vigorously.
Ely Ould Bakkar, and other opponents of Abderrahmane, together with their
followers, were released from the framework of the tribal confederation, and
49allowed to constitute together their own, independent fraction, not
subjugated to the authority of the new ^amı¯r (this measure applied initially to
50eight rival brothers, of whom only two were still alive in 1938). Later,
tribes that continued to contest Abderrahmane’s authority were released
from it, and all transferred to other administrative regions (such was the case
of the Awla¯d Talh. a, who after such a solution had been discussed since 1914,
51 52were finally registered in Kaédi in 1939 ).
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   Besides this deep influence on the inner structure of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak
confederation, at which already lay the nucleus of the territorial materialisa-
tion of processes of (inner-)tribal segmentation and conflict, the instauration
of the Tagant emirate had a second major outcome: the reorganisation, i.e. the
dissolution, of the vast majority of tributes paid to the ^amı¯r of Tagant by
various dependent tribes or fractions. This large-scale process of renegotia-
ting actually preceded Abderrahmane’s coming into office as ^amı¯r, and in
these respects was unique in colonial history. Other emirates and h. assa¯n
tribes were able to maintain their rights to tributes for much longer, and the
French openly acknowledged this differentiation in their policy towards the
53leading h. assa¯n. As representative of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak h. assa¯n, Abderrah-
mane Ould Bakkar certified the end of obligations to pay tribute, whenever
these had been bought up by the former debtors according to terms over
which both parties had achieved consent. The tributes bought up in the
majority of cases were of two kinds. First came the h. urma. This obligation
normally was paid individually by tributary families to their individual
h. assa¯n overlords, but in many cases these individual rights to tribute had come
to profit the ^amı¯r directly. The second type of tributes to h. assa¯n was the
g˙aver, paid collectively by a tribe or a fraction to manifest the recognition of
h. assa¯n political suzerainty. The colonial administrators showed themselves
very satisfied with Abderrahmane’s attitude in these delicate affairs. They
considered him to have been very generous when negotiating what depend-
ent tribes had to pay to be released from their tributes. By the end of 1914
twenty-two treaties had already been signed and registered in Tidjikja, and
Abderrahmane was granted the right to negotiate in the name of smaller h. as-
sa¯n tribes the conditions by which their rights to tributes were paid off. In
1915 the continuation of the campaign to free people of the Adrar from
paying tributes to the ^amı¯r and the h. assa¯n of Tagant was planned (cf. Bonte
541985a: 43f.).
   Certainly the abolition of numerous rights to tributes held by the Tagant
h. assa¯n and the ^amı¯r did not end all relations of political domination that had
existed before colonisation. The practice of inter-tribal relations is a complex
matter, and many of its aspects are likely to have remained unnoticed by the
colonial administrators, especially in the early decades of their presence on
Mauritanian territory. In 1933 Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar obviously felt
strong enough to reopen the case of tributes formerly paid by zna¯ga of the
Brakna and Gorgol, the abolition of which had been negotiated by some of
55his brothers at very low prices, and to his detriment. Still in 1942, the ^amı¯r
did not feel uneasy telling a French administrator that he was on the way to
collect some of the h. urma due to him from people of the Aftout (cf. Féral
1983: 64).
   Until today some of these levies, most of which probably were not truly
h. urma, but other types of tribute, are remembered in the region of Achram-
Diouk; e.g. the La¯g˙la¯l are known to have paid the ^amı¯r one hundred sheep or
goats per year during the time of the French, in order to have him take care
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of their affairs. The same amount was paid by the Tagˇaka¯net until the death
of Abderrahmane in 1982. The Legwa¯t.it. in turn gave the ^amı¯r a share of their
harvest, and a number of animals too. Some h. assa¯n tribes like the Awla¯d ^Alı¯
56Ntu¯nva paid an annual tribute called gabez. . This levy consisted of one cow,
or fifteen sheep or goats (i.e. the equivalent of one cow), paid by the chief,
and another goat or sheep paid by every family. Other tribes seem to have
had no fixed amount of tributes to pay, but to have sent animals and millet to
the ^amı¯r annually. The h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med too paid tribute
consisting of one third of their harvest to the ^amı¯r, and slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n
57owning animals paid tribute in animals too.
   The continuation of tribute-paying by a number of tribes did reflect the
continuation of a distinct political model, focusing on the recognition of a
major bı¯z. a¯n authority in the person of ^amı¯r of Tagant. To act like an ^amı¯r,
i.e. to keep alive the complementary relations of exchange linked to this
office, was a prerequisite to maintain this political structure parallel to the
colonial power, and later the independent Mauritanian state. Among the
tribes still paying tributes to the ^amı¯r the h. assa¯n of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak
confederation were most prominent. These tributes first of all symbolised the
cohesion among the constituent tribes through the recognition of a political
authority, disregardful of the tribes’ possible spatial separation. In economic
terms, however, these tributes were only of slight interest. The muda¯ra¯t, as
they were often called, in this respect were the opposite of the h. urma and
g˙aver, which as tributes in return for physical protection had been the basic
sources of income for the h. assa¯n. For this reason they had become the object
of abolitionist French colonial policy in the Tagant profiting in the first place
58the zwa¯ya and zna¯ga.
   First the rich and powerful Idaw^Alı¯ zwa¯ya of Tidjikja ceased paying
59tribute to the Idaw^I¯š directly after the arrival of the French on the Tagant.
Numerous zna¯ga, who until then had been under the domination of h. assa¯n
tribes, profited from their weakness to change their overlords, and become
clients of the zwa¯ya, e.g. the Idaw^Alı¯. When finally the h. assa¯n rights to
receive tributes were bought up, it were the zwa¯ya who paid in the place of
the zna¯ga, thus making them merely change their overlords (cf. Ould Khalifa
601991: 581, 668). Only a few years later most of the remaining zwa¯ya tribes,
and the zna¯ga too, freed themselves from tributes. Different zna¯ga of the
Kunta paid 1,626 pieces of guinée to buy up their h. urma, the Tarkoz zwa¯ya
in 1919 paid 1,500 Francs simply to be released from their g˙aver. The Idebus-
sa¯t., like the Tagˇaka¯net, had nothing to buy back, as their tributes had occa-
61sional character.
   Today the retrospective view provided by interview data shows that the
result of this policy triggered off more profound changes in bı¯z. a¯n society
than its authors perhaps would have imagined. The promotion of zwa¯ya
status, especially of those groups who once had subjugated themselves to the
sovereignty of the h. assa¯n, has borne remarkable fruits. The Tarkoz, which
had not only been perceived as “the zwa¯ya of the Idaw^I¯š”, but had paid them
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62considerable tributes, in the popular mind today deny ever having done so.
For many, the former times were when the Tarkoz scholars still provided
free education for the Ahel Swayd Ah. med (instead of making everybody
pay), and thus demonstrated their special attachment with the ^amı¯r’s tribe.
The major challenge the h. assa¯n of the Tagant had to face as a consequence of
the end of tributes that was forced upon them by the colonial power, is well
put by a chief of an Idaw^I¯š Abakak tribe:
After the arrival of the French things changed. There were no more
[obligatory] tributes [g˙aver and mag˙ram], and therefore another solution
[for the h. assa¯n tribes] had to be found. (Interview Hamoud Ould Amar,
h. assa¯n, 4.11.1995)
This alternative was looked for and found by the h. assa¯n. As they were losing
both income and labour resources due to the great number of zna¯ga who
shifted from h. assa¯n to zwa¯ya overlords, they had to appropriate resources
for the constitution of a productive base of their own, and again to attract a
labour force. Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar seems to have been a highly
sensitive and far-sighted politician, who anticipated these future problems,
not only to his paramount tribe and confederation, but to his rule too.
Knowing that his position as general chief and later ^amı¯r initially to a very
large extent depended on the sympathy the colonial power had for his
person, he was completely aware that developing a solution for the h. assa¯n
problem was only possible within the framework of colonial policy. Already
on the occasion of the replacement of Houssein Ould Bakkar by Abderrah-
mane, the French had shown their readiness to gratify political good conduct
with the reward of significant land resources. They thus may have laid the
initial basis for the development of a more general pattern according to which
the Idaw^I¯š Abakak were later able to meet the challenge of vanishing
political control of space. Territorial hegemony was now produced by the
legal appropriation of a narrow web of agricultural sites. The h. assa¯n, who
until then, and unlike the zwa¯ya, had not been land owners, obviously easily
slipped into this role that so long had been alien to them. The registration of
land ownership had become a major means by which they were able to
maintain their identity as masters of the (local) territory, and to defend it
from intrusion by outsiders. This again is expressed by a statement of the
h. assa¯n chief that framed the one cited above:
In the times we had no land. That was because the Idaw^I¯š received
tributes. . . . The land was ours [i.e. the Idaw^I¯š’s], and not the zwa¯ya’s. It
was us who were the masters of everything, therefore the land belonged to
us. (Interview Hamoud Ould Amar, h. assa¯n, 4.11.1995)
A more analytical statement comes from a prominent member of the emiral
family, today owner of one of the most important dams in the region of
Achram-Diouk, as well as one other dam, and plots in twelve other sites:
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SMOD: Our collectivity [i.e. our tribe, the Ahel Swayd Ah. med] was not
the largest one . . . we contented ourselves with our animals, all sorts of
animals, we even were overcharged with them to some degree. But at the
same time, we were careful to register agricultural sites.
Author: Register them?
SMOD: Register them before using them in order to avoid that today
there is no place to go. For some time, they [the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, i.e.
his tribesmen] now have begun to cultivate. And there they are with
several dams that are quite profitable.
Author: And this registration, how was it made, and when did it begin?
SMOD: One went to the préfet, or the chief of the subdivision, and told
him he should register that and that site in the name of one’s collectivity.
By this, the collectivities began to use these sites, these reserves of land.
They used them when they wanted to start with cultivation.
Author: When did this begin?
SMOD: I don’t know. When I was born [age: 54 years] the people already
were cultivating here. (Interview Sid Mohamed Ould Dey, h. assa¯n,
27.8.1995, emphasis added)
Indeed the territory, i.e. the most fertile and cultivable areas of the southern
Tagant, and the bordering stretch of the Aftout soon after colonisation
became the object of intense interest from the local tribes, and among these
most prominent was the ^amı¯r’s tribe, the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. In 1915 the
French approved their wish to move the boundary of the administrative
region of Moudjéria about fifteen kilometres southwards, stating that by this
measure they wanted to provide the Idaw^I¯š Abakak with land they indeed
63were lacking for cultivation. Until then the boundary had been right at the
bottom of the hillside, where the Tagant plateau reaches the plains of the
Aftout. This delimitation had cut off the many fertile wa¯ds and depressions
located close to the Tagant plateau from the Moudjéria district. There, a
stretch of about ten to fifteen kilometres depth constitutes an intermittent
zone which is characterised by fertile soils and especially dense vegetation,
64between the plateau and the almost bare plains of the Aftout. As long as
this land had been part of another administrative district, it had been difficult
for the Tagant administrators in Tidjikja and Moudjéria to attribute it to the
Idaw^I¯š Abakak. The original territorial layout of the Moudjéria district had
contradicted the aim of bringing into accordance regions of administrative
registration destined to represent major areas of residence (and to a lesser
65degree areas of nomadisation), and administrative boundaries.
   According to the land register kept in Moudjéria, the first entitlements in
land (apart from the case of Houssein Ould Bakkar), were made as early as
661919 (depression of Aouinet Arr). In 1920 and 1921 a first comprehensive
list of agricultural sites and possessions was established. In this period the
Ahel Swayd Ah. med, together with the tribes of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak confed-
eration which had remained in the vicinity of the new ^amı¯r, and a few closely
allied zwa¯ya tribes duly registered the great majority of important sites in the
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67area. Abderrahmane in several cases succeeded in establishing himself as an
intermediary between the administration and the less powerful tribes of the
Abakak confederation that had remained in his vicinity. The ^amı¯r thus again
68became able to control a part of these tribes’ collective resources. In
another case, the ^amı¯r was able to profit from his political weight.
   The dam of Mounhal had been constructed by Tarkoz (zwa¯ya) of the Awla¯d
Tı¯ki fraction. It had been registered and used by their chief, but had
remained uncultivated for some years after his death. In 1934 the dam was
declared public domain by the administration, and the use-rights given to a
šarı¯v from Kiffa, who lived among the Ahel Swayd Ah. med as a host and close
69friend of the ^amı¯r. Nominally these use-rights were bound to the condi-
tion that the land had to be cultivated every year, and hence revocable. This
restriction, however, seems never to have been applied. On the contrary, in
1936 the šarı¯v was exempted from paying the ^ašu¯r tax, in order to encourage
him to clear the land, and some years later (undated), he was reported to have
proceeded to the plantation of twenty-two date palm trees, and the construc-
tion of a stone-lined well. While the first incident clearly indicates the failure
of the šarı¯v to meet the conditions set by the colonial authorities (there
cannot be continuous cultivation without clearing), the second is a remarka-
ble violation of customary law. The construction of a permanent well, and
the planting of palm trees by a bı¯z. a¯n are acts of vivification, and thus
establish private ownership of land. This clearly is a most direct offence
against the former owners, the Tarkoz Awla¯d Tı¯ki, who, as long as only
use-rights had been attributed to the šarı¯v, could still nourish hopes to get
back the land one day. This original ownership of the site through the Tarkoz
fraction is also revealed by the fact that in former times it was su¯da¯n of this
70tribal affiliation who cultivated there. Unfortunately no entries concerning
this case have been made to the register in Moudjéria since 1950, when only
the status quo of affairs, and no ongoing quarrels were recorded. Today Oum
Nhal, as the location is also called, is definitely in the hands of the family of
the šarı¯v mentioned above. A small village has evolved close to the agricultur-
al site, cultivated mainly by su¯da¯n who joined the šarı¯v.
   In a few cases, this scramble for land had at least temporarily an outcome to
the disadvantage of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak and the new ^amı¯r. The depression of
Aouinet Arr was first attributed to the Ideybni, a fraction of the Idaw^I¯š
Abakak that left the Tagant region in 1924. For this reason, the Ideybni had
transferred their rights in this location to the Awla¯d Talh. a in 1923. When
these left the region too, in 1939, the land was left with members of the tribe
who remained in situ. Obviously not willing to be associated with any of the
other Idaw^I¯š Abakak fractions, the Ideybni (h. assa¯n) families were registered
together with the Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb (zwa¯ya). This status was recorded,
uncontested, in 1950. Today, however, things seem to have reversed to their
proper order again. Aouinet Arr, now made more productive by a modern
dam, is in the hands of the Legwa¯nit. (h. assa¯n), and among these, the chief’s
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family holds half of the land that now belongs again to a member the Idaw^I¯š
Abakak confederation.
   The early and clearly marked interest the newly imposed ^amı¯r of Tagant,
Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, developed for the fertile lands of the northern-
most Aftout, raise the question why ownership of cultivable land in these
times had became a serious issue. Unlike in the years following the big
drought of 1969, it was not bitter need that pushed the bı¯z. a¯n to cultivate
th themselves, and to vivify land. Cultivation at the begin of the 20 century still
was the almost exclusive occupation of su¯da¯n. In the course of the imposition
of colonial rule, and the subsequent weakening of their former dominant
position, the h. assa¯n of the Tagant had not only lost many of their tributaries
(who had sought protection from new overlords, supposed to be less exact-
71ing, such as e.g. the Kunta or the Idaw^Alı¯), but had also lost a large part of
the resources by which they could attract such followers. The heavy loss of
income formerly generated by tributes affected the h. assa¯n’s ability to
establish and maintain alliances, which used to be underpinned by generous
72gifts. Besides the symbolic value of becoming once again the “masters of
the land”, if not yet the “masters of everything”, the appropriation of
cultivable land made the h. assa¯n of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak attractive to su¯da¯n
seeking new patrons too. The h. assa¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med had always
integrated numerous su¯da¯n, a considerable number of whom had been able to
improve their status and become h. ara¯t.ı¯n recognised as members of the tribe.
They bore arms, took part in warfare, and lived in relations of dependency
73that came close to those of zna¯ga (cf. p. 168-170). While today among the
su¯da¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med these warrior h. ara¯t.ı¯n have slipped from public
74memory, it is evident that there was a significant in-migration by su¯da¯n,
especially from the neighbouring Kunta. The Idaw^I¯š of the Abakak branch
thus again became what the literal meaning of their name promises: “come
here – you can live with them” that illuminated the way for all those who
75sought better conditions of life.
   Until today, the originally distinct modes of access to land practised by h. as-
sa¯n and zwa¯ya can be discerned from the shape of their respective territories,
an outline of which for the region of Achram-Diouk is displayed on
Map 3. It has to be observed that today, the perception of tribal territories
among the bı¯z. a¯n has come close to matching modern two-dimensional
76representations of space, such as e.g. on maps. The abstract definition of
territories by reference to boundaries is a decisive departure from the
perception of space prevalent among nomadic peoples such as the bı¯z. a¯n had
had for most of their history. In these societies, and until today with respect
to practical use and appropriation of land among the bı¯z. a¯n too, spatial
references are made to distinct localities bearing a relevance for human
occupation and use. Such localities are wells, springs, salt deposits, locations
of dry- or wet-season pastures, agricultural sites, etc. Out of these places in
space, numerous paths and corridors linking the locations create what might
be called “territory”, but more are reminiscent of a web spun around numer-
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ous white patches, than of a comprehensive two-dimensional representation
77of space (cf. Ingold 1986: 130-164; Schlee 1992).
   Nowadays these fragmented (tribal) territories have largely condensed to
homogeneous entities, of which only some aspects of the proper delimitation
of the periphery may be called into question. This is revealed by the local
modernist discourse, which aims to replace the notion of “tribe” by that of
collectivities, and which no longer takes genealogy and relations of solidarity
as reference for cohesion, but joint occupation of one site:
We now no longer accept, we no longer want to speak of the tribe,
because this is traditional. We now want to speak of collectivities which
fix themselves at a location, like e.g. the collectivities of Achram. This
means those who fix themselves at Achram, who depend on the adminis-
tration of Achram. You find collectivities that fix themselves just where
they are everywhere. Therefore it is named collectivity . . . a collectivity
because you can no longer speak of a tribe, because the tribe has settled at
several wells, and close to several, distinct dams. Therefore you remain
only with collectivities. (Interview Sid Mohamed Ould Dey, h. assa¯n,
27.8.1995, emphasis added)
What the discourse tries to mask, is that collectivities, according to the
proposed definition, have to be of a tribally homogeneous composition. Thus
Achram is not presented as one village, or else collectivity, but as several
collectivities, thus anticipating the division into several, largely tribally
homogeneous quarters (cf. p. 129-133). Further, Sid Mohamed Ould Dey, as a
fine politician, omits to make explicit that the collectivities in general are
78located on their tribe’s land, and thus take part in the tribal appropriation
and definition of space that is also secured by limiting access to land to
members of alien tribes or fractions.
   The layout of tribal territories in the northernmost Aftout, among the Ahel
Swayd Ah. med and the Tarkoz, is revealing of how the history of both tribal
groups shaped present patterns of land tenure. The Tarkoz, although zwa¯ya
with a strong affiliation towards the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, were the holders of
ownership rights in land. As these were not abstract, territorial claims, they
applied to distinct places, such as watercourses. When after colonisation, the
Ahel Swayd Ah. med managed to transform their former political hegemony
into land entitlements, they were able to appropriate much of the fertile land
of the northernmost Aftout, but had to respect the rights pertaining to
distinct localities held by the Tarkoz. Thus today, the watercourse fuelling
the big dam of Achram is Tarkoz land, while all land besides this small
stretch belongs to the Ahel Swayd Ah. med (cf. Map 3).
   Another case revealing of the relationship between political power and
access and ownership of land, is that of the L^aweysya¯t. They migrated
thcomparatively recently, i.e. within the 19 century, from the Adrar to the
Tagant, and became integrated by the Idaw^I¯š Abakak. Within this h. assa¯n
confederation, the L^aweysya¯t, who like to emphasise their dedication to
Bı¯z. a¯n Land Tenure and Social Stratification        221
 
 
79warfare, are considered to be h. assa¯n of comparatively low regard and
80prestige. Later, in the colonial period, they failed to become the closest ally
81of the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, and were internally weakened by
82heavy factionalism. This, their minor status, is graphically represented in
the topography of tribal land that can be discerned from Map 3.
   The rather small territory of the L^aweysya¯t, owned jointly by the two
competing small fractions (cf. “Aoueissiat” in Table 3), and causing much
dispute over tenure between them, is centred around the depression of
Djouengi. This fertile area, which recently was developed by the construction
of a dam, is located in the small strip of the northernmost Aftout that today is
bounded on either sides by the tarred road, and the slopes of the Tagant.
With their quite marginal emplacement at only one depression in between the
Tarkoz, the Ta¯ga¯t., and the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, the L^aweysya¯t are clearly at
the margins of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak confederation’s territory. Unlike older,
and much more prestigious and powerful groups like the Awla¯d ^Alı¯ Ntu¯nva,
they do not possess land on the Tagant, considered to be the symbolic “seat”,
i.e. the homeland of the emirate. Even during nomadisation, the L^aweysya¯t
rarely moved onto the Tagant, but stayed – like the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Ahel
Swayd Ah. med – in the Aftout. Even on the occasion of the annual date cure,
the getna, members of the L^aweysya¯t did not move on the Tagant, but to
83Guérou, home area of the Tagˇaka¯net zwa¯ya.
   The secondary rank of the L^aweysya¯t within the Idaw^I¯š Abakak confed-
eration, and the problematic nature of their access to land is revealed by
another tradition, stating that the L^aweysya¯t had to pay one hundred goats
to the ^amı¯r of Tagant Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed to obtain the ownership
of Djouengi, and later continued to pay between one and two hundred goats
84per year (Interview Boueibou Ould Amar, h. art.a¯ni, 1.11.1995). Additional-
ly, their ownership rights were contested by the neighbouring Tarkoz Ahel
Sı¯di Reyu¯g, and it was the French administration which had to intervene in
1942 (a year of drought), and to assist in the demarcation of boundaries
85between both parties at Djouengi.
Growing Dates and Millet
   The evolution of a bı¯z. a¯n interest in agriculture and the appropriation of
cultivable land in the wake of colonisation resulted not only from changed
configurations of power within bı¯z. a¯n society, and most notably between h. as-
sa¯n and zwa¯ya, but was fuelled by a determined policy of agricultural devel-
opment set up by the French. On the Tagant this policy was introduced and
forcefully implemented by Capitaine Anselme Dubost, who became “com-
mandant de cercle” in 1919. The aim was to intensify the use of natural
resources, especially where pastoral production was considered to exploit
these only partially. The most fertile areas, like depressions and wa¯ds, thus
had to be transformed into farmland, and the labour resources necessary
were to be pulled out of the pastoral sector. Unlike most other colonial
policies in areas predominantly populated by nomadic pastoralists, the
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Mauritanian administration did not want to limit or draw back pastoral
production. It was acknowledged that these “desert” lands in general had
little other productive potential. Sedentarisation of the nomadic population
never became an explicit objective of colonial policy either. What the admin-
istration wanted, was to increase the self-reliance of the Mauritanian popula-
tion with regard to agricultural production, and thus to reduce the Maurita-
nian demand for grain on the markets of the south. More local production
could also compensate the nomadic pastoralists for the loss of tributes from
cultivators in the šema¯ma, and thus reduce the potential for conflict. Finally,
the colonial administration hoped that increasing their own agricultural
production would strengthen the pastoralists’ bonds to their soils, and make
them more stable. If sedentarisation was acknowledged to be a goal much too
ambitious to become an objective of colonial policy, the administration never
failed to hope that its action could lead the nomads to stick more closely to
their supposed home, i.e. their region of registration (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991:
86766ff., 781f.; Dubost 1924).
   The ambitiousness of this colonial policy for agricultural development was
in contrast to the limited means available for this purpose. There were only a
few colonial posts, and the number of French administrators was low.
Frequently one European commanded a whole district. Money was also
scarce. The colony was designed to meet the expenses of administration by its
own means, but throughout its history, this goal was rarely achieved.
Administrators willing to stimulate agricultural development therefore had
little to rely on. They could try to convince their subjects – or make use of
coercion. While forced labour was commonly used for specific purposes (e.g.
construction of administrative posts, tracks, etc.), there were also risks in
exerting too much direct pressure. This was likely to create troubles, and
troubles with the bı¯z. a¯n not only continued to escalate into armed (and thus
costly) confrontation far into the 1930s, but also could become a nuisance to
an administrator’s career (cf. De Chassey 1984: 54-60).
   Seen in the light of these unfavourable circumstances, the slow, but
continued expansion of agriculture under colonial rule appears to a large
extent to have developed on the basis of a tacit consent between coloniser and
colonised. Most marked was this evolution in the domain of pheniculture.
Following colonisation, the number of date palm trees more or less exploded,
as numbers from the Moudjéria district in Table 7 demonstrate. Not only
did traditional areas of bı¯z. a¯n pheniculture, like the Adrar and a few oases on
the Tagant, witness a boom, but the cultivation of date palms was extended to
areas that until then had not been the locus of oases (e.g. the Assaba region;
cf. Table 8). For the colonial authorities, the expansion of the oasis sector
was also another means to get control of local production as well as of
nomadic pastoralists visiting these places. From the perspective of the bı¯z. a¯n
the initial labour-input needed for the planting was low in view of an anticip-
ated self-sustaining nature of the later palm tree, and the hope to benefit one
day from the dates. Furthermore the planting of palm trees was an act of
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Table 7: Evolution of Date Palm Plantations, Moudjéria District, 1905-1984
Year Number Species
a1905 300 palm trees
1923 969 palm trees (fully taxed)
1931 9,226 trees and plants in 22 date palm groves
1936 22,452 trees and plants in 43 date palm groves
b1984 31,598 palm trees
a: ANM E2-82, lieutnant Fonde, “les palmiers du Tagant occidental”, 1936, docu-
ment kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
b: FAO (1985: 23).
Table 8: Evolution of Date Palm Plantations, Assaba Region, 1920-1984
Year Number Species
a1920 150 palm trees
1948 70,000 palm trees
b1951 120,000 palm trees
c1984 443,036 palm trees
a: Féral (1983: 120f).
b: Villasante-de Beauvais (1992: 47).
c: FAO (1985: 24).
vivification that was easily carried out by individuals, and established rights
of ownership on the usually fertile land, even if its exploitation later was only
occasional. These characteristics meant that the planting of date palm trees,
even when resulting in still well remembered coercion by the administration,
which again hit the sedentary population hardest (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991:
766), did not raise universal resistance among the bı¯z. a¯n. Rather these devel-
oped a stronger interest in the extension of their date palm plantations, which
87became more profitable due to fewer tributes and raids by enemy tribes.
   More complex to evaluate is the question whether millet production
expanded during the first decades of colonial rule, a question still controver-
88sial among scholars. This is largely owing to the great variability of
agricultural production in a sahelo-saharan climate, marked by high inter-an-
nual and local variability of precipitation (about 50 percent interannual
variation of rainfall in Tidjikja during the “wet” period from 1931-68; cf.
Toupet 1977: 72). The strongest effects of insufficient or badly distributed
rainfall are experienced in rainfed farming. Fields under these conditions may
not even be sown for years, thus bearing no sign of use, while others nearby
may be exploited, thanks to good local rainfall, and others again are ravaged
by locusts, plant diseases, or late drought. In these circumstances there is
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hardly a linear correspondence between effort invested in cultivation, and
benefit derived from it. An increase in cultivated land, and of harvest in one
year, thus may already be reversed in the next year.
   Better suited to assess raising or diminishing interest in cultivation is the
evolution of recession agriculture. This technique is practised either in
natural depressions, or in watercourses of low gradient, flooded with the aid
of large dams (barrages). In both cases, the effects on production caused by
inter-annual variation of rainfall are minimised by the large catchment areas.
Additionally, once the earth has been submerged sufficiently long (between
four and five weeks seems to be the optimum), no further rainfall is needed
for successful cultivation. The humidity stored in the soil allows for the full
development of the plant. Although deficient rainfall affects the extension of
cultivable land behind dams too, it rarely leads to a complete loss of the
89harvest. While before colonisation, cultivation was largely restricted to
natural depressions of significant size, like e.g. the Tamourt en-Naaj, the
construction of dams became a major means of increasing the cultivable land
from the start of this century on. This latter aspect is responsible for the
French as well as the bı¯z. a¯n interest in promoting this technique. Much like
the expansion of date palm groves, the construction and the use of dams were
comparatively easy to evaluate, and thus are the most reliable source provid-
ing insight into the evolution of bı¯z. a¯n interest in agriculture in the first
90decades of the colonial era.
   It is remembered among the Legwa¯t.it., and some neighbouring tribes too,
that the construction of the dam Zemmal, which developed a major water-
course for cultivation in the northern Aftout close to the village of Leklewa,
91dates back to the arrival of the French, i.e. the period between 1905-10. A
little later, many other dams were constructed in the area. The dam of
Achram, until today one of the most important of the whole region, was
92constructed around 1915 (Interview Mohammed Yahya, zwa¯ya, 21.9.1995),
and the dam Teidouma in 1920 (land register Moudjéria). In quantitative
terms, the expansion of agriculture was less impressive, and more limited by
physical constraints than that of date palms, but nevertheless was a remarka-
ble exploit. In 1936 a number of 154 agricultural sites, covering a total
potential of 3,000 ha (unfortunately confounding all types of plots) were
registered alone in the subdivision of Moudjéria. Among these were five
dams of more than 200 ha, three of more than 100 ha, six of more than 30 ha,
and finally 34 of a size of 2-30 ha. The length of the dams varied between
931,200 metres in the case of Tachott, and about 100 metres. Later the
construction of new dams continued. In 1945 a report states that Abderrah-
mane Ould Bakkar had built three new dams, his brother Mohamed Mah-
moud Ould Bakkar had built two smaller ones, and the Legwa¯nit. had built a
dam of 400 metres in length together with twelve smaller dams. Furthermore
94quite a lot of older dams were reported as being cultivated.
   Even more significant than the early and rapid expansion of dam-driven
recession agriculture, is its development parallel to the imposition of colonial
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rule. Constructing a dam, like planting date palms or building wells, is an act
of sustainable vivification, establishing rights of ownership of the submerged
land. In view of the apparently limited range and magnitude of the colonial
material incentives for an expansion of agriculture and pheniculture on the
Tagant during the first half of this century, these measures are hardly ade-
quate to fully explain the occurrence of major, and in the long run sustainable
changes in these two sectors. Although exemptions from agricultural taxes,
bonuses and fines are likely to have “convinced” many bı¯z. a¯n of the necessity
to follow the administrator’s advice to increase the area under cultivation and
95to plant palm trees, there needed to be other factors pushing in the same
96direction to allow for successes of this policy on the Tagant. Far from
blindly following the intentions of French administration (and therefore
often being accused of disinterest), the bı¯z. a¯n, by increasing agricultural
production, responded to a changed political and economic environment
which resulted from imperialist colonial rule, and deeply affected and
changed the modes of bı¯z. a¯n pastoral and agricultural production, as well as
97patterns of land tenure.
   Besides providing a means to obtain, and reproduce political domination,
the appropriation of land by vivification had opened to many tribes the
98avenue to a further diversification of their production. Extending agricul-
ture and thus developing an extra revenue was possible for those bı¯z. a¯n who
either had access to land ownership, or managed to achieve this by the virtue
of their dominant political role (e.g. the Idaw^Alı¯, the Kunta, and the Ahel
Swayd Ah. med). Others, however, did not follow this trend, and maintained
themselves as highly specialised nomadic pastoralists (e.g. the Tarkoz Ahel
Sı¯di Reyu¯g), while again others migrated towards areas where they could
escape political and social domination, and establish themselves independent-
ly as agro-pastoralists (e.g. the Ahel Swayd and the Awla¯d Talh. a).
   The different interests and options bı¯z. a¯n tribes had with regard to the
appropriation of land reveal that despite an overall increase of agricultural
and phenicultural production there was no unidirectional development
towards an increase in these sectors involving all bı¯z. a¯n. Neither was the
process of land appropriation and sustained cultivation as closely linked as
might be presumed. The confluence of two diverging interests in agricultural
land, a political and an economic one, serves to explain bı¯z. a¯n disinterest in a
sustained agricultural use of land, and in investing too much of their own
means in its further exploitation. Rather than represent a general disinterest
towards agricultural production, these phenomena are significant of a
predominance of political and strategic interest in ownership rights in land,
which, once they were achieved, needed little further action to be maintained.
In addition, the reluctance some bı¯z. a¯n showed, according to colonial records,
when confronted with the demand of building dams, is less revealing of a
general disinterest in these innovations, than of the development of tactics
aimed at the perception of additional funding and assistance. Besides this, it
was the colonial administrators themselves who had to glorify their own
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action when reporting on their work, and thus underlined the salutary effects
their action produced vis-à-vis a desperately backward indigenous popula-
99tion.
Old Dams, New Dams
   More difficult to assess than the expansion of agricultural activities is the
real amount of agricultural production that these were able to provide.
However high the French interest in the expansion of agricultural production
was, the colonisers hardly had the means to evaluate it. Until today produc-
tion potential and real gross production in the rural hinterland can only be
roughly estimated. In 1938, the resident at Moudjéria estimated the district’s
production of millet to make up 700 tons. This obviously good year was
followed by a poor harvest estimated at 340 tons. In the following years, the
various residents most often abstained from direct estimations, and were
content to describe the conditions as being good or bad, and to detail these
descriptions by information on the availability and the prices of millet on the
local markets. This preference for rough estimates was continued when in
1953 a local resident reported that the production of millet in the district of
Moudjéria could meet the local demand – provided that climatic conditions
were favourable. Ever since, the self-sufficiency of local millet production has
continued to resurge until the present, where it has become part of the local
rural development strategies. Whether or not the agricultural potential of the
district of Moudjéria, or the region of Achram-Diouk, exactly meets the
needs of the local population, is of minor interest. More important is, that the
agricultural potential was until the present estimated to keep up with the
local needs, even when these rose due to a rapidly growing local population
100and in-migration since 1969.
   The economic significance of agricultural production on the Tagant can
also be discerned from another perspective. As outlined before, over the
centuries grain was an important commodity, which bı¯z. a¯n traders bartered in
the south for desert salt and other commodities (cf. p. 165f., 188f.). One
major route of this grain trade, linking the Adrar with the Senegal valley,
passed through the Tagant. Many Adrar small traders, however, preferred to
already buy their millet on the Tagant, and thus to economise on the journey,
rather than the price. Tagant agriculturalists in turn were able to barter their
millet for products from the north or, as was later the case, sell it for cash.
This strategy, which persisted until the begin of the drought cycle in 1969,
was not without risk (Interview Bâke Mint El Mokhtar, h. art.a¯niyya,
2.11.1995). In January 1941 people from the Adrar were reported to have
bought up almost the whole grain production of the Tagant, bartering it for
guinée cloth and sugar, because no millet was available on the markets of the
south. When during the rainy season the rainfall was highly unsatisfactory,
prices for grain on the Tagant rose quickly. At the same time the administra-
tion maintained restrictions on the grain trade forbidding all cultivators in the
south to sell their millet to pastoralists from the north. In 1942 rainfall
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proved to be even worse than the year before. The situation deteriorated
badly and the local harvest failed almost completely. These severe difficulties
of the Tagant population were further aggravated by the still persisting
administrative regulations, and a general economic crisis hitting the French
West African colonies. Almost all commodities crucial to the local trade were
out of supply (cloth, sugar, millet). Animals, seriously affected by the
drought too, were sold in great numbers to buy grain. The population of
Tidjikja alone grew from about 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, and many su¯da¯n
migrated to the south, thus further minimising the local potential for cultiva-
101tion (Ould Khalifa 1991: 895f.). This both manifest and fragile potential
offered by a local agricultural production serving either auto-consumption
and barter trade, is but one other reason why bı¯z. a¯n were interested in
growing millet locally, and why their interest persisted even during the
heyday of bı¯z. a¯n pastoral production in the wet decades before the big
drought in 1969.
   Following the end of the Second World War, in the course of which the
102French West African colonies (A.O.F.) had sided with the regime at Vichy,
a new policy vis-à-vis the French colonies was developed. Besides a territorial
reorganisation, which added the two regions of the Hodh (until then admin-
istered by the French Sudan) to the Mauritanian colony, the bestowal of
103more autonomy on the colonies was placed on the agenda. In 1946, Mauri-
tania lost the status of a colony, and became a “territoire d’Outre Mer”
th (T.O.M.) of the 4 French republic, and thus obtained the right to send its
own deputy to the national assembly. These first elections held on Mauritani-
an ground ended in a fiasco for the French administration. Instead of their
candidate, the administrator Yvon Razac, it was a bı¯z. a¯n of the Idaw^Alı¯ who
won the elections. Horma Ould Babana had prepared his exploit well by
developing strong political ties to the influential Senegalese politicians
Lamine Guèye and the deputy Léopold Sedar Senghor. The latter in turn
supported the candidacy of Horma Ould Babana among the black African
ethnic groups within Mauritania, and enabled him thus to gather support
both among black Africans in the south, and among the bı¯z. a¯n (cf. Marchesin
1041992: 86ff.; Féral 1983: 89ff.;  Ould Khalifa 1991: 899, 939ff.).
   As a consequence of their failure to promote their own candidate, the
French decided to prepare better for later elections. For this reason the
clientele structures that indirect rule via the tribal chiefs had helped to create
were reinforced. The drastically increased funding of the Mauritanian
territory, which for the first time enabled the colony to develop its economy
and enhance the living conditions of its population, gave the administrators a
powerful means to favour those chiefs, i.e. tribes, who sided with the admin-
istration (cf. De Chassey 1984: 168ff.; Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, personal
communication).
   Part of the plans for the economic development of the Mauritanian
territory were considerable funds assigned for the construction of wells, and
the reconstruction, or improvement of traditional, i.e. hand-built earthen
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dams. These in general were to be improved with a concrete outflow, while
the dams received some fortification. or profited from the work of caterpil-
105lars. On the Tagant, one of the greatest beneficiaries of these measures was
the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, known to have been opposed to
106Horma Ould Babana. He was assigned the improvement of the major dams
at Daber and Kehmeit. Further beneficiaries were the Kunta ^A¯skı¯ra at
Bourraga, and the Kunta Awla¯d Busayv at Tachot. The Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb
107profited from the reconstruction of their dam at Achram.
The Drought, a Development Project, and New Patterns of Land Tenure
   The most decisive transformation of land-use in the region of the northern
Aftout, but of vast areas of the Tagant too, took place in the years subsequent
to the big drought of 1969, that soon transpired to have only been the
starting point of a period of increased aridity lasting until the present, and
striking the whole Sahel. Deprived of the vast majority, if not all of their
animals, both bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n settled close to already established agricultural
sites, and started to develop new ones. The vicinity of the track linking the
capital Nouakchott with the east of the country made of the northernmost
Aftout a prime location for sedentarisation. Here access to the food aid
delivered by the government in Nouakchott was good, whereas the situation
on the Tagant, which was difficult for the large trucks to access was difficult.
   The vicinity of motorised transport facilities also eased migration and later
communication between the rural dwellers and urban migrants. The trans-
formation of the already existing earthen west-east dust-track into the tarred
“road of hope”, reaching the region of Achram-Diouk in 1977, further
increased the number of rural-rural migrants settling in its vicinity. As a
consequence of this growing population, the pressure on land increased.
Tribally homogeneous groups constructed new dams and repaired old ones,
thus appropriating land collectively. Additionally, many individual small
dams (diguettes) were built, allowing for an improved rainfed cultivation, and
strongly accentuating the movement towards an appropriation of cultivable
land encompassing the whole region. Already by the mid 1980s all land
suited to cultivation in the area of Achram-Diouk was considered to be in
collective or individual ownership, thus leaving no more land for initial
vivification to those migrants who continued to settle in the region (cf.
Binneweg 1988).
   Subsequent to the start of the drought cycle, the living conditions deterior-
ated in the region of Achram-Diouk – as in many other areas of Mauritania
and the Sahel. Most prominent in this respect was the desperate state of the
local water supply which caused numerous diseases and was quite inade-
quate. The concentration of both population and problems in this part of the
northern Aftout, which until then had been notorious for its lack of perma-
nent wells, led to the activity of several donors and NGOs, and the installa-
108tion of an integrated rural development project in 1982. In order to increase
and render more sustainable local agricultural production, and thus enhance
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the local populations’ living conditions, large investments were made to
increase the number of dams and to improve their technical design (cf. Seiler
1992; Justen 1991).
   Today dams of modern design are considered to allow for cultivation
already with only 120–150 mm of rainfall during the rainy season. 29 dams,
allowing for the flooding and subsequent cultivation of close to 3,000 ha were
constructed or reconstructed between 1987 and 1995 with modern techniques
in the region of Achram-Diouk. Additionally a far greater number of smaller
dams were strengthened with the support of a caterpillar. This machine,
together with qualified staff, could be hired by the local population in order
to overcome the labour shortage occurring shortly before the rainy season,
when dams damaged by floods or water run-off had to be rebuilt, or new
dams were constructed. Support was also given for a time to the construction
of small individual dams (diguettes), by the subsidisation of construction
material. Besides this material support, know-how about cultivation, and in
particular plant diseases and remedies, was also disseminated.
   The increased pressure on land fuelled the further rigidification of tribal
territorial boundaries (cf. p. 219f.), and led to a number of conflicts in the
region of Achram-Diouk. Among tribes, these occurred in areas where the
marginal state of land had led to only vague definitions of territorial bound-
aries. Besides these conflicts located at the periphery, the increasing number
of dams created another source of conflict involving the heartland of
agricultural exploitation. Large watercourses had been exploited, at least
since colonial times, not by a single, but by several consecutive dams. These
often were in the ownership of different tribes, for tribal territories used to
cross-cut the watercourses rectangularly. In order to achieve the maximum
potential of the dams lying at the lower end of the watercourse (i.e. to fill
them up completely, and allow for the optimum period of flooding), those at
the upper end have to be distant enough to allow the lower end dams to have
a proper catchment zone. Additionally, upper end dams have to be emptied
early enough not to affect the interests of lower end cultivators. Tensions
arise whenever new dams are built in such a setting on an “upriver” territory,
because they may withhold water from the lower ones. This distribution of
natural resources makes inter-tribal cooperation a crucial prerequisite for an
effective exploitation of the given resources. Further, it adds another facet to
land tenure. The construction of dams not only legitimises the appropriation
of the land flooded by this undertaking, but establishes rights to the water-
courses feeding it, even if these lie beyond the tribal territory.
   Inter-tribal conflict over land and surface water resources has gained
prominence in some cases (cf. Ould Al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996: 171ff.), but
contrary to what might be anticipated, it is not the most frequent configura-
tion of such discord. Among fourteen cases of conflict over land that were
delegated to the local authorities between 1977 and 1991, all of which
involved the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d of the Assaba region, only five cases fell into
the category of “inter-tribal” conflicts. The remaining majority of cases
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involved members of the same tribe. Either different factions were unable to
solve their divergent interpretation of land ownership (five cases), or the
conflict arose among bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n (three cases). Segmentation processes
(three cases), familial disputes (one case) and intervention by notables (one
case) too led to conflict over land (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 1093).
   This rather detailed classification of the nature of conflicts, major aspects of
109which are still subject to controversy among scholars, is valuable insofar as
it is able to shed light on the multitude of levels on which conflict over access
to land can develop within the tribe. This is due to the heterogeneous compo-
sition of these highly flexible social entities. Su¯da¯n oppose bı¯z. a¯n, influential
bı¯z. a¯n families conquer for power, as do political factions, to name only a few
configurations. Tribal cohesion may thus be articulated on a scale ranging
from only one small group, up to large entities encompassing a number of
110almost autonomous fractions. While the tribes’ territorial boundaries in
most cases have become quite well-defined during this century, the collective
control of the resources thus assembled, and the mode of their exploitation
are less consistent. Still-ongoing processes of internal factionalism, splitting
111up formerly homogeneous authorities and tribal groups, find a major field
for articulation in land tenure. The control of the most fertile land is an issue
the local elites need to manage and exploit for the sake of their political
hegemony.
   Inner-tribal configurations of conflict become evident in cases where
resources that are owned collectively by various factions have to be subjected
to new modes of exploitation. Enhancing agricultural productivity, e.g. by
the construction of dams, frequently necessitates a redistribution of land
among the contributors to the building. Difficulties arise whenever only a
part of the tribe is concerned with the undertaking, or when different factions
of the same tribe have to negotiate their respective share of land. These
constellations are revelations of the actual balance of power within the tribe.
While most frequently bı¯z. a¯n oppose bı¯z. a¯n and the authority of a chief
becomes contested, recently new patterns of conflict evolved in which su¯da¯n
actively take part. This was the case with the dam of Dharagouadir, built by
about thirty su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n subsequent to the droughts of the early 1970s
near Leklewa. The chief of the Legwa¯t.it. at the time claimed a sort of primary
control over all lands exploited on the tribe’s territory, and translated this
into a right to get a share in every new dam constructed, without even
112contributing to the work. The conflict escalated at various stages, and was
settled only by a decision from the regional court in Kaédi. The bı¯z. a¯n and
su¯da¯n families got the right to appropriate the land, but had to transfer the
new dam farther upriver, and hence more distant to the tribe’s most impor-
113tant, rather old dam at Zemmal. This outcome of inner-tribal conflict meant
different things to either bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n. The bı¯z. a¯n, who had been landless
so far, had provoked and experienced the break up of many of their relations
with the tribe’s elite, who was a source of patronage and security for depen-
dents of all kinds, in order to gain some rights in land instead. The su¯da¯n on
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the other hand exchanged precarious use-rights at the tribe’s major dam
Zemmal, burdened with high contributions to the bı¯z. a¯n land owners, for real
entitlements in land. Besides this most obvious dividing line, the case is
spectacular, because it provoked an alliance between parts of deprived bı¯z. a¯n
(they had been by the majority pastoralists, and therefore prior to the
drought had no, or very few individual rights to agricultural land) and a
114group of su¯da¯n largely independent of their former masters. The bı¯z. a¯n,
among whom only four families owned a plot at Zemmal, at the time were
split over the issue whether to coalesce with the su¯da¯n or to accept the
demands of their chief for the sake of tribal integrity. The conflict was
resolved by some bı¯z. a¯n remaining with the chief’s fraction, and another
group moving off with the su¯da¯n.
   In numerous cases, however, bı¯z. a¯n factionalism continues to rule patterns
of conflict and land tenure. At El Gharga su¯da¯n from two fractions of the
Tmoddek had begun to cultivate land in a depression subsequent to the
drought, and had hindered su¯da¯n from other tribes from establishing
themselves in the area. The su¯da¯n had thus marked not only their own
appropriation of the site, but had also made their tribe’s and their respective
115fraction’s claims manifest. In order to receive aid from the local develop-
ment project for the construction of a new dam on this site, the two factions
of the Tmoddek present on the spot had to develop a consensus on how to
share both the costs and the land behind the dam. This was such a controver-
sial issue among the bı¯z. a¯n factions (who alone were in the position to
arbitrate on the land, for it is they who hold the proofs of legitimate owner-
116ship), that compromises that had already been made were called into
question several times. The development project, following a policy to
intervene only on sites free of conflicting claims in order to avoid taking the
role of an arbiter, therefore twice stopped all construction activities. This
pressure on both bı¯z. a¯n parties finally led to the conclusion of a sustainable
arrangement, according to which the dam (and its costs) was divided into two
equal halves, each of which was shared among the members of the respective
factions (Interview Amadou Bâ, project leader SO.NA.DE.R Achram,
30.1.1996; Walid Ould Mbarek, h. art.a¯ni, 7.2.1996).
   Why consent is difficult to achieve between two, or sometimes even more
factions, is illuminated by the opposition of two distinct principles of
equality underlying this kind of negotiation of access to land. Either all
members of one tribe have equal rights to land regardless of their factional
affiliation, or access to land is mediated by the factions, whose leaders want
to assert their political role, and thus are unlikely to accept any unfavourable
agreement. In the case of El Gharga, the factions, i.e. their elites, were
successful in this strategy, and negotiated access to land for their affiliates.
The “equality” thus achieved between the two parties, however, caused
difference on another level: the 55 members of the first faction contributing
to the dam share the same surface as the 93 members of the second one.
232        Chapter 7
 
 
Getting Land, Losing Land: Su¯da¯n Land Ownership
   Disputes over land such as outlined in the preceding section, could hardly
develop without su¯da¯n contribution. Su¯da¯n not only continue to be more
intensely involved in agriculture (although many bı¯z. a¯n now depend strongly
on agriculture too), but are directly affected by the recent increase of bı¯z. a¯n
interest in cultivable land. In former times, few bı¯z. a¯n cultivated themselves.
They were the owners of the land, but the majority of the work was done
either by their slaves or by h. ara¯t.ı¯n. When the pastoral sector was struck by
the drought crisis, and agriculture became a low capital activity to fall back
on for many bı¯z. a¯n, pressure on the su¯da¯n grew. Old claims were reactivated,
and h. ara¯t.ı¯n had to pay increasing shares of their harvest for the right to
cultivate bı¯z. a¯n land (cf. Bonte 1987b: 211; and above p. 203f.).
   Confronted with these worsening conditions, many su¯da¯n sought to
appropriate their own land by vivification, and thus to escape from the
117obligation to share their harvests with bı¯z. a¯n landowners. However, the
land still free for appropriation by this time was by and large marginal land.
Most fertile land, such as depressions and watercourses, has been under tight
bı¯z. a¯n control for generations. In 1988, a study for the development project
for the region of Achram-Diouk calculated that a bı¯z. a¯n family in the area of
Leklewa and Syassa had access to a mean of 1.8 ha of land behind large dams
(barrages), and 1.0 ha behind small dams (diguettes), while a h. ara¯t.ı¯n family
had access to only 1.2 ha behind large dams, and 3.5 ha behind small dams (cf.
118Binneweg 1988: 36).
   Su¯da¯n difficulties in becoming owners of most fertile land are revealed by
the case of the second large dam intersecting the wa¯d Achram. It was
constructed in 1977 after local notables had proposed to reinforce the
substructure of the “road of hope” and to turn it into a dam equipped with
an adjustable outflow. Conflict arose over the issue of how to distribute this
land, which none of the zwa¯ya of the Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb owning the wa¯d had
to pay for. While the su¯da¯n wanted to become participants with equal
standing to the bı¯z. a¯n and to get parcels like them, the bı¯z. a¯n concluded that
this land was exclusively to benefit themselves. The su¯da¯n should not be
taken into account during the allotment of parcels. Consequently the whole
dam came under the ownership of the bı¯z. a¯n. Whenever they wanted to
cultivate on plots behind the new dam, the su¯da¯n had to submit to the well-
known sharecropping conditions, obliging them to pay half or one third of
119their harvest to the bı¯z. a¯n landowner.
   For many su¯da¯n of the Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb, this major disappointment of
their aspirations to be treated as equal members of the tribe marked a turning
point in their relations with the bı¯z. a¯n. Many today report that they boycot-
ted cultivation of the new dam totally, or at least no longer accepted the
classical, disadvantageous sharecropping arrangements. Although the land
behind the dam remained a most important resource, and is (together with
the other dams controlled by the bı¯z. a¯n) almost the only resort in years of bad
rainfall, the strategy of the su¯da¯n, who in the meantime had raised many
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individual and a few collective dams in order to become less dependent on
the bı¯z. a¯n land, had some effect. Many parcels belonging to bı¯z. a¯n who did not
want to soften the terms for sharecropping by su¯da¯n remained uncultivated.
Landowners who preferred to make a small profit rather than none, therefore
began to offer better conditions to the su¯da¯n, leaving them most often with
120two thirds, and in a few cases with up to 90 percent of the harvest. All of
these achievements, however, attenuated but did not profoundly alter
existing relations of dependency.
   Quite a different principle of access to land was practised at those sites
where new dams were constructed with assistance by the local development
project. Here all members of a collectivity (the current euphemism for
members of a tribe residing in one location), su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n alike, were
considered to be able to become landowners on equal terms. The single
condition was that everybody had to participate, i.e. to pay for his share.
121Large plots thus could be obtained by paying a correspondingly higher share.
In order to facilitate payment calculated in cash, this could also be replaced
by an equivalent amount of work. The preference of su¯da¯n for work, and of bı¯-
z. a¯n for cash, gives another glimpse of the difference between both groups,
and also reveals the impact of the development project’s policy on the
establishment of new patterns of land tenure. Coinciding closely with the
impetus of Mauritanian land reform, the project’s action effectively under-
scored the abolitionist impetus inherent to the new legislation. While already
before the intervention of the project cooperation between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n
on an equal footing had begun on some occasions, the intervention of the
development project set new standards on how equal rights were to be
applied. Besides being a clever policy, this was made possible through the
project’s outstanding economic resources, which made it renowned in the
capital Nouakchott 450 km away as the true master of the region, outclassing
the region’s state officials and tribal elites (Meskerem Brhane, personal
communication). Drawing on these resources, both the interests of the
poorest and of the local elite could be met. This balance, although favouring
not only the most needy, but to some extent also the old and new notability,
however was – as the case of the second dam at Achram had shown – crucial
to achieve a sustainable use of the local resources and hence to promote local
development.
Getting Social Hierarchy Back In
   Besides equality, the need for consent as a prerequisite for development aid
also allowed for modes of tenure reintroducing the notion of inequality
among different groups of land owners, above all among su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n.
Most prominent in this respect is the dam at Leklewa, built jointly by bı¯z. a¯n
and su¯da¯n of the nearby village of the same name and prominent in that it
became something of a model promoting this kind of assistance for develop-
ment (cf. Wüst 1989; Justen 1991). Obviously unnoticed by the development
experts, the bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n (the vast majority of whom had not been
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involved in relations of dependency towards each other), developed a model
of how to transform their conflictual relationship into a consensus on land
tenure.
   Initial quarrelling at Leklewa was about the question whether the su¯da¯n
should become owners of the dam like the bı¯z. a¯n, or if sharecropping
arrangements should be pursued, as was the rule on most other dams owned
by bı¯z. a¯n. After the bı¯z. a¯n had split into two factions over this question it was
decided by a part of the bı¯z. a¯n and a part of the su¯da¯n to divide the dam into
two equal halves, one for the bı¯z. a¯n, and one for the su¯da¯n. As there were
fewer contributors for the bı¯z. a¯n half than for the su¯da¯n half, the bı¯z. a¯n plots
were designed with a width of 25 metres, whereas the su¯da¯n ones attained
122only 15 metres (all plots have nominally the same length). Although the
reason for this arrangement clearly is to be seen in the dissimilar number of bı¯-
z. a¯n and su¯da¯n cultivators, a rather different justification was given by one of
the su¯da¯n concerned. According to him the su¯da¯n community accepted the
arrangement, because the larger bı¯z. a¯n plots were conceived as “family plots”,
while the su¯da¯n ones were seen as “individual plots”. While among the su¯da¯n,
several brothers (even unmarried ones) could, and did, engage independently
in the construction of the dam and the appropriation of plots, among the
bı¯z. a¯n this was only supposed to be done by household chiefs. While su¯da¯n were
conceived as having to sustain themselves above all, the bı¯z. a¯n were regarded
123as responsible for families – and in some regards responsible for dependents.
Here again, as in the case of bı¯z. a¯n factionalism at El Gharga, it was important
for both groups to establish themselves as distinct communities with equal
rights, even though the su¯da¯n had to accept much smaller parcels of land than
the neighbouring bı¯z. a¯n as a result (Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. ara¯t.ı¯n,
27.7.1995).
   Elements of traditional hierarchy will be likely to resurge even more
strongly after the withdrawal of the development project, which became
124definite in 1996. Besides the maintenance of the new facilities, the raising of
125new funds for local development will continue to be on the agenda. Local
elites, both old and new ones, will gain in importance whenever they prove to
be successful in this domain. This is highlighted by those cases where
126individual bı¯z. a¯n have succeeded in developing their sites. A zwa¯ya notable
owning a large part of a recently enhanced dam employs a number of su¯da¯n
for cultivation and harvest. These, however, do not originate from the
owner’s tribe, but have migrated into the Aftout, to leave their former
masters and relations of dependency behind. Now they have established new
relations of clientage free of the burden of a slave past, but also void of the
material benefits and the security these relations sometimes continued to
provide. Despite this tendency towards the evolution of a rural proletariat,
ready to move to wherever there is work (cf. Bonte 1987b: 212), the still most
widespread arrangement between bı¯z. a¯n landowners, both h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya,
and su¯da¯n cultivators in the region of Achram-Diouk continues to be
sharecropping – but its conditions become increasingly diverse. Landowners
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may receive one half, one third, and sometimes much less of the harvest for
granting the use-rights of their land. Su¯da¯n cultivators on the other hand may
be found working behind one and the same dam on their own as well as on
bı¯z. a¯n plots.
Honourable Su¯da¯n: the H. assa¯n Mode of Land Tenure
   Quite a different kind of arrangement is made among su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n in
the h. assa¯n milieu of the emiral tribe of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med and among
other h. assa¯n tribes of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak confederation. Among these the
great individual landowners grant plots without fixing any compensation,
and indeed evince deep disdain for the sharecropping arrangements common
among the neighbouring zwa¯ya by answering to the question whether they
rent land for a share of the harvest as do the neighbouring Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb
zwa¯ya: “We don’t do that [like the Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb], we only give.” (cf. the
narrative of Youba, p. 72)
   Suspicious of what appeared to be too much generosity to be true, I had to
await a quite distinct situation to unravel the nature of these h. assa¯n-su¯da¯n
relations. In the meantime the matter proved not easily accessible via
interviews, for both parties, h. assa¯n and su¯da¯n alike, continued to deny giving
or demanding any kind of compensation for the right to cultivate. A new
light was shed on the case at the end of 1995, when my driver, Nanna Ould
El Vaida, asked permission to be freed from work for one day. There was
some urgent work awaiting him on his millet field, which I knew he had been
granted by one of the great Ahel Swayd Ah. med landowners. Admittedly I
was annoyed by demands from my employees to be freed from work, for
127these seemed “to make children”, rather than that the spare time granted
resolved the problems it had been designed for. To make the conversation at
least a little bit more productive I decided to turn it into a conversation on
the different aspects of millet cultivation. Wanting to increase my knowledge
on this topic, I started reasoning about when and where which kind of work
had already been done on this field, and why the current business could not
be delayed until Sunday. The dilemma of my h. art.a¯ni driver soon surfaced.
Originally, the work now in question had been scheduled by him for the
week before, but then the su¯da¯n cultivating on the plots granted by the
h. assa¯n notable had all decided to work on the site of the latter instead of their
own plots. Profiting like all other su¯da¯n from the land of the notable, Nanna
Ould El Vaida had to submit to this decision, and postponed work on his
own field.
   The decision of the su¯da¯n to work the fields of the notable was remarkable
for another reason too. The notable was on a journey at this time, and
therefore was unable to manage his fields personally. The su¯da¯n therefore –
as a matter of honour – released him from this responsibility. Leaving the
region without explicitly demanding that su¯da¯n care for his fields, the notable
had made proof of his trust towards the reliability of the su¯da¯n and their
ability to decide on the right thing to do. The su¯da¯n had got the unspoken
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128message very well, and done what they were expected to do (it goes
without saying that there is an unspoken threat of sanctions too, and notables
129also ask for distinct services). Rather than further fixing the su¯da¯n’s
subordinate status, this kind of arrangement enabled them to behave not like
dependents, but like free men. It shows how both sides agreed to respect each
other, and thus further increase each other’s prestige. Finally, the case
illustrates quite well how the Ahel Swayd Ah. med could attract many su¯da¯n
by providing not only a homestead and land to work on, but a chance to be
130treated like a full member of the tribe. Even when h. assa¯n directly demand
assistance from those h. ara¯t.ı¯n benefiting from their land, as is also the case,
this honourable relation is not destroyed, for asking for help does not mean
fixing a direct remuneration, but only underscoring the relations of mutual
131assistance.
   This “h. assa¯n mode of land tenure” is practised not only by some leading
members of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, but to a lesser extent by other h. assa¯n
132too. The limits to the extension of this practice result from the strong
centralisation of land among only a few people. Dispersed, small-scale
individual owners, who indeed lend plots to assist fellows in need, are rarely
able to do so on a larger scale involving more than one or two plots without
confirming what the revenue might be. Large landowners, granting plots to
many individual cultivators, face little risk to their revenue in both symbolic
and economic terms, even if some beneficiaries fail to fulfil the exigencies
they are submitted to.
The Politics of H. ara¯t. ı¯n Generosity
   The centralised control of much land by a few bı¯z. a¯n, which is closely
intertwined with traditional tribal hierarchy, means that use-rights on these
sites continue to be revocable even after decades of continued cultivation by
distinct groups of su¯da¯n. Several dams on the Ahel Swayd Ah. med territory
are reported to have been constructed by the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Ahel Swayd
133Ah. med, or jointly by these and the ^amı¯r, and other leading members of the
emiral family. Most of these former h. ara¯t.ı¯n plots were given up by their
supposed possessors, and donated to the ^amı¯r when the emiral camp of the
Ahel Swayd Ah. med, the h. ella, settled near Achram. The aim of this allegedly
deliberate action of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n was to provide the ^amı¯r with land for
cultivation which he could distribute (on the same revocable conditions)
among the needy population of the former h. ella, now settled in the village of
the same name. This miraculous and most unselfish h. ara¯t.ı¯n withdrawal took
place at several dams they had cultivated for years, but most of which were
(and still are) registered at the préfecture in Moudjéria under the name of the
former ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, the official representa-
134tive of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med.
   One dam affected by this redistribution of use-rights is Brik. It was
constructed as early as 1948 both by a group of h. assa¯n and of h. ara¯t.ı¯n who
now say to have lent their land to the ^amı¯r in order to help the poor (bı¯z. a¯n)
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people of Hella. Elimba too is an old dam, which originally was entirely
exploited by the h. ara¯t.ı¯n. All families but eight who used to cultivate there left
135anddonatedtheir landtothe ^amı¯r. BlaTama^awas leftcompletelybytheh. ara¯-
t.ı¯n, and now is occupied by an influential h. ara¯t.ı¯n with close ties to the
emiral family, the Ahel Sneibe, and six other su¯da¯n families. In other cases,
the h. ara¯t.ı¯n were able to continue cultivation on plots side by side with those
of members of the emiral family, but had to endure the tutelage of the
notables. The dam of Legned was reconstructed and enlarged in 1969. The
^amı¯r and his seven h. assa¯n co-owners decided to make their parcels, which
were already much larger than those of the fifteen h. ara¯t.ı¯n families, even
larger on this occasion. Today the h. assa¯n plots are of 200 metres width,
measuring a length of 1,500 metres, while those of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n are of only
50 metres width and the same length. According to one h. ara¯t.ı¯n informant
these dissimilar sizes of the plots resulted from a corresponding, uneven
contribution of h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and h. assa¯n notables to the construction of the dam.
This view, however, was contested by another h. ara¯t.ı¯n informant, who
stressed the role of the pressure the h. ara¯t.ı¯n were subjected to at the time to
make them accept this redistribution. Similar cases of uneven plot sizes, all
involving the same h. assa¯n families found in Legned, occur at the dam of
Zmeimil and Amriche El Beidha.
   Quite controversial too are the views concerning the important dam at
Toueidima. This dam was rebuilt in 1983, directly after the death of the old
^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, and the year of the settling of
the h. ella, the emiral camp. Seeing the numerous participants, and consider-
ing the plots fixed by a preliminary distribution too small to be worth
cultivating, the h. ara¯t.ı¯n left their share of land for the people of Hella.
According to another account, the rebuilding of the dam was effected already
in 1977 by using a caterpillar borrowed from the company constructing the
tarred “road of hope”. The later redistribution of parcels resulted from the
old ^amı¯r’s sons’ decision to let Toueidima with only three of them, while the
ownership rights on other dams were distributed among the remaining
brothers. Ever since there has been a fixed delimitation of the parcels at
Toueidima, because the experience of several years is said to have demonstrat-
ed that there was no need to calculate plots sizes in relation to the surface
flooded.
   The fragile character many su¯da¯n claims to land still have, is also revealed
by a case of conflicting claims to land among su¯da¯n affiliated to the Ahel
Swayd Ah. med that happened in 1995. The long wa¯d of Achram, which is an
affluent to the Gorgol Blanc, is exploited by a series of dams among which
are the two dams owned by the Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb at Achram, and a series of
dams owned by two important members of the emiral family. In between
these large dams on land of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med are located two smaller
ones built and owned by su¯da¯n the Oued Moud, and the Oued Haratin. The
history of the ownership of these sites is quite a troubled one, and marked by
the succession of different owners: the Oued Moud was constructed by ten
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su¯da¯n families who later gave up the site, which in 1986 became reoccupied
and reconstructed by the h. art.a¯ni Moud and six other families.
   More complex is the case of the Oued Haratin. The first construction of a
dam on this site was initiated by four su¯da¯n families but finally a total of
eleven families contributed to the building of the dam, which later was
136enhanced by a small concrete outflow funded by the development project.
Since then the number of su¯da¯n cultivators has grown to about twenty,
because revocable grants, which do not have to be paid for, were made by the
137initial collectivity of users. Troubles started when a member of the Ahel
Sneibe, a h. ara¯t.ı¯n family with strong ties to the ^amı¯r of Tagant, raised claims
on this and surrounding sites prior to the start of the cultivation season 1995.
The claimant had found out that once his family owned small dams in the
area, and was able to provide three witnesses for his cause, his claim for the
ownership of the land was well founded on legal grounds. Alarmed by the
threat that their dam might be declared illicit, and hence might have been
destroyed, the su¯da¯n asked the (unofficial) ^amı¯r Ethman Ould Abderrahma-
ne for assistance. His mediation achieved a compromise: the Ahel Sneibe
were given a share of the land, and the dam remained in place (Interview h. ar-
t.a¯ni, 23.1.1996). Below the surface, the legal issues were far more complicated
The land reclaimed had been cultivated for quite a long time by two su¯da¯n
families without raising opposition from members of the Ahel Sneibe who
had remained in the area. Despite these ambiguities the quarrelsome and
scheming brother continued to raise ever more far-reaching claims, almost
leading to a violent clash when members of the Ahel Sneibe intended to build
a new dam flooding a large area including the dam of Oued Haratin.
   According the local qa¯d. i the strict application of the šarı¯^a legitimised all
the claims of the Ahel Sneibe, but nevertheless the qa¯d. i considered this
option to do justice neither to the diverging interests leading to the conflict in
question, nor to any other conflict over land in the area. He therefore saw his
role, like that of other notables, in resolving problems, an aim that was not to
achieve by definitive arbitration to either side’s advantage, but by introducing
an agreement (Interview Ahmed Ould Aly, qa¯d. i, 24.12.1995).
   This statement of the local jurist is revealing about the relationship between
the application of the šarı¯^a, and of legal tradition (^urf). While elements of
the former enter the latter, there is hardly any dogmatic application. The
major goal is to develop consent and a kind of legal legitimacy allowing both
parties to save their faces. Both parties win in some respects, and on the other
hand are able to present what they conceded as a generous offer to their
counterpart. This arrangement is thus very reminiscent of the agreements
made between conflicting bı¯z. a¯n parties. However, there is a major difference.
While both su¯da¯n parties appealed to bı¯z. a¯n notables in order to get assistance
in their struggle, the latter played a much less decisive role in the case of the
two bı¯z. a¯n parties’ struggling over the partition of the dam at El Gharga.
Additionally, there the two bı¯z. a¯n factions were equal to each other and were
much less inclined to respect the authority of some notables then the su¯da¯n.
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In the case of the Oued Haratine, right from the beginning a moral and
juridical authority was involved. The quick settlement, again, was largely due
to the intervention of several bı¯z. a¯n authorities. Further, it seems likely that –
although this cannot be proved – the case would not have arisen, if the claims
had been made by su¯da¯n other than the Ahel Sneibe. This old h. ara¯t.ı¯n family
not only has old and close ties of affinity to the emiral family, but had even
been attributed ownership rights in land fixed in the colonial register at
Moudjéria. Against such a plaintiff, the su¯da¯n cultivating the Oued Haratin
had only a limited means to defend their position. Rejecting the arrangement
proposed by the notables would have meant for the su¯da¯n to offend among
others the (unofficial) ^amı¯r of Tagant, a man who still owns quite a consider-
able amount of land, and like a number of other notables, was recently able to
extend his property. Despite his power being challenged by the action of the
regional development project and at the beginning of the 1990s by the
138democratisation process, the ^amı¯r of Tagant continues to be a major
instance managing access to land among the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, as will be
shown in the following.
139The Power and the Glory
   For several years, the region of Achram-Diouk has been the homestead of a
small group of Idebussa¯t.. In 1987 two of the wealthiest members of this
group diversified their economic activities from camel pastoralism, livestock
140trading and marketing of fresh camel’s milk to running a large shop in
Achram. Funded with an initial capital of 1.2 million UM, this shop soon
became one of the most important in the village. As the revenues from the
shop rose ever more, and as many of the pastoralist activities were delegated
to hired herders, the wish to settle in a village of their own grew among the
Idebussa¯t.. An appeal to the (unofficial) ^amı¯r of Tagant was made, and was
successful. The ^amı¯r granted the Idebussa¯t. a piece of land on which they
141were allowed to drill a well and build their own village. For the Idebussa¯t. it
went without saying that they would meet this emiral generosity with some
return service, funded by contributions from all beneficiaries. Their future
h. ara¯t.ı¯n neighbours too, were destined to profit, but unlike the ^amı¯r, their
benefit was considered to arise from job opportunities supposed to develop
as a consequence of the Idebussa¯t. presence (Interview Mohamed Sid’Ahmed,
142zwa¯ya, 13.9.1995).
   The site determined for the installation of the new village was unsuited for
143cultivation, and thus until then had not been the object of direct appropria-
tion, nor was it likely to ever have become so. Nevertheless the decision to let
the Idebussa¯t. build a village raised opposition. The site concerned was in
direct proximity to the village of Legned amidst the fields of its almost
exclusively h. ara¯t.ı¯n inhabitants. One immediate concern was the probable
devastation, the continuous coming and going of the numerous Idebussa¯t.
camels, which would be watered at the new well, would create in the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
144millet fields. Another concern was that the settlement of the Idebussa¯t.
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constituted an intrusion upon the integrity of what might be anticipated as
145the territory of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of Legned. This is not a justiciable category,
neither with regard to traditional, nor to modern land tenure, but rather
expresses a sentiment of territorial hegemony and privacy that extends from
the village to its vicinity. The dense web of agricultural sites around Legned
(which the h. ara¯t.ı¯n either own or exploit on the basis of granted use-rights)
also marks off this area of joint appropriation that integrates the unused gaps
and patches between the spots of direct appropriation. The very existence of
this h. ara¯t.ı¯n sphere of territorial authority is reflected by the Idebussa¯t.
attitude, acknowledging the grant of land to result from a generous attitude
of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, considered worth being compensated.
   Besides this dimension of expropriation, the settling of the Idebussa¯t. near
Legned is a serious issue because it breaks up the tribal homogeneity which
the settlements on land belonging to the Ahel Swayd Ah. med had until then.
Violating this integrity of tribal land was only possible at its periphery, both
in territorial and social terms. Only vis-à-vis the h. ara¯t.ı¯n was the ^amı¯r able to
carry this project through without raising direct opposition, or risking
further strengthening of bı¯z. a¯n political factionalism detrimental to his own
power base. Nevertheless, in the words of an influential h. art.a¯ni from Legned,
who is a close ally of the ^amı¯r too, everything was fine with the Idebussa¯t.
settlement, for the ^amı¯r made an appeal to the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and these were glad to
help their friend solve his problem:
146This site is for a zwa¯ya family, the Ahel Limam from the Idebussa¯t..
This is a family that has good relations with the ^amı¯r, and they asked him
to get land [for the construction of a village]. Consequently the ^amı¯r
asked the h. ara¯t.ı¯n to find a site in their vicinity. We directly declared
ourselves ready to do so, and attributed them this site. (Interview h. art.a¯ni,
5.2.1996)
The account diplomatically tries to frame the event, and thus to downplay its
significance. Harmony determines the fraternal relations of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n with
the ^amı¯r, who are portrayed as able to help their powerful friend from their
own resources. Nevertheless ambiguities are expressed as well. The h. ara¯t.ı¯n
were not asked for advice, but to approve a preconceived solution. The only
room for manoeuvre left to the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, and allowing them in some respects
to keep their face, was to determine the site for the construction. The at best
formal character the consultation of h. ara¯t.ı¯n by the ^amı¯r had, is illuminated
by the composition of the delegation from Legned. According to the Legned
h. ara¯t.ı¯n leader cited above, it was about ten men who visited the ^amı¯r and
then agreed to his proposition. Asked to enumerate these men the interview-
ee, who, it should be pointed out, was speaking in the presence of several
bı¯z. a¯n on that occasion, expressed a great uneasiness. In fact only a few h. ara¯t.ı¯n
renowned for their loyalty to the ^amı¯r were convoked by the latter, and then
had to inform their compatriots of the decision taken.
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Well, I took part [i.e. in this delegation; pause]. It is difficult to count
these people. There was myself, and then [person a, who according to his
own words is a follower of the ^amı¯r], all the others I just can’t recall. This
is a problem. I wasn’t prepared for this [delegation], [laughing] there was
also . . . [person b], as well as . . . [person c], . . . [the brother of person c],
and . . . [person d]. Well, I only found a few men to tell that this family
[the Idebussa¯t.] will live beside us. (Interview h. art.a¯ni, 5.2.1996)
Even less room for ambiguities and speculations about a h. ara¯t.ı¯n autonomy is
left by the account of Mohamed A. Ould Khalil, a leading zwa¯ya at Achram,
and thus an external observer of the affair (Interview 5.9.1995). According to
him, the Idebussa¯t. failed to get the consent of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n at Legned for their
plans to drill a well and settle in their vicinity. It then probably was the ^amı¯r
who called the h. ara¯t.ı¯n back to order, and arranged consent on the matter, for
the land concerned was of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, and the issue thus subject
147to his authority. While the Idebussa¯t. so far had failed to get cultivable land
from the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, they had already profited from some grants
from the neighbouring Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb.
Poor Su¯da¯n
   The ongoing involvement of bı¯z. a¯n in questions of su¯da¯n access to land, and
the persisting dependency the su¯da¯n experience in this regard vis-à-vis the bı¯-
z. a¯n, is revealed by another case, that of the L^aweysya¯t su¯da¯n at Téjal. The
occupation and cultivation at this site, however, has a long history, and needs
to be detailed for a proper understanding of the present issues. Conflict over
land was endemic between the Tarkoz and the Ta¯ga¯t., and one area thus
148disputed at least since the 1930s, largely corresponds to the area of Téjal.
When the conflict grew in intensity and both parties started attacking each
other, the French administration intervened. Because any act of arbitration
on the validity of either side’s claims would have been followed by the most
bitter hostility on the part of the disfavoured party towards the administra-
tion, the French simply withdrew from this task – as they did in many major
conflicts over land, and as the Mauritanian administration still continues to
149do. Instead of attributing the land to one party, or drawing a boundary,
both tribes were prohibited from cultivating the land, or from undertaking
any other act liable to symbolise appropriation. This procedure of suspend-
ing all arbitration made it possible to handle the conflict, for no definitive
decision on legal ownership was made (thus leaving both parties with some
hope for the future), while the ocasion on which conflict developed was
suppressed. The whole affair, however, took a new turn, when – probably
without the formal consent of the colonial administration – the ^amı¯r of
Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, interfered. Taking advantage of the
dismissal of the Ta¯ga¯t. and the Tarkoz, he sent out some of “his h. ara¯t.ı¯n” to
Téjal (in total about fifty families), to build up a buffer zone with a potential
150for threat between the conflicting parties, and of course, to cultivate there.
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   The occupation of the area by su¯da¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med was limited
to the cultivation period. The water supply from the distant wells and springs
was a great problem, and often the amount of water carried to Téjal by a
daily trek of donkeys lasting almost half of the day, did not meet the needs.
The thirst thus experienced is still vividly remembered today. In 1969, the
year of the great drought, the su¯da¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med therefore left
Téjal, and moved back to the northernmost Aftout, an area with much better
access to water, and better conditions for cultivation, which became the new
centre of their tribe’s agricultural activities. Ever since then the area around
what is today the small village of Téjal has been occupied and cultivated by a
growing number of su¯da¯n of the L^aweysya¯t, who thus succeeded to the
su¯da¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. The legitimacy of L^aweysya¯t land ownership
in Téjal – with the exception of a few su¯da¯n who have been cultivating in the
151area for a long time – is therefore essentially based on the vivification of
land either uncultivated, or left only recently by former users. To underscore
their claim the su¯da¯n now stay at Téjal all year round, and no longer leave the
place during the hot dry season, as former generations of su¯da¯n did. Never-
theless, these most recent references to ownership of land leave room for
contestation, once the focus is turned to the issue of whether the land had
been appropriated unjustly, i.e. overriding pre-existing rights. Conflict is
continuous, as much of the area is still subject to claims by the neighbouring
Ta¯ga¯t.. Su¯da¯n from two conflicting fractions of this tribe continue to cultivate
in the area, and only the Tarkoz retreated from the conflict (Interview
Boueibou Ould Amar, h. art.a¯ni, 1.11.1995; Mahmoude Mint Benjik, h. ar-
t.a¯niyya, 8.8.1995, Nanna Ould El Vaida, h. art.a¯ni, 27.12.1995).
   While disputing land ownership with the Ta¯ga¯t., the su¯da¯n of the
L^aweysya¯t are subject to yet another threat. Settling at Téjal was a means for su¯-
da¯n to escape the obligations arising in the context of co-residence and
heavy dependency on land resources controlled by the bı¯z. a¯n masters and
patrons at Djouengi. These try hard to discourage the su¯da¯n and focus on the
lack of legitimacy of a L^aweysya¯t presence at Téjal:
SOL: There are two tribes thinking this land is theirs. . . . These are the
Ta¯ga¯t., the one is the fraction of the Ideyneb, and the others of the Idewa¯š.
. . . We here are of the L^aweysya¯t.
Author: Is it the bı¯z. a¯n or the su¯da¯n who want to get the land here?
SOL: The decision, that comes always from the bı¯z. a¯n, but they send only
the su¯da¯n. . . . The bı¯z. a¯n of the L^aweysya¯t told us not to go here, but to
remain at Djouengi. But the su¯da¯n didn’t accept going back there, and
remained here. The bı¯z. a¯n then said that the L^aweysya¯t didn’t own land
here, this was only said by the bı¯z. a¯n, but the su¯da¯n said that they owned
these fields, and therefore they stayed. In Djouengi now remain only
bı¯z. a¯n [Author’s note: This is largely exaggerated, since about as many su¯da¯n
of the L^aweysya¯t still live and cultivate in Djouengi, as do in Téjal]. We
now want to watch this land here. This is because of the two Ta¯ga¯t.
fractions. Each time there is the préfet who comes here, he comes and tells
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each fraction to take its fields, and to stay there. . . . These decisions were
made by several people. There was the chef d’arondissement from
Djonâba who came here, and the Hakem of Magta’lahjar, and several
other men from Aleg too. These made the boundaries here between the
three fractions. . . . Now the boundaries are strictly defined. The problems
began in 1982, and persisted until this year. Meanwhile that side [bound-
ary] over there has been well defined. But we don’t believe in it. There are
always people who start talking, and you never know. Three years ago,
the Hakem from Djonâba made a written contract concerning the bound-
aries. But problems continue on that side, with the Ideyneb. They first
had agreed to the arrangement, but later they regretted [this decision].
(Interview Salem Ould Laghdaf, h. art.a¯ni, 24.10.1995)
State authorities recognise both sides’ claims as being of equal value, i.e.
equally recent, and only manifested by definitive signs of land-use such as the
building of small earthen dams or large dams. Their attempts to define
boundaries try to respect both sides’ interests by granting both sides land,
and thus separating both communities. The authority of these decisions,
however, is low. Compromises once found are called into question again
soon after, not only in word, but by constructing, or else destroying new
dams.
   With regard to their opponents from the Ta¯ga¯t., the L^aweysya¯t su¯da¯n
locate the causes for these ongoing troubles with the bı¯z. a¯n. The Ta¯ga¯t. su¯da¯n,
who effectively operate the aggressions, are considered to be only their
willing executors. Indeed there is nothing like a solidarity among these su¯da¯n
living in the same place, but only concurrence articulated in terms of defence
152and expansion of tribal territories. On this issue, only the bı¯z. a¯n, holding as
they do the monopoly of written accounts of the past (cf. Ould al-Barra/
Ould Cheikh 1996: 168; Brhane 1997a: 111), are able to develop those
arguments capable of increasing the weight of today’s claims. As the
L^aweysya¯t su¯da¯n in this respect can expect little support from their bı¯z. a¯n
patrons, unwilling but also unable to support the su¯da¯n (cf. p. 220f.), they have
to rely on their own forces: first of all they rely on the application of the state
laws, legitimising their acts of vivification. Additionally they produce an
ideology adding historical depth to their presence at Téjal, and try to contract
new alliances with bı¯z. a¯n notables, who although alien to their tribe, might be
153able to support their ambitions.
   Processes of segregation between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n of one tribe also occur
within the boundaries of the shared tribal territory. In Labde, and earlier in
Wassa^a, su¯da¯n of the Tarkoz settled in independent villages close to their
fields. Of these cases the one of Labde, constituted by su¯da¯n from Achram, is
most recent and is revealing of a number of particular problems such
attempts at reducing su¯da¯n dependence on bı¯z. a¯n and increasing internal
group cohesion have to face.
   In the early 1990s a number of su¯da¯n took the initiative of increasing their
distance from the bı¯z. a¯n in Achram by building houses in Labde. As with the
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other settlements in the plain of the Aftout, the main problem of establishing
a permanent settlement here was to ensure permanent and reliable access to
water – a task that, because the groundwater is located at 40 metres depth in
stony ground, could only be carried out with assistance from the local
development project. Initial difficulties in obtaining this service are attributed
by the su¯da¯n to influences of Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb bı¯z. a¯n eager to prevent them
154from getting a well of their own. However, this was by far not the only
difficulty to be overcome. All su¯da¯n wishing to benefit later from the well, or
to build houses in Labde, were supposed to contribute either financially or
155by work to the construction of the well – but by no means all did so.
Neither did many su¯da¯n move from Achram, where they already had houses
and access to many facilities, to Labde. Conflict arose between those su¯da¯n
who had moved to Labde and paid for the well and su¯da¯n who had not, when
the latter started to install themselves in Labde, and consequently also made
permanent use of the well. The quarrel was finally settled by granting
everybody access to the water. This decision, however, reflects more the need
to attract further settlers and hence the su¯da¯n activists’ vulnerability to
pressure than it underscores group-solidarity among su¯da¯n. With regard to
the next project, the establishment of a school in Labde, the result therefore is
likely to be the same despite the su¯da¯n leaders’ announcement that this time
the benefit of the new investment will be restricted to those who participated
156in the construction of the schooling facilities.
Does the Past Persist?
   Land tenure in the region of Achram-Diouk, on which the focus of the
present analysis has been, is not representative of land tenure in Mauritania.
Land tenure, though submitted to the same legal traditions in all of the
country, takes different shapes in different settings. Partly this differentiation
reflects different modes of land-use in different systems of production, such
as the predominance of flood recession agriculture and rainfed farming in the
Senegal valley, date palm cultivation and gardening in the oases versus the
predominance of various forms of pastoralism and agro-pastoralism in the
rest of Mauritania. However, as could be established from documents on the
early colonial period, i.e. the first decades of this century, the actual patterns
of land tenure responded not only to ecological conditions but to political
and social change too. Although there was no pressing economic need for
land in the first decades of this century (unlike the one that developed as a
consequence of the breakdown of the pastoral economy in the early 1970s),
the bı¯z. a¯n elites renegotiated their rights over land in this period. Two major
parties were involved in this scramble for land: the formerly politically
dominant h. assa¯n, and the economically dominant zwa¯ya. They struggled for
the transfer of their opposing concepts of control over land into one single
system of land tenure. The status quo of both inner bı¯z. a¯n and inter-tribal
hierarchies thus achieved became cemented by its transfer into the nucleus of
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a new legal framework, provided by the colonial authorities, and based on
collective and private ownership.
   This reconfiguration of land tenure encompassed all of the bı¯z. a¯n-domin-
ated territory, and allowed that the prevailing distribution of power and
powerlessness was largely maintained (cf. Bonte 1987b; Villasante-de Beau-
vais 1991, Ould al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996). The only thing that seems to
have differed is the time at which this process became effective in the various
regions. The order of implementation, from the south-west to the north and
the east, however, is strongly reminiscent of the course of colonial expansion.
   None of these changes in land tenure was a fundamental challenge to the
legal framework prevalent in precolonial times, which was largely based on
local legal tradition (^urf), with occasional references to the šarı¯^a. Rather it
brought about a rigidification and a growing uniformity of the formerly
highly diverse land tenure patterns (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985b). Nevertheless,
most authors so far have attributed little practical significance to the intro-
duction of new legal patterns of land tenure under colonial rule and in
independent Mauritania (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1991) or have regarded it
as being limited to the few locations of modern intensive agriculture (cf.
Leservoisier 1994a).
   The present analysis both confirms and questions these statements. The
structures of the past seem strong whenever the focus is placed on the tribal
fragmentation of land. It is indeed the “tribe” that continues to pervade the
territorial organisation of Mauritania. Land in most parts of Mauritania is not
the object of market transactions following the liberal paradigm of free trade,
157the application of which would mean moving beyond the tribal framework.
However, it is this very observation that needs critical attention. Witnessing
also the dramatic social turmoil of the few last decades, the question has to be
raised whether the tribe can properly be equated with the perpetuation of the
past, or with regard to the focus of this analysis, with traditional patterns of
land tenure.
   Both the historical and contemporary lines of analysis presented here argue
for a perception of the tribe as a dynamic social entity, able not only to adapt
to new economic and political circumstances, but to exploit these and model
them to suit its own interests. Both h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya tribes developed a new,
and this time uniform, model of “tribal territory”, putting aside former
concepts of a political hegemony over territory, and of an appropriation
limited to sites and locations. This new mode of tribal territoriality first
began to take shape as a consequence of colonial rule. Later these first
rudiments proved to have been the basis for a real boost, triggered off by the
158economic and social crisis resulting from the drought cycle. Tribal units in
this context condensed into territorial units. Tribes, fractions and factions
developed their own sites and areas, their boundaries became ever more
clearly circumscribed in what was a true scramble for land.
   Local political elites not only disseminate apologetics, whenever they refuse
to speak of tribes, and instead prefer speaking of “collectivities”; the many
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villages in the rural world today already have created new tribo-territorial
units, and thus have added a new, localised element to the tribal framework.
Factionalism, which once could easily articulate itself in the shape of spatial
segregation, and on the occasion of sedentarisation by the emergence of
numerous homogeneous villages and quarters, now operates within much
more limited areas, and on a limited number of scarce resources. Sheer need
raises pressure for cooperation on a communal level. Here the tribe comes
back in. The individual collectivities are far too small to persist in an
environment depending more or less continuously on external resources.
Both practical solidarity and political organisation are needed to improve
individual and collective welfare. On this field, which needs as much the
purveyance of goods and services as it permits to control these resources,
both old and new tribal elites are able to regain the scene. They fill the gap
left by the nation-state’s disengagement from the local arena, a process which
is largely due to conditions formulated by the successive structural adjust-
ment programmes (SAP) and reinforced by the process of globalisation (cf.
Ould Mey 1996).
   This persistence, or else resurgence of “tradition” paradoxically even
benefits those who continue to experience social discrimination, notably the su¯-
da¯n. The tribal grip on land allows for the concentration of land only among
members of the tribe. Unlike strangers, the elites profiting from this constel-
lation are bound to a tribal morality. They are obliged to maintain their
prestige, they have to help the needy, and they are not able to increase their
own benefit without contributing at least a little to the welfare of their tribe
and collectivity. Maintaining the tribal control of land thus for a great many
means securing relations of exchange for both the su¯da¯n and the bı¯z. a¯n, and
barring the road to an infiltration by market relations void of this social
impetus.
   These beneficial effects profit only those whose tribes control a satisfactory
amount of land. However, this is by far not true for all tribes. Wherever the
tribal framework, for whatever reasons, is unable to provide and secure
desperately needed resources, it becomes weakened and loses authority
vis-à-vis other elites or institutions of the state (e.g. the case of the
L^aweysya¯t; cf. p. 220f., 242f.). It is the future of such underprivileged groups,
deliberately placing themselves at the margins of their past affiliation, that
will be decisive of a move towards a stronger segregation of the rural world,
or the maintenance of strong territorial and political units. Either powerful
tribes will be able to integrate new groups and territories, as well as to
maintain the status quo, or distinct groups will become able to live a life of
their own by appropriating land at the margins, and thus adding new facets to
the social and territorial topography.
   Both options, however, are constrained by the limited resources of land still
available. Powerful tribes, like e.g. the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, are no longer able
to assign some of the best cultivable land to strangers they want to support
(cf. the case of the dam at Mounhal, p. 218), but at best can offer small pieces
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of land worthless in productive terms (cf. the case of the Idebussa¯t., p. 239-
241). On the other hand, su¯da¯n struggles for land lead them in some cases to
rely more on their own power than wait for assistance from bı¯z. a¯n overlords
(cf. the case of the L^aweysya¯t su¯da¯n; p. 241-243). Su¯da¯n struggling for
increased autonomy may also form the nuclei of a further fragmentation of
tribal land, as the case of a number of su¯da¯n of the Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb, who
built their own village on the periphery of their tribe’s territory at Labde
shows (cf. p. 243f.). While these trends open up different outcomes for the
nature of territorial organisation, they have a common outcome too: focusing
on the few still existing interstitial zones left over by the web of tribal
territories, they are part of the elimination of these remainders of past, more
flexible land tenure arrangements.
Land Tenure, Gender and Relations of Domination
The discrimination against the subordinate strata resulting from bı¯z. a¯n land
tenure has been clearly shown by numerous authors (cf. Bonte 1987b; Les-
ervoisier 1994a,b; Ould al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996; Villasante-de Beauvais
1992), and is confirmed by this study as well. Some local conflicts arising
from the deprivation of su¯da¯n of access to land have gained significance on a
national level (e.g. the famous case of the dam at Magta’lahjar; cf. Bonte
1987b: 211ff.; Brhane 1997a: 255ff.; Mercer 1982: 55-62). These experiences in
the domain of land tenure were only some of the many discriminations
against su¯da¯n, the latter had to suffer from. One result of these was that a
national, political organisation fighting for the rights of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, the
movement El Hor, began a campaign of public action in 1978.
   Today, many su¯da¯n continue to cultivate land that was once vivified by
their ancestors, but they do not own this land. Instead, as a consequence of
the slave estate of the su¯da¯n forefathers these sites have become the property
of bı¯z. a¯n, who thus continue to profit from the labour their forefathers
exacted from their slaves. Bitterness about this status quo, which continues to
remind the present generation of their past, is expressed by many su¯da¯n, and
becomes diverted into a very special reconstruction of the past: the su¯da¯n,
now considering themselves free and able to appropriate land by vivification,
like to subsume the past to the present, and obstinately declare themselves to
be the only owners of this land with any moral integrity.
Zemmal, that was for the Legwa¯t.it., the su¯da¯n, and . . . [pause] We made
that together, and when the work was over, the masters [^arabi] sent the
su¯da¯n away. Now it [the dam] is for the bı¯z. a¯n, but it was all [people] that
had made it together. This was at the time of my father, but it all remained
with the bı¯z. a¯n. They said it was their dam. . . . In 1983 it was finished at
Zemmal. In this year we started work here, to get a dam for the su¯da¯n,
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where the su¯da¯n have full access to the land. Before we always had to ask
the bı¯z. a¯n to get land rented at Zemmal. And this while it was our fathers
who had built that dam! In these times the su¯da¯n only worked for their
masters. (Interview Ahmed Ould Aimar, h. art.a¯ni, 29.3.1995)
Meanwhile these lands nevertheless continue to be cultivated by su¯da¯n under
conditions reminiscent of sharecropping. These arrangements, already re-
ferred to several times in the preceding chapters, reflect many of the changes
that have occurred in the relations of domination. Slaves in former times had
no right to a fixed share of their harvest. Nevertheless the practice of dividing
the harvest into two equal halves, symbolising a master’s and a slave’s share,
seems to have been common even in these cases, but for different reasons.
Masters, as freemen, had the obligation to pay the zaka¯t to the poor and
needy. Obviously devious bı¯z. a¯n who wanted to save themselves from paying
the full amount of zaka¯t divided the harvest of their slaves, and found that
159they had to pay only for their share, thus considerably minimising the zaka¯t.
Once this obligation was settled, all of the harvest was put together again,
and there was no more discussion of a slave’s share, apart from giving him a
daily ration of food (Interview Boueibou Ould Amar, h. art.a¯ni, 1.11.1995).
   All arrangements by which slaves entered fixed arrangements with their
masters, defining what kind of services either side had to supply, meant a
considerable amelioration of the slave’s condition (cf. Meillassoux 1986: 118).
This the French colonisers anticipated. They made the expansion of more
formalised sharecropping arrangements one of their most powerful weapons
in their fight against slavery. This strategy had the decisive advantage that it
was both able to demonstrate the administration’s abolitionist efforts, and to
maintain exchanges between the different social strata, and thus to change
little on the ground (cf. Leservoisier 1994a: 89ff.). However, as could be
shown by the preceding analysis, not all relations between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n
developing on the basis of granting access to land stick to the pattern of
sharecropping. Some h. assa¯n big men, who individually own a lot of land,
refuse to rent out land for a fixed share of the harvest, and instead prefer
more flexible arrangements. These unspoken rules provide them with a wide
range of “voluntary” services from the su¯da¯n beneficiaries, and thus secure
the bı¯z. a¯n overlords a large number of clients.
   Despite these persisting structures benefiting the continuation of discrimi-
natory practices of the bı¯z. a¯n vis-à-vis the su¯da¯n, the present analysis takes an
optimistic attitude. The rural world in Mauritania is changing rapidly. This
change has brought about a major shift in the perception of space, and has led
to a redefinition of tribal territories. Within this process the actions of su¯da¯n
have gained weight. Filling up the interstices of cultivable land left unoccu-
pied by the bı¯z. a¯n, the su¯da¯n take part in shaping the tribal territories and
contribute to its representation. In several cases where new dams were
constructed, they participated in the construction and became legal owners of
land. To the extent that land has become the last, and almost sole local
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resource after the decline of pastoralism, its symbolic value for the represen-
tation of the tribe and as a means of identification has risen. Here again, the su¯-
da¯n enter a new role. While some bı¯z. a¯n converted to cultivation, and now
are able to make a large share of their living out of it, many others have failed
to do so. Pressing debts, as well as other reasons today drive them to sell their
most valuable land: the plots behind large dams. Buyers are wealthy bı¯z. a¯n
living in the big cities, and rural su¯da¯n. These latter invest cash earned in the
160course of wage labour migration in land for cultivation. This new redistri-
bution of parts of the tribes’ heartland allows su¯da¯n to move from the
periphery to the centre. Together with the new, money-made bı¯z. a¯n patrons,
they protect the tribal land from intrusion by outsiders. Maintaining the
occupation of the rural hinterland, which becomes more and more emptied of
161bı¯z. a¯n, the su¯da¯n reveal themselves to be among the most dedicated
protectors of tribal inheritance, i.e. the most fervent protagonists of tradition
(Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 27.7.1995; Abdel Wedoud Ould Mamma,
162h. assa¯n, 31.10.1995; cf. note 122, this chapter).
   Land tenure in bı¯z. a¯n society so far has been presented in gender-neutral
terms, raising doubts whether either men and women, or only men are being
considered. Women, although in many cases cultivating like, and among the
men, and quite often even replacing them in the fields, do not show up as
actors in those discourses focusing on access to land and conflict over land.
The same applies to the academic discourse on land tenure in bı¯z. a¯n society.
While the women’s contribution to agricultural production – a most visible
and obvious fact – is at least documented, little is known about land tenure
163and women in this context. Although in theory women can legally own
land, and in quite a number of cases do so, it is by the majority the men who
164exercise the effective control of land, by managing access to it. This is most
obvious when men migrate and their families’ fields are watched not by their
wives, but their brothers (Interview Ahmed Ould Breik h. art.a¯ni, 11.4.1995; cf.
note 62, chapter 6).
   Already in precolonial bı¯z. a¯n society, women were often excluded from
receiving their share of inheritance by practices of pre-inheritance or the
constitution of land and animals as h. ubs (i.e. as an indivisible entity, the
use-rights of which remained with the family but could not be alienated; cf.
De Chassey 1977: 79; Féral 1983: 185). Nevertheless women owned animals,
and continue to do so until now (cf. Tauzin 1984a: 88; see also the narrative
165of Valha, p. 69-72). In certain conditions, however, women preferred
ownership of less bulky goods such as jewellery. A dowry of this kind was
easily taken along and unlikely to be reclaimed by the husband in the case of
divorce (cf. Cleaveland 1995: 41).
   Women are also actively engaged in their own businesses, and their signifi-
cant number, as well as the economic success they have and the respect they
gain (cf. Simard 1996), prove that there is no restriction to female property
and female economic activity in bı¯z. a¯n society. This is confirmed by the
success new economic activities of women have in the rural area. There
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numbers of shops, as well as the production of various items, are run by, and
to the direct profit of, the women involved. The limited importance of
women in the traditional scheme of land tenure therefore results from the
very specifics that make land in this context a commodity very distinct from
others, and different too from the plots in the new irrigation schemes. These
have become the object of speculation by members of the urban business
class and local elites, and were often registered in the name of women, who
were merely a front (cf. Blanchard de la Brosse 1986: 201).
   A wide range of arrangements is practised in order to lend and share land
among owners and non-owners, among friends, or within the family. These
many means of access to land not only allow for the maintenance of relations
of dependency, but also meet the need to continually adapt access to land to
changing requirements. Families grow or shrink, strangers come and go, and
thus a surplus of land arises in one place, while the need for land increases in
another one. Too much individualisation of property rights, further downs-
caling the amounts of land controlled by single parties, would be detrimental
to this flexibility. On the other hand, the joint and flexible management of
land, as is the case for family patrimonies, often discriminates against women.
   Providing a family with basic food, which today has come to mean grain, is
one of the men’s most important obligations. In order to be able to do so, the
men also have to have access to the necessary land. Women, while main-
taining their option on a part of their own families’ land, when marrying do
not longer need to make use of it. They may claim it under certain condi-
166tions, but in general giving their husband land would mean to relieve him
unnecessarily of one of his most urgent obligations, and this to the disadvan-
tage of the women’s own families, who are in need of land as well. Main-
taining the women’s land under the control of their own families is also
crucial, as these are the place women go to and seek support in case of
divorce. Within the families the distinction between women’s and men’s
property is preserved. It is the mothers who are entrusted with the manage-
ment of the women’s property in land (Mahmoude Mint Ali, h. ara¯t.ı¯n,
26.7.1995), and in the case of inheritance have to defend it from becoming
usurped by the women’s brothers. This threat of dispossession is extended to
the women’s new families. Women’s claims upon the estate of husbands who
die early quite regularly face strong opposition from the men’s family,
167unwilling to give up a part of its patrimony.
   Increasing pressure on land is likely to further weaken women’s access to
land whenever these are unable to take part in the competition for ownership
rights. This tendency is reinforced by recent changes in land tenure practices.
Among the su¯da¯n the ownership rights in land, which the majority could
168only establish recently, are highly individualised. As in most cases the dams
are built by the men, their women, although contributing to the work in one
way or another as well, frequently fail to obtain direct rights pertaining to
this land. By strengthening the principle of individual appropriation and
ownership with regard to new or enhanced dams, the dam-building activities
Bı¯z. a¯n Land Tenure and Social Stratification        251
 
 
of the regional development project at Achram have contributed to solidify-
ing this patriarchal tendency inherent to bı¯z. a¯n land tenure. Although women
in some cases took part in decision-making concerning dams, the issue,
though professed to apply to households quite “naturally” became above all a
men’s affair. Project activities designed to promote the women’s situation did
not change this state of affairs. Such activities had the objective of developing
new opportunities of generating income for women and of providing basic
169education, but were not aimed at interfering directly with gender relations
or their manifestation in such domains as land tenure. The delegation of
major elements of decision making and administration of the land behind
new dams to the local communities thus had ambiguous results. While it was
possible to achieve local participation, and in the case of collectively owned
dams su¯da¯n were no longer discriminated against as regards access to land,
the men were favoured with regard to the appropriation of the newly devel-
170oped land. This present increase in male control of land, however, is likely
to change in the course of subsequent generations. Once the land becomes
part of family patrimonies, a space for the redefinition of the gendered
imbalance in individual land ownership will open up. This will be the locale
where su¯da¯n women, who proved to be sensitive towards the issue, will be
able to articulate their interests.
 
 
 
The Difference in Identity        253
 
 
 
Chapter 8
The Difference in Identity
The Politics of H. ara¯t. ı¯n Identity
Relations of dependency, as they are experienced by the great majority of su¯-
da¯n, are far from uniform. It is a major characteristic of master-slave relations
that they produce a great diversity of conditions which the dependents
experience despite being bound to a uniform estate. Men and women still
bound to the slave estate, manumitted slaves, slaves who gained autonomy by
leaving their masters, and h. ara¯t.ı¯n who claim never to have been bound to the
slave estate, today live in a great variety of conditions. Many continue to
experience social and economic discrimination, while a few have been able to
1make a career, and have become part of the bı¯z. a¯n establishment.
   Major aspects of this diversity in relations of dependency have been
analysed so far. Biographical narratives illuminated how highly diverse, and
often ambiguous personal experiences have shaped particular perceptions of
bı¯z. a¯n society, and of discrimination against su¯da¯n. Gender in this context
was revealed to be a major category providing an analytical tool to unravel
different configurations of hierarchy and dependency. Further fields which
manifest the varying levels of dependency and social differentiation, includ-
ing not only the su¯da¯n, but numbers of dependent bı¯z. a¯n too, are the division
of labour and land tenure. In the following, the focus will shift from the
analysis of distinct configurations of dependency to practices of group
formation and identification within these contexts. In a number of case
studies it will be explored how su¯da¯n describe themselves, and how they are
perceived by bı¯z. a¯n. As the fundamental question for the su¯da¯n is to over-
come their stigma as social outsiders, or at least as descendants of these, their
discourses and practices are marked by a fundamental ambivalence. Either
they stress difference between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n, and portray the su¯da¯n as
distinct from the bı¯z. a¯n, or they depict su¯da¯n as members of bı¯z. a¯n society,
and thus as being bı¯z. a¯n. In a second step, the analysis will show that these
two discourses, despite their inherent antagonism, are used more or less
simultaneously by su¯da¯n to locate themselves in the social space. Depending
on the context of these discursive practices of identification, su¯da¯n either
stress difference from, or identity with the bı¯z. a¯n. The su¯da¯n, or h. ara¯t.ı¯n
identity (as the political activists prefer to call it) is thus revealed to be deeply
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contradictory and fragmented. This contradictory consciousness, however,
appears less to be so once “being bı¯z. a¯n” or “being h. ara¯t.ı¯n” are understood as
relational categories. Rather than describing an essence of being, these
identifications describe what one considers oneself to be vis-à-vis specific
environments.
H. ara¯t. ı¯n Identity in the National Context
   While the social topography of the dependent strata of bı¯z. a¯n society, as has
been revealed by the lines of analysis already elaborated, varies considerably,
and proves to be at the basis of a number of internal cleavages, the relevance
of these characteristics is downplayed by discourses which depict the su¯da¯n
as one homogeneous group. Their shared experience of uniform social and
economic deprivation is considered to create a distinct group solidarity of the
oppressed, which will result in a common, then h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity. These
discourses, elaborating an ideal of su¯da¯n being, are developed by political
activists of this stratum. Their aim is to raise awareness of being discrimin-
ated against among the su¯da¯n, and thus to incite them to struggle for their
emancipation, the end of bı¯z. a¯n predominance, and equal rights. Most
prominent in this respect remained for a long time the organisation El Hor
(Arabic: al-h. urr; free, noble, freeborn; Wehr 1976: 165), which was founded
2in 1974, and since 1978 has fought in public for the cause of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n,
who are no longer to feel inferior, but become self-confident (cf. El Hor
1993; Mercer 1982: 31ff.).
El Hor also wants to be, from now on, characteristic of a completely
new society, where the word Haratine will be worn with pride, like a
standard, and will no longer be synonymous with a bad destiny, to be
endured with fatalism. (El Hor 1993: 3; author’s translation)
The unity of the su¯da¯n is to be achieved under the banner of a common
identity. The term h. ara¯t.ı¯n therefore has to be freed from its pejorative
connotations, and instead become the symbol of the new society in which all
su¯da¯n have united, and thus put an end to their social discrimination. This
project for a new h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity clearly aims to transform the meanings the
term “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” has been ascribed by the dominant bı¯z. a¯n discourse (i.e. either
“freed slave”, or euphemistically “all slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n”). In this attempt the
counter-hegemonic discourses, however, differ considerably. The majority
tries to build a bridge from the past into the future by reference to ethnic
categories. Either the origin of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n among the black African ethnic
groups is stressed, and the h. ara¯t.ı¯n thus are considered to have to go back to
3their roots, instead of remaining within bı¯z. a¯n society, or, as is the more
influential, and current position of El Hor, they form a distinct social entity,
4which is neither entirely bı¯z. a¯n nor black African, but an original synthesis
of both cultures. Lastly, a third major stance portrays the h. ara¯t.ı¯n as com-
pletely assimilated into bı¯z. a¯n society. They are considered to be Arab by
birth, and hence Arab forever. Being a part of the bı¯z. a¯n universe the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
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therefore will have to struggle for equal rights within this framework, and
have nothing to gain but only to lose beyond it (Interview with Boïdel Ould
Homeïd in: Mauritanie Nouvelles, nº 28, 18.8.1992: 6f.; Brhane 1997a: 242ff.).
   Despite their contradictions over the issue of what the h. ara¯t.ı¯n are to
become, all political leaders claiming to speak in the name of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
assume that these constitute a distinct group that can be discerned by a set of
distinguishing marks. According to El Hor this is manifest in several do-
mains:
The specificity of the haratin thus is manifested by their Hassaniya
language which they speak despite their black colour, by their folklore,
their games and leisure. (El Hor 1993: 11; author’s translation)
The cultural boundary thus drawn makes references to both history and
cultural practices. The h. ara¯t.ı¯n are part of the bı¯z. a¯n because they speak their
language, the h. assa¯niyya Arab dialect. However, they are different from the
bı¯z. a¯n because they speak h. assa¯niyya only as a consequence of their assimila-
tion to bı¯z. a¯n society, which is a consequence of their slave past. This differ-
ent historical background is also responsible for a set of cultural practices the
h. ara¯t.ı¯n do not share with the bı¯z. a¯n, namely folklore, games and leisure.
   While this discourse on h. ara¯t.ı¯n cultural features and practices conforms
well to the exigencies Fredrik Barth (1969a: 14f) revealed to be crucial to the
maintenance of ethnic boundaries, it remains an open question what signifi-
cance the project of a distinct h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity has gained. Meskerem Brhane
(1997a) most recently evaluated this question in the urban context of Nouak-
chott, and ascertained that there still is no uniform h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity. Instead
h. ara¯t.ı¯n, i.e. su¯da¯n, tend by appealing to distinct strategies (e.g. patri-centred
versus matri-centred narratives) to locate themselves either within, or outside
bı¯z. a¯n society. This distinction, described as one of “radical h. ara¯t.ı¯n” versus
“conservative h. ara¯t.ı¯n”, structures social life in major domains. H. ara¯t.ı¯n of the
two distinct categories not only have different perceptions of their history,
5but also practise different patterns of social relations. They furthermore
oppose each other on the political scene, where the h. ara¯t.ı¯n have become a
6significant factor in the process of democratisation.
When the City Goes Rural
   The rural hinterland, of which the region of Achram-Diouk is to be
considered a part, has for a long time been closely related to the urban
centres. Bı¯z. a¯n society, despite the recent sedentarisation, is still highly
mobile. Seasonal migration between towns and the rural areas seems in many
respects to have replaced former nomadic mobility (cf. Ruf 1995) and now
means that the city and its ideas go rural. Major news in bı¯z. a¯n society
continue to spread quickly, despite various limitations experienced, especially
7by the most heavily deprived populations, in this respect. The counter-
hegemonic discourses, created by h. ara¯t.ı¯n elites located above all in the
modern sector, thus did not remain limited to the cities, but spread over the
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whole country, and became effective even in the most remote locations. Or,
as a h. assa¯n told me with regard to the su¯da¯n of his tribe living in a nearby
adabay:
It was in 1976 that the su¯da¯n in . . . stopped paying half of their harvest.
. . . This was because a part of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n went to Nouakchott. Every time
they went there, they heard that there are no more slaves, and that all
people are equal. Once back at the adabay, these su¯da¯n started to tell all
the others about what they had heard. So each time one su¯da¯ni came back
from Nouakchott, he started to change [the attitude of] all the other su¯da¯n
there in the adabay. (Interview h. assa¯n, 9.12.1995)
Discourse and action, however, do not have to correspond as neatly as the
h. assa¯n interviewee assumes to have been the case here. In many cases, the
configurations of dependency on land grants outlined in the previous chapter
leave the su¯da¯n little room to publicly reject bı¯z. a¯n exploitation. Instead
resistance in this context is a more subtle process, and counter-hegemonic
discourses remain restricted to the backstage or what James C. Scott (1990)
8has called “hidden transcripts”. A selective reading and narration of the
past is a powerful means to interpret the present and make sense of it.
H. ara¯t.ı¯n, seeking to develop a historic background for their we-group, develop
accounts of the past that make it possible to portray today’s h. ara¯t.ı¯n as free
and independent. As this in the context of bı¯z. a¯n society implies developing
genealogical accounts, the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, who lack precisely this means of reference
to the past, face a major challenge to their project (cf. Brhane 1997a: 101ff.).
Besides developing a number of mythical accounts aimed at compensating for
the lack of a genealogical representation of their past, su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n make
use of many more discursive and other practices to articulate social group
identity in the context of bı¯z. a¯n society. These different modes for the
production of meaning, based on expressions of identity and difference, will
be analysed in the context of several case studies from the region of Ach-
ram-Diouk.
Marking Difference, Marking Identity
The Two Brothers: Narrating Difference by Allegories
   Invoking the past to speak about the present is but one option to fuel
processes of identity formation. Narratives of the past in this respect,
especially whenever they portray mythical accounts, intersect with allegories.
Smadar Lavie (1990: 29ff.) has recently shown the central place which
allegories, and with them an allegorical mode of reasoning, have in the
process of identity formation among Mzeini Bedouins. This argument,
developed for the context of how the Mzeini remember and construct their
history and identity in a context of oppression threatening in some respects
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their very existence, namely Israeli and Egyptian rule, applies well to the case
of the su¯da¯n. Both projects of identity formation have to make sense of a
present that still is marked by the social and economic turmoil of the recent
past. While among the Mzeina, the distant past and the genealogical charts of
their tribes and ancestors seem to have lost much of their significance for the
production of Bedouin sense in a rapidly changing social and economic
environment, the su¯da¯n are perturbed by their lack of such a past. The
following narrative highlights the su¯da¯n concern with this deprivation. It was
presented to me by a Badeyn (cf. his narrative p. 57-59) in a moment of deep
relaxation one late afternoon, after we had had lunch together, he had milked
his goats, and all glasses of tea had been drunk:
There once was a bı¯z. a¯n from this region [northern Aftout/southern
Tagant]. He probably was a h. assa¯n. He had stolen his wife from the
Bambara at the river Senegal. Here, on the Tagant, he made this woman
his slave, in order to make her his wife and marry her. With this woman,
the man had several children.
   One day two of his sons went on a journey. One of them was of light
complexion, because he had had a bı¯z. a¯n mother, the other one was of
dark complexion, because he descended from that stolen Bambara wo-
9man. The two brothers went together to the town of Atar in the Adrar.
Having arrived there, the light-skinned brother went onto the market and
sold his dark-skinned brother as a slave. The latter did not know anything
about the ambitions of his brother. The light-skinned brother arranged
with the new slave master that he should tell the dark-skinned brother
only fifteen days later about his fate. Until then, they should only act as if
the light-skinned brother had gone on a short journey, and would come
back soon.
   Meanwhile the treacherous brother left with all of the money he got
from selling his brother into slavery, and travelled back home to the
Tagant. There the mother of the dark-skinned brother saw him return
with his pockets full of money, but without her son. She immediately
realised what had happened, and started to scold the returned brother in
the presence of all people. Therefore the father came to know about the
story, and indeed there were many indicators speaking against the light-
skinned brother. The latter denied all reproaches against him, and insisted
on his version of the events, stating that his dark-skinned brother had
remained of his own will in the Adrar. Finally, the family decided to take
all of the money they found on the light-skinned brother, and to travel to
the Adrar to investigate what had become of the missing brother.
   The latter in the meantime had been informed about his fate, and he had
accepted it with the words “If I am to be your slave, then I will follow
you”.
   The people from the Tagant reached the Adrar about two months after
the sale had been concluded. After a while they managed to meet people
telling them that they had bought a slave about two or three months ago.
However, there was no trace to be found of the dark-skinned son. This
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was because he had become a shepherd, and remained all time out in the
bush with the animals. When he returned to the camp one evening, his
voice was immediately recognised by members of his family present there.
The latter then took all the money they had found with the light-skinned
brother, and gave it back to the master of their brother, thus buying the
latter’s freedom, and revealing the treachery of the light-skinned brother.
Badeyn, 23.12.1995)
At first sight this narrative seems to tell little more than that su¯da¯n always
have to beware of the bı¯z. a¯n proneness to treachery towards them, and of
their unconditional brutality. In this respect the narrative accounts for little
more than a radical h. ara¯t.ı¯n perspective, according to which the dividing line
between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n is the one separating slave raiders from the ensla-
ved, ore else evil from good. However, this is not all the story is about. It is
indeed about a bı¯z. a¯n (by his patrilineal descent) who becomes subject to
treatment as a slave due to his maternal descent from a slave woman, from
whom he inherited his dark complexion. But being a full-fledged bı¯z. a¯n, he
cannot become the victim of anybody, only of his brother. The latter in turn
does not need to feel much concern for his half-brother, because they both
have different mothers. While on the one hand, the story is about the dis-
crimination against a bı¯z. a¯n because of his slave mother, it is also about the
segmentational structure of conflict within bı¯z. a¯n patrilineages. These do not
necessarily arise along the division of su¯da¯n versus bı¯z. a¯n uterine ties, but
such a configuration is likely to create unity of a distinct kind among bı¯z. a¯n
kin of different, but nevertheless bı¯z. a¯n affiliation on the mother’s side (cf. the
case of the ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, p. 105-108). The
attitude of the dark-skinned brother once he becomes aware of his new
condition is also striking. Rather than oppose it, he submits to his new
master, and becomes a shepherd living with the animals in the bush – a kind
of life that is a synonym for backwardness and ignorance in bı¯z. a¯n society. It
takes his mother, for whom the status of her son is the materialisation of her
own rise from slave estate to the legal wife of a bı¯z. a¯n, to make the bı¯z. a¯n
aware of what had happened, and to free the enslaved son. Indeed falsely
enslaved freemen, which is a recurring pattern in narratives concerning
slavery, never directly oppose their estate. Their freeborn status is revealed
10only on occasions in which the circumstances account for their true identity.
Overt resistance in this constellation for a true bı¯z. a¯n would mean violating
the rules of good conduct, and subverting the foundations of social hierarchy
by giving a bad example to all other slaves.
   The tale of the bı¯z. a¯n who sold his brother thus serves not only h. ara¯t.ı¯n
propaganda, but also opens up insights into the complex universe of bı¯z. a¯n
social relations. In the last instance it is the slave woman who gains most. She,
due to her slave origin, was able to transgress exactly those boundaries of
social conduct the bı¯z. a¯n were unable to cross. It was she alone who could
blame the treacherous bı¯z. a¯n for having sold his brother, and make her
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husband look for his lost son. Finally she not only gets her son back, but also
strengthens her own, and her children’s position in the competition with
those members of the family who are of bı¯z. a¯n descent on their mother’s side.
   Taken as an allegory, the story of the two brothers says much more than
11simply that the su¯da¯n have to fear bı¯z. a¯n dishonesty and racism. Like the
narrative of Badeyn (cf. p. 57-59), it is instructive on the most sensitive issue
of whether su¯da¯n can become bı¯z. a¯n or not. The matter remains full of
ambivalence for the su¯da¯n. Indeed, there are avenues to becoming bı¯z. a¯n in
legal status, but these are strained by the jealousy and overt disregard such an
enhancement of individual status may produce among fully-fledged bı¯z. a¯n.
The sticky nature of a su¯da¯n past is also revealed by a number of narratives in
which bı¯z. a¯n who had a su¯da¯n mother continued to express their sympathy
with the su¯da¯n. A slave woman from the Ahel Swayd Ah. med (Interview
21.12.1995), who lives at Daber on the Tagant, told me how in 1969, at the
height of the drought, she was given jewellery by two bı¯z. a¯n women of the
emiral family. These women, who lived in Néma, where the slave woman had
travelled to in order to get some medical treatment, were so generous because
they themselves had a former slave mother, she said. Surely the most promi-
nent defender of the slaves was the former ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane
Ould Bakkar, whose mother too had been a slave. Within the h. ella, the
emiral camp, he was recounted to have had not only absolute authority, but
to have owned everything. Su¯da¯n who had lived at the h. ella were unanimous
about one point: although they had served different bı¯z. a¯n, they had had only
one master, the ^amı¯r of Tagant. Several su¯da¯n also reported that Abderrah-
mane was aware of the risks his protégés would encounter once he was gone.
On his deathbed he therefore ordered his sons not to change the slaves’
condition, and to prevent the bı¯z. a¯n of the h. ella from appropriating slaves
who had so far been under his authority individually. While these narratives
surely are part of the glorification of the old ^amı¯r, who was also reported to
12have shown little mercy as a slave master himself, the enthusiasm of many su¯-
da¯n for this personality does not stop at this point. It is marked even among
13su¯da¯n of tribes other than the emiral Ahel Swayd Ah. med.
Slave Behaviour as Expression of Good and Evil
   Masters and slaves were meant to occupy distinct spheres in bı¯z. a¯n society.
This not only concerned the locality and the distinct character of their
respective work (cf. chapter five), but also opposing behavioural patterns.
According to the bı¯z. a¯n perspective, slaves represented the uncivilised world,
and in this respect naturally were the counter-model to the bı¯z. a¯n, who were
14supposed to represent refinement and civilisation. The mastery of distinct
behavioural patterns and emotion management are a basic means for the
production of difference, and the legitimation for the assumption of a
superior position in society (cf. Elias 1988, 1990). Out of everyday practices
of discriminating social strata develop links between behaviour, psychologi-
cal disposition and the legitimation of social inequality in society. These
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provide a fruitful domain for the analysis of master-slave relationships, as a
recurrent pattern in the ideology of slavery shows; the portrayal of the slave
as a minor, who needs to be socially and physically controlled by the masters.
Rather than take up the discussion whether this conception of slavery makes
of it an “institution of marginality” (Miers/Kopytoff 1977a), or excludes
slaves from society (Meillassoux 1986), the focus here will be on how differ-
ence and hierarchy were to be produced among slaves and masters in bı¯z. a¯n
15society.
   The most striking insights into the opposing characteristics of bı¯z. a¯n and
slave personalities as conceived by the master’s ideology, are given by
narratives about slaves. First of all slave women are portrayed as unable to act
of their own will, and even worse, they are not even able to develop one they
could stick to. The tale of Vneyde (cf. Tauzin 1993: 71ff.), a slave woman
who always swore not to do what her masters asked her, but nevertheless
always ended up doing it, illuminates well this concept of a slave mentality –
one that, albeit with less vigour, is applied to slave men too (cf. Tauzin 1989b:
86). According to the masters, the slave needs somebody to direct and guide
his actions. together they constitute a complementary couple: while the
master is unable to bear the hardship of manual labour, he is able to direct the
actions of the slave, who himself is able to bear any hardships, but cannot
plan his actions. While in the domain of work this distinction helped more to
legitimise and maintain a division of labour between working slaves and
16non-working masters, than take the shape of a symbiosis like the one
between the blind and the lame, the non-sociability of the slaves which it
expresses is fundamental to the bı¯z. a¯n ideology of slavery. The perception of
the slave as the incarnation of the uncivilised being, or else the antithesis of
one’s own identity, has so deeply impregnated bı¯z. a¯n thought that major
17elements of this distinction are still present today. Discussing the issue of
illegitimate children with a young h. assa¯n woman of about eighteen, attending
high school, and quite ambitious to emancipate herself by becoming a
professional, and getting a qualified job of her own, in this respect was quite a
revelation. Having an illegitimate child, it emerged, had completely different
meanings to bı¯z. a¯n and slave women. While for the former, it meant losing
their power, and running the risk of not getting a husband corresponding to
their status, illegitimate children were described as being no real nuisance to
slave women, because these were ignorant of the laws and values, and thus
had no consciousness of the social implications of their action (Interview h. as-
18sa¯n woman, 10.9.1995). How much this view is shaped by the masters’
ideology and negates the sentiments of slave women can be discerned from
the accounts of slave women who were forced to have their children illegiti-
mately, because their masters denied them the right to enter into marriages
19(cf. the narrative of M’Barke p. 68; Interview h
˘
a¯dem, 6.2.1996). Discrimi-
nation against slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n does not stop at this point. Until today, they
are excluded from leading prayers in the mosques, and from performing
20other duties symbolising moral integrity and leadership.
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   Most su¯da¯n nowadays are well aware of these prejudices about su¯da¯n, i.e.
about the slaves’ and slave descendants’ modes of behaviour and their sup-
posed ignorance. In former times, slave women used to perform a particular
kind of folk song, while pounding millet. Accompanying the monotonous
rhythm of millet-pounding, they sang songs mocking their masters, and
especially the mistresses present at their work. The contents of these songs
showed little concern about vulgarity, as the following verses show:
Vous êtes témoins, je ne la blâme pas
La chienne, je ne la blâme pas
Son honneur est son cou
Elle qui attache serré le sac de mil
Elle qui cache tout sous la natte
Et qui boit à même l’outre
(Tauzin 1989b: 79)
Not to react when publicly called a bitch, a designation which is one of the
strongest offences not only in Arab-Islamic culture, required a good deal of
emotion management on the part of the bı¯z. a¯n mistress. In turn, however, bı¯-
z. a¯n success in this domain meant taking part in the reciprocal manifestation of
distinct cultures, of distinct involvement in civilisation, and hence in repro-
ducing social hierarchy. Today, at least in the region of Achram-Diouk, the
21su¯da¯n women have become reluctant on the topic of these songs. Not only
has this genre almost died out because there hardly are any more women
pounding millet in mortars, and the number of slave women who still do this
work in front of their mistresses is even smaller still, but also the su¯da¯n
women no longer want to perform this kind of song. Raising the topic made
22everybody feel quite uncomfortable and embarrassed.
   A different case is that of another genre of distinct su¯da¯n culture, a variety
of spirituals and blues performed by su¯da¯n women, and called meddh. These
songs, which praise the prophet Muhammad, are perceived as laudable by the
bı¯z. a¯n. Even some rigorous interpreters of Ma¯liki Islam, like the local qa¯d. i at
Achram, Ahmed Ould Aly (Interview 24.12.1995), have the highest esteem
for this music because unlike the genres performed by the igga¯wen, it consists
only of vocals, and is not accompanied by instruments, which this branch of
Islam considers to be evil. While in the region of Achram-Diouk there were
not many performances of meddh, it was ardently performed by the su¯da¯n
23living at Daber on the Tagant. Well-arranged sessions, and a veritable art of
meddh, has developed in those quarters of Nouakchott inhabited primarily
by su¯da¯n. Meddh has also become integrated into the political agitation for
the h. ara¯t.ı¯n cause. New texts, inspired by the little red book of Mao, and
calling for h. ara¯t.ı¯n freedom, were superimposed on the classical songs (cf.
Brhane 1997a: 245, 255; Houssein Ould Mahand in: Al-Bayane nº 64,
2410.3.1993: 9; Interview h. art.a¯ni, 23.12.1995).
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Putting an End to Ignorance
   The most serious and far-reaching means for the maintenance of bı¯z. a¯n
hegemony within society was their knowledge of Islam. As long as the bı¯z. a¯n
were able to mediate all of the spiritual world, and su¯da¯n at best were
attributed the ability to manage the forces of evil, it went without saying that
no su¯da¯n could become the equal of a bı¯z. a¯n. On the contrary, this very
relationship, and the central role the practice and knowledge of Islam has in bı¯-
z. a¯n society for the generation of symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu 1987: 205ff.),
soon made the acquisition of religious knowledge one of the most important
fields on which su¯da¯n struggled for social recognition. The issue of this
struggle was the more sensitive, as the boundary between the learned and the
ignorant never did coincide with the one separating bı¯z. a¯n from su¯da¯n.
25Decrying the ignorance of pastoralists or cultivators living out in the bush
is as much a means to ascertain inner-bı¯z. a¯n social hierarchy between those
who are aware of religious obligations and those who are not, as it is a means
to discriminate against su¯da¯n. In view of these inner-bı¯z. a¯n contradictions,
gaining some knowledge of Islam meant for the su¯da¯n – and here one has to
26speak of su¯da¯n men to be precise – becoming at least equal if not superior
to a number of bı¯z. a¯n. From the 1950s on, a small number of su¯da¯n boys was
able to receive Qur\a¯nic instruction, and thus to learn not only about religion
27but to read and write Arabic too. The implications this had for su¯da¯n boys,
such as e.g. the seasonal interruption of learning by agricultural work, and
the need for the su¯da¯n family to be already quite well off, is revealed by the
narrative of Brahim (cf. p. 59-66). In a later interview I asked Brahim about
his motivation to engage so deeply in Islamic scholarship:
Author: Why did you attend the Qur\a¯nic school [mah. az. ra], and what did
this have to do with the matter of ignorance?
Brahim: I wanted to know my religion, and the mah. az. ra was the way to
learn something about it, to get out of the unawareness. Today one can
also go to school, this is now just as good. In those times, the issue was to
know what the prayer means, to stop resigning oneself with the situation.
Today one needs also to know reading and writing whenever one wants a
good job, otherwise one will always remain a day labourer. In those days
many people were ignorant, but only the su¯da¯n were so profoundly
ignorant that they did not even know how to get out of this situation.
And the bı¯z. a¯n always kept all the knowledge for themselves. I never saw a
bı¯z. a¯n ask a su¯da¯n whether he would like to learn something. The su¯da¯n
were ignorant, the bı¯z. a¯n knew this very well, this was the way the bı¯z. a¯n
then were able to oppress the su¯da¯n.
The arguments of Brahim show that opposing bı¯z. a¯n dominance does not
mean rejecting bı¯z. a¯n culture on the whole. The critique raised by Brahim
goes right to the heart of the matter, the exploitation of religious knowledge
for the maintenance of oppression. Rather than spread religious learning, as
they should have done to obey the precepts of Islam among all, and especially
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among their slaves, many bı¯z. a¯n did withhold their knowledge, and did not
28even let the su¯da¯n know the meaning of the prayers. Brahim, however, does
not stop at this point, but criticises the su¯da¯n themselves too. He blames
them for another kind of ignorance, the one of not knowing how to escape
from ignorance. This implies that Brahim perceives the su¯da¯n of these times
as not conscious of their social and religious deprivation, and thus as comply-
ing with the masters’ prejudice against slaves as beings unaware of Islam and
29disregarding its precepts. This discourse is central to the definition of
distinct h. ara¯t.ı¯n characteristics, and hence to the definition of central elements
marking “h. ara¯t.ı¯n-ness”. Brahim not only draws a boundary between the
oppressive bı¯z. a¯n and the deprived su¯da¯n, but also one distinguishing igno-
rant, and hence passive and submissive su¯da¯n, from su¯da¯n (or rather h. ara¯t.ı¯n)
dedicated to knowledge, and aware of the modern world. Ignorance in this
discourse becomes differentiated into simple ignorance caused by the circum-
stances, and for which the individual concerned therefore cannot be blamed,
and “ignorance of ignorance”, meaning the lack of interest in becoming
aware, and feeling responsible for one’s own fate. While this distinction
remains contradictory, for either one is ignorant, and thus does not know
about his state of deprivation, or not, it is central to the outline of a new
mode of life, based on the will to base life on one’s own means, i.e. on manual
labour. The h. ara¯t.ı¯n consider themselves, and to some extent are considered
by a number of bı¯z. a¯n too, to be the protagonists of this attitude towards the
difficulties of life in rural and urban Mauritania,.
   Their knowledge of work and gaining a living from it enables the su¯da¯n to
avoid the modern side of ignorance, but it does not save them from the risk
of betraying ignorance in the second domain, i.e. vis-à-vis religious practices.
While still slaves, the su¯da¯n did not pay the zaka¯t, the tithe for the poor
prescribed by Islam as one of the five duties of every Muslim. This was
because anyone bound to the slave estate did not exist socially, and thus did
not have to comply with social obligations. While the masters should have
taken over this responsibility, many seem to have neglected this aspect of
30their obligations. Beginning to pay the zaka¯t thus had two distinct mea-
nings for slaves. This moment not only demarcated a definite change in the
master-slave relation, but also the coming into existence of the slave as a
social being performing the same ritual practices as the bı¯z. a¯n. While paying
zaka¯t thus on the one hand becomes an instrument of demonstrating inde-
31pendence, many su¯da¯n still feel uncomfortable about it. They fear not
knowing well enough the prescriptions defining how to pay zaka¯t (cf. note
159, chapter 7), and thus failing to achieve the full range of symbolic capital
this practice is able to produce. Disseminating knowledge about the zaka¯t
therefore is subject to many discussions among su¯da¯n, especially at the time
of harvest. Su¯da¯n intellectuals then are expected to disseminate their knowl-
edge, and to enable their fellow su¯da¯n to face the bı¯z. a¯n challenge in this
domain.
   Practising the payment of zaka¯t is also significant of how the su¯da¯n redefine
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their relationship with the bı¯z. a¯n in a second way. The major question arising
when su¯da¯n start paying the zaka¯t is who will benefit from these donations.
It is commonly argued that manumitted slaves become the clients of their
former masters (cf. Ould Mohamed 1988: 50; Villasante-de Beauvais 1991:
188). As a consequence of the manumission both enter a relation of wala¯\
(patronage). The former master thus becomes walı¯, or mawla, the “legal
guardian” (Schacht 1964: 120) of his former slave, who thus becomes mawla
too, while the term then means freedman or client (cf. Pipes 1979; Ibn Abî
Zayd al-Qayrawânî 1983: 229). The relations with former masters, today, are
more likely to be defined by su¯da¯n in categories of nearness, or by disavo-
wing them altogether, than in the legal categories of wala¯\, which indeed most
su¯da¯n (like most bı¯z. a¯n) ignore. A major manifestation of the current state of
these relations is the issue whether the former master is looked upon as being
close enough to become the beneficiary of the su¯da¯n zaka¯t payments. In this
domain su¯da¯n attitudes are controversial. Some continue to maintain good
relations with their former (or, sometimes, formally at least, current) masters
and therefore pay them zaka¯t, while others insist on giving zaka¯t only to the
needy in their vicinity, be they bı¯z. a¯n or su¯da¯n; and again other su¯da¯n stress
that they have put an end to all relations with bı¯z. a¯n and now give all their zaka¯t
and further charity only to su¯da¯n. These practices in fact do not contradict
the logic of wala¯\, for this relation is described as analogous to relations
created by filiation, and does not create distinct rights, especially not in
respect to property. The manumitted slave therefore is not obliged to
contribute materially to the patrimony of his former master, as a fatwa¯ of
Šayh
˘
Sidyya al-Kabı¯r (1775-1868), one of the most illustrious religious and
political figures in precolonial bı¯z. a¯n society, who lived in the Gebla conclu-
des (cf. Ould Mohamed 1988: 64f.).
   The controversy among su¯da¯n concerning the modes of paying zaka¯t
outlined here throws a light on some unorthodox interpretations of this tithe,
which according to the Qur\a¯n is supposed to benefit only the poor. In the
history of bı¯z. a¯n society, the term zaka¯t, however, has frequently been
employed synonymously with other terms designating taxes like e.g. gabez. ,
and thus came to be used as a means of expressing and defining relations of
32patronage. Therefore the issue of whether the beneficiaries of zaka¯t pay-
ments necessarily have to be poor remained disputed among zwa¯ya scholars,
despite the clear-cut definition provided by the Qur\a¯n (cf. Oßwald 1993:
33104f, 115f., 120f.). This intermingling of zaka¯t payments with tributes and
levies means that until today receiving benefits declared to be zaka¯t involves
no stigma for the beneficiary, but rather expresses some close social relation.
This also allows for different interpretations of the nature of such payments,
which thus can be declared zaka¯t by the su¯da¯n, while former masters perceive
them as remnants of tributes, or may perceive themselves as trustees who
34manage the zaka¯t payment for a third party. The question whether one
favours a close affiliate as beneficiary of one’s zaka¯t payment, or a poor
person regardless of his affiliation, thus proves to be the expression of a
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deliberate choice how to shape the relationships with former masters and
one’s own community. Each position can be legitimised, as long as the
opposition between a rigid interpretation of Islam and one stressing local
35customs is maintained.
The H. ara¯t. ı¯n “Work Ethic”
   Many aspects of the specifics of su¯da¯n work have already been outlined
previously (cf. chapter five). This analysis has revealed the importance of
hard, manual work in the life of most slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n. Today this former
marker of low social status has been turned into symbol of a new, a modern
attitude. Su¯da¯n demonstrate pride when telling that they live from the work
of their own hands, and portray these as being the sole source of wealth:
BOS: The most wealthy were the h. ara¯t.ı¯n.
Author: Oh really, how did they become so?
BOS: The h. ara¯t.ı¯n, they are the most wealthy because they worked with
their own hands, and they had the fields. The h. assa¯n and the ma^alimı¯n,
they all depended on them [the h. ara¯t.ı¯n]. They [the h. ara¯t.ı¯n] were the ones
who made everything.
(Interview Brahim Ould Soueilim, h. art.a¯ni, 26.8.1995)
This new h. ara¯t.ı¯n self-confidence, which has become reinforced by the
revaluation of manual labour in recent times, makes for a h. ara¯t.ı¯n “work
ethic” (a terminology introduced by Ann McDougall 1988: 379), which can
36be summed up in the motto that there is nothing a h. art.a¯ni cannot do. The su¯-
da¯n claim to have always done all the work, and especially the hardest. They
also continue to cultivate, and to work in the new industries, i.e. to (re-)
37produce the material world of bı¯z. a¯n society today. This image of the su¯da¯n
as universal worker is maintained by the bı¯z. a¯n too. There is no problem in
turning a su¯da¯n cultivator who never in his life tended animals in only a few
weeks into a highly skilled herdsman (Interview Mohammed Sid’Ahmed,
zwa¯ya, 12.9.1995). Likewise the bı¯z. a¯n now engage in a discourse valuing
manual labour and personal responsibility for one’s fate. According to
Abderrahmane Ould Ahmed (zwa¯ya, Interview 13.7.1995), there are now
several kinds of ignorance. One who knows the Qur\a¯n of course cannot be
accused of ignorance, but today, anyone who does not know how to make a
living by his own efforts and who has no occupation must be regarded as
ignorant. A similar view is held by Hamoud Ould Amar (Interview
4.11.1995), a member of the h. assa¯n nobility who classifies the h. ara¯t.ı¯n (i.e. su¯da¯n)
into two opposite groups: either they now are among the best, thus some-
times even superior to all other strata in contemporary bı¯z. a¯n society, or they
continue to behave like the slaves by doing stupid things, stealing and the
like.
   The esteem manual labour and production is now gaining among all strata
of bı¯z. a¯n society is a result of the changing social and economic conditions.
Indeed manual labour has become an ever more important means for gaining
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a living not only for the su¯da¯n but for many bı¯z. a¯n too. More significant,
however, is the influence of a discourse of modernity and development that is
specific to countries which like Mauritania rate among the least developed of
the world. Development cooperation now for years has been calling for the
participation and the commitment of the “target groups”, and no longer
wants to strengthen passivity and dependency. The people of Achram-
Diouk, and most Mauritanians as well, are well aware of these expectations of
the international community of donors, be they state-funded or NGOs.
While the discourse on the new value system, based on the appreciation of
manual work, thus proves to be a response to Mauritania’s dependency on
foreign aid, it cannot be reduced to this single factor. For the su¯da¯n struggl-
ing for their emancipation, the ideology of self-reliance, reinforced by the
spread of capitalist culture and wage labour in the course of globalisation, has
opened up a field in which they are able to take part in the production of
common sense and hence to compete successfully for social power with the
38bı¯z. a¯n (cf. Bourdieu 1985: 729).
The Politics of Cattle and Goats
   Religious learning and manual labour are by far not the only fields on
which su¯da¯n pursue their quest for symbolic capital, which despite all
achievements, continues to take place on unequal grounds. Further arenas for
the production of difference between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n were the possession
and control of land (which was the subject of the previous chapter), and the
ownership of livestock. This latter issue, for the bı¯z. a¯n originally were a
pastoral nomadic people, is burdened with especially strong emotions, and
39was laden with high symbolic value. The possession of livestock, and
within this domain especially of large animals like cattle, camels and horses,
40symbolised (and continues to do so) welfare and status. Consequently
livestock in former times was concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of
the bı¯z. a¯n masters. Slaves, within the restrictions resulting from their estate, in
a few cases managed to acquire a number of small ruminants. They either
profited from compensation for special services given in livestock by their
masters, or acquired sheep and goats themselves This latter option had
become frequent when the wage labour sector expanded after the Second
World War, and bı¯z. a¯n began more often to pay in animals for the herding
and watering of their livestock. Finally the reinvestment of surplus millet was
another means for su¯da¯n to accumulate animals (cf. p. 184-190).
   Cattle, which were much more expensive, and a symbol of affluence and
status, were only rarely in the hands of slaves. Youba (Interview 22.1.1996), a
man of slave origin of the h. assa¯n tribe of the Awla¯d ^Alı¯ Ntu¯nva, told me
how his father’s family got two cows during the big drought in 1969. While
Youba’s father watered the cattle of his master, a bı¯z. a¯n herder approached
with his herd of cattle. While resting, one of the stranger’s cows calved.
However, the cow and its calf were too weak to pursue the southward
emergency migration of their herd. The bı¯z. a¯n therefore gave them both as a
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gift to Youba’s father, the slave who had helped him water his animals. After
the animals’ return to the camp in the evening, the master of Youba’s father
became aware that his slave had been given a cow and a calf by a stranger just
passing by. He then went to Youba’s father and immediately gave him
another cow as present.
   The case throws a light on the very specific tie between a bı¯z. a¯n master and
a slave who had played already an important role in the management and
maintenance of the animal wealth of the former. Youba’s father was already
well off among the slaves. His family owned quite a number of small rumi-
nants. Getting a cow, however, meant considerably more than just getting an
animal of great value (about the value of ten to fifteen goats prior to the
drought). Getting a cow meant possession of an animal species which until
then had been reserved for the master, and thus entering a sphere of symbolic
representation that until then had been occupied solely by the bı¯z. a¯n master.
Confronted with this accidental turmoil in the well-established hierarchy of
symbolic goods, the master had to react and to save his face, i.e. he had to
manifest his leadership in the management of symbolic goods. This he
41achieved by one of the most powerful means to acquire prestige, generosity.
The bı¯z. a¯n master’s giving his slave a cow was a significant gesture not only
on material grounds, because it acknowledged the slave’s right to possess an
animal species otherwise owned by bı¯z. a¯n only. Nevertheless, as all post-hoc
actions, this one too was hardly able to disguise its hasty and reactive
character. Today the slave’s son, who at the time of this event was about six
years old, still vividly remembers this moment, and makes of it a central
argument underscoring his family’s very close contact with the bı¯z. a¯n and
hence their likeness with the bı¯z. a¯n. However, becoming more like the bı¯z. a¯n
within this social matrix remained an individual experience, which above all
became employed by Youba to underline his family’s difference from the
other su¯da¯n in their camp.
Cultivation and Pastoralism, Adabay and Vrı¯g
   Like the drought, several other external factors fuelled social change in
bı¯z. a¯n society, and opened up spaces for a redefinition of what it meant to be su¯-
da¯n or bı¯z. a¯n. While in the preceding case, the su¯da¯n family had managed to
become a little bit more like their bı¯z. a¯n master’s, changing circumstances also
made it possible to stress difference between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n. The intensifi-
cation of agricultural production throughout this century, which had been
promoted by the colonial administration ever since it was established,
enhanced differentiation between agriculturists and pastoralists in Maurita-
nia. This meant increasing the gap between su¯da¯n as cultivators, and bı¯z. a¯n,
together with numbers of their su¯da¯n dependents, as nomadic or transhu-
mant pastoralists. Although this dichotomy had been well established in
bı¯z. a¯n society for centuries, the new structuration of space resulting from the
pacification of the Mauritanian territory, and the policy of free access to
pasture, increased these differences, which are significant to the representa-
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tion of the self. Those su¯da¯n living in the adwaba continued to live on their
own in almost sedentary camps for large parts of the year, while the bı¯z. a¯n
were engaged in herding and trading often far away from these spots. Part of
this process was an increased professional specialisation of many su¯da¯n. They
now were able to develop a larger knowledge of millet cultivation than in the
times when this activity occurred only occasionally, and the rhythm of work
was dominated by the needs of the livestock. In the south of the Tagant, as
well as large parts of the Assaba, the expansion of date palm cultivation
opened up another path to a non-pastoral, professional specialisation (cf.
42p. 161-165, 205f., 221-226). Though the segregation of work among bı¯z. a¯n
and su¯da¯n is less marked in the case of date palm cultivation than it is for
millet cultivation, and a number of bı¯z. a¯n had effectively been engaged in
caring for date palms established in a few locations on the Tagant for centu-
ries, there is no doubt that the most profound knowledge of date palm
cultivation lay with the long-established su¯da¯n populations of the oasis. This
intensification of several branches of agricultural production soon after
colonisation affected lifestyles too. The adwaba, as the camps of the su¯da¯n
cultivators are called, and which are by and large immobile, became a means
of reference by which su¯da¯n were able to distinguish themselves from the bı¯z. a¯n
supposed to live in nomadic camps (h. assa¯niyya: pl. varga¯n; sing. vrı¯g), and
vice versa. The antagonistic relationship between the two concepts is revealed
43by the following interview statements:
On the plateau there are people who are not fixed, i.e. who have construc-
ted until now, but they have fixed points where to they always go. . . .
Adabay, that is a camp of su¯da¯n, there are only su¯da¯n, if it is composed of
bı¯z. a¯n, you will say vrı¯g [camp]. (Interview Mohamed A. Ould Khalil,
zwa¯ya, 1.8.98)
Adabay means a camp that remains in one place for a long time, it may
stay at one place for even more than one year. . . . We went to the adabay
when we started to cultivate. Once the harvest was over, the adabay
dissipated, and everybody went back to the [bı¯z. a¯n] camps. (Interview
Boye Mint Abeide, h. art.a¯niyya, 10.1.1996)
There always was a camp of su¯da¯n, an adabay. It is in Wa¯d Lg˙nem. There
were su¯da¯n who always stayed with us [in the bı¯z. a¯n camp], and others
who were in their own camp. Adabay, that means an as.l [origin] of the
su¯da¯n. When someone searches for a su¯da¯n, then he will go there, because it
is their as.l [origin]. We visited these su¯da¯n every year at the time of the
harvest. (Interview Yahya Ould Heime, h. assa¯n, 9.12.1995)
The accounts illuminate that there is nothing like a clear-cut opposition
between the vrı¯g, the nomadic camp, and the adabay, the location of su¯da¯n
residence. Rather the contradictory characteristics are developed within the
limitations resulting from the background of mobile agro-pastoral produc-
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tion in an arid environment, shared by bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n alike. Mobility and
immobility could formerly be, and still can be found among both su¯da¯n and
bı¯z. a¯n. Many bı¯z. a¯n nomadic pastoralists had quite restricted areas of nomadi-
sation, which they left rarely. Others were transhumant, and consequently
engaged in major seasonal migrations only twice a year, while they remained
44rather immobile throughout the rest of the year. The adwaba in the
northern Aftout and on the Tagant in turn greatly resembled the bı¯z. a¯n
45camps, because they were (and many still are today) composed of tents.
Like the bı¯z. a¯n, the su¯da¯n shifted their camp to new locations when the
pollution of the current emplacement had become too annoying. An interre-
lation between these distinct spheres was assured by many of the su¯da¯n living
not permanently in the adabay, but in the vrı¯g as well for a part of the year.
Finally not all su¯da¯n moved into an adabay, for many remained in the vrı¯g,
and close to the bı¯z. a¯n throughout the year, and did not even have knowledge
of cultivation, but only of livestock rearing.
   These analogies reveal how patterns of life in the adwaba and varga¯n
resemble each other despite the opposition suggested by the concepts of
adabay and vrı¯g. Rather than represent and describe the situation on the
ground, or the degree of mobility, these concepts aim to construct difference
between what are considered to be su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n characteristics. At the
heart of this opposition lies the reference to distinct professional specialisa-
tion, agriculture and pastoralism respectively, to which are attributed differ-
ent modes of residential mobility, conceptions of space, and patterns of
46life-style. The location of the su¯da¯n camps depends largely on the location
of their agricultural work, i.e. the major cultivating areas. These plots in fact
are much less subject to annual variation than are the pastures frequented by
the bı¯z. a¯n pastoralists. As the su¯da¯n become identified with the location of
their fields, they acquire the attribute of immobility and sedentarity, while
the bı¯z. a¯n, associated with the needs of their animals, are perceived as mobile.
This opposition is stressed by another assumption: although many adwaba in
the centre and the north of Mauritania did not persist throughout the year,
but were constituted only during the cultivation cycle, they nevertheless are
attributed characteristics of permanency. This results in the qualification of
adabay as an origin of su¯da¯n proposed by interviewee Yahya Ould Heime
(cf. above). The adwaba, by their association with ideally annually exploited
agricultural sites, become transcendent localities, independent of their actual
state, which may vary considerably. Though effectively shifting their location
every year (admittedly within a restricted range), and often composed of
tents, the adwaba are not perceived as having this characteristic, but as fixed
locations. They are referred to by the name of the agricultural site its inhabi-
tants exploit (e.g. Daber, Wa¯d Lg˙nem, etc.). Like in the processes of trans-lo-
cal identity formation observed among Lebanese migrants in West Africa (cf.
Peleikis 1998), the adabay thus during a part of the year are maintained as
virtual entities, serving as a means of identification to both bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n,
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and thus providing the su¯da¯n with what they so fundamentally lack: a
location of origin.
   While the means by which su¯da¯n camps are identified is the association
with a locality, the reference to bı¯z. a¯n camps is derived from genealogy and
kinship, and refers to persons. A camp thus is referred to by the name of its
leading member as “vrı¯g ahel Sı¯di”. Whenever the reference is beyond the
level of personal acquaintance, the mode of identification shifts to a more
47general level, such as the fraction’s or the tribe’s name. This is the case
although, like the adwaba, many bı¯z. a¯n camps can be found almost every year
at the same series of places, e.g. wells, springs, pastures etc. The association of
bı¯z. a¯n communities with a genealogical reference common to camps does not
apply to permanent settlements like villages and cities. These, like the
48adwaba, become identified with a locality. Genealogical terms may be
added, whenever the reference to a place fails to be unanimous. This is the
case with the two separate neighbouring villages of Wassa^a. These are
distinguished by an appendix to the villages’ name marking the different
fractional affiliation of the su¯da¯n residents, who either belong to the Tarkoz
Awla¯d Tı¯kı¯, or the Tarkoz Awla¯d Sı¯d Ah. med. Similar cases can be found
among bı¯z. a¯n villages too, but there appendixes may also distinguish villages
or neighbourhoods inhabited by bı¯z. a¯n of only different factions of one and
49the same tribal group. These factions, revealing internal cleavages that may
lead into a more complete separation into two distinct branches or fractions,
most often differentiated by colour attributes such as the “whites”, the
50“green” and the “blacks”.
   As a key to these distinct modes of either personal or topographical
reference to inhabited localities, appears the need for a universal mark of
reference, the logic of which is revealed to be deeply impregnated in pasto-
ral-nomadic concepts of space (cf. Schlee 1992). Neither the adabay, with its
constantly changing inhabitants of low status, many of whom were not even
considered members of bı¯z. a¯n society by the bı¯z. a¯n nobility, nor the village or
town, which in many respects shares the negative characteristics of the
adabay, complies with the need to provide for common, personalised referen-
51ces. This is clearly different in the case of the camp, where the fluctuation
of members does not affect the mark of reference, the name of one family
which constitutes the core of the camp. This personalisation of references to
localities is experiencing a resurgence in the modern, urban context. While in
Nouakchott and other Mauritanian towns street names have hardly ever been
used (not even for postal services), streets are distinguished by reference to
well-known people living there (cf. Taine-Cheikh 1998: 81, note 11).
Su¯da¯n Hard Talk
   Beyond sociostructural changes opening new arenas for the production of
cultural difference, a number of past experiences, alive and well in the
collective memory of the su¯da¯n, account for their difference from the bı¯z. a¯n.
These elements of a collective history of the su¯da¯n concern the experience of
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major deprivations resulting from their social status, and of major advances
which brought to an end many of the most direct and coercive relations of
dependency.
   One recurrent element in su¯da¯n descriptions of the past is the h. assa¯niyya
term ist^amma¯r, which literally means “the times in which the people could
be obliged”. Thus being widely applicable to different conditions of oppres-
sion, the term has come to mean different things to su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n. For the
latter ist^amma¯r is a synonym for colonisation, which is remembered as
having been the time when the French had all rights, and everybody, bı¯z. a¯n
52and su¯da¯n alike, had to obey their orders. The su¯da¯n are well aware of this
meaning of ist^amma¯r, but subvert it into one blaming the internal colonisa-
tion of bı¯z. a¯n society, i.e. the systematic oppression of the su¯da¯n by the bı¯z. a¯n.
Ist^amma¯r then comes to describe the state of mind of somebody “who takes
the others like the goats, like a part of a herd which he wants to sell” (Daouda
Ould Haroun, ^abd, 19.12.1995), or “people who come and start to compel
other people to give them animals or other things” (Interview Moisse Ould
Emine, ^abd, 10.2.1996), or simply to force people to work for somebody
else. On a second level of meaning, ist^amma¯r stands for a past where there
53were no rights for the su¯da¯n – the time of slavery :
GOEK: It was Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar [the old ^amı¯r of Tagant] who
decided what he wanted to leave with the cultivator. First it was him to
make his choice and take [of the harvest] what he wanted, then it was the
turn of the cultivator and his family. . . .
Author: Was there a distinct name for this system of giving a share of the
harvest?
GOEK: No, this had no proper name, this was not gabez. , and not ^ašu¯r,
this simply implied work, ist^amma¯r. This was the time of ist^amma¯r, then
the ^amı¯r decided [all alone]. If he wanted, he could take all of the harvest.
(Interview Ghalim Ould El Kheir, ^abd, 17.12.1995)
Speaking of ist^amma¯r as of a past that no longer exists, raises the question
when this time of oppression ended. Over this issue there is no consensus
among the su¯da¯n. For most of them, the times of ist^amma¯r are long-gone, or
at least never concerned them personally, but only other su¯da¯n. However,
this past is not so far away, for it can be remembered that Abderrahmane
Ould Bakkar, who was just reported above to have been practising ist^amma¯r
died only in 1982. Consequently, the proposition of a h. ara¯t.ı¯n that ist^amma¯r
ended with the independence of Mauritania raised much laughter among
several other su¯da¯n present at the interview. In an ensuing lively debate
everybody came to agree that it was most probable that ist^amma¯r had ended
with the rule of colonel Ould Haidalla in the early 1980s, a time by which
also numerous other traditional levies were no longer recognised (Interview
12.12.1995).
   The reign of colonel Ould Haidalla has in two more respects become a
synonym for su¯da¯n emancipation. Under his rule slavery in Mauritania was
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th abolished for the third time during the 20 century on 5 July 1980, and it
was Ould Haidalla himself who made this decision public another time on
the 5 July 1983 in a speech broadcast by the national radio (cf. Mauritanie
Nouvelles 1997, nº 235: 8). Among su¯da¯n the colonel became famous for
saying on this occasion that all Mauritanians were equal, that black and white
were the same, that everybody should look on each other as brothers, and ask
for permission before taking others’ belongings. A message that put simply
meant that the time had come to stop treating others as slaves and inferiors
(Interview M’Barke Mint Lebeid, h. art.a¯niyya, 22.10.1995; cf. the narrative of
54Brahim, p. 59-66). Besides initiating the land reform and strengthening the
su¯da¯n’s rights to land ownership, Ould Haidalla also created the “Structures
d’Éducation des Masses” (SEM). This nation-wide institution was designed
to replace the old unitary party, which had been dissolved by the military
regime after the coup against president Mokhtar Ould Daddah in 1978. The
very peculiar thing about the SEM was that they were supposed to represent
all Mauritanians and structured according to a military model. Every ten
families were to elect a “chief of the ten” (or “cell”), ten of these chiefs were
to elect among themselves a “chief of the one hundred” (or “quarter”) and so
on up to regional and the national level, where four executive secretaries were
placed. These represented the different domains in which the SEM would
intervene for the promotion of the living conditions and the development of
modern attitudes: orientation, organisation, economy and culture, Islamic
55morality and social action (cf. Marchesin 1992: 186).
   These benefits of the era of colonel Ould Haidalla do not prevent Maurita-
nians from remembering it as the most severe period in the history of
independent Mauritania until today. Indeed the regime under Ould Haidalla
was famous for the introduction of the penal code of the šarı¯^a, and the
practice of executing punishments in public. This raised strong disapproval,
for all this meant a radical shift away from the traditions of Islamic jurispru-
dence prevailing in Mauritania, which constitute a major element of zwa¯ya
56identity (cf. Ould Cheikh 1991b; Oßwald 1993: 62ff.). The regime also
reinforced the secret services, and thus created fear of prosecution due to
false accusation and denunciation. In sum, the times of Ould Haidalla are
remembered as having been a time of conspiracy and unmeasured brutality
by the executive (Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. art.a¯ni, 30.1.1996).
   To this extent both su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n agree about the nature of Ould
Haidalla’s policies. A significant difference in their respective conclusions
arises over the issue whether the SEM had a democratic character. For bı¯z. a¯n,
it goes without saying that the SEM had nothing to do with democracy, for
this period only began with the first free communal elections, and the
establishment of multi-partyism under the rule of later president Ould Taya
from 1989 on (Ould Cheikh 1994b: 32ff.; Interview Mohamed A. Ould
57Khalil, zwa¯ya, 1.8.1995). Su¯da¯n on the contrary describe the introduction
of the SEM as the first arrival of democracy in Mauritania (Interview
M’Barke Mint Lebeid, h. art.a¯niyya, 22.10.1995; cf. the narrative of Zeyneb,
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p. 66). Indeed this rather rigidly structured institution was implemented in
many regions in a way that for the first time came to introduce the principle
of “one man, one vote”. Su¯da¯n thus had equal rights along with bı¯z. a¯n, and
were elected to represent their communities, for in communities with a large
majority of su¯da¯n, such as the adwaba, it was su¯da¯n who became the repre-
sentatives of the SEM. While on the regional and national level, the SEM still
remained marked by the tribal fragmentation of political power (cf. Marche-
sin 1992: 187f.), they nevertheless portrayed a different ideal, and sometimes
58even managed to curtail the influence of the traditional elites. This was
largely anticipated by the su¯da¯n, and made them sympathise with this
59project, while interest in the institution remained mitigated among the bı¯z. a¯n.
Being a Part or Being Apart?
The preceding accounts describe su¯da¯n first of all as different from the bı¯z. a¯n,
thus fitting in many respects into the image propagated by the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
activists, such as the leaders of El Hor, and the more recent political party
“Action pour le Changement” (AC), of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n as a distinct “ethnic”
group. The tendency of su¯da¯n to describe themselves as different from the bı¯-
z. a¯n is strongest in accounts portraying the past as a time of injustice and
oppression, marked by bı¯z. a¯n neglecting their commitment to Islamic
precepts, being treacherous and racist, and many other misdemeanours.
Consequently it could be expected that on the basis of these many experien-
ces of deprivation and disregard, the su¯da¯n would find it difficult to identify
themselves with the bı¯z. a¯n. Nevertheless, this is the case. In many of these
accounts the individual su¯da¯n’s claim to being part of the bı¯z. a¯n appears
included as a subtext in the radical discourse decrying bı¯z. a¯n oppression. This
profound ambivalence in most su¯da¯n discourses is created by several means.
First of all talking about bı¯z. a¯n oppression is portrayed as talking about the
past, i.e. relations of dependency which no longer exist in this configuration.
Whenever the context of the events thus described does not allow recourse to
this strategy, because most recent cases of what can be defined as ist^amma¯r
are concerned, a second strategy comes to the fore. The experience of
ist^amma¯r in any case is denied to have been a personal experience. It only
was, and maybe continues to be part of the experience of other su¯da¯n.
Suffering from ist^amma¯r in this perspective is an experience above all which
the su¯da¯n concerned have to be blamed for. Rather than being portrayed as
social structures allowing for the oppression of whole groups, the relations of
dependency resulting from the practice of slavery are delineated as individual
ties, in which the individual su¯da¯n has a large responsibility for whether he
lives under oppression or free like the bı¯z. a¯n. Ist^amma¯r from this point of
view becomes the result of ignorance, which both su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n do not
challenge (Interview Daouda Ould Haroun, ^abd, 19.12.1995).
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   While the major lines of this argumentation can already be derived from the
preceding strains of analysis, all focusing on different fields for the produc-
tion of difference and sameness, a few further case studies exploring su¯da¯n
attempts to locate themselves in the bı¯z. a¯n universe are needed to fully grasp
the present line of argumentation. A second step then will develop a synthesis
able to explain the frequent parallelism of marking difference (which is most
pronounced in the case of processes of segregation such as described above;
p. 267-270), su¯da¯n efforts to become like the bı¯z. a¯n through the appropriation
of symbolic goods (cf. p. 266f.), and the mastery of corresponding cultural
practices (cf. p. 259-265).
Significations of Black and White
   Asked about what constitutes the difference between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n,
terms which are literally translated into “blacks” and “whites” by the fran-
cophone inhabitants of Mauritania, interviewees from both groups in the
region of Achram-Diouk most often respond by saying that both are just the
same. As it is a paradox to refer to two different entities, i.e. the “blacks” and
the “whites”, only to claim their sameness, these statements are complement-
ed by the remark that the only difference is colour, but differences in colour
are of no significance. Indeed, phenotype is one of the least reliable criteria
for discerning bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n. While in the present all seem to have become
the same, differences among bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n are manifest once the focus
shifts to the past. Here perceptions of what marks difference between bı¯z. a¯n
and su¯da¯n start to follow a distinct logic, depending on the speaker’s affilia-
tion.
The su¯da¯n are like the bı¯z. a¯n, this is all the same, there is no separation
between the two, there is no reason to do so. In former times everything
was mixed. We were all together, made our tea together, ate together, slept
together under one tent, but everybody knew his status. (Interview Abdel
Wedoud Ould Mamma, h. assa¯n, 31.10.1995; author’s emphasis)
We visited them [the su¯da¯n] every year, at the time of harvest. Then every
[bı¯z. a¯n] family went there [to the adabay] to visit her family of su¯da¯n, who
gave them half of their harvest. And the bı¯z. a¯n too, helped him [the su¯da¯n],
with goats, clothing, tea. . . . Today this no longer exists, now everybody
does his own work. (Interview Yahya Ould Heime, h. assa¯n, 9.12.1995;
author’s emphasis)
Both bı¯z. a¯n narrators stress that the sameness they attribute to bı¯z. a¯n and
su¯da¯n resulted from their close interaction. Either they did everything together,
or at least they had a more or less mutual relationship, in which complemen-
tary agricultural and pastoral products were exchanged. The changes which
have occurred ever since seem to be minor, but nevertheless are made
responsible for a new kind of difference. In the first case the su¯da¯n may
continue to live quite close to the bı¯z. a¯n, but the basis on which the bı¯z. a¯n
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allowed them to be like themselves – the proper knowledge of one’s status,
and thus of difference – has crumbled away. The same forgetfulness has
struck the su¯da¯n of the second example. They no longer remember what
related them to the bı¯z. a¯n, and how they came to interact so closely with
them. While the accounts reveal that in effect the su¯da¯n became more like the
bı¯z. a¯n, i.e. more independent, they deny that this increased their “bı¯z. a¯n-ness”.
Although the old distinctions and the paternalistic framework are no longer
in place, the bı¯z. a¯n continue to portray the su¯da¯n as still being as much like
the bı¯z. a¯n as they ever had been. This demonstration of a half-hearted and
complacent generosity of bı¯z. a¯n towards their su¯da¯n brethren reveals that
describing themselves as a true part of the bı¯z. a¯n is a major challenge for the
su¯da¯n, and has to take place in a narrow framework.
   There is a wide range of discourses of su¯da¯n in the region of Achram-
Diouk on the previously stated likeness between them and the bı¯z. a¯n. Su¯da¯n
and bı¯z. a¯n are supposed to be alike because everybody knows his place in
society, because there is no difference between the two but the phenotype,
which has been created by Allah, because both cultivate, and finally because
all Muslims are alike, and therefore there is no difference between h. assa¯n,
zwa¯ya, and all other status groups in bı¯z. a¯n society. Some su¯da¯n, however,
when elucidating their point of view on my request, switched their discourse
on this occasion. Instead of describing further patterns of sameness, they
started to depict patterns of difference. The difference between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯
n, which before had been described as non-existent, then turned out to be
the difference between oppressors and oppressed (ist^amma¯r), between bı¯z. a¯n
feeling superior, and su¯da¯n feeling inferior, both united only in their igno-
rance.
   How is it possible to make sense of these contradictions? James C. Scott
(1990) suggests differentiating discourses of the oppressed into public and
hidden transcripts: those destined to reproduce the point of view of the
dominant people, and those speaking at face value, where both the thoughts
and the knowledge of the dominated about power relations resurge, and
account for resistance. Indeed many interviewees might have wondered what
interest lay behind a great many of the absurd questions they had to answer.
And despite my all-su¯da¯n research team, many su¯da¯n interviewees are likely
to have felt unsure what kind of discourse this nasra¯ni (the common term for
Christians in Mauritania, designating them as the people from Nazareth)
wanted to get. Therefore they shifted the emphasis of their accounts whenev-
er they had new assumptions about the state of mind of the researcher.
Tempting though this approach is, and admitting that it focuses on the
observation of discourses in different settings, it will be dismissed here.
Taking up the interpretative framework distinguishing public and hidden
discourses would lead into the dilemma of what interviewees were actually
displaying: their mastery of the dominant discourse or their “false conscious-
ness” (a term falsely ascribed to Karl Marx), or perhaps fitted neither
category. In line with the criticism of Susan Gal (1995: 409), according to
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which Scott “develops a notion of the natural (precultural, presemiotic)
interacting self that is at odds with recent understandings about the role of
linguistic ideologies and cultural conceptions in the production of self and
emotion”, the accounts will be seen as spontaneous utterances of a contradic-
tory consciousness, which were created by a very unusual and dynamic
60conversation between the researcher, his assistant and the interviewees.
This mode of interaction, to a large extent alien to the local context, by
raising different issues supposed to be interrelated, and thus actively shaping
associations between topics, created a distinct framework within which the
interviewees not only developed meaning, but also came to reflect on these
meanings, and portray different and contradictory understandings of their
social relations and practices.
   These expressions of contradictory consciousness, the portrayal of both
consent and resistance to dominant discourses, will be interpreted here from
a point of view located in the tradition of Marxist approaches to a theory of
consciousness (cf. Marx [1846] 1983b, especially p. 5-7 “Theses on Feuer-
bach”; Leontjew 1982), and concepts of hegemony building on the work of
Antonio Gramsci ([1929-35] 1971). Social supremacy in this perspective
manifests “itself in two forms: ‘domination’, which is realized through the
coercive organs of the state, and ‘intellectual and moral leadership’, which is
objectified in and exercised through the institutions of civil society, the
ensemble of educational, religious and associational institutions. This latter
form of supremacy constitutes hegemony.” (Femia 1975: 30) Precolonial
bı¯z. a¯n society (as well as in many respects colonial and postcolonial Mauritanian
society), fails to provide the multitude of institutionalised arenas of the
production of consent which are essential to the constitution of a civil
society, for which Gramsci developed his concept of hegemony (cf. Lewis
1992: 281). Nevertheless, besides coercion slave societies, and here especially
those practising mainly household slavery such as the bı¯z. a¯n, had to produce a
modicum of social consent, and an ideology where there was a place for the
slaves, and on which the slaves could rely to make – at least partially – sense
of the world they lived in. Jonathon Glassman (1991, 1995), concerned with
the analysis of slave resistance on the Swahili coast, gave an outline of how
this relationship between the ideology of the oppressor and its partial in-
corporation by the oppressed could be configured:
The quest for rebellious slave consciousness must therefore begin not with
the depiction of a seamless ideology of domination that was uniformly
rejected by slave rebels but with an understanding of the incoherent
cultural idioms in which slaves and masters defined differing visions of the
bonds that tied them. (Glassman1991: 288)
Drawing the attention back to the two bı¯z. a¯n accounts introducing this
chapter, it has to be noticed that their definition of the relationship between bı¯-
z. a¯n and su¯da¯n focused on the decay of what for them marks the decay of
their practice, while simultaneously upholding the major assumption that the
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su¯da¯n are part of the bı¯z. a¯n, because there is no difference between the two.
By this statement, the bı¯z. a¯n (much like the su¯da¯n statements) blend both a
discourse of paternalism and a discourse of domination. Both su¯da¯n and
bı¯z. a¯n indicate that their ideological universe is not closed and coherent, but is
61composed of several and sometimes contradictory ideological strains. The
narratives and practices of identification presented so far show a great variety
of means by which su¯da¯n produce identity with and difference from the
bı¯z. a¯n. They reveal that there is no clear-cut opposition between su¯da¯n seeking
integration into bı¯z. a¯n society and those rejecting it. Contrary to what
Meskerem Brhane (1997a) concludes, the dominant mode of identification
among su¯da¯n in the perspective developed here is not marked by a dichotom-
ising tendency which leads su¯da¯n to either identify with the bı¯z. a¯n, or with
what is supposed to be h. ara¯t.ı¯n. Not only are the su¯da¯n discourses full of
ambiguities, but the bı¯z. a¯n ones too. This, however, is not the reflection of a
so-called “false consciousness”, but of the lived experience of contradictory
social relations, which underlies the formation of individual consciousness, a
relationship Karl Marx ([1846] 1983b: 6) summed up in his sixth thesis on
Feuerbach: “Aber das menschliche Wesen ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum
inwohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das ensemble der
62gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.”
   Now taking up again the question to what extent the su¯da¯n become
integrated into present bı¯z. a¯n society, and how both bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n rational-
ise these attributions of difference and sameness, the outlined theoretical
framework will be employed as a foil for the analysis of a distinct discursive
practice. Accounts of one’s origins are central not only to the definition of
being bı¯z. a¯n, but to localising oneself in the bı¯z. a¯n social universe as well.
Comparing slaves and former slaves’ accounts of their genealogies with those
of bı¯z. a¯n means engaging in a battle on uneven ground. It is well known, and
has already been outlined, that most su¯da¯n lack the means of producing the
same kind of lengthy genealogical charts as do – at least some – bı¯z. a¯n. The
su¯da¯n also lack written chronicles and other means accounting for a glorious
past in the same way as the bı¯z. a¯n do. Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 101-161)
brought to light how su¯da¯n bypass these pitfalls. They subvert the bı¯z. a¯n
mode of referring to the past by putting mythical narratives of their collective
origin in the place of the genealogical references telling of individual and
tribal bı¯z. a¯n origins. These insights open up the floor for an evaluation less
interested in the plausibility of the individual account than the distinct modes
by which origins are expressed by different actors.
   Talking about what one is in bı¯z. a¯n society, a member of a distinct tribe, a
zwa¯ya or h. assa¯n, an Arab etc., means talking about the past. This does not
imply that each claim to being this or that will automatically be underpinned
by a chronicle of the past. Rather the past becomes part of the present. Being
a Legwa¯t.it., i.e. a member of the Legwa¯t.it. tribe, implies that one’s father had
been so, as well as his father, and so on. In everyday discursive practice,
however, these distinctions frequently collapse, and one and the same person
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comes to be referred to as either father or grandfather, and narrators blend
themselves with their ancestors. Indeed there is no need to maintain this
distinction, for what one actually claims to be is considered to be the invaria-
ble essence of past generations’ social being. Social position, in this perspec-
tive, has a primordial character, and cannot be changed (cf. Brhane 1997a:
105f.). It is this mode of producing social status affiliation that allows the
maintenance of a rigid classification in a society with a considerable social
mobility. Whenever in narratives of the past, present status can be inter-
mingled with statuses of the past, and when present practices can be relayed
to the past by confounding actors of the present with those of the past, then
the present engages in shaping the past. Lively and controversial discussions
of family histories (cf. Brhane 1997a: 105) thus reflect the ongoing process by
which the past is made to match up with the present and its needs. These
ambiguities in the genealogical imagination mean that a profound knowledge
of one’s family history (be it contested or not) remains the most crucial
cultural material. New emphases added to bı¯z. a¯n narratives of origins have to
be subtle not to endanger their legitimacy, and in turn can only be apprehen-
63ded on the basis of a knowledge extending from the present to the past.
   Talking about origins, however, implies more than just family history and
individual social status. The links created by filiation, which make up the core
of family genealogies, are the same which link the individual to those social
bodies providing group solidarity, i.e. the tribes, virtual communities of
64awla¯d ^amm (descendants of father-brothers). Further patrilineal filiation
links the individual, and by shared ancestors whole groups, to Arab origins,
and from there back to the descendants of the prophet Muhammad. Accord-
ing to this ideology, already analysed by Ibn Khaldun, the famous
th 14 century North African scholar and pioneer of modern social sciences,
common ancestry is a necessary element of group solidarity, but does not by
itself create it. What it needs is the development of an esprit de corps, the
^as.abiya, which will only become fully effective if it takes into account
common ancestry, and makes of it a means of identification (cf. Hamès 1987:
65111; Ibn Khaldun 1992: 78f.). The notion of origin in the context of Arab
societies, as this short overview reveals, is closely intertwined with the notion
of sharing ancestors. These multiple dimensions of what makes up an origin
are revealed by the Arab term nasab. Used by Ibn Khaldun to designate those
relations by blood essential to the development of a common identity, and
thus as the complement of the ^as.abiya, nasab is commonly translated as
filiation or genealogy (cf. Bonte/Conte 1991: 39; Conte 1987). However, like
many Arab terms, this one too has a multitude of readings. According to
Hans Wehr (1976: 959) these are lineage, descent, origin and kinship.
   This multi-dimensionality of notions like nasab and ^as.abiya means that
they can be employed with quite different meanings in different contexts.
The notion of ^as.abiya thus came to signify several distinct levels of solidarity
in the discourses of bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n in the region of Achram-Diouk.
Building upon a basic meaning of “tendon”, ^as.abiya was designated as being
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66that which holds something tightly together. Thus it could mean solidarity
on varying levels, ranging from unions, or else diyya (blood-money) paying
67groups at tribal (or infra or supra-tribal) level, or it meant a group of
patrilineal affiliates comprising between five or six generations (sometimes
68more), and thus sharing reciprocal rights of inheritance. The meaning of the
term nasab in the local context shifted slightly away from the common
translation too. It thus came to designate first of all “status”, i.e. the quality
of belonging to a distinct and recognised family (literally a “great tent”). This
does not contradict the inherent idea of nasab meaning to relate oneself to the
past through genealogical ties, but relays this reference onto a collective level,
i.e. the status a whole group has achieved. However, the question of one’s
nasab did not lead interviewees to describe their individual affiliation to these
status groups, but raised only discourses in which the interviewees claimed to
be a part of those groups they considered to make up their status identity.
   Distinct family genealogies, in turn, were not directly associated with
matters of status or nobility, but described as representing the interviewees’
^as.abiya. The gap between these two modes of referring to the past by
individual filiation was meant to be closed by a third notion, that of as.l. Also
incorporating a whole universe of divergent meanings in standard Arabic
(root, trunk (of a tree), origin, source, cause, reason, descent, lineage, stock
foundation; Wehr 1976), it was meant to represent a personal origin (Khalifa
Ould Kebab), but also has the notion of genealogical and ethnic origin (cf.
Taine-Cheikh 1988: 21). In fact the differentiation between nasab and as.l
rarely did work out, and some interviewees (both bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n) used
69nasab and as.l interchangeably. It thus can be assumed that both terms,
though with different emphasis, represent the two meanings inherent also to
the English notion of origin, namely ancestry and parentage on the one hand,
and origin, source, inception and root on the other hand (cf. Merriam
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1997).
   Already this short outline of three terms central to the understanding of
tribal identity formation reveals that their proper use needs a very good
command of Arabic. This the su¯da¯n are most likely not to have, and it was
among su¯da¯n (though there are probably numbers of bı¯z. a¯n too) that I
encountered interviewees checking what was meant by asking about “as.l”
(h. assa¯niyya: as.elan šenhu?). Nevertheless with many interviewees, the issue of
“origins” could be discussed, and the statements they made in this context
revealed some differences between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n in their respective
reasoning about who had been one’s ascendants and of whom one is part
today. According to one of the most elaborate bı¯z. a¯n statements the origin of
most tribes in the region of Achram-Diouk is among the Qurayš, the tribe of
the prophet (cf. Busse 1989: 17f.), to whom most local tribes are supposed to
be linked by the fraction of the Bani Umayat (the Idaw^I¯š are designated as
tracing their link via Bou Bakkar ben Amar, the Almoravid leader to H. imyar,
70and thus to the Qurayš). All awla¯d ^amm, i.e. all members of the (bı¯z. a¯n)
tribes – according to this view – are considered to have an Arab as.l (origin)
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and to share the same forebears (h. assa¯niyya: nasabu wa¯h. id ; i.e. one genealo-
gy). Both h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya thus are equal from the point of view of their
common Arab forefathers, and the difference among them arose only from
their choice of different occupations (warrior versus religious scholar;
71Interview Bettarmo Ould Cheikh, zwa¯ya, 8.2.1996). While this account
reproduces to a significant extent the common myth about the foundation of
bı¯z. a¯n society, according to which the once united society became divided
into different statuses according to their respective occupations, it excludes
all groups which are not h. assa¯n or zwa¯ya. Thus neither the zna¯ga nor the h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n, both of whom are seen as constituting the workers of traditional bı¯z. a¯n
society, are classified as having Arab antecedants. Mythical narratives of the
origin of the division of bı¯z. a¯n society into three different status groups were
more generous in this respect. Pierre Amilhat (1937: 45) reported local
traditions of the Tagant, according to which it was the Almoravid leader Bou
Bakkar ben Amar who took the initiative of dividing his followers into noble
warriors, clerics, and those people charged with working. The division
between all major groups, including the workers, according to this account,
72thus was by work, and not by distinct ethnic origin.
   The notion of origin, which in the broadest sense implied claiming Arab
ancestry, generally was detailed by bı¯z. a¯n by referring to their tribal affilia-
tion. This identity marker was designed in most cases to tell as much about
one’s status (as.l) as one’s ancestry (nasab), and thus revealed yet one more
time the close interrelationship between these two notions. This insight was
put in nutshell by a h. assa¯n intellectual (Interview Sid Mohamed Oud Dey,
7327.8.1995) by stating “The tribe is the origin.” This point of view, the bı¯z. a¯n
practice of locating one’s origin within the tribe, is not shared by su¯da¯n. For
them – and here the interviewed su¯da¯n were quite unanimous – their origin is
from the kwa¯r, the black African ethnic groups. This origin, as one h. ara¯t.ı¯n
interviewee noted, may not be considered a good origin, but at least one
respected as such. For su¯da¯n it thus is better to have a kwa¯r origin than none
(Interview Brahim Ould Soueilim, 26.8.1995). A second point peculiar to su¯-
da¯n origins is that they usually trace decent by the matrilineage. Thus one
slave woman reported her mother to have been from the Awla¯d Mbarek,
where she had come to as a ku¯ri, i.e. as a member of a black African ethnic
group (Interview Moime Mint El Abd, 26.12.1995). Claiming the inheritance
of an independent status is also said by many su¯da¯n to have been passed on to
them by their mothers and not their fathers. This applies to su¯da¯n claiming to
have had h. ara¯t.ı¯n ancestors for generations, as well as su¯da¯n who deny the
legitimacy of their slave estate. In the former case, a h. art.a¯ni claimed that his
mothers had all been h. ara¯t.ı¯n, while he did not want to affirm this status for
74all of his forefathers, who thus were ejected from the family genealogy. The
legitimacy of a freeman’s status was additionally underscored by describing
75one of his foremothers as having been a zna¯ga woman. These, though
socially despised too, were at least known to have definitely no links with
servile estate. The construction of origins by a descendant of a slave woman
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who had adopted parts of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n political discourse was different. To
him his grandmother had been a Bambara, an origin he assumed to apply to
76all su¯da¯n in the region of Achram Diouk. As a ku¯ri, he argued, this woman
had been free, and therefore all of her descendants were free too (Interview
77Bekkai Ould Elemine, 20.12.1995). The lack of a definition of origins in
tribal terms applies even to those su¯da¯n who claim most forcefully to have no
slave past, the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. For one of them, as well as
another su¯da¯n, their origin was among the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, i.e. among the free people.
This distinct status, however, was not stressed to mark difference from the bı¯-
78z. a¯n, but from su¯da¯n supposed to be tent-slaves (na¯nme), and hence to
79display the corresponding behavioural patterns.
   The almost demonstrative location of their origin among the black African
ethnic groups, and here almost always among the Bambara, seems to contra-
dict the point of view held by most su¯da¯n that there is no difference between
them and the bı¯z. a¯n other than their different phenotype. However, that
su¯da¯n think of themselves as being bı¯z. a¯n, while they are well aware that their
origin is alien to this society, only reflects once again their very condition.
They are acculturated to bı¯z. a¯n society, and thus constitute a part of it, but
can still be recognised and referred to as a group apart, which is distinct from
the bı¯z. a¯n (among other factors) by origin. This insight is rationalised by
Brahim, whom we know to have contracted manumission for himself and
parts of his family with his former master, and to have attended bı¯z. a¯n
teaching of the Qur\a¯n.
Author: Did you pay for your manumission?
80 Brahim: Yes I did, I paid only the zaka¯t and the vat.ra, this means what
is comprised by what one calls wala¯\ [clientage/patronage; cf. p. 264].
Author: Do you still pay it?
Brahim: Yes.
Author: And you agreed about this matter with your master?
Brahim: Yes, completely. You know, we now have become the same, we
now are as.abi, we share the same ^as.abiya [close solidarity among people
81having a common ancestor], he manumitted the whole family, and I was
the first among them.
Author: And what is your origin [as.l]?
Brahim: as.elak? My as.l [origin] is only h. ara¯t.ı¯n. What do you mean by
this? I know very well that I have been a slave, but now I am free. But the
82origin, any slave has a father and a mother, so this is one origin. Look,
what is important to me is that I am Mauritanian. What has been before
does not interest me. That I once was a slave, that I remained a slave until
I became manumitted, and that I now am a free man like everybody else.
If I want to investigate my origin scrupulously, then I will perhaps be able
83to find a ku¯ri, and be a ku¯ri. But [instead of] a ku¯ri, I prefer to be a
bı¯z. a¯n. I know very well that my origin comes from the kwa¯r, but the only
thing important to me is to be a bı¯z. a¯n, to be free.
Author: Can’t you get a bı¯z. a¯n origin?
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Brahim: The difference is only the colour, this is of no importance. I am
like the bı¯z. a¯n. I ask you. Am I ku¯ri? Am I a šarı¯v? These often are black
[of black phenotype]. The colour is not important, you can also see
light-coloured slaves.
The past that takes the shape of “origins” – this is made obvious by Brahim’s
narrative – is of little interest to former slaves who wish to integrate them-
selves into bı¯z. a¯n society. Indeed, they, like everybody else in bı¯z. a¯n society,
assume the origin of the overwhelming majority of su¯da¯n to be among the
black African ethnic groups. But the ties to these societies are cut off for the
su¯da¯n, and they shall remain so, because going back to these roots has no
advantage for the individual su¯da¯n. This does not mean that su¯da¯n generally
are not interested in the question where they come from. One su¯da¯n
interviewee told me his father had managed to find out his ancestors among
the kwa¯r, to have gone there and been welcomed. Nevertheless he returned
to the Tagant, for it was the place his family lived, and he found it to be his
home (Interview Bekkai Ould Elemine, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 20.12.1995). That slaves,
now, after generations of acculturation to bı¯z. a¯n society, are aware of making
a choice about where they want to belong to is revealed by another case.
Having talked about her (female) ancestors, of whom she knew quite a lot, a
su¯da¯n woman concluded that these, her origins, were of no interest to her, for
all that mattered now was to be a L^aweysya¯t, i.e. a member of the tribe she
had been affiliated to through her slave past (Interview Moime Mint El Abd,
^abd, 26.12.1995).
   Talking about one’s origin, i.e. talking about one’s genealogy, is an ambigu-
ous issue for su¯da¯n. It is important for them because it demonstrates their
ability to master idioms central to bı¯z. a¯n culture and society, it proves that
slave descendants and subordinated groups are able to express themselves in
the language of the superiors. Adopting the masters’ language, however, also
means absorbing some of the ideas it is designed to communicate (cf.
Glassman 1991: 312; 1995). Speaking of their origins thus is for the su¯da¯n also
an experience and reinforcement of their exclusion from bı¯z. a¯n society. The
outcome of these discourses reveals itself to be of no use for su¯da¯n, other
than to distinguish themselves from the bı¯z. a¯n. In this respect the su¯da¯n living
in the region of Achram-Diouk seem to have made their choice long ago:
they want to take part in bı¯z. a¯n society, and their struggle focuses on getting
equal rights, and becoming like the bı¯z. a¯n. This unanimous will for integra-
tion, which contradicts in some respects the conclusions on h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity
84formation drawn by Meskerem Brhane (1997a, b), does not mean the same
to all su¯da¯n. By far not all of them are interested in becoming as closely
associated with the bı¯z. a¯n as Brahim is. Many want to gain autonomy, and
live at a distance from the bı¯z. a¯n. Therefore, besides the production of
similarity between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n, there is room for marking difference.
While social evolution is starting to blur major social differentiations such as
the distinctions between zwa¯ya, h. assa¯n and zna¯ga, and environmental and
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economic developments mean that the vast majority of rural residents are
subject to and live in almost the same desperate conditions, there is also a
new social space for the articulation of difference between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n
opening up. As has been shown, especially with regard to the development of
a “h. ara¯t.ı¯n work ethic” (cf. p. 265f.), these struggles for differentiation are
taking a new shape. Rather than opposing bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n within a hierar-
chical order, these new demarcations represent a challenge to the definition
not only of what it means to be a bı¯z. a¯n, but what it means to be a good, i.e.
non-ignorant and modern member not only of bı¯z. a¯n, but Mauritanian
society.
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Chapter 9
Where Do They Go To?
The end of slavery in Mauritania – as this analysis shows – has not yet been
accomplished, and the master-slave relations of dependency have proved to
be of a longevity which is intriguing in itself. However, those patterns and
practices of slavery that still persist do not account for the continuation of an
archaic social order in Mauritania. Any such assertion misses the point about
social change in this country, and – perhaps even more important – shows a
lack of respect for those it professes to speak for, namely former slaves and
slaves. These are not just passive victims of their brutal masters, but take an
active part in shaping the master-slave relations. In focusing on these
relations, this book has, it is hoped, succeeded in elucidating major aspects of
the many more or less subtle differentiations characterising the slave condi-
tion and allowing to discriminate against both slaves and freed slaves.
   In this respect it could be shown that relations of domination were not
uniform, but differed in many respects. Gender and patterns of work
appeared to be among the most significant variables in this respect. To own
slave women was until recently – and in some cases continues to be – more
important to bı¯z. a¯n masters and mistresses than to possess slave men. Work
far from the tent of the masters, which most often was men’s work, allowed
for greater liberties than work close to the tent, which was considered to be
the women’s domain. While slave men were able to acquire skills in their
respective occupations which gave them a distinct value as labourers, slave
women performed their tasks under the direct observation and guidance of
the mistresses. Historic evolution too accounts for changes in the nature of bı¯-
z. a¯n slavery. Although historical accounts of the situation of slaves in former
centuries are few, it can be assumed that slavery had been well established in
the pastoral nomadic western Sahara for centuries. Within this household
slavery, slaves to a great extent performed almost the same tasks, and did a
great deal of the work that until recently marked life in rural Mauritania.
They worked as household maids, herders, and cultivators. Nevertheless
bı¯z. a¯n slavery changed its shape throughout the centuries. As extrapolations on
the development of the different slave trades both within and beyond of
sub-Saharan Africa suggest, the number of slaves in bı¯z. a¯n society rose
th considerably in the course of the 19 century. This evolution allowed the bı¯z. a¯n
to deepen and extend complementary patterns of production within their
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society, namely pastoralism and agriculture, which were linked by master-
slave relations.
   Slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n did experience major social deprivation, among which
the exclusion from parentage, and often from major social practices like
marriages, were the hardest to bear. Slaves were very well conscious of this
situation and they offered resistance. Taking resistance as an analytical
category, however, is an ambivalent issue. Any such project is at risk of
over-interpreting the actions of the subordinated, or of narrowing the focus
of what is understood as resistance in such a way that the often subtle
expressions of slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n would hardly fall into this category (cf.
1Rubin 1995). Slave resistance as such therefore is not the issue of this
discussion. Rather it has tried to unravel how the different constituents of bı¯-
z. a¯n society placed themselves in different configurations of hierarchy and
dependency. For the slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n, the issue of these different configura-
tions was symbolised by their struggle for a place in bı¯z. a¯n society. Both
discourses and practices producing social spaces and attributing them to
different social strata have been analysed. This undertaking involved a
number of different levels, such as individual biographic narratives, the
question of land tenure, and discourses on su¯da¯n identity with and difference
from bı¯z. a¯n society. Based on interpretations of the theory of hegemony
developed by Antonio Gramsci ([1929-35] 1971), it could be revealed that
there are no homogeneous interpretations of their world by the subservient
strata in bı¯z. a¯n society. The vast majority of their attitudes continue to
express both their wish for integration into bı¯z. a¯n society and their knowl-
edge (and to some extent their wish too) to be different from the bı¯z. a¯n.
   By this characterisation of what su¯da¯n identify with, the present analysis
contrasts with the conclusions drawn with regard to processes of h. ara¯t.ı¯n
identity formation in Nouakchott by Meskerem Brhane (1997a,b). According
to the latter, h. ara¯t.ı¯n develop a number of different attitudes of what it means
to be h. ara¯t.ı¯n. The range of these identities ranges from identifying being h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n with being bı¯z. a¯n up to defining both groups as antagonistic. In the
perspective developed in the preceding chapter, these h. ara¯t.ı¯n identifications
can be understood as further differentiating, and even accentuating the logic
which produces jointly both difference and identity among bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n.
Much of this issue concerns how to determine bı¯z. a¯n-ness and h. ara¯t.ı¯n-ness. In
the present work a great emphasis has been laid on the point that su¯da¯n
struggle to become like the bı¯z. a¯n, but not to become bı¯z. a¯n. This argument
was underscored by the su¯da¯n’s knowledge of their black African origins,
and their knowledge of the implication this has for possible claims of a
different origin being accepted by other su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n. Certainly the
strongest argument raised by Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 101ff.) is the exist-
ence of mythical narratives which are shared by bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n and tell of a
non-slave origin of either all h. ara¯t.ı¯n or of a distinct group of h. ara¯t.ı¯n.
Claiming that there are h. ara¯t.ı¯n without a slave past, however, is a topic
encountered also in the region of Achram-Diouk (the case of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of
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the Ahel Swayd Ah. med). Beyond the deconstruction of this supposedly
better status with regard to major domains like e.g. land tenure (cf. p. 236-
241), all claims for a distinct h. ara¯t.ı¯n status are simply a variation on how
su¯da¯n struggle for better status ascription within the complementary differen-
tial bı¯z. a¯n-su¯da¯n. As to their nature, the discourses of a free ancestor differ
2only slightly from those portrayed in the preceding chapter. These blamed
slavery for having no origin, and underlined the illegitimate nature of this
institution, which was supposed to result from the enslavement of free kwa¯r
3(i.e. members of black African ethnic groups). But while su¯da¯n claiming a
kwa¯r ancestry face few problems in getting their position to be recognised as
legitimate, those h. ara¯t.ı¯n who individually want to trace an ancestry among
the unrightfully enslaved bı¯z. a¯n will remain subject to suspicion from either
su¯da¯n or bı¯z. a¯n. To effectively change sides, and thus live a new identity is a
matter of acquiring consent on this issue not only among the bı¯z. a¯n but
4among the su¯da¯n too. The former indeed in some cases were willing to
integrate su¯da¯n, i.e. to make bı¯z. a¯n out of them. In such cases they were also
ready to provide the necessary ideological background (like e.g. an origin
which could be traced to a zna¯ga woman), but on occasion they could also
5withdraw this support. The su¯da¯n, however, were unlikely to forget as
quickly as that about the past of these suddenly “whitened blacks”, and they
6perhaps are even less so today, when su¯da¯n discourses are gaining a greater
7public than they had done in former times. The sticky nature of a slave past
is even felt by people who emerged from the su¯da¯n, and whose career
enabled them to be accepted as equals by bı¯z. a¯n on probably the ultimate
level, namely by marrying a bı¯z. a¯n women. Lastly, the most limiting factor to
becoming bı¯z. a¯n may not even result from social control by either bı¯z. a¯n or
su¯da¯n, but is likely to arise from the internalisation of a deep concern about
this issue which many of those su¯da¯n who have effectively managed to rise to
the highest ranks of society seem unable to overcome (cf. McDougall 1988:
384; Meskerem Brhane, personal communication).
   When insisting so penetratingly on the longevity and indelibility of a real or
assumed slave past, one is at great risk of essentialising social categories, and
attributing to them a primordial and immutable nature. Indeed the present
argumentation may be perceived as one stating in essence that one who has
once been a slave will always be recognised as such. This is neither the case,
nor the argument developed here. Rather the point is that the nature of one’s
origins continues to be a decisive element, marking sameness and difference,
inclusion and exclusion in the discourses on identity in bı¯z. a¯n society.
Processes of identification, which here are understood as a set of practices,
rely on this cultural material of the past to produce those differences that
shape the boundaries constituting the imagined “identity”. Identity forma-
tion as a differentiation between “us” and “them” is thus not an autonomous
process, but results from interaction not only within the symbolic borders,
but across these (cf. Hall 1996; Schlee 1994b). Taking up Norbert Elias’
(1990) notion of social configurations, changing patterns of identification
288        Chapter 9
 
 
take place in a social context where the shift of one position affects the
relations of all others. Changing social identity means challenging given
configurations of social power. Thus shifting from a h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity to a
bı¯z. a¯n one involves both the h. ara¯t.ı¯n we-group and the bı¯z. a¯n we-group, and
demands that both achieve consent on the new configuration. Shifting among
identities, which like “bı¯z. a¯n” and “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” are representations of a hierar-
chical order, means engaging in the mutual redefinition of these categories.
For the bı¯z. a¯n, the very act of accepting the inclusion of – this here is taken
for granted – people known before as h. ara¯t.ı¯n or ^abı¯d means redrawing
exactly that boundary which defines bı¯z. a¯n first of all as non-h. ara¯t.ı¯n and
non-^abı¯d. Maintaining the fiction of this boundary being impermeable thus
is constitutive of both bı¯z. a¯n and h. ara¯t.ı¯n identities.
   Processes of identity formation by status groups within a sharply stratified
society, where until recently the range of hierarchy not only differentiated
members of the society, but extended to discrimination against many of its
constituting elements as non-social beings, comprise both typical elements of
identification processes and distinct features. In the perspective of the current
analysis, the issue of identification among su¯da¯n, i.e. h. ara¯t.ı¯n and ^abı¯d, has
emerged less as one of shifting between either a bı¯z. a¯n or a h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity,
like those switches observed with regard to ethnic identities (cf. Schlee 1989),
but as engaged in redefining these essentially social categories. Processes of
identification for su¯da¯n have a major goal; they aim at their constitution as
social beings and at economic promotion. Therefore members of the
subordinate strata have developed two major strategies. Either they stress the
difference in identity of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n vis-à-vis the bı¯z. a¯n, meaning that though
different in origin, the h. ara¯t.ı¯n as a result of acculturation have become like
the bı¯z. a¯n and thus have to share equal rights, or they express identity in
difference, which means that as a distinct ethnic or better we-group, the h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n are equal members of Mauritanian society, and in this respect have to be
granted rights of participation by the dominating bı¯z. a¯n. Both concepts in
effect are like two sides of the same coin. Both serve as legitimation for
claiming more or less radically the participation in the power of a distinct
group, called the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, which effectively comprises a variety of subordinat-
ed groups (subsumed under the designation su¯da¯n throughout this book).
Though the first discourse puts great emphasis on describing how the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
are like the bı¯z. a¯n, and effectively leads some of its proponents to describe
themselves first of all as bı¯z. a¯n, it does not question the distinction between bı¯-
z. a¯n and h. ara¯t.ı¯n (or else su¯da¯n). Rather it acknowledges it as the basis for an
integration of h. ara¯t.ı¯n into bı¯z. a¯n society, which grants them rights to
participation and economic resources. This political project, like the second
one, adds a new facet to the meaning of bı¯z. a¯n identity. According to the first
concept of difference in identity, being bı¯z. a¯n comes to mean two different
things. Either only those who have bı¯z. a¯n ancestors appear as bı¯z. a¯n, or all
people sharing the h. assa¯niyya language and bı¯z. a¯n cultural practices. While
the first definition proposes a closed mode of membership, where belonging
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to the bı¯z. a¯n can hardly be extended beyond those people linked by blood,
the latter perspective embraces an open mode. A modern, cultural definition
of bı¯z. a¯n as an ethnic group fits into this latter scheme in so far as it leaves
8room for the assimilation of strangers. The su¯da¯n can achieve advantages
from this antagonism whenever they juxtapose both perspectives, and
become able to switch between their social inclusion and exclusion. A
different strategy is pursued by the concept of identity in difference. Within
this framework genealogical affiliation is acknowledged to be the single
hallmark of being bı¯z. a¯n, and the su¯da¯n appear as a distinct group, which can
9no longer be incorporated by the bı¯z. a¯n. The objective in both models,
however, remains the same. Activists of both discursive strains seek partici-
pation and benefits within the bı¯z. a¯n dominated Mauritanian society on the
basis of what then becomes positive discrimination with regard to “h. ara¯t.ı¯n”
(for a discussion of such patterns of identification refer to Schlee 1996).
   This general orientation of the su¯da¯n towards an integration into bı¯z. a¯n
society is to a large extent the result of the generations of acculturation both
h. ara¯t.ı¯n and ^abı¯d living today in Mauritania have as their historical and
cultural background. Recently this trend – manifest already in the first years
of independent Mauritania – became heavily intensified. Under the rule of
Mauritania’s first president, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, power in the state had
been distributed between the bı¯z. a¯n elite and the elites of the different black
African ethnic groups, the Halpulaar’en, Soninké and Wolof, according to a
10more or less fixed quota. The military regimes, and later on president
Maouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, changed this system. The access some
h. ara¯t.ı¯n were granted to high positions in the government were achieved to the
disadvantage of the representation in power of the black African ethnic
groups (cf. Brhane 1997a: 314; Ould Cheikh 1994a: 34).
   The most decisive turn towards an “ethnic” bipolarity in Mauritania, and
the discrimination against the black African ethnic groups occurred in 1989,
when about 200 members of black African ethnic groups were killed in the
course of bloody riots on “Black Tuesday”. These riots had been triggered
off by an incident in the Senegal river valley among Mauritanian and Senega-
lese members of black African ethnic groups. The conflict escalated quickly.
A number of bı¯z. a¯n shops in some Senegalese towns were looted and a few
days later bloody riots, targeting all supposed “Senegalese”, and hence black
11Africans, started in the Mauritanian towns and in the Senegal river valley.
In Senegal it was in turn the bı¯z. a¯n minority which became increasingly the
target of violence articulated in ethnic terms. In an international airlift
100,000 so-called Senegalese living in Mauritania and 100,000 bı¯z. a¯n living in
Senegal were repatriated. In addition in the Senegal river valley another
estimated 100,000 Mauritanian black Africans were forced to leave the
country. The governments of both countries, rather than seeking mediation,
joined in the conflict and in early January 1990 were close to declaring war.
International mediation under the aegis of the secretary general of the United
Nations (UN), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and the president of the Organisation
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of African Unity (OAU), Hosni Mubarak, finally succeeded in preventing a
further escalation of the conflict and re-establishing negotiations. A decisive
step towards regular relations between both countries was taken on 18 July
1991, with the decision to resume diplomatic relations between both coun-
tries and to reopen the borders (cf. Magistro 1993: 203ff.; Clausen 1994b:
12249ff.). As in riots before, e.g. in 1966 on the occasion of demonstrations
sparked off by black African pupils, “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” built up street gangs chasing,
beating and killing black Africans (cf. De Chassey 1984: 392ff.; Baduel 1989:
1326f.).
   How far the balance of power has shifted further to the detriment of the
different black African groups, and in favour of the bı¯z. a¯n ensemble, now
probably composed more tightly than ever of all strata of this society, may be
understood from the growing number of members of the low strata of the
black African ethnic groups who now claim descent from h. ara¯t.ı¯n who had
once been enslaved by black Africans (cf. Brhane 1997a: 321). This trend is
also one towards the Arabisation of Mauritanian society, which had its onset
already shortly after independence, when a shift to Arabic was promoted to
the detriment of French (and the languages of the black African ethnic
groups) in the educational system. A number of compromises on the issue
turned out to have been concluded mainly to appease the black African
communities, rather than grant them a stronger recognition of their languag-
14es. Since 1992 the Arabisation of major branches of the education system
and of parts of the administration increased further. As not only French-
educated, but also black Africans trained in Arabic countries are discriminat-
ed against, tensions between the two ethnic groups continue to be fuelled (cf.
Taine-Cheikh 1994: 147f.; Sall 1999 : 92f.). At present this trend towards a
confrontation in ethnic terms seems to have passed its climax. In April 1999 a
reform, the outcome of which will have to be watched carefully, was
launched, reinstalling French as Mauritania’s standard language for the
15instruction of mathematics and natural sciences.
   In the light of these events it is no wonder that in mid 1995 a number of
16Fulbe Aynaabe founded an association called “Association Nationale de
l’Amitié et du Retour aux Origines” (ANARO), supposed to propagate the
truth about Fulbe origins, meant to be their supposed Arab origin (the Fulbe
Aynaabe are part of the Halpulaar’en, a designation for all speakers of the
Pulaar language). In late 1995 the ANARO made more explicit their point of
view by publishing a document dismissing all of the many visions of Fulbe
origins contradicting their claim for an Arab origin of the Fulbe. While the
undertaking is still highly controversial within the Mauritanian Halpulaar’en
17community, this recent step forward by one (minor) faction deeply
involved in both Arab and Islamic culture clearly indicates that disintegration
is becoming a concern for this largest black African ethnic group in Maurita-
nia. Like numbers of leaders of the political opposition, who in this period
18opted to change sides and joined the party in power (PRDS) , the members
of the Fulbe Aynaabe in question opted for rallying, in ethnic terms, round
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the bı¯z. a¯n controlling the power in place (cf. Le Calame, nº 120, 26.12.1995: 5;
and nº 123, 13.1.1996: 3; Sall 1999).
   While the general direction of where Mauritania is heading to is thus
outlined, the question of how the su¯da¯n, i.e. the h. ara¯t.ı¯n and ^abı¯d, will take
part in this process remains open. Here parallels can be seen with the case of
the Sudan, where slavery was alive and well up to this century too. There the
vigorous Sudanese nationalism provided a basis on which slave emancipation
and integration into society developed faster than in Mauritania. Neverthe-
less, descendants of slaves long remained a stigmatised group, marked by
distinct cultural and religious practices. The former slaves practices of a
self-demarcation from the dominant and enslaving Arabs that developed as a
response to this continued social discrimination went into a significant
decline, and their meanings became partially reinterpreted when the coun-
try’s north-south conflict was intensified. The growing emphasis laid on the
difference between the Arab-Islamic north and the Christian-Animist black
African south paved the way for an homogenisation of the northerners in
terms of shared cultural values, and hence the integration and assimilation of
19the slave descendants (cf. Makris 1996; Sikainga 1996).
   In the rural areas of Mauritania, there actually seems to be no real impedi-
ment to the resurgence of tribes as territorial and political entities. However,
as has been demonstrated, this process is far from reproducing the past.
Though still alive, the relations of power between bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n are in a
process of transformation. While difference continues to be marked in several
domains, this appears also to provide the basis for a stronger integration of
the su¯da¯n into bı¯z. a¯n society, and the attribution of more autonomy to the
former subservient strata. Thus, as could be witnessed at Achram, even those
su¯da¯n who are among the most fervent propagators of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n cause, are
20able to engage in violent conflicts, opposing “their” tribe to another one.
Another indicator for the continuation of this kind of due integration into bı¯-
z. a¯n society as clients comes from the fact that many su¯da¯n who have not yet
received an official manumission by their masters still continue to pay for the
formal act of their liberation. Prices vary, and in quite a few cases may have a
more or less symbolic value, but those cases where su¯da¯n have to pay
considerable sums are still frequent. As recently as 1993 three brothers a-
greed to build a house for their master, corresponding to a value of about
100,000 UM (approximately US$750 at that time), and in turn received con-
tracted manumission in the presence of a qa¯d. i and several witnesses. A su¯da¯n
woman received manumission in compensation for working for one year
without payment as a housemaid, labour that was worth a sum of 24-36,000
21UM, for her freedom alone.
   Another factor which will have a decisive influence on the shape of the
future bı¯z. a¯n and Mauritanian society, and especially for the future of
22collective action by the su¯da¯n, is the evolution of Islam. Like most other
predominantly Muslim societies, Mauritania is witnessing a strengthening of
Islamist groups and discourses at present. This issue was merely glanced at in
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the present analysis, for this would have meant embarking on a subject worth
its own extensive evaluation (on this topic refer to Stone 1994, forthcoming;
Boubrik 1998, 1999). Islam in Mauritania, which has long been shaped by the
traditions of zwa¯ya scholarship, is currently undergoing major changes,
among them a secularisation of religious knowledge and learning. Although
there are numbers of dispossessed bı¯z. a¯n who profit from this evolution, the
turn towards a less hierarchical version of Islam above all works in favour of
the su¯da¯n. Islamist interpretations, denouncing the unfitting behaviour of the
powerful, and proclaiming salvation to come from the individual’s efforts to
comply with practices they believe to be demanded of a good Muslim, are
undoubtedly opening up one of the most important arenas for the develop-
ment of a distinct identity, uniting the disadvantaged (both su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n)
against the Mauritanian establishment. However, until now, and especially in
the rural context, the grip of the traditional religious elite remains tight.
   In summer 1995 an Islamist activist was transferred to work at the devel-
opment project at Debissa near Achram. Soon after having arrived there,
religious life in the very small village was thrown into turmoil. A mosque was
installed in a small building, and – and this is still revolutionary in rural
Mauritania – a muezzin, amplifying his voice with a megaphone, started
calling the believers to prayer on a regular basis. Among su¯da¯n, and here
above all among those already concerned with behaving as a good Muslim,
the new mosque became a point of great attraction, and hours were spent
23there in the evening after the prayer, taking part in long discussions. A
short time later, a number of activists arrived from Nouakchott, and started
to disseminate their view of Islam on a greater scale in different villages.
However, after some weeks, the megaphone remained mute for a while, only
to reappear on an irregular basis, and then used by a group of young men.
Among the su¯da¯n, the initial euphoria had subsided considerably in the
meantime. Asked why they no longer attended the mosque they answered
that it was no longer a place for serious men to go to, because now it had
become occupied by children “kidding around”. In fact, much more had
changed. The propagators of the Islamist cause, driven in from Nouakchott,
had put the visitors to the mosque under a lot of pressure to join the long
recitations of propaganda they added to the evening prayer. Work at home,
like the milking of animals, thus had been postponed, probably causing
annoyance among the women, who saw their men abstaining from their
duties. A little later the cultivation season began, and almost all su¯da¯n moved
out of the village to live under the tent close to their fields. While going to the
mosque to pray had meant no great effort as long as it demanded only a few
hundred metres’ walk, it became a considerable time-constraint on cultiva-
tion and pastoral activities when for this end more than just a couple of
kilometres had to be crossed by foot. However, this practical problem, of
which the Islamist activist was aware, was but one element which eased the
process of raising reservations towards this new practice of Islam. Soon after
the appearance of the Islamist activists on the local scene, several important
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marabouts from the Tagant made a visit to Achram, and obviously called the
24deviants to order.
   These last remarks reveal but two aspects which set the question of the
emancipation of former slaves in a wider context, allowing comparative
perspectives to develop. Indeed in recent times interest has grown not only in
the Mauritanian h. ara¯t.ı¯n and ^abı¯d (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais/Brhane/Ruf
forthcoming; Bonte 1998b), but also in other slave and former slave groups
within the societies of the Sahelian band and in Africa. At present, besides the
work of Makris (1996) and Sikainga (1996) on the emancipation of slaves and
former slaves in Sudan, a number of studies on different Tuareg communities
(cf. Waibel 1998), on former slaves of the Fulbe in northern Benin (cf.
Hardung 1998 and forthcoming) and on the current situation of slaves and
former slaves of the Tuareg, the bı¯z. a¯n and the Fulbe (cf. Botte 1999) focus on
this issue. A broad scope of case studies, reconsidering the issue of slavery
not only in the context of African societies is provided by Botte (2000). New
studies focusing on the impact of colonial rule on systems of slavery (Klein
1998) have also been developed in the field of the history of slavery in Africa
and provide a number of case studies from West, North and East Africa (cf.
Klein/Miers 1999). This growing scholarly attention, of which the present
book is a part, is to be welcomed, as the issue of persisting relations of
hierarchy and dependency is an important factor shaping the present and
future of many African societies.
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Notes
Preface
1 Slavery was abolished de jure in 1903 as a consequence of the French
colonisation of Mauritania, in 1961 when the universal declaration of human
rights of the United Nations was ratified by independent Mauritania, and
finally on 5 July 1980, when Colonel Ould Haidalla, then leader of the
military committee for national salvation, declared slavery to be abolished.
Legislation for this last abolition was passed as ordinance nº 81.234 on
9 November 1981 and included a stipulation that masters who freed their
slaves should be compensated (cf. Mauritanie Nouvelles, nº 235, 23.1.1997:
7f.).
2 Public concern over the issue of slavery in Mauritania is actually greatest in
France, the former colonial power in Mauritania, and the USA: examples in
recent articles decrying the persistence of Moorish, i.e. bı¯z. a¯n, slavery are
Mercer (1982); Salondon (1983); Paringaux (1990); Jacobs/Athie (1994);
Diallo (1995); French (1996); Montefiori (1996); Burkett (1997), and finally
more tempered views presented by Hecht (1997) and Daddah (1998).
3 Traditional forms of servitude also survive in other areas, such as many parts
of south-east Asia, or India, where bondage persists (cf. Klein 1993b: 26).
4 Indeed the notion of slavery is not altogether dead, but it is often used
metaphorically today to compare living conditions of distinct groups and
individuals with what are commonly assumed to have been slaves’ living
conditions. There is a bitter irony in the fact that today children from
Mauritania become subjected to such modern types of exploitation. They are
employed as jockeys for the camel races in the oil-exporting countries of the
gulf, where they live more or less without payment, while their job of riding
camels at the highest speed is an excessively dangerous one. Once they
become too big for this task they are sent back home.
5 Among others Frederick Cooper (1979: 105) voiced this reproach to African-
ists studying slavery. In the quest for an African, emic description able to
contrast African slavery with slavery in the Americas, they reproduced the
ideology of the elites. Recently the UNESCO “Slave Route” Project,
inaugurated on 1 September 1994 at the old slaving port of Ouidah in
today’s Bénin, put the systematic study of the reciprocal influences the
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Atlantic slave trade had on Africa and the Americas on the agenda (cf.
Lovejoy 1997).
6 Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (1995: 28ff. and 1997: 587, note 1) recently
suggested applying Louis Dumont’s (1966) theories on social hierarchy to bı¯-
z. a¯n society, and hence concluded that belonging to hierarchically stratified
status groups in this society is not perceived as disgraceful, unconscious, or
rejected but is a social classification adopted voluntarily by this society. This
definition begs the question of how such consent achieves hegemony in
society and whether there are any groups contesting it.
7 Mauritanie-Net@Home.Ease.Lsoft.com
8 The Mauritanian NGO SOS-esclaves defines its position towards this
question as follows:
“4. N’y a t-il seulement que des séquelles de l’esclavage en Mauritanie?
Une certaine opinion voudrait, sans doute pour se donner bonne con-
science, qu’il n’y ait plus que des séquelles de l’esclavage en Mauritanie et
non pas une véritable pratique de ce phénomène. Pour ce faire on recourt à la
vieille rengaine de la cécité, si ce n’est de l’amnésie volontaire. Il n’y a pas
d’esclavage. Il n’y a que des survivances, car on ne veut pas voir une réalité
qui, pourtant, crève les yeux. Parler de séquelles permettrait en effet de
justifier le peu d’empressement des autorités sur ce dossier. Se pencher sur
les restes d’un phénomène supposé disparu, permettrait ainsi de légitimer la
négation officielle du problème.
C’est une approche bonne pour mystifier l’opinion internationale et non à
usage interne. La réalité vécue et non pas seulement vue des palais officiels,
lui apporte, en effet, un démenti certain. Dans ce pays, des hommes et des
femmes continuent de souffrir d’un esclavage qui, pour être multiforme n’en
est pas moins réel.” (SOS Esclaves 1995: 2f.; emphasis added)
9 The five, Maître Brahim Ould Ebety, Professor Cheikh Saad Bouh Kamara,
Boubacar Ould Messaoud, Fatimata M’Baye, and Abdel Nasser Ould Yessa,
were accused of “faux usage de faux” and “création et appartenance à
association non autorisée et propagation d’allégations mensongères” (cf.
L’Autre Afrique, 18.2.1998: 35).
Introduction
1 On the impact of the war with the POLISARIO on Mauritanian politics
refer e.g. to Pazzanita (1997: 18ff.).
2 Albert Memmi (1993) distinguishes between the relation of domination-
subjection on the one hand and purveyance-dependence on the other. While
dependence is based on consent resulting from the purveyance of goods,
domination reflects a relation of power likely to be called into question.
3 On a micro-level scale this insight is used as a methodological device, for
example in ethnomethodology, where Garfinkel (1967) developed crisis
experiments as a means to uncover common-sense and the structures of
society incorporated in everyday life.
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4 The existence of discrete and hidden though not powerless forms of resist-
ance by subservient strata, such as peasants, has been highlighted by James
C. Scott (1985, 1990). While the theoretical assumptions of this approach are
subject to strong criticism (cf. Akram-Lodhi 1992; Rubin 1995), which are
seen as justified in the present analysis (cf. chapter eight), its strength lies in
raising sensitivity to the subtle elements in the localised manifestations of
social power. The need to take into account slave action as a substantial
element defining the master-slave relation has been highlighted by Frederick
Cooper (1979) and Jonathon Glassman (1991 and 1995).
5 Jonathon Glassman (1995) gave his both favourable and critical review of
Claude Meillassoux’s (1986) theoretical contribution to the study of slavery
the title “No words of their own” to highlight the lack of concern with slave
action and expression not only in Meillassoux’s work.
Chapter 1
1 Later a Catholic abolition movement developed as well, having the founda-
tion of several societies in France in 1888 as a starting point (cf. Klein 1993b:
17).
2 Only recently a DNA-analysis proved that Thomas Jefferson (1746-1826)
had fathered several children on his slave Sally Heming, a fact he had
continued to deny during his lifetime.
3 Of course the socialist states’ ideology was critical of slavery as well, but the
kind of freedom the capitalist market economy professed to be the alterna-
tive was criticised as failing to meet essential needs of mankind.
4 The definition of slavery as resulting from an initial act of violence is
controversial as there were also non-coercive ways to become slave, for
instance as a result of debts (debt-bondage), or became subject to arrange-
ments very similar to slavery as famine refugees or war captives (cf. Glass-
man 1995: 134). Stressing that the slave estate results from an initial act of
violence, however, by narrowing the definition makes it possible to link
slavery as an institution more consistently with a systematic versus a kind of
accidental use of slaves in society. While the latter case also expresses an act
of violence, though on a lower level, two theoretical concepts have been
based on this distinction. James L. Watson (1980b) differentiated between
“open and closed systems” of slavery, societies which offered modes of
integration to slaves and those which denied such options. Other scholars,
such as Martin A. Klein (1983: 79) and Paul E. Lovejoy (1981: 22f.), have
tried to frame these distinct patterns of slavery in terms of a distinction
between a household mode of production and a slave mode of production.
However, most of the evidence they present distinguishes between societies
in which slaves constituted a significant part of the population, and thus
were important to its functioning, and societies in which slaves were of
minor importance. Claude Meillassoux (1986), who is a proponent of the
mode of production approach, refrains from applying this concept to slave
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societies, while Frederick Cooper (1979: 116, note 51) denounces it in the
context of the analysis of slavery as a “pigeonhole”.
5 Claude Meillassoux (1986: 35) characterises the slaves’ deprivation in the
following terms: “l’incapacité sociale de l’esclave à se reproduire sociale-
ment” and in the statement that slavery constitutes “l’antithèse de la pa-
renté”.
6 Wendy James (1988: 133) emphasised that the enslaving society has to
construct a boundary separating itself from the enslaveable other. By this
practice of attributing features to alien people the slave society engages in the
definition of its own identity.
7 The French terms used by Claude Meillassoux (1986) are “état” and “condi-
tion”. The translation used here follows the one proposed by Martin A.
Klein in his translation of Claude Meillassoux’s (1983) article on “Female
Slavery”, wherein this latter author notes (note 3) “I distinguish estate from
status because the jural situation of the slave stands on negative criteria
whereas status defines people on positive jural grounds.” (original emphasis)
8 M.I. Finley (1968: 310) suggests that slavery becomes institutionalised once
slaves are essential to the working of the economy and consequently that
slave work outweighed other forms of labour.
9 The notable exception to the demographic deficiency of slave populations
not only in Africa but on other continents too, is the US South. There the
slave population grew and thus – quite paradoxically – this slave system
therefore fails to fit into the theoretical framework of Claude Meillassoux
(1986), who argues that there needs to be a slave mode of reproduction by
trade and warfare.
10 The impact of the Atlantic slave trade on Africa remains disputed among
scholars, although a majority of these confirm the thesis that the Atlantic
trade indeed affected Africa in many ways. A thorough discussion of this
topic is provided by Paul E. Lovejoy (1989: 365), who concludes that the
Atlantic trade “marked a radical break in the history of Africa, most espe-
cially because it was a major influence in transforming African society.” As a
consequence of this evolution, enslavement on the continent increased, the
trade grew, and African societies themselves employed a growing number of
slaves, thus developing new modes of enslavement. For a more complete
elaboration of Lovejoy’s transformation thesis refer to his “Transformations
in Slavery” (1983). The issue of the responsibility of the Atlantic slave trade
for today’s Africa’s underdevelopment is still vigorously discussed (cf.
among others Manning 1990a, b; Klein 1990 and 1992; M’Bokolo 1998;
Rauzduel 1998).
11 This very special mode of reproduction of slaves, namely by warfare and
trade, which constitutes the central thesis of Meillassoux’s (1986) book, is
expressed by a subtle metaphor in the subtitle: “le ventre de fer et d’argent”.
12 In his descriptions of slaves as having completely internalised their subservi-
ent status and being incapable of developing thoughts of their own, Claude
Meillassoux (1986: 127f.; 318, 359) moves even beyond the position forward-
ed by Orlando Patterson (1982), who has been blamed for merely reproduc-
ing dominant ideology in his descriptions of slaves and slaves’ actions (cf.
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Glassman 1995: 136ff.). For the very same reason Frederick Cooper (1979:
110) expressed discomfort with certain aspects of the earlier work of
Meillassoux (1975a).
13 According to David B. Davis (1966: 33) these two characteristics of the slave
were already acknowledged by Roman law. While in most legal contexts the
slave was treated as a thing, in distinct cases, such as provision for preventing
the slave from being murdered, he was considered a person. Islamic
jurisprudence, while maintaining the divide between the slave as a thing and
as a person, later widened the number of circumstances in which slaves could
appear as legal persons. Nevertheless, despite becoming “the brother of the
freeman in Islam and before God” (Lewis 1990: 6), slaves remained discrimin-
ated against in many regards, e.g. they could testify, but their testimony had
only half of the weight of a freeman’s (cf. Brunschwig 1960: 26ff.).
14 This concern indeed takes up a major criticism Frederick Cooper (1979: 117)
expressed with regard to Africanist studies of slavery: “Africanists have tried
too hard to say what ‘rights’ slaves did or did not have or what the ‘status of
slaves’ in a particular society was, and not hard enough to analyse how such
rights and statuses became customary or how they changed.”
15 It has to be called to mind that until recently isolated cases of slave sales have
been reported from Mauritania, the most prominent case of which certainly
is the one of a woman sold on the market of Atar in 1980, an incident which
took place at the height of the confrontation between El Hor, Mauritania’s
first political organisation of former slaves and manumitted slaves and the
government, and resulted in strong national and international protests (cf.
Mercer 1982: 31f.).
16 In this feature slavery in Islamic societies differed from slavery in many
African societies which had no codified legal system. Although Islamic
jurisprudence, especially in the western Sahara, did not provide the institu-
tional support the state institutions in the US South did for the maintenance
of slavery, it remained a powerful source of reference for the masters. This
argument, however, does not mean that Islam has been a causative agent
shaping a distinct kind of slavery, as it appears in a number of writings (such
as Claude Meillassoux 1986). Rather the Qur\a¯n and numerous h. adı¯ts which
demanded that slaves be treated well and recommended manumission, but
did not question slavery (i.e. conversion of a slave to Islam was no reason for
manumission, cf. Brunschwig 1960; Lewis 1990: 5ff.), were used as a cultural
means by the masters to produce an ideology legitimising their rule. Howev-
er, this is a two-edged strategy. The two tendencies present in the Qur\a¯n
and further developed into a legal framework by the Islamic schools of
jurisprudence allow the oppressed to make the interpretation of Islam an
element in their struggles for social recognition (cf. Cooper 1981; see also
p. 262-265).
For an overview of Islamic jurisprudence concerning slavery refer to
Daumas (1883: 319-344), Schacht (1964: esp. 127ff.), Ibn Abî Zayd Al-
Qayrawânî (1983), Willis (1985a) and Lewis (1990).
17 Until today one of the most common conflicts between slaves and former
slaves and their masters or else former masters develops from quarrels
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involving the question who has the right to inherit from dead slaves: the
master or the children of the slave. Numerous such cases are documented by
SOS esclaves (1995) as well as the independent press of Mauritania. These
contemporary cases, concerning deceased slave women and men alike,
however, mark the definite break in master-slave relations more than
manifest how slavery is maintained. Those masters who now want to inherit
the few belongings of their deceased slaves want to profit a last time from an
estate that has lost most of its significance, and would be of no benefit with
regard to the slave’s descendants anyhow.
18 The case also shows how the bı¯z. a¯n effectively did not respect slave marriages
as legally valid. This contradicts Islamic jurisprudence, which respects slaves
as legal persons, though not endowed with full responsibility. However, as
subjects of their masters, they were allowed to conclude marriages (although
they could also be married contrary to their will by the master), and hence
should have had the right to enjoy their marital relation fully (cf. Schacht
1964: 127).
19 The Qur\a¯n is especially rigid in defining the circumstances allowing slavery
to arise: through war (against infidels) (4:94, 8:67) or by birth as a slave (cf.
Lewis 1990: 6). The enslavement of Muslims is hence banned and soon
became forbidden by Islamic jurisprudence. However, this point was often
not respected. What remained unquestioned, even by Sudanese Muslim
reformers wanting to restrict slavery, was that conversion of slaves after
(due) enslavement did not entail their manumission (cf. Barbour/Jacobs
1985: 130). Great emphasis is laid in the Qur\a¯n on the fact that masters
should do good unto their slaves and other dependents (4:36), that they may
not force female slaves into prostitution (24:33), and that freeing slaves is
recommended after war is over (47:4), as a break with pre-Islamic traditions
(90:13), as a penance for a broken oath (5:89) and the death of believers
fighting against you (4:92), and also for retracting a divorce (58:3). Freeing is
also described as the act of a truly pious person (2:177) and the master is
asked to share sustenance with his slaves (16:71). For a discussion of the
prescriptions of the Qur\a¯n with regard to slavery by a Mauritanian scholar
refer to Ahmed (1983: 26ff.)
20 Martin A. Klein (1993c: 189f.) portrays slave masters in the region of the
French Sudan as not having been able to suppress much of the emancipation
of their slaves after colonisation, but as having won another battle, that of
controlling the slaves’ past, i.e. maintaining the memory of their slave
ancestry and estate.
21 The settling of runaway slaves in new villages was difficult first of all because
these people lacked almost all means of production and at best were only
able to start cultivation directly after their arrival in the new area, which
meant they had to wait almost half a year until their first harvest. During this
time, they had to find other means to secure their survival. These problems
runaway slaves had to overcome contributed decisively to the development
of a free labour market in the Sudan and in the peanut-basin of Senegal (cf.
Roberts 1988: 287ff.; Moitt 1989; Klein 1993c: 182ff.).
Lee V. Cassanelli (1988: 321f.) describes how runaway slaves formed
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independent villages in Italian Somalia. While the first villages thus built
were inhabited by former slaves of like ethnic origin, those founded later, i.e.
th at the turn of the 20 century were occupied by runaway slaves of diverse
ethnic origins who identified themselves as ex-slaves of various Somali clans.
Within these villages principles of seniority developed, which granted the
first settlers control over resources like land and political power. The
resulting disadvantages for newcomers are responsible for the successive
development of many small villages inhabited by groups of runaway slaves
who had settled together.
22 In fact by far not all slaves were exploited in economic terms. Some were
integrated into the state apparatus, where they often occupied important
positions, or as what is probably the most prominent example, the Mamluks
of Egypt, shows, became themselves the rulers of a state (cf. Hunwick 1992:
17; Patterson 1979: 42f.).
23 Until today the volume edited by Claire C. Robertson and Martin A. Klein
(1983) remains to my knowledge the only comprehensive approach to the
question apart from local studies such as e.g. the one by Claire Oxby (1978),
Aurelia Martìn (1991) and Marcia Wright (1993).
24 In these features, these societies fit a Marxist interpretation of what constitu-
tes a slave society: “the most significant distinguishing feature of a given
mode of production is not so much how the bulk of the labour of production
is done, as how the dominant propertied classes, controlling the conditions of
production, ensure the extraction of the surplus which makes their leisured
existence possible.” (De St. Croix 1988: 20, original emphasis) However, as
the bı¯z. a¯n case will show, things are not always as neatly to be discerned, and
hence the demographic significance of slavery, though being no theoretical
device, comes to be an appropriate means to discern different kinds of
slavery (cf. Klein 1993c: 172).
25 Indeed the great camel caravans were constituted in the north of the country,
especially in the trade towns and the Adrar, which was the western Sahara’s
link with the north, i.e. Morocco. More to the south, in the Tagant and the
Gebla regions, caravans were much smaller, and trade was more decentrali-
sed (cf. Webb 1995: 61).
26 Indeed little is known about this group, whose name recurs in different
contexts. E.g. a distinct group of date-palm workers in the oasis of Tidjikja is
also called ^ag˙za¯zı¯r. Even more scarce is information on other bı¯z. a¯n salt
mines. The earth-salt dug at Tîchît e.g. seems to have been extracted by free
people of a distinct group, the Masna, but perhaps these employed slave
workers too. In the Trarza there were also earth salt deposits, which seem to
have played an important role in the region’s history, but even less is known
about their exploitation than is about the Tîchît case (cf. McDougall 1990:
248ff.).
27 Similar structures of complementary production patterns linked by relations
of servility are found among the Tuareg and their slaves (cf. Olivier de
Sardan 1976: 26ff.).
28 These literal meanings of the two h. assa¯niyya terms have entered the French
discourses of Moors in Mauritania, in both newspapers and academic
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writing. There su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n appear often as “Maures noirs” and “Maures
blancs”.
29 The term kwa¯r might be derived from the North African ka¯fir, designating
the unbelieving (cf. Aguade/Meouak 1993).
30 This latter etymology is something of a paradox, for the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Sahara
cultivate by the hoe, not by the plough.
31 Such groups, representing a kind of a h. ara¯t.ı¯n nobility, effectively existed in bı¯-
z. a¯n society. In the Adrar a number of h. ara¯t.ı¯n own written manumission
contracts which are already 200 years old (Pierre Bonte, personal communi-
cation 1994). Among the Ahel Swayd Ah. med h. ara¯t.ı¯n were among the closest
counsellors of the ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar (deceased in
1982). And h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Kunta living in the Tamourt en-Naaj on the Tagant
plateau claim to descend from independent workers who lived in the nearby
former Kunta trade town Kasr el Barka. Such distinctions are taken up by El
Keihel Ould Mohamed El Abd (1986: 28), who makes a distinction between
independent populations that became h. ara¯t.ı¯n and imported slaves that did
so, calling the former “Noirs Maures” and the latter “Maures Noirs”. While
it can be affirmed that there existed a kind of a h. ara¯t.ı¯n nobility in precolonial
bı¯z. a¯n society, there is also a recent trend to describe a growing number of
independent groups of low status as h. ara¯t.ı¯n of free origin (cf. Brhane 1997a:
58ff., 78f.). This use of the term h. ara¯t.ı¯n helps to affirm the representation of
bı¯z. a¯n society as marked by a bipolarity between h. ara¯t.ı¯n (or else su¯da¯n in the
terminology adopted here) and bı¯z. a¯n, which is less and less embarrassed by
social groups not fitting into this scheme.
32 Among the Fulbe of Boobola, who also owned slaves (maccubbe) and who
called the manumitted slaves riimaaybe the latter term is reported to have
received a new meaning recently. While riimaaybe used to be a euphemism
among Fulbe freemen speaking of both former slaves and manumitted slaves,
there now are Fulbe stating that the term does not mean “those to whom we
gave birth” but “we have grown together” (cf. Diallo 1997: 103).
33 Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 59, note 39) remarks that the use of “akh. al” in
order to refer to su¯da¯n might be a recent evolution of h. assa¯niyya language
which does not imply a reference to phenotype but to distinct race and
therefore can also designate black Africans. This contradicts an earlier
finding of Catherine Taine-Cheikh (1989a: 97) stating that this adjective is
not used in h. assa¯niyya to describe human beings.
34 Several su¯da¯n interviewees in the region of Achram-Diouk presented the su¯-
da¯n living at Daber (the former location of the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould
Bakkar’s main camp on the Tagant) as all being na¯nme and hence subservient
to and dependent on the bı¯z. a¯n.
35 The feminine form of ^abd can be derived regularly from the masculine form
and hence is ^abda (cf. Wehr 1976: 586).
36 These conclusions are based on written documents, which admittedly use
classical Arabic and not h. assa¯niyya. Within this corpus of sources the term
kwa¯r occurs as well, but often in an adjectival form and only for distinguish-
ing prominent bı¯z. a¯n figures who have a close relationship with people of
black African ethnic groups (cf. Taylor 1996: 37, note 1).
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37 The list of references to descriptions of bı¯z. a¯n social hierarchy is long, as
almost all works dedicated to aspects of bı¯z. a¯n society provide an introduc-
tion to this topic. Certainly the most important works in this respect are
Ahmed Lamine Ech Chenguiti (1953, which includes a description of bı¯z. a¯n
th society at the end of the 19 century written by a zwa¯ya emigrant to Egypt
to introduce his country and people to members of his host society) and the
colonial ethnologist Paul Marty (1919, 1920, 1921a,b). New perceptions of bı¯-
z. a¯n society were shaped by Pierre Bonte (1979, 1987a, 1991, 1997, 1998c),
Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1985a, 1991a,b, 1997), Charles C. Stewart
(1972, 1973) and Harry T. Norris (1960, 1968, 1972, 1986). Recently the
debate on the characteristics of bı¯z. a¯n society has been reanimated and fuelled
by new evidence by Rainer Oßwald (1986, 1993), Mariella Villasante-de
Beauvais (1995, 1997, 1998), Raymond Taylor (1995, 1996), Timothy
Cleaveland (1995), Glen W. McLaughlin (1997), Meskerem Brhane (1997a)
and Urs Peter Ruf (1995).
38 Part of the strategies to portray this tripartite order as invariable are mythical
narratives. One such tradition refers to the Almoravid leader Bou Bakkar
ben Amar (died 1087). While fighting against the blacks of the south this
historical figure is presented as having taken the decision to divide his
followers into three groups, one specialising in warfare, one in religious
scholarship and one working manually (cf. Norris 1972: 154, note F; Amilhat
1937: 45). Another tradition, focusing especially on the establishment of a
hierarchy between h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya, locates the definitive establishment of
a hierarchical order among the three status groups at the war of Šurr Bubba,
which is reported to have taken place from 1644-74. However, this event,
which opposed two bı¯z. a¯n coalitions in the Gebla region (one led first of all
by zwa¯ya and one by h. assa¯n), hardly had the character of an ethnic confron-
tation between zwa¯ya Berbers and h. assa¯n Arab invaders (members of both
ethnic affiliations could be found on either side of the two opposing groups),
nor did its regional character allow the shaping of h. assa¯n-zwa¯ya relations in
all of the vast bı¯z. a¯n territory. Rather the confrontation was part of a struggle
for the control of the economy of the Senegal valley at the start of the trade
with European merchants at Saint-Louis (cf. Ruf 1995: 108ff.; for different
strains of interpretation refer to Stewart 1972: 378f.; Ould Cheikh 1985a:
830-964; Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 153ff.; Marty 1919: 60; Norris 1960)
39 Bı¯z. a¯n traditions, which were strengthened and underscored by colonial
ethnologists, portray an initial ethnic divide of bı¯z. a¯n society. Here the
h. assa¯n are descendants of Arab invaders who continued to migrate into the
th western Sahara from the 15 century on and defeated the Berber (S. anha¯gˇa)
population. The latter, once beaten, are supposed to have given up warfare
and as a consequence converted to peaceful religious scholarship (for an
overview of these traditions refer to Villasante-de Beauvais 1997: 592-611).
This reconstruction of the past in ethnic terms, however, is not convincing,
not only as far as theoretical assumptions about the nature of inter-ethnic
interaction are concerned but also with regard to empirical facts. First, the
in-migration of Arab tribes into the western Sahara, which continued over
centuries, is unlikely to have produced a direct and violent confrontation,
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but suggests slowly changing patterns of interaction. Second, the Idaw^I¯š, a
major h. assa¯n tribe, have a Berber and not an Arab ancestry. What indeed
took place after the arrival of Arab groups was an increasing Arabisation of
the western Sahara, including an Arabisation of tribal genealogies (cf. Ruf
1995: 104-115).
40 Derived from the Arabic root T. LB, meaning search, quest, pursuit, from
which is also derived the word meaning student (cf. Wehr 1976: 563f.).
41 The word is derived from the Arabic root TWB, meaning to repent, do
penance, be penitent (cf. Wehr 1976: 98).
42 Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (1997) argues that the occurrence of this less
rigid social order is specific to the eastern regions of the bı¯z. a¯n territory as
opposed to a more complete evolution of rigid patterns of hierarchy in the
Gebla and the Adrar. While this assumption is tempting, for it allows new
interpretations to be added to older ones without the need for a reassessment
of the latter, it should nevertheless be dismissed. Raymond Taylor (1996), on
th the basis of bı¯z. a¯n documents from the 19 century, draws convincingly a
picture of Gebla society marked both by social mobility and shifting ethnic
identities. Useful insights into how perceptions of the social order, and
especially the status of zwa¯ya vis-à-vis the h. assa¯n continued to be debated in
th precolonial times from the 16 century on, are also given by Rainer Oßwald
(1993).
43 The common distinction was between zwa¯ya of the sun, i.e. zwa¯ya who did
not have to pay tributes to h. assa¯n, who in return provided protection, and
zwa¯ya of the shade who did pay such tributes (cf. Norris 1968: 15).
44 This perception is highlighted by Ahmed Mahmoud Ould Mûdi, a leading
member of the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d, who was interviewed on the issue of this
tribe’s characteristics by Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (1997: 594; see also
Ould Cheikh 1985a: 443).
45 Lah. me is considered to be a less pejorative name for the tributary groups and
persons than zna¯ga (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1997: 608). The Arab etymol-
ogy of lah. me needs attention. The verbal form derived from the root H. LM
refers to “mend, patch, weld, solder (up) s.th.”, and hence presents the
lah. me/zna¯ga as the base of bı¯z. a¯n society and evokes the idea of solidarity
among the different orders (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985a: 399). The noun derived
from the same root indeed is less romantic. Meaning “flesh, meat” it unmis-
takably hints at the major occupation of the tributaries: raising livestock
(Wehr 1976: 861).
46 One of the most prominent examples of such an ascension from tributary to
master are the Idaw^I¯š, one branch of which, the Abakak, later led the
emirate of Tagant (cf. Amilhat 1937: 58ff.; Ould Cheikh 1991a: 110; Miské
1970: 110). Raymond Taylor (1996: 149-194) provides a detailed study of
how the emiral power in the Gebla depended on support from tributary
tribes, which, outnumbering the small h. assa¯n elites by far, managed to take
advantage of conflicts among competing h. assa¯n lineages by shifting alliances
or threatening their overlords with a change of allegiance. Abdel Wedoud
Ould Cheikh (1997) recently criticised some of these conclusions for being
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too strongly committed to the paradigms of segmentation theory and
neglecting the centralisation of political power in the hands of the ^amı¯rs.
47 Major aspects of discursive strategies vis-à-vis the zna¯ga and the valuation of
their status are found in the following interview with a h. art.a¯ni:
Author: What is the difference between a zna¯ga and a h. assa¯n?
BOS: This is a huge difference. The zna¯ga have no origin [as.l], they have
no status [nasab], they are not recognised. You have to know there are true
zna¯ga and those where you cannot be sure about their true status. Their
behaviour shows that they are zna¯ga, but nobody knows where they come
from. One doesn’t know whether they are zwa¯ya or h. assa¯n. In the times of
the battles and wars, then people had to leave their tribes and had to go to
other ones. Then nobody knows about the status [these people had]. There
[within the other tribe] you started to do the work of a zna¯ga. Before you
could have been a šarı¯v, or a h. assa¯n, but this is not known. However, you
continued to do the work of a zna¯ga. . . . These people have a secret. (Inter-
view Brahim Ould Soueilim, h. art.a¯ni, 26.8.1995)
48 Among the igga¯wen the women play a harp (ardı¯n), and the men a lute (tidi-
nı¯t). Both sing, though they veil their mouths every time their voices rise.
The topics of their songs, which today have become an important means of bı¯-
z. a¯n identification, cover a wide range, from praising and mocking to topics
associated with sexuality (cf. Guignard 1975; Norris 1968).
49 A few interviewees did not want their statements to be documented on tape.
In these cases extensive notes were taken and also later transcribed.
50 These efforts surely are exemplary of the pitfalls of intercultural communica-
tion. While I always admired the oral memory of my su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n
friends, the latter, basing their methodology of “teaching” h. assa¯niyya on
such skills were annoyed by my inability to match up to their expectations.
I on the other hand missed the kind of a textbook that until then had accom-
panied my learning of foreign languages.
Chapter 2
1 For the most concise presentation of Norbert Elias’ arguments against the
static impetus of “social change” see Elias (1977).
2 The present chapter owes much of its inspiration to seminars and colloquia
held by Prof. Dr. Karen Knorr-Cetina, Dr. Stefan Hirschauer and Dr. Claus
Amman at the University of Bielefeld, all discussing new trends in ethnogra-
phy as well as their publications (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1991; Hirschauer/Amann
1997).
3 Mark Hobart (1997: 12) formulated one of the most trenchant critiques of
anthropology. To him “much of what we wish to convey by ‘understanding’
anyway is closer to ‘recognition’, the mutual, but momentary and situated,
appreciation of difference.” In fact there hardly ever is complete understand-
ing, but if this is true of the dialogue with other cultures, it is also essentially
true of any communication. For this reason, understanding is not to be
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negated, provided one is aware of its partiality, its momentary and contesta-
ble nature.
4 The idea of the anthropologist being passively permeated by the foreign
culture is no longer maintained as the constituting dogma of anthropology,
and other core assumptions are also under severe criticism; e.g. the method-
ology of participant observation constitutes a permanent shift from the
inside to the outside, that if taken by the letter would constitute a paradox.
Participant observation therefore should be interpreted in terms of herme-
neutics (cf. Clifford 1988: 15).
5 There has been and still is a lively debate on the post-modern challenge (cf.
Alexander 1992) to ethnography, dealing first of all with questions of the
construction of ethnographic authority (cf. Clifford 1988), the epistemologi-
cal consequences of the relation between textual representation and field-
work (cf. Agar 1990) and the question of writing ethnography in times of an
“epistemological hypochondria” (cf. Geertz 1988: 71).
6 Mark Hobart stresses the partial character of field research when stating that
most communication the anthropologist performs is confined to people to be
considered as “organic” intellectuals in the Gramscian sense (personal
communication, 12 May 1997, at Bielefeld Workshop on Ethnography and
Lifestyles). These people, often outsider themselves, rationalise their society
in a way communicable to the western-trained anthropologist. Their dis-
course is much like the scientific discourse, and translation – understood as
taking place between different types of logic and reasoning – thus is
minimised.
7 As the interview was held in French, Badeyn here used the term “noir”.
8 Long periods of apprenticeship are common for novices in trade and other
occupations like driving trucks. It took my driver Nanna Ould El Vaida six
years of work as an apprentice with a truck driver before the latter helped
him get a driving licence.
9 The unusual character of this religious knowledge among people of slave of
origin is revealed through the fact that during the entire period of fieldwork,
I only became aware of three cases of slaves/h. ara¯t.ı¯n who had participated in
traditional religious education.
10 The zaka¯t is the tithe for the poor prescribed by Islam and paying it used to
be a privilege of the free. However, former slaves often lack the knowledge
of how to determine the amount of zaka¯t and it is the masters who are the
beneficiaries (cf. p. 263-265). Freed slaves continuing to pay the zaka¯t to their
former masters after having gained independence subsequent to the First
World War are also reported by Roberts (1988: 296) from the Banamba area
in Mali.
11 Approximately 40 kg, the mu¯d being a measure of capacity whose weight
equivalent varies greatly throughout Mauritania; in the Tagant/Aftout
Region one mu¯d is equivalent to 4 kg. For the different measurements of the
mu¯d refer to Pierret (1948: 185).
12 According to his mother, this dam was first constructed in 1975. Whatever
the exact date may be, the case fits well the general tendency in the region to
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increase agricultural production after the partial destruction of the livestock
sector due to the severe drought in 1969.
13 I use this term following the convention of livestock classification in French
literature. In Mauritania sheep and goats are commonly subsumed under the
term lg˙nem, and not distinguished in most contexts. This although – taken
for granted numbers of livestock attaining the herd level (100 to 200 head) –
goats and black and white sheep were watered at different times of the day,
in order not to mix up the species. Today preferences with regard to the
different species are changing, favouring to some extent goats for being more
resistant to poor pasture than sheep. Today most families in the rural areas
own just a few animals. These, together with other people’s animals, are led
to pasture by children who assemble both sheep and goats in these herds
thus making of the lg˙nem  a true entity.
14 The preference for a high share of females in the herds of pastoral nomads is
well known. In this context it nevertheless becomes significant in a second
way: the obligation to pay the herder did not specify whether he should be
given a male or a female animal. Most logically the owner of the herd too
wanted to maximise his stock, hence the herder in most cases was remunera-
ted with male animals. This is the reason why male to female exchanges were
essential to the creation and perpetuation of the dependent’s livestock.
15 Interviewees used to call the colonial tax on livestock ^ašu¯r, although the
French had a different term for this tax, namely zekat, thus alluding to the
alms tax prescribed by Islam (zaka¯t). The tax on livestock, measuring one
tenth of the animals’ assumed value, replaced in the colony of Mauritania the
poll tax common in all other regions of French West Africa (A.O.F.). A
colonial tax called ^ašu¯r existed as well, but concerned one tenth of agricul-
tural production. Unlike the zekat it was collected only irregularly and was
suppressed as early as in 1940 (cf. Toupet 1959: 103).
16 This is a euphemism used frequently by bı¯z. a¯n to speak of their slave. In
employing the nisba -ı¯ a relation to a place or proprietor is expressed, e.g. the
master is speaking of “his” h. art.a¯ni. For an elaboration of the nisba as a
variable category of social identification in Moroccan society refer to
Clifford Geertz (1977: 487ff.).
17 During the years 1994-1995, the price of one mu¯d was about 100 UM in sales
of peasants to traders at the time of harvest. The approximate value of the
millet involved here therefore is about 12,500 UM, or about four goats, quite
a significant sum.
18 Colonel Ould Haidalla indeed decreed the official abolition of slavery on
5 July 1980 during his first year in office and legislation was passed in
November 1981. The famous national radio broadcast condemning slavery in
question here, however, was on 5 July 1983 (Brahim’s mother Zeyneb’s
memory seems to be more accurate, cf. p. 62). This public discourse was
initiated by the removal from office of a judge who had refused to apply the
new legislation on slavery (Mauritanie Nouvelles, nº 235, 23.1.1997: 8).
19 I.e. the master as the owner of the slave was also his legal tutor and hence
replaced the slave’s parents. Without permission of the slave master, no slave
could get married. It also was the slave master who was involved in setting
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the dowry and arranged the marriage ceremony. Slave parents could be
consulted, but until these days cases can be witnessed in which the master’s
will remains decisive for a marriage to be concluded or not (for the legal
aspects refer to Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî 1983: 173ff., 181).
20 According to Abdallahi Ould Youba Ould Khalifa (1991: 700) “the year of
the first banknote in Mauritania” was in 1919. An age of about seventy-five
at the time of the interview seems realistic to me. According to Khalifa Ould
Kebab, my research assistant, who worked for years as a basic health agent,
by “the year of the diseases” most probably an epidemic of syphilis is meant.
21 These grains are from Panicum turgidum, a meadow plant. It starts growing
with the first rain that appears, the grains are mature at the end of August (cf.
Ould Hamidoun 1952: 23).
22 This is Boscia senegalensis, which Mokhtar Ould Hamidoun (1952: 19)
describes as follows: “Arbre aux feuilles assez grandes, à l’écorce fibreuse;
inerme. Il produit des baies (mandyhagha) qui ressemblent un peu au café.
Les gens de basse classe les mangent après les avoir lavées et fait cuire. Ce
fruit et très nourrissant et sain en raison des matières grasses qu’il contient.”
23 Being big symbolises feminine beauty. In former times young girls were
forced to drink large amounts of fat milk and eat huge portions of millet –
often prepared by specialised slave women or h. art.aniyya – in order to grow
fat (a most detailed description of the cruelties imposed on a young noble
girl by a slave woman in former times is presented by Caillié [1830: 98f.],
another eye-witness account comes from Daniel Meyer [1959: 53f.]). While
in former times the custom was mainly restricted to the better off people,
and often restricted to the short period of unmarried women’s youth, the
custom nowadays is fading. Many young girls refuse to get fat, while many
other women of high status tend to retain a life-long cycle of fattening.
24 There are several Oued (wa¯d) Labiod, as well as places called Achram etc. in
the region of Tagant/Aftout.
25 According to the French model, which the Mauritanian educational system
is based on, access to higher education often is restricted to successful
participation in entry examinations. In early independent Mauritania this
concept permitted the ad hoc establishment of university level education,
while formally qualified adherents were still lacking. In addition as in the
case described, the system offered reintegration facilities to those once
excluded from the formal educational system.
26 As the interview was held mostly in French, the term “serviteur” employed
by Youba is adopted here. It is one of the numerous common euphemisms to
circumscribe “slave” and the condition of “slavery”.
27 In h. assa¯niyya “tent” [h˘
aima], is a synonym for family, e.g. one speaks of
descending from a good tent to indicate noble descent. Counting slave tents
like those of free people thus means to accept them as a families on a more or
less equal footing and to include them in the social community.
28 The mnih. a is a loan of use-rights that can be concluded according to
different conditions, e.g. as here for the duration of one rainy season. Often a
mnih. a is lent without a fixed time schedule, until the lender feels himself to
be in need of his property.
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29 H. ubs according to Islamic jurisprudence transfers property into a pious
endowment (cf. Oßwald 1993: 188f.; Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî 1983:
231ff.). In the bı¯z. a¯n context this is realised by a definitive loan of rights of
use, either limited through the lifetime of the proprietor or the beneficiary of
the loan. These arrangements most often concern palm trees, agricultural
plots or animals, but also slaves. The idea behind a h. ubs is that the property
in question becomes indivisible and inalienable. An animal under h. ubs thus
cannot be slaughtered (except if at risk of being wasted through natural
death), and agricultural plots cannot be divided amongst inheritors (Inter-
view Ahmed Ould ’Aly, qa¯d. i, 24.12.1995).
30 The Ougiya has been the bı¯z. a¯n unity of currency for a long time. Like in
other regions of Africa, in bı¯z. a¯n society money is counted in units of five.
The French Franc and later the Franc CFA (until its replacement by the UM
on the 29 June 1973) used to be counted in “Ougiyas”, with five Francs
being considered as one Ougiya.
31 During the regime of colonel Ould Haidalla the seat of the national iron ore
mining company (SNIM) was transferred from Nouakchott to Nouadhibou.
The former headquarters building of the company then was used to lodge
ministries.
32 This statement refers to the so-called “événements” of 1989, when after riots
against black Africans in Mauritania and bı¯z. a¯n in Senegal both countries
expelled a great number of people from these ethnic minorities (cf. p. 289f.).
33 Throughout the interview a su¯da¯n was sitting besides Youba. At an earlier
moment of the interview, he already had referred to him as the one of his
servants still with him. During the sequence concerning the plots for, and the
methods of cultivation, Youba was much helped by this servant to formulate
appropriate answers.
Metric measurements provided by the interviewees have to be taken
cautiously. The land flooded by the dams (barrages) and small dams
(diguettes) is not right-angled but depends on the shape the depressed area
has. Also the length of a dam does not determine the width and hence the
surface of the fields thus created. The A. dam has in fact a length of
1,100 metres, but the total size of inundated and hence cultivable land
measures only 67 ha.
34 Jonathon Glassman, although providing a profound critique of several
aspects of Meillassoux’s (1986) study, takes up and extends his central
distinction between estate and condition (in Glassman’s terminology, state).
“Meillassoux also emphasizes the contradiction between the absence of a
legal recognition of the slave’s personhood and the fact that it is the slave’s
very humanity that makes him valuable. Focusing on this contradiction as
the source of struggle is my own elaboration.” (Glassman 1991: 289; original
emphasis)
35 Martin A. Klein (1983: 77) notes that despite severe penalties slave flights had
always threatened African masters. After colonisation and the abolition of
slavery in 1848 the number of escapees grew even further, making of them a
major topic of correspondence between African rulers and French colonis-
ers.
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This was true for the Mauritanian context as well. Slaves left their masters
to seek protection from another master, or they fled to the adwaba (more or
less independent settlements of slaves). As late as 1940 bı¯z. a¯n complained to
the French administration about h. ara¯t.ı¯n (in this case more probably slaves,
^abı¯d, are meant) leaving the subdivision of Moudjéria for the plains of the
Gorgol, and wished to get them back (AT Colonie de la Mauritanie, Cercle
du Tagant, Résidence de Moudjéria, “fiche de renseignement tribu Torkoz”
n.d., document kindly passed on by Roger Botte). Even in 1953 a meeting of
local notables headed by the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, remarked to
the commandant de cercle on the lack of labour power, and the continuing
drain of labourers to the more southern regions of the colony (AM, Cercle
du Tagant, “Procès Verbal de la réunion du conseil des notables du Tagant”
29.6.1953).
Analogous examples are reported from the French archives of the Adrar at
Atar, e.g. slave women from Chinguetti fled to Atar, and slave men ran away
to the Assaba and Senegal Valley to engage in commerce and agriculture
(McDougall 1988: 373).
36 This is undeniably a rather simplistic characterisation of the economic
system induced by the colonial powers. In fact “free labour” was very much
a coloniser’s ideology – but rarely applied to Africans. For a long time,
coerced labour dominated the mode in which Africans were brought to
work (cf. Klein 1993c). Frederick Cooper (1996) presents a detailed study of
the hardships the French and the British colonists had in conceiving labour
in Africa and developing a coherent policy.
37 I am well aware that this line of argumentation follows the dominant, i.e. the
master’s ideology. Orlando Patterson (1979 and 1982) has been heavily
criticised for presenting this perspective as the somewhat emic perspective of
the slaves, and of declaring the master-slave dyad to be the essence of slavery
(cf. Glassman 1991 and 1995). This critique is right, but to explore slave
consciousness one has literally to “go through” these ideological representa-
tions. This in fact is done in a brilliant way by Jonathon Glassman, in his
critical evaluation of major contributions to the question of slavery.
38 According to the Ma¯liki school of Islamic jurisprudence, damage caused by a
slave had to be compensated by the master (cf. Brunschwig 1960: 229; for the
bı¯z. a¯n context: Ould Mohamed 1988: 100; Caratini 1989: 101). The matter is
also discussed by Patterson (1982: 204ff.), who stresses that this practice is of
pre-Islamic origin later rationalised by Islamic jurisprudence. A number of
sources, among them Patterson, attribute this practice to the Tuareg.
However, Claire Oxby, in her detailed study on a camp of Kel Ferwan
Tuareg, did not find any trace of the practice (cf. Oxby 1978: 203). An
account somewhat contradicting the bı¯z. a¯n practice applied to slaves comes
from René Caillié, who differentiated very well in his observations between
the different social groups, He reported this habit only with reference to the
tributaries, the zna¯ga (Caillié 1830: 155). Finally Ould Mohamed (1988: 37,
58, 100) tells with reference to a French administrator’s report of 1949 that
only the h. assa¯n regarded this slave action as resulting in a change of the
proprietor, and reports a council of zwa¯ya notables of the Ahel Ba¯rikalla and
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the Tandg˙a having taken the decision to ignore these actions in 1865, in
order to reduce the number of slave flights. The most concise information on
this practice comes from Oßwald (1993: 107), citing several bı¯z. a¯n legal
documents which recount cases of slaves having cut off a bı¯z. a¯n’s ear or that
of a bı¯z. a¯n’s horse, from 1901 Tîchît, 1859 Ouadâne, and an undated docu-
ment from Oualâta. According to these documents, slaves were not automat-
ically handed over to those mutilated, but often their masters preferred to
pay high fines, usually in guinée cloth.
39 Of course as an outsider, the slave had no protection from injury by a third
person than his estimated slave-value to the master, for a Muslim free man in
this case was not to be punished by the law of retaliation (cf. Ibn Abî Zayd
Al-Qayrawânî 1983: 249ff.).
40 Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1993: 185) cites a French administrator who
reported that he had met in 1942 a slave with burns so severe that they made
amputation necessary. The master declared he had wanted to prevent the
slave from fleeing by this measure.
Cruelty in the treatment of slaves is a sensitive matter. Human rights
activists such as Hecht (1997) blame Mauritania for tolerating the continu-
ance of practices such as the “camel treatment”, the “insect treatment” and
others. Whilst in no way sympathetic to many of the bı¯z. a¯n masters’
attitudes, however, I have to stress, I was not told of any such case.
41 This is an aspect Pierre Bonte (1993: 71) recently has focused on. He deals
with an early period of colonial administration in the Adrar region, where
the French had re-established one of the bı¯z. a¯n emirates. This ^amı¯r, for
different reasons, started in 1932 to oppose the colonial power by arms. He
failed after an unexpectedly short period and found very little support from
the Adrar population – he had misconceived the important social change that
had already taken place. But the administrators too had no less trouble in
establishing and keeping their system of indirect rule running – for many
remained prisoners of their static colonial-ethnographic misperception of
bı¯z. a¯n society.
42 The French army behaved very much like their Sudanese enemies during the
conquest of what was later French West Africa (A.O.F.). Its troops, the
“tirailleurs”, were largely recruited among slaves, and during the war most
prisoners were distributed among the French allies, the officers and soldiers;
indeed even the slave trade was encouraged (cf. Klein 1993c: 176ff.).
43 According to various reports the living conditions in these villages were very
much like those they had experienced among their former masters. The aim
of the “villages de liberté” was largely to weaken the enemies of the French
by creaming off some of their servile labour force, and put the latter to use as
a coercible pool of labour. The success remained limited, since many of those
few who did come to the villages merely used them as an outpost for another
flight (cf. Roberts 1988: 284ff.; Ould Cheikh 1993: 187; De Chassey 1984:
92). Even long times after establishing their colonial rule the French had an
at best ambivalent position towards the use of coerced labour. Only in 1937
did the Popular Front finally take the decision to ratify the 1930 ILO
Convention on forced labour (cf. Cooper 1996: 91).
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44 Kiffa, today Mauritania’s third largest city, was until the big drought of 1969
inhabited predominantly by su¯da¯n, some of them were categorised as “clan
Khadara” (meaning the “green” and used as a synonym for h. ara¯t.ı¯n) by the
French administration and allotted some fields in 1936 (cf. Villasante-de
Beauvais 1991: 194).
45 Two factors influenced a significant restructuring of the Mauritanian
labour-market; first the creation of the MIFERMA, the iron-ore mine in the
northern desert region of the country, which necessitated much wage labour
for its construction as well as an extensive infrastructure (railway to the
coast, roads, buildings etc.; cf. e.g. Anonymous 1996), and second the
construction of the capital Nouakchott, located on a spot near the coast with
only some hundred inhabitants in 1957. The big drought in 1969 gave the
definitive kick to an already massive urbanisation process focusing heavily
on the capital. Today out of an estimated 2.1 million Mauritanians an
estimated 700,000 live in Nouakchott.
46 Fieldwork in an area of emigration inevitably brings to the fore those cases
where people stay or come back. Narratives of family history or the life of
friends nevertheless tell of numerous slaves leaving the zone. Often the
economic feasibility of the master-slave relationship had ceased due to
external influences and emigration seemed to be the most promising alterna-
tive for survival.
47 Ahmed Salem Ould Salik Liman, a warrior-poet of the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d,
th living at the end of the 19 century, is reported to have once manumitted a
h
˘
a¯dem for a very peculiar reason. On the occasion of the camp changing its
location, the slave woman had been left behind in order to pack some very
heavy tents onto a camel, and then follow the others to the new camp-place.
Soon after she was left alone, some visitors arrived, and the h
˘
a¯dem slaugh-
tered the camel to fulfil the obligations of hospitality. Ahmed Salem,
wondering why his slave did not turn up, returned and found her with the
tents, but unable to proceed in transport, because she had sacrificed the
camel in honour of the visitors. Ahmed Salem liberated her on the spot,
because what she had done could only be done by someone with a warrior’s
nobility. While this legendary account has been interpreted as one praising
the generosity of the warrior-poet (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 217f.), a
second reading is possible too. The obligation of Ahmed Salem to manumit
the h
˘
a¯dem (undoubtedly a result of his deep commitment to the morality of
paternalism), was the result of the slave woman’s obvious ability to behave
not like a slave, but honourably and responsibly like a noble warrior.
Manumission in this constellation is hence a way of acknowledging a slave’s
qualities.
48 Meskerem Brhane reports a case of an escaped slave’s son, who managed to
trace his father’s master’s family on the Tagant. Both sides insist that they are
now like brothers, and have the same rights. Their fathers, i.e. those related
to the fact of slavery, are dead, and the fact it once existed is taken simply as
a reminder of how the two families now allied once became connected; but is
not considered to be a constituent of their present interrelation (cf. Brhane
1997a: 141ff.).
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49 The case illustrates very well the aspect stressed by Orlando Patterson (1982:
63). Fictive kinship is either “adoptive” or “quasi-filial”, and these ties
“involve genuine assimilation by the adopted person of all the claims,
privileges, powers, and obligations of the status he or she has been ascribed.
Fictive kin ties that are quasi-filial are essentially expressive: they use the
language of kinship as a means of expressing an authority relation between
master and slave, and a state of loyalty to the kinsmen of the master.”
Though this characterisation emphasising the fundamental opposition
between the two concepts is revealing, the structures of alliances as practised
in Arab societies reveal a large number of ambiguities as well (cf. Conte
1991, Bonte/Conte 1991).
50 A bı¯z. a¯n of noble descent, directly linked to the prophet Muhammad’s
family, in standard Arabic “šarı¯f” (cf. Wehr 1976: 467).
51 The abolition of slavery by colonel Ould Haidalla was embedded in the
general project of the application of the šarı¯^a. Legal advice was sought from
experts before proclaiming the decree of abolition. Thus the masters’ rights
of proprietorship of their slaves were acknowledged, and they were consid-
ered to be compensated. This latter aspect of the decree in fact was never
applied. Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1993: 191) notes the irony of a slave
liberation bound to the establishment of the law of retaliation.
52 It has already been suggested that the pace of change towards freedom was
more rapid for men than women. “Men more often had formal education
and wage-paying jobs open to them, whereas women remained in labor-in-
tensive work.” (Klein/Robertson 1983: 17) The present example shows this
to be more an outcome of a society’s gender structure and its transposition
onto slaves.
53 Brahim recounts that the first of his brothers left for the towns in 1982. The
eldest of these brothers might have been about the same age as the master’s
son, as it was Zeyneb who nursed him.
54 Animals could be lent, e.g. under the terms of mnih. a, so that animal numbers
with the household did not necessarily correspond to the numbers belonging
to a family (cf. for the Tuareg and the problems of raising exact data on herd
sizes Klute 1992: 131; Falkenstein 1995: 210). Granaries hence had to be
guarded against theft. Nevertheless in former times, as several interviewees
mentioned, millet sometimes was hidden by putting it in holes dug in the
earth.
One example of the times of the old ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar,
reported in Daber on the Tagant plateau, confirms the difficulties slaves
wanting to save a part of their harvest had to face. Daouda’s father wanted to
give his old mother a donkey. Directly after the harvest he bought the animal
with some of his millet and sent it to his mother in Kehmeit. When the ^amı¯r
came to collect his share in the harvest, no sign of the transaction remained,
and hence the ^amı¯r had no reason to doubt his slave’s honesty. This strategy
failed in a second attempt following an especially good harvest. Of 600 mu¯d
Daouda’s father hid 200 mu¯d. The ^amı¯r, however, took all 400 mu¯d his slave
presented him and, after having been told by somebody that there was some
more millet hidden, later returned to take off all the rest (Interview Daouda
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Ould Haroun, h. art.a¯ni, Daber, 19.12.1995). Besides throwing a light on
Daouda’s political attitudes, the two stories throw a light on the legitimacy
and illegitimacy of different kinds of slave belongings.
55 Not all adwaba were exclusively inhabited by su¯da¯n. Many interviewees in
Daber on the Tagant stated – although not univocally – that there were bı¯z. a¯n
living among them in the adabay. This might have resulted either from bı¯z. a¯n
supervising su¯da¯n as already reported by René Caillié (1830: 133ff.), or as
can be observed nowadays, of impoverished bı¯z. a¯n choosing to live among
the su¯da¯n. The adabay therefore are not necessarily equivalent to independ-
ent su¯da¯n settlements with emancipatory aspirations, but can also be a kind
of a satellite camp.
56 Changes in the slave’s condition following marriage are reported of different
societies practising slavery: “Most slaves ‘born in the house’ were permitted
after marriage to farm for themselves. A fixed sum was paid every year for
each man, woman, and child.” (Klein 1983: 76)
57 In nomadic societies the co-residence of a couple was often the exception
rather than the rule. Men herding animals like camels, those engaged in
learning or warfare, or men engaged in business like caravan-trade were
absent from their household or tent for a large part of the year (cf. for the
Tuareg Spittler 1989b: 77ff.). While slave couples were often hindered from
living together at all, separation among free couples resulted from the men
participating in more or less self-determined and above all temporary tasks.
58 There are legal traditions which confer to the male slave’s master the
obligation to sustain his slave’s spouse. But this right was more or less
theoretical, for it was bound to the condition of the couple living together –
a right slave couples were often denied. If ever this happened, and the slave
man’s master contributed to the bringing up of the slave couple’s children,
he had the right to be compensated for his efforts by the legal owner of the
children, the slave woman’s master (cf. Ould Mohamed 1988: 60f.).
59 The reverse case was also possible; slaves could be well treated, and e.g. be
promised their manumission by their master (one common agreement was to
provide liberty upon the death of the master). But once his former mentor
was dead, the slave found himself confronted with the master’s heirs, not
necessarily prepared to acknowledge the slave’s claims for the fulfilment of
his dead master’s last will. If written testimony was lacking, the slave had
hardly any chance of experiencing the manumission he had been promised.
Such a case was reported from the village of Achoueibir, and Brahim in his
narrative stressed the point too, when he remarked that he got a second copy
of his manumission contract, one for his masters (and descendants) and one
for his family and himself.
60 The first marriage in bı¯z. a¯n society should result from the parents’ preferen-
ces. Under such circumstances, these marriages are concluded in terms of the
classical preferential patterns, e.g. with the patrilateral parallel cousin or
members of same status group. However, divorce is frequent, and subse-
quent marriages are ruled by individual preferences rather than group
aspirations (cf. Tauzin 1984a: 89). The first marriage among the free thus
marks a step out of parental hegemony. This clearly is not the case among
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slaves. As the example of Badeyn’s first spouse shows, living a marriage
among slaves depends on the masters’ approval to continue, and thus never
completely loses its precarious character.
61 The point that property within the family was attributed individually to
every member was stressed by several su¯da¯n interviewees.
62 Property is individual, but exploitation of livestock nevertheless is organised
by the chief of the family managing the animals collectively, as one of the
few important livestock-owners in the region of Achram-Diouk explained:
“We have 20 to 40 camels, these are for the whole family, my brothers, my
father and me. Everything we have is regarded as belonging to the whole
family, even if it’s owned individually. Even the animals of the father are
treated alike, it is considered as being of the family’s, and his sons will have
nothing.” (Interview Mohammed Sid’Ahmed, 13.9.1995). Or in other words,
unless a proprietor has constituted his own tent, his animals will be managed
together with all others of the tent he belongs to. Often individual members
of the family are assigned animals from childhood on. Men build up the herd
that will be the nucleus of their own animal possession once they establish a
household separated from their parents after marriage in a sort of pre-inheri-
tance. Women too can own livestock. Often animals owned before marriage
remain with the woman’s own family; otherwise they are joined to the
family herd, but assigned to the woman. These animals thus constitute a sort
of individual relief property in case the marriage fails and the woman returns
to her parents. A more important part of feminine wealth is constituted by
jewellery (cf. Tauzin 1984a: 88ff.; Caratini 1989: 52ff., 86).
Chapter 3
1 Jonathon Glassman (1995) sums up in the title “no words of their own” his
major criticism of Claude Meillassoux’s (1986) work on slavery in Africa.
2 According to Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh the word “na¯nme” is of Berber
origin, and the meaning unknown to him. Albert Leriche (1955: 175) refers
to the znagui (former Berber language, spoken in the western Sahara) term of
“en-anem”, meaning adaptation, becoming accustomed to a family. These
slaves, according to Leriche, are supposed to descend from ancient slaves of
the times of the Almoravid ^amı¯r Abu¯ Bakr ben ^Umar, or else Bou Bakkar
ben Amar (died 1087 AD). Therefore their genealogy is supposed to be
known and their sale is forbidden. I personally, like Abdel Wedoud Ould
Cheikh, never encountered this definition smelling so heavily the masters’
ideology, and controverted by M’Barke’s experiences. A second designation
for slaves, tila¯d (root TLD), is of Arab origin. However, I did not witness its
use in the region of my fieldwork. Like na¯nme, tila¯d carries the idea of an
ancient possession (cf. Ould Cheikh 1993: 183; Wehr 1976: 96). Albert
Leriche (1955: 176), whose description of bı¯z. a¯n terminology of status groups
is flawed by subsuming h
˘
a¯dem (slave woman) under the category of
tributary people, proposes for this case the meaning of inherited slaves.
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3 I met one other old slave woman, of a zwa¯ya tribe too, who confessed she
had been denied the right to marry by her masters (“the bı¯z. a¯n did not make
a t.bal [marriage ceremony] for the su¯da¯n.” Interview Boye Mint Ahmeide,
6.2.1996). In most of the cases however the marriage was reported to have
been celebrated in accord with or even with the support of the masters. The
problem of legitimate marriage among slaves is less one of assuming the same
rights as the bı¯z. a¯n, but of having legitimate children. This was obvious when
I tried to look up some su¯da¯n men I met once before by asking people. These
men were recognised by other inhabitants of the village only by their first-
or nickname, while the father’s names these interviewees had told me (Ould:
“son of”) were unknown.
4 Rza¯^a seems to be a dialectal form of rid. a¯^a, translated as “foster relation-
ship”, whereas the verbal form of the root RD. ^ refers to sucking and nursing
at the breast (cf. Wehr 1976: 344).
5 This statement is somewhat paradoxical, for neither the Qur\a¯n nor the
jurists explicitly assign men this predominant place with regard to the
establishment of milk-kinship. Rather the jurists take great care to scrupu-
lously list all possible relations prohibited according to this kind of relation
(cf. Héritier 1994: 323f.). The ambivalence of this is revealed by milk-kinship
thus becoming either more strictly integrated into the patrilineal model of
filiation, as well as being made legally acceptable and valid. In bı¯z. a¯n practice,
the male line of milk-kinship, however, is of no significance. It rather is
believed that all bodily fluids (blood, semen, and milk), are supposed to
establish parental relations (cf. Meskerem Brhane, personal correspondence
22.1.1998). This vision is likely to be inspired by classical Arab humoral
medicine, which was in turn derived from ancient Greek traditions and has
been widely disseminated in bı¯z. a¯n society. Therefore bodily fluids and their
circulation play a major role in the constitution of health and illness (cf.
Ould Ahmedou, E.G. 1990: 98f.).
6 The root H. RM stands for “forbidden, prohibited, interdicted; taboo; holy
sacred, sacrosanct; s.th. sacred, sacred object; sacred possession; wife;
sanctum sanctuary, sacred precinct;” (Wehr 1976: 171).
7 “These igga¯wen I could touch, because they were my milk siblings, they had
drunk of the same milk as I had. . . . Milk parenthood entails the same rights
as real parenthood, you can touch these people just like your own brothers
and sisters, and it is the same case with a milk-mother. You have the right to
touch her and sit around and talk with her. And both you are forbidden to
marry. . . . But their food does not concern you, this is because they have
their own father and mother, you are not responsible for them, as well you
don’t inherit.” Ahmed Ould Aly, the region of Achram-Diouk’s most
famous qa¯d. i, who follows an austere interpretation of Islam condemning all
instrumental music (Interview 24.12.1995).
8 Aline Tauzin (1984b: 98f.) discusses various aspects of bı¯z. a¯n oral tradition;
those about incest make strong allusions to bad spirits involved in these
liaisons. These make that e.g. each time the couple is together creatures
separating them appear; among other consequences it is described that these
couples’ offspring dies.
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9 I was not able to get hold of a copy of Poulet’s work. Until recently this type
of nursing has been observed. Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (personal
correspondence, 26.6.1997) reports two cases of slave women breast-feeding
their mistress’ babies in 1988 in the oasis of Kurudjel (Assaba) and states that
nursing the mistress’ children was more a rule than an exception. This is
confirmed by Ann McDougall (1988: 364). Another recent observation is
documented by Aline Tauzin (1989b: 76) from the east of Mauritania.
10 There are also reasons to avoid establishing milk-kinship with the masters by
nursing their children. In order to breast-feed the master’s or mistress’
children, slave women had to have children of their own. This complied with
the master’s desire to breed slaves and cut short slave women’s opportunities
to resist or to flee. Last but not least, being responsible for the nursing of the
master’s or mistress’ children meant reducing one’s own children’s supply of
mother’s milk (cf. Tauzin 1989b: 76).
11 I doubt that milk-sons rather than sons-in law are a secure source of material
support for a woman, as proposed by Cleaveland (1995: 47) and Brhane
(1997a: 76). This kind of responsibility was clearly denied by all local
informants I interviewed on the question (Khalifa Ould Kebab, Interview
Ahmed Ould Aly, qa¯d. i 24.12.1995). This goes along with the prescription
that only blood-kin are allowed to inherit (cf. Conte 1991: 77). Most women
declared that their daughters were the ones to support them later. Material
support nevertheless often is provided by sons, as e.g. in the case of Mousta-
va, now living together with his su¯da¯n mother and her h. art.a¯ni husband. This
view is also presented in the analysis of some bı¯z. a¯n oral traditions on female
ruses. “Il semble que l’objectif de ces trois ruses soit bien plus l’obtention
d’un enfant que celle d’un mari.” (Tauzin: 1984b: 93)
12 This very difficulty of employing milk-kinship for immediate purposes is
highlighted by a tradition related to the prophet Muhammad, reported to
have given a married woman the advice to nurse, and hence create an
adoptive relation towards a former slave, whom her husband did not want to
meet her for reasons of female seclusion. As the woman asked the prophet if
he was aware of the man in question being an adult, the prophet told her he
knew this very well. Although the suckling of adults is univocally rejected as
not valid by Islamic jurisprudence (and hence dismisses female strategies to
surmount seclusion by establishing milk-parenthood with adults), the
prophet in this case consciously made an exception (cf. Conte 1991: 78f). The
example reveals that the question of easing the relations between masters and
slaves is not a general problem, but one of surmounting the barriers of
gender segregation.
13 A very similar case is made for the West African Songhay-Zarma female
slaves. Milk-kinship here is interpreted as a remnant of earlier matrilineal
practices of alliance. A slave women nursing her mistress’ babies rises to be a
social mother, i.e., she stops merely breeding slaves. Relationships with
milk-siblings were the safest way to preserve their status as slaves of the
house, because they were secured by the magic of milk (cf. Olivier de Sardan
1983: 142).
14 Sexual relations or abuses of masters with regard to their female slaves are a
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much obscured issue. Meskerem Brhane (personal correspondence,
30.6.1997) suggests that slave women were frequently inclined to have sexual
relations with the masters or their sons, a statement very well illustrated by
Gabriel Féral (1983: 287).
Although – as detailed later – the offspring of a free man and a slave
woman should be recognised as the man’s son or daughter and be assigned
his social status, in practice there are many exceptions to the rule. Begetting a
child with a slave milk sister, however, might have resulted in far more
severe mental stress because this meant offending the incest taboo. Marriage
between a master and his children’s nurse on the contrary was possible.
15 This interpretation might also apply to milk-kin ties between patrons and
clients, i.e. between h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya on the one hand and zna¯ga on the
other. These are reported to be frequent in Tidjikja and to be an expression
of close relations by Abdallahi O.Y. Ould Khalifa (1991: 284; for the Moroc-
can deep south see Ensel 1998: 80-87). Affective relations cross-cutting
status barriers thus are not limited to master-slave relations.
16 Legally these two options do not exclude each other. A male slave holder did
not lose his rights over his female slaves if these established milk-kinship
with the master’s children.
17 One interpretation of Ma¯liki law derives the master’s right over his female
slaves from the integration of the latter into the master’s dominium. Illicit
are only sexual relations with slave women who are neither Jewish or
Christian. While other people’s slave women can be married by free Muslim,
one’s own slave women have first to be manumitted, for one cannot have
one’s slave as spouse (cf. Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî 1983: 179).
18 This was the case with slave women destined to be traded and employed as
such, and who hence obtained the status of concubine (cf. Meillassoux 1986:
193).
19 The Islamic regulations concerning master-slave woman sexual relations and
their offspring are largely based on pre-Islamic principles, refined by Islamic
jurisprudence (cf. Abd el Wahed 1931: 255ff.). Nevertheless the slaves were
given some definite rights for the first time. These – as any laws – then
underwent a process of varying interpretation and application (cf. Hunwick
1992: 6ff.).
20 The practice of Islamic jurisprudence or the application of traditional law
(^urf) varied according to the socio-geographical location of the community.
Among nomads and in remote areas the ^urf predominated, while in the oasis
towns, or among zwa¯ya, the šarı¯^a was more likely to be followed (cf.
Norris 1968: 18).
21 Monette Clapier-Valladon (1971: 68) in her observation of life in the town of
Néma states that bı¯z. a¯n men frequently took their slave women as concu-
bines and assigns the black phenotype of most bı¯z. a¯n in the Hodh region to
this practice. “Becoming black”, as the references indirectly suggest, was not
only a matter of intermarriage between “white” masters and “black” slaves,
or else the latters’ descendants. The bı¯z. a¯n kept various inter-ethnic relation-
ships with the neighbouring black African communities, including inter-
marriage not only in the east (cf. Schmitz 1996; Leservoisier 1994a: 125f.).
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22 Unfortunately Webb does not provide any source for his statement. Ahmed
B. Miské (1970: 111) equally describes as frequently concubinage between bı¯-
z. a¯n masters and their slaves, but states these became immediately free, and
their descendants legal and full heirs.
23 This description of bı¯z. a¯niyya power reads much like a practical study of the
oral traditions on women’s ruses presented by Aline Tauzin (1984b, 1989a).
According to her analysis, men only achieve superiority to the women if
they unite and act together, whereas the corpus of female tricks is abundant.
24 This right is still in use today and extends to all form of adultery, be it with
concubines or other women. It is codified in the bı¯z. a¯n marriage contract, and
follows scrupulously a stipulation from 1099 (cf. Oßwald 1993: 61).
25 This is also reflected in statements from zwa¯ya asked for legal advice on the
matter (cf. Oßwald 1993: 61).
26 I was told of one case of a slave woman still working for, and having three
children of both sexes by her married master, a member of a h. assa¯n tribe’s
notability.
27 Freeing and marrying slave women rather than taking them as concubines
seems to have been frequent in the West African Islamic context. It is
reported to have been practised by scholars of Timbuktu, who were given
Fulbe slave girls by Sunni ^Ali (cf. Hunwick 1985: 27). The urban centres of
Timbuktu in turn, as well as Djenné, were the cradles of the evolution of the
important western-Saharan Islamic civilisation (cf. Oßwald 1986: 200ff.,
251f.).
28 The Moroccan meaning of this verb, here phonetically gˇu¯ra, is “living with
slave concubines at the exclusion of free wives” (cf. Taine-Cheikh 1989b:
346). However in classical Arabic gˇa¯riyye designates not a concubine but a
“slave girl, maid, servant” (Wehr 1976: 122).
29 It goes almost without saying that such a strategy could fail. There were (and
are) extra-marital relations that never become recognised publicly. This
might be the case even in the paradoxical setting of everybody knowing
about a relationship, but it nevertheless remaining a “public” secret. One
such recent, and widely known case is reported from Nouakchott. Brahim
Ould Daddah was not recognised as son by his father, a member of a
prominent family. “Nevertheless, as a child, Brahim (and indeed the entire
community) was aware of his father’s identity. When as an adult, his father
continued to deny his paternity, Brahim sued. The court ruled in his favor as
his father’s identity was common knowledge, thus giving him the right to
bear the Daddah family name. The central piece of evidence was the public
knowledge of the father’s name which could only be propagated through
information only women (i.e. his mother and those around her) had access
to.” (Brhane 1997a: 74)
30 To my knowledge besides Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais only Aline Tauzin
once made reference to sarriye as a means of establishing ties between a
bı¯z. a¯n and a h. art.a¯niyya (cf. Tauzin 1989b: 87). El Ghassem Ould Ahmedou
(1994: 121f.) describes sarriye in the context of his novel on bı¯z. a¯n society.
All in all there might be some overlapping in the meaning of gˇa¯riyye on the
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one hand and sarriye on the other hand, as derivatives of the latter word’s
root (SRR) also refer to “concubine/concubinage” (cf. Wehr 1976: 405).
31 The legitimacy of children is assured even if these are born after a marriage.
The idea of the “sleeping child”, known as mah. s.u¯r, which may reside for
several years in its mother’s womb before starting to grow, is approved by
Islamic jurisprudence. This institution allows women to bridge several years
of divorce without having to fear that a child born in this time might damage
their reputation (cf. Al-Akhbar nº 7, 21.8.1995: 4f.).
32 A congruent case is that of Hammodi, an Adrar h. art.a¯ni “who made it”.
Among many other “slaves of quality”, he bought a slave woman from Mali,
who first served him in the household and as his concubine (in the wider
sense, without implying legal rights and obligations). In 1955 he opted for a
change in her status and married her. She bore him a son (cf. McDougall
1988: 382).
33 With respect to bı¯z. a¯n society Pierre Bonte has carried out a most detailed
examination of different practices of marriage. These are found to aim at
maintaining a hierarchical representation of different tribal entities. Nobility
thus results from close strategies of matrimonial alliances as opposed to open
ones. While deficient on symbolic grounds, the latter strategy allows for the
inclusion of many new members into the tribe, and the transformation of
gains in demographic weight into political power (cf. Bonte 1987a). Accord-
ing to this strain of analysis the concept of exogamous versus endogamous
matrimonial strategies proves to be inappropriate, and has to be replaced by
the notion of “open” or “distant” versus “close” range modes of matrimonial
alliance (cf. Bonte 1991, 1994a,b; Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 661ff.).
34 This observation fits neatly into the framework of segmentary theory,
providing a further level of fission and fusion to the popular interpretation:
“I against my brother, my brother and me against my cousin, all of us against
the rest of the world.” Many criticisms have been advanced against this
simplistic application and indeed the theory as a whole, but these are not the
issue here (for some aspects of re-evaluation see Bonte/Conte 1991, Amselle
1990, Eickelmann 1984). On rivalry between half-brothers and sisters born
of slave and free women refer also to Fisher/Fisher (1970: 105-107).
35 The fact that Abderrahmane in popular consciousness is remembered as
having been born of a woman of slave, and not as being of h. ara¯t.ı¯n origin,
reveals the profoundness of the distinction. A status formally achieved had
to be transformed into one socially recognised. Hence he is remembered not
only by his father’s name but also as “wull at-tläylä” his mother’s name. An
analogous tradition is reported of the important ^amı¯r of the Trarza Amar
Ould al-Muhtar, who died in about 1800 (cf. Ould Mohamed 1988: 61f.).
36 Another similar case is the influential leader of the Kunta fraction of the Awla¯d
Sı¯di H. ayballa, Mohamed Ould Ahmed, who died in 1995. His father had
four wives, one of them a former slave. Her son was the one to become his
father’s successor. This chief in those days was the candidate to the office
supported by his tribe, but opposed by the French colonial administration.
Despite considerable pressure, the French candidate, the uncle of the still
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very young Mohammed Ould Ahmed, could be dismissed (Khalifa Ould
Kebab).
The success of prestigious h. assa¯n leaders with a h. art.a¯niyya mother raises
questions of a more fundamental kind. Claude Meillassoux outlines the
important role slaves could be assigned in the organisation of power in a
single aristocratic lineage, where blood-ties create rivalry rather than
solidarity. Slaves are exempt from multi-directional commitments (cf.
Meillassoux 1986: 192). Likewise a h. assa¯n leader with a h. art.a¯niyya mother
has only one filiative tie, the one to his father’s family whereas descendants
of more prestigious unions have to meet the expectancies of both their
father’s and their mother’s lineage. Candidates lacking maternal kinsmen
therefore were most liable to be of a certain neutrality in this regard and thus
likely to become the exponents of compromise between competing lineages
and to maintain the chiefly lineage (cf. Cooper 1979: 117). All in all the
pattern is widespread. Among the leaders of the Song˙ay empire, the Askias,
all except Muhammad I were sons of concubines (cf. Hunwick 1985: 22).
37 Still in 1951 Ely Ould Bakkar was depicted as being among the most
persistent enemies of Abderrahmane (AM, chef de subdivision Moudjéria,
“fiche de renseignement” n.d.).
38 One member of the emiral lineage presented his own youth to me as being
that of a spoilt child. He never had to work nor was obliged to do anything
(Interview Sid Mohamed Ould Dey, 27.8.1995). This style of life is presented
too by Youba – although his focus is on his brothers, who have a bı¯z. a¯n
mother. While he is obliged to go to school, they stay under the tent and
pass their time in camel-riding and other diversions.
39 Much the same beliefs are reported from the h. assa¯n already in the mid of the
th 19 century (cf. Carrère/Holle 1855: 226; see also Toupet 1977: 182).
40 Claude Meillassoux analyses in depth both the attraction and pitfalls
resulting from the lack of a maternal lineage. However, his concern is not
with a case similar to those presented here. Central to any of these unions, in
patrilineal- as well as in matrilineal societies, are factors weakening the
offspring’s social position (cf. Meillassoux 1986: 135ff.). Other such exam-
ples are presented by Keim (1983: 147f.) and Olivier de Sardan (1983: 141).
41 With the beginning of the new pasture after the first rains in the rainy season
(normally in July), ewes with a lamb are imported from the Hodh and sold
throughout the cities and also large villages like Achram. These are consider-
ably cheaper than the local sheep, and many people profit from the occasion
to buy some, take them out to the seasonal camp they are living in, drink of
the milk and later, when back in town where keeping animals is problematic,
sell the fattened animals at local conditions, thus making some profit.
42 An individual’s outfit is not a good indicator of status or affluence. Quite
noble, rich and influential people may dress more than modestly. Somewhat
recognisable to western eyes is the symbolism nowadays applied to houses
and household utensils. The more money at hand, the more likely there will
be a nice set for the tea-ceremony, a carpet, a radio etc.
43 There were many bı¯z. a¯n who did not want to send their own children to
school, but managed to make their dependents’ children go (cf. De Chassey
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1984: 141ff.). However, some local leaders – forced initially to send children
to school – at least from the 1950s on perceived the opportunities offered by
school education, and made their sons enter the colonial and later independ-
ent administration (Interview Hamoud Ould Amar, 4.11.1995).
44 This h. ara¯t.ı¯n community insists that it was never anybody’s slave, but only
the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. They had close tributary-like ties
with the ^amı¯r, but did not keep individual patron-client relations with
specific families. This consciousness of status reaches a peak of a certain kind
in the statement of a h. art.a¯niyya who refused to let her children marry
descendants of some other communities whom she perceived as not being
true h. ara¯t.ı¯n, but ^abı¯d (slaves; Interview Bâke Mint El Mokhtar, 2.11.1995).
45 This ambiguity and precariousness in the status of a slave woman married by
a freeborn man is very well analysed for the Songhay-Zarma. Being married
to a freeborn man thus meant advancement to a new status, however
reminiscent of the master-spouse’s goodwill. While entering into such a
relationship needed the display of sexual attractiveness, one of the major
characteristics of female slaves, the objective of slave women in these
circumstances was to overcome these stereotypes by consolidating their role
as wives. This they achieved by giving birth to children who no longer
suffered from the stigma of servility, but who in turn later would deny all of
their maternal origin for this reason (cf. Olivier de Sardan 1983: 141).
46 This pattern of non-integration of the former slave, woman-spouse into the
family of the noble, or better-off status is also apparent in the case of
Hammody, a h. art.a¯ni from the Adrar, who made a great career and fortune
during the colonial rule. He married several freeborn and noblewomen and
one of his female slaves. Until today this woman and her son live separate
from the rest of the family, and relations between the two branches of the
family are strained, because of the memory of their slave origin (cf. Mc-
Dougall 1988: 384).
Chapter 4
1 These are only the most important, and with respect to West Africa, the
main destinies of slave trade. However, on the African east coast and horn a
quickly expanding, but small and short-lived slave trade developed as well
(cf. Manning 1990a: 73ff.).
2 From 1700–1809 an annual average of 2,458 slaves from the interior West
African regions are calculated to have been exported across the Atlantic and
an average of about 1,824 across the Sahara. Changes in trade patterns would
have resulted in the trans-Saharan trade absorbing more slaves from
1700–1709 and from 1770 onward. Both trades would have been near parity
from 1760–69, and the Atlantic trade would have outnumbered the trans-Sa-
haran from 1710–59 (cf. Webb 1995: 66).
3 One of the major flaws in the nevertheless exciting analysis of Patrick
Manning (1990a, b) might be his assumption that the “number, age, and sex
Chapter 4        323
 
 
composition of male and female captives were similar” (Manning 1990a: 189,
note 8). As the author acknowledges, this most important factor in demo-
graphic model building is contested by other scholars. Manning’s model is
also insensitive to changes in the composition of the enslaved population.
These were likely to result from different modes of enslavement driven by
either a political or an economic rationale (cf. Curtin 1975a: 181ff.).
4 By the 1850s Timbuktu had ceased to play this important role due to
political instability in the region. Caravans effectively by-passed the city (cf.
McDougall 1992: 65).
5 This pattern of trade is revealed in the accounts of the French shipwrecked
on the western Saharan coast (cf. Barbier 1984). By the end of the
th 19 century the bı¯z. a¯n trade network had expanded and trade routes were
re-structured in response to changing geo-political circumstances. In the
Trarza salt mines were exploited to acquire slaves from the Niger bend.
These were transported westwards along the desert-edge and the right bank
of the river Senegal until reaching the Trarza, from where they were moved
to Morocco (cf. McDougall 1992: 70).
6 Daniel J. Schroeter (1992), drawing on data concerning slave sales on
th Moroccan markets, estimates that the early 19 century witnessed a decline
in the slave trade, because of insecurity in the desert, and later competition
from eastern trade routes. Subsequent to the abolition of the Atlantic trade, a
new climax in trade lasted from about 1840-56. A continuous high level in
slave trading was reached from the 1870s to 1894. There the numbers of
slaves traded between the western Sudan and Morocco, according to a
conservative estimate, are likely to have ranged between 4,000 and 7,000 per
year. This increase reflected the fact that all other Maghribi destinations for
the many Sudanese slaves were already closed by this time.
7 The main interest of the Portuguese during the heyday of Arguin lay in the
acquisition of gold, not slaves. They used to trade slaves along the West
African coast from one region to the other, in order to exchange them for
gold (cf. Lovejoy 1983: 35f.).
8 James Webb holds the view that enslavement within the region persisted, but
was primarily related to the Sudanese kings’ need (namely of Kajoor and
Waalo) for a commodity they could barter for horses. These were crucial to
maintain the region’s most important military force, the cavalry, which
suffered severely from the animal diseases of the humid zone. The Barbary
horses the bı¯z. a¯n bartered were either bred in the western Sahara or imported
from the north and the trade continued well into the second half of the
th 19 century (cf. Webb 1995: 68ff.).
9 James Searing (1993: 75) portrays the exchanges with the desert-side as two
distinct networks: “This trade exchanged animals for slaves, grain, dried fish,
and other savannah commodities on the one hand, and gum for Atlantic
imports such as cotton cloth, iron, and firearms on the other.”
10 According to James Searing (1993: 196), the demand for grain produced by
the slave traders having to feed their slaves while waiting for the middle
passage and later on the trip, has been the pivotal moment behind the
region’s commercialisation of agricultural production, the emergence of
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slavery as the primary means of organising economic production and
political control, and the development of important urban centres. This may
be to overemphasise this very special aspect within the vast Senegambian
trade networks. It is equally difficult to assess the hypothesis according to
which the trade with gum arabic in the context of overall increase in trade
activities raised bı¯z. a¯n demand for grain from the left bank (as stated by
Searing 1993: 62).
11 The take-off in urban growth and trade in Saint-Louis took place only after
the end of the legitimate Atlantic slave trade in the 1820s. It was an outcome
of the trade in gum arabic rather than the slave trade (cf. Searing 1993: 165).
12 It might be argued that the trade in gum arabic was more profitable for the
local bı¯z. a¯n than joining into the east-west slave trade feeding the Atlantic
markets. Martin A. Klein (1990: 237) has convincingly argued that slaves
were rarely a commodity of a higher value than other competing commodi-
ties, but often of lower or equal value. This pattern of profitability seems to
have altered by the end of legitimate slave trade, which witnessed a rapid
expansion of salt and slave exchanges, now all destined for Morocco,
throughout the whole western Sahara, including Trarza (cf. McDougall
1992).
13 Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n claimed to be an Ima¯m, a leader of the faithful in prayer, and
took the title of ^amı¯r al-mu\minı¯n (Commander of the Faithful). He also
appointed a wazı¯r and four qa¯d. is in order to administer the state and collect
taxes (cf. Gomez 1985: 550). His religious learning, praised on various
occasions (cf. Ould Cheikh 1985a: 841; Seiwert 1988: 70f.), remains contested
however. No writings of Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n are transmitted, but several of
contemporary zwa¯ya, who argued against him (cf. Oßwald 1986: 282).
14 John Ralph Willis (1985c: 16) has pointed to the “paradox” that the “jihad, in
its effort to free men from unbelief, should become a device to deprive men
of freedom.” Although the gˇiha¯d of Na¯s.ir al-Dı¯n in its initial phase opposed
the illegitimate enslavement of Muslims by their own rulers, the logic of holy
warfare soon became a means to redefine the boundary between the believers
and unbelievers to be enslaved.
15 The decisive character of the impact this single event is supposed to have had
for the evolution of antagonistic h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya identities, and of the h. as-
sa¯n emirates, has to be questioned. The recent analysis of the development of
th 19 century Gebla identities provided by Raymond Taylor (1997: 131f.) and
fitting neatly into Barth’s (1969a) approach to the evolution of ethnic groups
demonstrates how group formation among the bı¯z. a¯n relied on the nature of
continued encounters in a socially and professionally highly heterogeneous
setting. In a similar perspective the emergence of Saharan conceptions of
“white and black” is seen by James Webb (1995: 16ff.) as result of the
encounter Saharan and Sudanese groups had during trade, as well as in the
context of political turbulence.
16 On right and left bank rulers’ alliances cross-cutting the Senegal river see
also Olivier Leservoisier (1994a) and Jean Schmitz (1994a: 430ff., and 1994b).
17 Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1997) recently criticised the theoretical
paradigm underlying the conclusions of Raymond Taylor (1995), and
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underscored that political power in bı¯z. a¯n society did not remain subject to
the patterns of fission and fusion typical to segmented societies, but that the
emirates were able to build nuclei of institutionalised and centralised power.
18 This is why Claude Meillassoux, analysing West African slavery, develops
the framework of a slave mode of reproduction, one by warfare and trade,
rather than a slave mode of production (cf. Meillassoux 1986). While data on
the demography of western Saharan slavery is lacking, demographic
deficiency can be deduced from their desperate living conditions having been
comparable to those of other African slaves. Reasons for high mortality and
frequent diseases lay in a lack of food and clothing, maltreatment, mental
stress, and the difficulty to adapt to a new and hostile environment (cf. Webb
1995: 25f.; Vincent 1860: 486, 492f.; Meyer 1959: 57).
19 The data is based on an estimate of Saharan population at the end of the
th 18 century considered to equal one quarter of today’s total Mauritanian
population. Of these two thirds, or 167,000 are estimated to have lived along
the axis from the Adrar to the Tagant and further south and south-east, and
one quarter to one third to have been slaves (cf. Webb 1995: 67).
20 The region’s infestation with animal diseases like Trypanosomiasis made
imported horses subject to an extremely high mortality rate. Over time
interbreeding with Sahelian ponies succeeded, but these breeds could not
match the equine qualities horses needed for military use: speed and height
(cf. Webb 1995: 68).
21 These numbers are estimates. Neither were only pure breed horses imported,
nor were all horses imported. Prices varied according to various factors, such
as equine qualities, but also the slaves’ age and sex (cf. Webb 1995: 89).
22 It is highly probable that from the beginning of the trade of salt for gold
(usually cited as the only trade in the medieval era), grain was traded as well
(cf. McDougall 1983: 266). Indeed medieval trade was likely to have already
been diversified, and not solely reliant on salt (cf. Ruf 1995: 95). The volume
of this trade, however, might have remained limited. A medieval source
describes the camel caravans travelling to Timbuktu and ancient Ma¯lı¯ to
change salt slabs for gold as having suffered terrible losses due to animal
diseases affecting up to 75 percent of the camels (cf. Ca da Mosto 1967: 20f.).
23 Many sources covering the time-span from the medieval era to the early
th 20 century stress the central role salt held in Saharan commerce with the
western Sudan, and the increasing relevance it gained in the slave trade (cf.
McDougall 1992). This does not imply that the extensive trade networks run
either by the bı¯z. a¯n, or by Sudanese communities like the Juula and the
Maraka, restricted themselves to only these commodities. Many goods, such
as e.g. grain, which were traded to the north as well as slaves could be
purchased not only with salt, but with horses, as well as other desert
products like livestock or dates. James Webb (1995: chapter three) argues
th that during the 18 century western Saharan salt trade for Savanna grain
increased to compensate shortfalls in local production induced by climatic
changes. While empirical evidence remains scanty, it seems unlikely that the
large populations of the Tagant and Adrar, who have a long experience of
cultivation (cf. Toupet 1958, Bonte 1985a), became all too heavily dependent
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on grain imports. Such modes of complementary production did develop,
but needed a high specialisation into camel rearing and caravan trade not
documented for the western Sahara. This is illustrated by the case of the
highly specialised economy of the Kel Ewey Tuareg of the Aïr in the
Republic of Niger (about 14,000 inhabitants in the early 1970s). Until today
they combine camel and small ruminant rearing, and caravan trade to
exchange desert salt for Sahelian millet, and oasis gardening (cf. Spittler
1989a, b).
24 Both Raymond Taylor and James Webb take the cases of the Ahel Gana¯r,
the Ahel al-Gebla, Trarza al-Kih. il, and the Idawalhagˇgˇ to underpin their
argument. Initially the Ahel Gana¯r were constituted by a conglomerate of
riverine populations having strong links to Wolof society, and being Wolof-
th speakers. During the 18 century, they integrated more and more closely
into bı¯z. a¯n society, and became the Ahel Gana¯r. The Idawalhagˇgˇ were bı¯z. a¯n
who for centuries controlled much of the trade with the Sudan, where they
settled to build up trade outposts. When the tribe’s influence in trade
diminished, and the formerly strong relations between its various branches
started to vanish, the southern communities increasingly dropped their
Saharan links and customs, such as e.g. the use of h. assa¯niyya as language, but
maintained much of their religious prestige (cf. Taylor 1997: 68ff.; Webb
1995: 36f.).
25 Khalifa Ould Kebab, my research assistant, told me his grandfather five
generations back had worked as a mason in the construction of Kasr el
Barka, the now abandoned important Kunta settlement on the Tagant. He
claimed his family had definitely never had another status than h. ara¯t.ı¯n, i.e.
none of his forefathers to have been unfree or slaves.
26 Al-Hajj Umar, who had started his conquest in 1852, was unlucky, as his
initial ambitions to control the Upper Senegal paralleled the rise of French
interests in controlling this region. In 1857 both parties clashed and Umar
was defeated. This led him to direct his movement to the east, and conquer
the territory of the former Segu Bambara State situated on the Niger River
up to Timbuktu (cf. Roberts 1987: 79ff.).
27 David Eltis has gathered data on the following points of embarkation: Upper
Guinea, Windward Coast, Bight of Benin, Bight of Biafra, Congo North,
Angola, Southeast Africa. Of the slaves shipped from the Bight of Benin,
46 percent were men; 21 percent women, 22 percent boys, and 19 percent
girls (cf. Eltis 1987: 256). These numbers are confirmed by French shipping
and plantation records (cf. Geggus 1989).
28 The same set of data shows the price differential to be much less marked for
older than for younger slaves of different sex (cf. Lovejoy/Richardson 1995:
279).
29 This can be discerned by the different ethnic origins noted for male and
th female slaves entering the Atlantic world. In the late 18 century the largest
group of male slaves was Hausa. Those slaves coming from the interior most
often were “prime slaves”, i.e. young male slaves, who had the lowest value
in the interior, but the highest on the coast. Those women and children
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shipped to the Americas most often came from the coastal regions (cf.
Lovejoy/Richardson 1995: 282, 286, see as well Geggus 1989).
30 Admittedly, this argument seems to portray a rather simple distinction of
supposed female/male virtues. The point here is not to decide whether men
or women were more docile, but to hint at the perceptions slave raiders,
traders, and masters developed of their slaves’ minds. It was these ideologies
that directed the masters’ actions. For a discussion of masters’ responses to
problems of slave control see Martin A. Klein (1983: 77ff.).
31 Islamic jurisprudence provides a large set of rules defining the rights and
obligations of slave traders and buyers. Within this framework it was
commonly admitted that the slave’s willingness to serve his new master, and
hence his value to the latter, was difficult to assess. Sales therefore remained
open to reversal within a distinct delay in case the buyer had not been
satisfied (cf. Daumas 1883: 321ff.).
32 The notion of a plantation sector was introduced to the discussion of African
slavery with regard to the east coast of Africa by Frederick Cooper (1977:
221f.). On these estates the sex ratios of slaves were relatively balanced. Paul
Lovejoy (1983: 31), though cautious about drawing an analogy to the slave
economy of the Americas, stresses the role plantations run by slaves had in
the economic transformation of the “inner Niger valley into a heavily
populated and productive region”. John H. Hanson (1990: 212) notes that
slave prices in Jomboxo rose considerably when Futanke settlers, who had
come there in the course of the Umarian movement, started to invest in slave
labour to expand agricultural production. Slave prices in the area became
twice as high as in the Senegal valley.
33 Slave marketing in the interior was rarely a public affair. Slaves were
commonly sold “in the house”, and only in the most important trade towns
were slaves sold on the public market (cf. Dunbar 1977: 161, note 7).
34 Martin Klein (1983: 82f.) reports interviewees both of slave and free origin
stressed the point that masters were obliged to provide adult male slaves with
a woman, i.e. a major means for social integration.
35 This conclusion has to be drawn from the data available on slave demogra-
phy in Africa. On average, slave women had less than one child. The rate of
reproduction thus was negative (cf. Klein 1983: 69, Meillassoux 1983: 51).
Still in 1974 Claire Oxby (1978: 176, 200) recognised that the fertility of slave
women among the Tuareg was markedly inferior to that of the freeborn; the
former having an average of 2.65, and the latter of 3.26 children. The slave
women also were more numerous than slave men in the camp.
36 This is most evident in those cases where slaves in the region of Achram-
Diouk remember their ancestors. I met no case of a slave reclaiming his most
far-reaching line of descent from a male ancestor. Instead all referred to a
woman, e.g. a Bambara stolen by one of the ^amı¯r Bakkar Ould Soueid
Ahmed brothers at the turn of the century, or an enslaved Fulbe woman,
whose ethnicity was recognisable due to her typical scars. Since socialisation
into bı¯z. a¯n society was important, only these first generation slave women
were remembered as having spoken some other language than h. assa¯niyya.
37 ANM (no registration number), Commandant de Cercle du Hodh, I.
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Bastouil, Aioun el Atrouss, “étude sur la population noire dans la subdivi-
sion centrale d’Aioun-el-Atrouss” 25.5.1959: 2; document kindly passed on
by Meskerem Brhane.
38 At this time 4,193 people of various black African ethnic groups were
counted. The data presented by Munier arose from the official administrative
census. It may underestimate the number of su¯da¯n, because according to I.
Bastouil, only su¯da¯n registered together with their masters’ tent were
counted, while those living independently with their own tent and house-
hold were numerous too (cf. ANM (no registration number), Commandant
de Cercle du Hodh, I. Bastouil, Aioun el Atrouss, “étude sur la population
noire dans la subdivision centrale d’Aioun-el-Atrouss” 25.5.1959: 2; docu-
ment kindly passed on by Meskerem Brhane).
39 The difficulty in drawing a sharp distinction between h. assa¯n and zwa¯ya is a
point stressed by Timothy Cleaveland (1995: 37) too. He cites a 1953 French
administrator’s “mémoire”, which in contrast to the colonial-administrative
mainstream criticises a dichotomy which he felt to be meaningless due to its
having too many exceptions.
40 This document, entitled “Rapport politique, année 1950, Tableau de Popula-
tion, TOM de la Mauritanie, Cercle du Tagant, Subdivision de Moudjéria”
found in 1979 in the Tidjikja branch of the ANM (no system of cataloguing)
was kindly passed on to me by Roger Botte. The original document distin-
guishes “Maures blancs” and “Maures noirs”, i.e. white and black moors.
This meant that zna¯ga, ma^alimı¯n and igga¯wen were subsumed under the
category bı¯z. a¯n. The layout of tribal fractions follows the colonial adminis-
trative design, which resulted occasionally in redrawing tribal boundaries.
This is most evident in the case of the Kounta Haiballa I and II, divided by
Commandant Frèrejean, to reward with his own chieftaincy a Kunta leader
for his support during the French conquest of Tagant. To clearly mark these
differences the French transcription of tribal names is maintained.
41 Unlike from the other colonies of French West Africa (A.O.F.), there was no
poll tax in Mauritania, but only a tax on livestock. A tax on agricultural
products, called ^ašu¯r, which was once introduced, was suspended in 1940 (cf.
Toupet 1959: 103).
42 One other explanation for the unbalanced sex ratios among the su¯da¯n might
be selective infanticide (Prof. Dr. Günther Schlee, personal communication
25.6.1998), but up to now data allowing to investigate the scale and the
rationale of such practices in the western Sahara are lacking.
43 A colonial administrative census of Oualâta’s 1912 population presents bı¯-
z. a¯n women as largely outnumbering men, and an even higher disproportion
among the su¯da¯n (cf. Cleaveland 1995: 315). This is characteristic for the
small, ancient trade towns, where men were absent most of the year accom-
panying caravans, and travelling for trade. Today, small towns and villages
which emerged subsequent to the drought of the early 1970s, are dominantly
populated by women. In the big urban centres, focus of male wage labour
migration, men outnumber women (cf. D’Hont 1985: 102).
44 This is a phenomenon still frequent in colonial times. One reason why
“tribes” moved out of a given territory were conflicts. A major case in the
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region of Achram-Diouk was the conflict between the Awla¯d Talh. a and the
former ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar. It was resolved in 1939 by
detaching the Awla¯d Talh. a from the administrative region of Tagant, and
registering them in Kaédi (cf. AT, anonymus, “Historique Abakaks”, n.d.,
kindly passed on by Roger Botte). In other cases parts of tribes sought to
establish themselves and become recognised as independent tribal fractions
(cf. AT, J. Hornac, “Télégramme-Lettre”, Subdivision de Moudjéria, appar-
ently May 1940; document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
45 Still in the 1960s, the evaluation of national demography was based on tribal
membership and not on areas of residence (cf. Brenez 1971). Later studies,
such as the 1977 census, adopted an approach taking coresidential units as
the basic units of inquiry (cf. Paccou/Blanc 1979).
46 Besides my fieldwork data I have not come across this definition of šurva.
The scholarly debate portrays them as zwa¯ya, a description conforming well
with the meaning of the term, which indicates direct descent from the
prophet Muhammad via the sons of his daughter Khadija. The example of
šurva among the emiral Ahel Swayd Ah. med shows how prestigious strangers
become integrated into the tribe and strengthen the intersections existing
between the zwa¯ya and h. assa¯n social world.
47 Of this total of 124 women heading a household alone, 57 were actually
unmarried, i.e. divorced, and 45 had survived their husbands. Of the re-
maining 18 cases data concerning the current marital status is missing. Only
three women were reported to be married, but nonetheless leading the house-
hold on their own, thus replacing their permanently absent husband.
48 This is the case in Hella, whereas the case of Achoueibir, where many of the
zna¯ga are closely integrated into the tribal community, presents a balanced
distribution. As among the h. ara¯t.ı¯n, among the zna¯ga different levels of
subordinate status exist. The present thesis therefore rests on the assumption
that subordination correlates with more fragile marital relations and male
absenteeism. Further research on this topic is required, as some of the cases
in question may be the result of marriages between old men of noble descent
and women of subordinate status, likely to survive their husbands for a long
time.
49 Achoueibir has a rate of 39, Téjal of 23, and Legned of 27 percent su¯da¯n
women leading a household without male support.
50 Most of the nine slave women in Hella leading their household on their own
are described as closely attached to one influential bı¯z. a¯n family. One woman
was married to the actual (unofficial) ^amı¯r of Tagant, but is now divorced
(for this to take place she ought to be a h. art.a¯niyya). Besides her, only one
other of these slave women was described as having ever been married. For
the eleven unmarried women in Téjal data on former marital status is lacking
except in two cases, one being that of a grandmother whose husband died
long ago, and another, divorced mother.
51 Here only valid data is processed. The cases from Leqraye are excluded,
because the missing data on women would have produced a strong bias.
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Chapter 5
1 There is just one narrative with a male slave actor (and provided by a slave
man). Alas, rather then telling of a slave’s fate and ruses like the female
narratives, he tells of one free enough to look for a job. The point of the
story is that he denies knowing any of a slave’s typical occupations, but
insists on being a good worker (cf. Tauzin 1989b: 86f.).
2 Claude Meillassoux (1983: 50ff.), while stressing the role de-sexualisation
played in producing the difference between masters and slaves, restricts its
practice to women. While the emphasis is right, de-sexualising practices, well
reflecting the actual slave condition, also applied to slave men (cf. Klein/
Robertson 1983: 10). E.g. Alexander Scott, enslaved on the western Saharan
coast in 1810, had to grind meal (cf. Scott in Barbier 1985: 82). His earlier
fellow in suffering, Brisson, had to make faggots, churn butter, spin wool
and pull up roots (cf. Brisson [1792] in Saugnier/Brisson 1969). Among the
Tuareg slave men were assigned typical women’s tasks whenever there was a
lack of slave women (cf. Bourgeot (1975: 83).
3 Time and space are dimensions crucial to the analysis of social relations and
the constitution of social structures (cf. Giddens 1992: 161-213). An
analytical framework drawing on the links between space and the division of
labour, and later also gender, has been developed in human geography and
feminist theory within this domain (cf. McDowell 1993a, b). Today the
differences produced by the gender differential are no longer perceived as
bound to local arenas and the household. Rather global structures, like
macroeconomics, which used to be portrayed as gender-neutral, appear to be
gendered and their shape in time and space to be pervaded by shifting
boundaries between male and female (cf. Lachenmann 1998: 312f.; Elson/
McGee 1995).
4 Nehemia Levtzion (1987) assumes that the development of a distinctly rural
Islam (a model opposing the common ideal of learned Muslims as urban
traders) in West Africa was possible only because of the strong hierarchical
structure of these societies. Slavery thus allowed the masters to develop a
religious scholarship for which they otherwise would have lacked the
material means – and the time.
5 In fact the abrupt end of slavery due to massive slave exoduses in some parts
of West Africa shortly after the colonisation did not lead to the breakdown
of the local economies, as the colonisers had feared. Instead the former
masters quite quickly adapted to the new situation, and made their way
without the former slave support (cf. Roberts 1988). The case of the bı¯z. a¯n in
this respect is different, for the longevity of slavery in this society may be
regarded as exceptional. This, however, does not imply that there was no
change in the bı¯z. a¯n modes of production. Indeed the bı¯z. a¯n, while main-
taining relations of dependency, managed to adapt their pastoral economy
quickly to the new circumstances provoked by colonisation (cf. e.g. the
development of pheniculture in many parts of Mauritania pp. 161-165
and 222f.).
6 These considerations, focusing on the slave perspective, leave out two major
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professional activities restricted to the bı¯z. a¯n: Islamic scholarship and
warfare. Neither are easily subjugated under a narrow definition of work,
implying the means of direct production and reproduction. More important
here, however, is the point that these occupations were inaccessible to slaves.
Some exceptions were made for h. ara¯t.ı¯n. There are several narratives speaking
of h. ara¯t.ı¯n forming distinct groupings of subordinate warriors (cf. Ba 1932:
118f., note 1; Bourrel 1861: 36f.; Taylor 1995: 427). Very few h. ara¯t.ı¯n
ascended to being trustees of bı¯z. a¯n, either in the caravan trade or among the h. as-
sa¯n chieftains (cf. p. 165-170).
7 Gudrun Lachenmann criticises the social sciences for having contributed to
making women’s economic agency invisible (cf. Lachenmann 1992: 77f.).
Today’s bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t are heavily involved in economic activities, above all
trade. The su¯da¯niyya¯t more often occupy niches of small scale production of
textiles, take-away food and the like (cf. Simard 1996).
8 With the rise of feminism came the challenge to the masculinity of social
sciences, and the development of women’s and gender studies. With regard
to slavery this track, in a nutshell, states that “The oppression of women
antedates slavery and makes it possible.” (Lerner 1983: 174) Many aspects of
the complex thus raised still remain largely understudied. The major
contributions with a focus on the Sahelian and African slavery are the
unpublished dissertation of Claire Oxby (1978), and the contributions to the
volume “Women and Slavery in Africa” edited by Claire C. Robertson and
Martin A. Klein (1983).
9 Few milk given to slaves was prevalent until the 1970s among some Tuareg
(cf. Oxby 1978: 153), however, this could change if milk was abundant, or
simply if the master was richer or more benign (cf. Robert Adam’s report of
captivity in 1816, reproduced in Barbier 1985: 35). Milk and millet when
consumed together, as is normally the case with ^aiš , yield more protein than
when consumed separately (cf. Webb 1984: 155). This is apparent in popular
traditions: ^aiš was reported to me as a meal endowing the one who eats it
with tremendous strength. Quite logically the former ^amı¯r Abderrahmane
Ould Bakkar was reported to have been one of the greatest lovers of ^aiš.
th 10 By the end of the 18 century the Wolof state of Waalo was destroyed, and
the Trarza warriors enslaved an unknown number of its inhabitants. Some
were traded to the North African markets, but most remained within the
desert society (cf. Webb 1984: 111; Barry 1988: 111).
11 Slave masters in the new world also profited from the skills African slaves
had. Farming practices such as bush-fallow and hoe-and-hill agriculture
proved to be best suited to the growing of plants such as tobacco and maize
in certain circumstances, such as in Chesapeake (Virginia) during the early
th 18 century (cf. Walsh 1997: 93).
12 Among the Kel Ferwan Tuareg until the 1970s mistresses are reported to
have claimed “at least one slave girl in every household (usually in the 10 to
14 year age-group) . . . in order to mind the latter’s [the mistresses’] baby,
and perform small tasks for her, such as sweeping; the free woman’s own
daughter would never be asked to do such things. This slave girl lives and
sleeps in her owner’s tent, not in her mother’s.” (Oxby 1978: 178)
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13 The collection of ^az was reported several times to me, mainly by slave
women. Although disliked for its inconvenience (three husks to be pounded
off, “had to be accompanied by much milk”), it still is collected in consider-
able amounts on the Tagant, while in the plains of the Aftout it seems to
have become rare. During the big drought in 1969 ^az was used as a relief
foodstuff by many inhabitants of the Achram-Diouk region. At this time
people even located colonies of ants in order to dig them up and get to their
supply of ^az. A technique already described by Bourrel (1861: 41f.).
14 Louis Hunkanrin, although he entered history as one of the first and most
fervent opponents of the French policy of laissez-faire vis-à-vis the practices
of bı¯z. a¯n slavery, had only a limited knowledge of bı¯z. a¯n society. Those cases
of slavery he referred to were drawn from his personal vicinity in the
Mauritanian towns were he was held under arrest (cf. McDougall 1989).
15 Reproductive labour is defined by Margaret Strobel (1983: 111), as “the
reproduction of new human beings, the daily restoration of human beings,
and the reproduction of ideology or culture”. The focus here is more
restricted and lies on chores serving daily reproduction, as well as how
female slave work was related to the reproduction of bı¯z. a¯n ideology.
16 Loughaye Mint Driss, born around 1945, comes from a well-off zwa¯ya
family. At the time she was speaking of they lived only off their pastoral
resources and did not engage in agriculture. Their animal possessions
numbered 50-60 cows, and 150-200 sheep and goats, together with some
riding camels and donkeys. She married a slightly less wealthy zwa¯ya, but
with a very good reputation and elaborate religious education.
17 Ideology persists despite, or perhaps just because of contrasting experiences.
Khaite early in her life experienced her mother having to work on the fields
because of the family’s poverty, and her husband having died early. While
the mother is described as working, Khaite does not mention having joined
in. She stresses that her brother had completed his basic studies in the
Qur\a¯n despite the difficult conditions the family was living in. The situation
only changed when Khaite married a man wealthy enough to sustain the
family.
18 Women in bı¯z. a¯n society are not obliged to enter and constitute from the day
of the wedding ceremony a household with their husband. The situation
described hence may arise from the woman’s will to continue to live with her
parents despite being already married. Only about 40 or 45 days after the
first child is born (childbirth has to take place with the woman’s family), is
the woman obliged to move to her husband (Khalifa Ould Kebab).
th 19 Brisson, one of the 18 century French castaways notes as a success that he
was sometimes allowed to stay in the back of the tent (cf. Saugnier/Brisson
[1792] 1969: 417).
20 Margaret Strobel (1983: 116ff., and note 7) has highlighted that work played
a crucial role in determining slave women’s conditions. Taking part in
reproductive work was crucial for an increasing integration because tasks in
and around the main house enabled the slave women to develop intimacy, to
acculturate, or from the masters’ point of view: to “become civilised”. This
step up meant also renouncing some of the slave subculture, was seen as
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essential for a further career as a concubine, and eventually becoming
manumitted.
21 Some bı¯z. a¯niyya¯t related the end of the su¯da¯niyya¯t’s (su¯da¯n women’s)
willingness to pound millet to the arrival of MENDEZ, the company
constructing the asphalt road from Nouakchott to the east of the country in
1977 (Interview Khadijetou Mint Abdallah, zwa¯ya, 11.2.1996).
22 Grinding one standard sack of cereals (50 kg) in a modern local small-scale
mill costs between 150 and 180 UM (US$1.00). For a fee of only 2,000 UM
(i.e. the equivalent of the supplemental monthly pay a housemaid receives
for pounding millet) one can therefore grind more than 500 kg of cereals, a
quantity even a large family couldn’t consume.
23 While during pounding the bran is separated from the flour, the simple
milling techniques are unable to do this. Couscous prepared with the locally
ground flour therefore is considered to scratch the gullet when consumed.
This annoying concomitant of modern times can be avoided by enveloping
the couscous-grains in a final layer of white wheat flour.
24 Analysing bı¯z. a¯n society as an entity one has to be aware of this multitude of
slave men’s occupations. There are several authors who have tried to
distinguish too sharply between slave and freemen’s occupations, e.g. by
stating that male slave labour performed almost all the work of livestock
rearing (cf. De Chassey 1977: 86; more differentiated: RAMS 1980: 74). Such
statements fail to illuminate the interrelations between different branches of
pastoral and agro-pastoral production and the wide range of male slave
labour.
25 Caillié’s report has been criticised for over-representing the importance of
slave labour to the collection of gum arabic (cf. Ould Cheikh, personal
communication in McDougall 1992: 85). Indeed this assertion relies on only
second hand information, (a fact not obscured by Caillié). Apart from the
exact number of slaves involved in the harvest and trade of gum arabic, what
remains besides question is the great interest the bı¯z. a¯n had in this business.
Most importantly, the trade in gum arabic fuelled trade networks through-
out the western Sahara, so that the exchange of cloth, millet and other goods
increased (cf. McDougall 1992: 74; Ruf 1995: 116ff.).
26 Unfortunately Bourrel hardly ever distinguishes between male and female
slaves. René Caillié (1830: 56, 92) too remarked that the zwa¯ya were much
better off than the h. assa¯n.
27 The development of bı¯z. a¯n pheniculture originated in the Adrar region
(perhaps on the remnants of wild palm trees) and later expanded to the
south. Slaves were imported to meet the need for labour power (cf. Bonte
1985a,b: 329ff.).
28 Here Dubié’s description lacks accuracy. It is not evident from his writing
whether the herders get the use-right or the possession of the sheep. Neither
is the number of sheep subject to the procedure mentioned.
29 There are doubts whether all these animals were the property of Weddou
Ould Jiddou. He himself declared that he had been very close to the ^amı¯r
Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar. This might indicate that he had managed some
of the latter’s herds.
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30 Charles Toupet (1958: 98), stating the same difficulties in ascertaining the
average animal property, proposed the characterisation of four distinct
lifestyles: 1) a pastoral nomad, not engaged in agriculture, with 30 cows and
140 small ruminants, 2) a h. art.a¯ni who was well off and owned 15 cows,
50 small ruminants, 140 date palms and some fields with an annual harvest of
about 140 mu¯d and an unknown quantity of ^az collected, 3) a noble bı¯z. a¯n,
owning a good riding camel and keeping 10 cows on loan, 4) a sedentarised
trader.
31 Meskerem Brhane (1997b: 26) analyses these strategies as a “subtle entrap-
ping”. A slave man, having received this or a similar favour from his master
(e.g. the latter also could buy the slave’s mother, if the slave had changed his
master), had much more to lose by leaving than one without family. Inter-
pretations of these acts however differ among the slaves themselves. Some
regard them as the charitable act of a generous man, others, often the
subsequent generation portray it as a strategic option for better conditions
of exploitation.
32 Michael Winter (1984), presents a rather different image of the cattle rearing
Kel Agheris Tuareg in northern Mali. There slaves made up as much as
70 percent of the population, and the noble strata relied almost entirely on
their slaves for livestock rearing. Dominance was maintained by prohibiting
livestock ownership by slaves. This system broke down when the colonial
administration interfered and decided the majority of cattle belonged to the
Bella slaves, thus dispossessing the Tuareg.
33 Different strategies of herd management are likely to result from socio-eco-
nomic transformation. Among the Kawa¯hla of Kordofan, the objectives of
pastoral production have changed markedly since the 1930s and 1940s.
Camels are no longer important as providers of milk and transport, but are
kept primarily for sale for slaughter. Ecological degradation, as well as the
main camps’ increased cattle herding has produced almost independent
movements of the cattle and camel herds and the redefinition of the herders’
tasks (cf. Beck 1988: 226ff.).
34 Of course there were tasks besides the narrow range of “normality”. One
interviewee of slave origin stated that he had left his master during the big
drought, because his work had increased to a level he could no longer
manage. His master, trying to save his cattle, had told his slave to cut fodder
for all the animals. Besides this task he had had to water them (cf. Interview
Boueibou Ould Amar, h. art.a¯ni, 1.11.1995).
35 René Caillié (1830: 98ff.) reports the cattle being led to the pasture by slaves,
but does not specify whether the animals were continuously guarded or not.
However, seeing the great danger from theft and predators in those times,
animals might normally have been guarded.
36 Samba Ould Haroun told me that already in the times before the drought
near to the well of Letfatar a camp existed, composed of people called
anma¯re, who were of various tribal origins. They herded cattle for other
people for a monthly payment of 60 UM. This was meant to pay for the
work of watering the animals. The use of the milk was included too.
Obviously these people accompanied the cattle to pasture, for one reason
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why people sent their precious lactating animals to these strange herders was
the danger of wolves prevalent in the region at this time (Interview Samba
Ould Haroun, h. art.a¯ni, 7.11.1995).
37 A full-time herder receives about 5,000 UM (about US$32) per month. For
cattle the average prices vary between 200 UM during the wet season and
250 UM during the dry season, when watering makes the job more labour
intensive (Interview Ma^arouf Ould Eleyatt, h. assa¯n, 26.3.1995).
38 This I observed among former slaves of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med nobility
living in Daber on the Tagant. Several interviewees stated that they herded
some goats and cows belonging to a bı¯z. a¯n among their own herd. While no
remuneration was specified, many in the course of the interview said they
had benefited from some aid in cereals or other goods offered to them in case
of need by the noble bı¯z. a¯n.
39 A whole variety of factors contribute to the well-being of the animals, e.g.
camels have a considerable need for salt. If there is no especially salty
pasture, the animals have to be led to salt deposits, or, as is nowadays
common in the region of Achram-Diouk, provided with salt every two to
four weeks (Interview Abdallahi Ould Briké, zwa¯ya, 9.4.1995).
40 El Ghassem Ould Ahmedou (1994) in his novel entitled “Le dernier des
nomades” gives a beautiful description of an outstanding camel herder’s
virtues.
41 Personal luck could increase or diminish animal property quite fast. Sı¯dı¯ Mu-
th h. ammad Wuld Habot, a 19 century La¯g˙la¯l trader, who amassed a legendary
fortune during his life, liberated a number of zna¯ga from their obligation
towards their h. assa¯n patrons. The experienced camel herders thus became his
dependents and watched his supposed 400 camels (cf. Bonte 1985b: 330)
42 Sophie Caratini (1989: 100) emphasises that the distinction the Rgayba¯t make
between second generation slaves born in the camp, and slaves captured or
bought, does not rely on different levels of affection but on more or less
complete socialisation into Rgayba¯t society. Only slave boys are believed to
become skilled herders, knowing all animals in the master’s possession
extremely well; once this is achieved they are hardly ever exchanged.
Saugnier, while enslaved in the western Sahara, consequently herded only
camels in the vicinity of the camp (cf. Saugnier/Brisson [1792] 1969: 37).
43 As already stated, property in this camp was distributed highly unevenly.
While Mohamed Ould Abass during his interview declared one close relative
to have owned 100 camels, and his own nuclear family to have owned 50 to
60, he stressed that the number of poor people in the camp has been so high
he now could not count them.
44 Most big herd owners I became aware of come from the local notability.
However there are some “new rich” too, the modest origins of whom people
increasingly dare to name (Interview Yahya Ould Heime, h. assa¯n,
12.12.1995).
45 Payment may vary according to the size of the herd; for herding about 20 to
50 head, recently about 5,000 UM were paid. Herds up to 100 animals,
necessitating labour input exceeding at least during a part of a year one
nuclear household’s capacity, could be paid for with up to 10,000 UM (about
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US$64) per month (Interview Mahmoud Ould Mnih, zna¯ga, 4.2.1996). The
sum of 60,000 UM approximately equals the price of an average riding camel.
For past arrangements refer to Mokhtar Ould Hamidoun (1952: 56).
46 The great bı¯z. a¯n traditions of brave herders, such as those of Deyloul, show
these to be zna¯ga (cf. Tauzin 1993: 13-20). Among my interviewees,
commitment to pastoral activities was most marked among people likely to
be of zna¯ga origin (Interview Mahmoud Ould Mnih, 4.2.1996). Though
slaves too could engage in camel herding, riding etc., they often did so only
as a secondary occupation to cultivation (Interview Ghalim Ould Elkhair,
^abd, 17.12.1995). Badeyn, too, in his long career of professional occupations
once herded camels for a Kunta notable (cf. p. 57-59).
47 This is practised throughout the Sahel. Although moving around in one and
the same herd, sheep and goats maintain different patterns of mobility, due
to distinct fodder preferences and seasonal vegetation differences. In a mixed
herd observed near Niono (Mali), sheep had an overall intake of 59 percent
herbaceous plants and goats about 87 percent of shrubs (cf. Wilson/de
Leeuw/de Haan 1983: 102).
48 The region of Achram-Diouk by and large has considerably cut down export
of livestock. Nowadays sheep imported from the Hodh region are cheaper
than local ones, and subsequently more competitive on the national and
international level. Former sales to Senegal are replaced by the quick lorry
transport to and subsequent sale in the capital Nouakchott. A few exceptions
come from the northern meat markets in the mining centres. In this direction
animals are still transported on the hoof until reaching the station of Choum
at the iron ore railway linking Nouadhibou with Zouérat.
49 Sheep are not able to browse and digest wooden fibres, but in turn seem to
use resources more efficiently than goats and have slightly fewer miscarriages
(cf. Wilson/de Leeuw/de Haan 1983: 87).
50 Several such plants were reported to me, but I was unable to identify all of
them. Whenever branches from a tree called tebnenna (this might be the
species called titarek, Leptadenia pyrotechnica, by Ould Hamidoun 1952:
19), are laid into water to make ropes of it, the water is poisoned for animals.
Residues of millet plants sprouting again some time after being cut for
harvest become harmful to animals too (Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. art.a¯ni,
12.4.1995).
51 There are a lot of practices to cure animals of this and other diseases. Most
prominent are treatments with a red-hot pole. Depending on the injury or
disease, different areas are marked with burns (the same treatment applies to
human beings). With regard to the inflation caused by tigengilit, several
treatments were related to me. One is to grease with oil or butter or to wash
with a large amount of soap the anus of the animal, another treatment is to
penetrate the animal’s belly with a sharp needle and hence let the pressure
out, yet another is to make small incisions beneath the ears and the nostrils
or to dilute sugar in water and make the animal breathe in this liquid.
52 During and for some months subsequent to the rainy season small stock can
be watered from surface water. Good shepherds then are able to distinguish
good from bad water infected e.g. by animal residues. Once this water
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supply dwindles away, professional adult herders have to dig wells, a task
they have to get an assistant for because of the amount of work entailed. On
the Tagant such wells attained a depth of between 8 and 10 metres (Interview
Mbarek Ould Koueriye, ^abd, 21.12.1995).
53 This period, experienced on a big plantation of millet, like the large dam of
Daber on the Tagant or Zemmal in the Aftout, is most impressive. All day
long the fields virtually vibrate with the endless shouting of an infinite
number of cultivators, reinforced by the cries of the chased birds, the sounds
of pots, cans and other items hit or clapped together and the irregular
rhythm of slapping slings. The omnipresent tension accompanies a deep
fatigue on the part of the cultivators.
54 Here flood recession agriculture is described, where both sowing and
harvesting takes place about two to three months later than in rainfed or
recession farming behind dams.
55 This method entailed the danger that the location of the granary might be
hard to recognise. Sometimes it could only be located after rain, when the
stored grain started sprouting (Interview Ahmed Ould Aimar, h. art.a¯ni
29.3.1995).
56 The submersion, either in the traditional walo-cultivation on the borders of
the Senegal river, or behind dams, referred to in the following, has the
advantage of suffocating vegetation. After the waters have retreated, the land
is ready for cultivation without further input.
57 Gerd Spittler (1991: 4f.) has analysed the ethic and conception of work
among Hausa cultivators. These draw a sharp distinction between places of
work, identified with loneliness and sometimes the bush, and places of
communication and social life. An interference of social life with work is
perceived as spoiling the latter. A comparable conception is probable for the
work ethic of both su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n. Bı¯z. a¯n interested in Islamic scholarship
usually left the camp of their family to live with a teacher elsewhere, and
only returned with the studies accomplished. Among the su¯da¯n the spatial
segregation of work places and social places follows a different pattern.
Cultivating implied in many cases living by the fields, often in the close
vicinity of other su¯da¯n. As many slaves were sent cultivating, this was the
time when many of the otherwise dispersed slaves met and families came to
live together.
58 There is divergent information on the ecological impact of the modern type
of large dams. A socio-economic study of the Tagant region, prospecting the
region’s potential for a development project (which later came into being as
the project Achram-Diouk), noted an increased compacting of the soils due
to the long-lasting flooding (cf. Grosser/Ibra Bra 1979: 49). Other scholars,
such as the geographer Charles Toupet (1977: 264f.), too, remark on this
phenomenon. Increased salinity of the soils seems not to be a major problem.
I found just one case concerning some stretches of the large dam of Daber on
the Tagant, constructed by the French administration in the early 1950s.
Other large dams, e.g. the almost one hundred-year-old large dam of Zem-
mal (120 ha), modernised by the Achram-Diouk rural development project
in 1991, do not reveal comparable problems.
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59 Millet and niébé beans (in h. assa¯niyya called adlaga¯n) are sometimes cultivat-
ed in combination. This is advantageous, because the leguminous plants
increase the nitrogen content of the ground (cf. Wüst 1989: 84).
60 There is a considerable number of women now living as household chiefs in
the region of Achram-Diouk as well as other rural areas of Mauritania. Many
teenagers dislike working on the fields, especially if a continued presence on
the highly dispersed fields is required, far away from their friends in the
nearby village. Therefore tasks needing constant presence, like guarding the
fields and chasing birds, is done by the women and small children, while the
teenage boys are obliged by their mothers to join in temporary activities like
weeding and harvesting. To get this work done, the youngsters rely more or
less successfully on reciprocal help from their friends (Interview Mahmoude
Mint Ali; h. art.a¯niyya, 26.7.1995; Boua Ould Beydyali, hartani, 11.9.1995).
61 Male absenteeism due to migration has probably increased women’s
contribution to these tasks vis-à-vis former times (cf. Toupet 1977: 259).
62 Both beans and melons are important cereal substitutes, being able to grow
successfully without too much rainfall. They were cultivated at the desert’s
edge to cope with the frequent shortfalls in sorghum supply and local
production, but the bı¯z. a¯n did not prize them. In good years with sufficient
grain available, the consumption of vundi and adlaga¯n, which when accom-
panying millet raises the dish’s yield of proteins, was left to the slaves and
h. ara¯t.ı¯n (cf. Webb 1984: 154f.; on the use of vundi see also Bonte 1985a: 36f.)
63 Pierre Bonte, who started research on the Adrar region of Mauritania in the
early 1970s, recently finished a comprehensive thesis on the history and
anthropology of the tribal society in this part of the western Sahara (cf.
Bonte 1998c).
64 The case of Awdaghust has always fascinated people and raised discussion.
Evidence is only to be drawn from excavations of a site lying in the Aouker,
in the exact middle-point between Kiffa and Tîchît, most probably identified
with the ancient Awdaghust. According to two divergent hypotheses,
th thoccupation of this site began either in the 7 or in the 8 century. An
excellent discussion of the interrelations between the early trans-Saharan
caravan trade, the Almoravid movement, ecological change and the emer-
gence of the bı¯z. a¯n society is provided by Ann McDougall (1985a).
65 A study of the Kunta trade network on the Tagant still needs to be done.
The towns of Talmeust, Rachid, and Kasr el Barka appear in almost none of
the descriptions of pre-colonial trans-Saharan trade, despite their considera-
ble size and affluence. The ruins of Kasr el Barka, with its distinct flat stone
architecture, are impressive, even one hundred years after the city was
abandoned (due to the defeat of most Kunta fractions in a war with the
Abakak Idaw^I¯š). The extent of its former date palm grove once was
estimated to be about 20,000 trees, and the number of inhabitants as many as
2,000 (cf. ANM E12-82, “rapport Lt. Fonde” 1936). In this Kasr el Barka is
likely to have outdone the famous trading-towns of Ouadâne (supposed
maximum inhabitants 1,500) and Chinguetti (supposed maximum inhabi-
tants 1,200; cf. Mauny 1961: 484). Rachid, destroyed several times as well,
was reconstructed during this century. The new town faces the ruins of the
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old town on the opposite slope of the valley. To my eyes these cities are very
likely to have performed as well as the illustrious old trade towns of Tidjikja
and Tîchît. The most concise analysis of the economics of the Kunta trade in
salt is provided by Ann McDougall (1980, 1987).
66 Tîchît, like Timbuktu for a long time out of reach of European travellers,
seems to have been subject to much idealisation. While its central role in
trade seems to be confirmed, much less so is the alleged fame of its date-palm
groves. Du Puigaudeau (1993: 204) describes during the 1930s the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of
Tîchît having to climb up the date-palms in order to wash off the salty
deposits inflicted on the dates by the heavy winds charged with salt from the
salt deposits. According to the former commandant de cercle du Tagant,
Dubost (1924: 459ff.) this procedure was effected every three or four days
during a period of about four months. Still then the Tîchît yield was much
below the Tagant average (25-30 kilos versus 70-80 per date-palm). Given
the high evaporation rates in the Saharan climate, this problem is likely to
have antedated recent decrease in rainfall. The huge demand for labour for
this type of cultivation also definitely limited the extension of the date-palm
groves.
67 The intensity of agricultural use can be derived from the complexity of water
management and irrigation systems. In this respect the Mauritanian oases did
not match those of the northern Sahara (cf. Clancy-Smith 1994: 15-25; Ensel
1998: 70-72).
68 According to this interviewee, who for some time co-operated with the
Mauritanian institute for research on pheniculture, throughout Mauritania
only the people of the Adrar are real experts at date-palm cultivation.
69 Grosser and Ibra Bra (1979: 44) estimate the intensity with which the Tagant
date-palm groves are put to use as follows: at maximum 10 percent meet the
standards of intensive use, 40 percent follow an intermediate scheme,
implying some fencing and the watering of the young plants, the remaining
50 percent rarely benefit from more care than pollination and harvest.
70 Ould Khalifa (1991: 253, 722) reports that the slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n (which he
subsumes under the euphemism of h. ara¯t.ı¯n) in Tidjikja always remained
directly attached to their master and subsequently lived in his household and
had no segregated residence. This rather dogmatic statement, although very
likely to describe accurately the case of most su¯da¯n dependents, might be
softened by supplemental characterisations. The masters often engaged in
caravan trade, and the women were sent to nomadic camps to drink milk, the
residences in town often were used more as a warehouse watched by the su¯-
da¯n. In the early colonial period, the su¯da¯n quickly started to sedentarise
within the date-palm groves, transforming their huts into houses.
71 This very concern is expressed by Ould Khalifa (1991: 800f.), obviously
trying to grasp his forefathers’ action.
72 The occurrence of witchcraft and bı¯z. a¯n society’s ways of dealing with it are
until today almost unstudied. Ann McDougall reports for the end of the
th th 19 and early 20 century Tidjikja witchcraft trials involving slaves,
performed by a bı¯z. a¯n jury composed of a prominent cleric, witnesses and the
supposed victim. The slave owners were in no way involved. Dealing with
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sorcery was common enough to produce a whole set of procedures, the
death penalty being only the ultima ratio. The French administration was
still concerned with these practices in 1936, trying at least to eradicate the
death penalty (cf. McDougall 1989: 289; Ould Khalifa 1991: 221). Witchcraft,
ultimately contradicting Islamic belief, is a much obscured subject in bı¯z. a¯n
society.
73 It is probable that the two names represent the same group. During my
fieldwork, although not working on the spot in the Wa¯d Tidjikja, I became
aware of the ^ag˙za¯zı¯r as a distinct group of specialists in date-palm cultiva-
tion living in social relations much like those of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n. Having come
across the writings of Ould Khalifa (1991) only subsequently, I was not able
to confirm the identity of the two terms. Another group with this name are
the ^ag˙za¯zı¯r of Ijil, who exploit the salt mine there and live in a sort of
tributary relation towards their Kunta overlords. Their origin is as mysteri-
ous as that of the ^ag˙za¯zı¯r of Tidjikja – and invokes similarly contradictory
oral traditions ranging from bı¯z. a¯n slave descent, mixed Berber and black
African, and finally purely Berber descent. A further, not unlikely hypothe-
sis is that the name might be derived from an ancient commercial language
called “azayr” (cf. McDougall 1990: 248f.).
74 Abwayr, a settlement founded according various traditions during the
th 8 century, was the predecessor of Sinqı¯t, ore else Chinguetti, founded in
660 H/1261 AD (cf. Mauny 1955: 148f.).
75 A red phenotype is invoked frequently in the description of social categories.
The blacksmiths (ma^alimı¯n), are similarly described as being of red pheno-
type. Another example is from the eastern regions of Mauritania. There the
term h
˘
ad. a¯ra, meaning greenish/dark, is frequently used to refer to h. ara¯t.ı¯n as
people who descend from legally manumitted slaves (cf. Brhane 1997a: 59,
and personal communication; Toupet 1977: 180).
76 Both authors develop the point of view that already before the 1960s the
production in the Tagant oases relied predominantly on contractual relations
between bı¯z. a¯n and (in this case necessarily) su¯da¯n of free status, i.e. h. ara¯t.ı¯n.
This phenomenon is described as ancient, and the h. ara¯t.ı¯n status of many
inhabitants of Tidjikja as coming from times immemorial. Other authors
however stress that this “h. art.a¯nisation” has contributed to a better perfor-
mance of the workforce and has risen considerably since the begin of
th colonisation, i.e. since the first decade of the 20 century (cf. Ould Khalifa
1991: 284). From the 1950s on all men of servile estate are said to have been
attributed freedom from their birth on (cf. Moussa/Ould Maouloud 1997).
th Similar trends during the first half of the 20 century have been derived from
colonial documents of the Adrar by Ann McDougall (1988: 376, note 26).
77 This was thanks to the institution of mug˙arassa. This treaty, generally
concluded between a bı¯z. a¯n and a h. art.a¯ni, obliges the former to provide the
land to plant the palm trees, and the latter to provide the labour necessary to
the development of the trees for about five years. This time being over, the
trees should be divided among the h. art.a¯ni and the bı¯z. a¯n, while the land
always remains the sole property of the bı¯z. a¯n (cf. Dubost 1924: 464; Ould
Abde 1989). The ease with which most bı¯z. a¯n made use of Islamic jurispru-
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dence, mechanisms of endebting and so forth, however, deprived most of the
h. ara¯t.ı¯n of ever getting proprietorship of palm trees, and of course land. A
second contract was musa¯qa¯t, defining a set of duties for the worker with
regard to the land owner, and in return his right to one fifth of the harvest.
This arrangement has been described as the most frequent in the Tagant until
the 1970s by Ba B. Moussa and Mohamed Ould Maouloud (1997), and as
common in the oases of the Maghrib too (there it is called h
˘
amma¯s). Unlike
mug˙arassa, it constitutes the h. ara¯t.ı¯n as a paid labourer without any means to
acquire their own means of production.
78 I remain sceptical towards the interpretation James Webb offers of the
interrelation of ecological degradation and social as well as economic change
in the western Sahara both on theoretical and empirical grounds (cf. Ruf
1995: 50-70). Climatological data on the era is scarce and most interpretation
has to rely on early travellers’ accounts. These however, very frequently lack
any accurate description of the severe seasonal variations the fauna and flora
are subjugated to in arid and semi-arid environments. An evaluation of the
th Sahelian droughts from local chronicles and oral data (from the 16 to the
th 20 century) provides no direct evidence of a continuous degradation during
this period (cf. Boureima 1993). Also desertification today is no longer
conceptualised as an encroaching desert frontier, but as developing in niches
and spots (cf. Mainguet 1991). Finally, an interpretation turning Webb’s
argument upside-down seems to fit the case at least equally well. After an
th initial crisis at the end of the 17 century, manifested in bı¯z. a¯n chronicles and
marked by segregation processes within, and southward migrations of some
tribal groupings, the new mode of production characterised by increased
trade activities developed. A dynamic economic development was induced,
by which the plateau regions of the western Sahara (Adrar and Tagant) were
able to import great numbers of slaves and hence to become the home of a
population bigger than ever before (cf. Ech Chenguiti 1953: 115f.; Bonte
1985b: 329).
79 This was largely due to the French struggle to replace desert salt with
imported sea-salt. While the Saharan salt was able to preserve its dominance
in the trade over the decades preceding colonisation, railway transportation
to Koulikoro (east of Bamako) available from 1904 brought about the
breakthrough for French salt on the western Sahelian markets (cf. McDoug-
all 1985b: 100; Roberts 1987: 161).
80 Donkeys could carry 50, oxen 100 kilograms of load over a daily distance of
about 30 kilometres. Camels could load up to 200 kilograms, a load they
could carry over 16 to 25 kilometres per day depending on their condition. A
lighter load considerably increased the distances the camels could cross per
day; up to 30 or 40 kilometres (cf. McDougall 1985b: 102). While within the
Saharan climate camels were the beast of burden of choice, they suffered
badly from animal diseases in more humid environments. Only a particular bı¯-
z. a¯n breed of pack-camels resistant to Trypanosomiasis could overcome this
limitation (cf. Féral 1983: 335).
81 The provisions of fodder naturally cannot fully cover the animals’ needs.
Rather they are intended to limit the deterioration of the animals’ physical
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condition during this period of extreme strain. These limits, however, are
interpreted differently by different caravaners, an attitude largely determined
by their dislike for the manual work of cutting fodder (cf. Spittler 1983: 70).
Here one has to add that in former times, when the Kel Ewey Tuareg still
had slaves to do this work in the place of the free men, the camels might have
been better off.
82 Similar examples are reported from Tuareg traders, especially of the Kel
Ewey and Kel Gress and their associates (cf. Baier/Lovejoy 1977; Lovejoy
1983: 211f.; Lovejoy 1986: 277f.).
83 Bourrel (1861: 66) in his mid-nineteenth century account from Brakna and
Aftout reports the case of a tent-slave sent by his master with Bourrel’s small
caravan, in order to have the opportunity to gain some pieces of guinée-
cloth.
84 This description particularly represents the situation of the eastern regions of
bı¯z. a¯n territory. In the south-west, the Gebla, caravan trade for a long time
was on a minor scale, and implied shorter distances (cf. Stewart 1973: 118f.).
Some caravans led by bı¯z. a¯n were even constituted by oxen instead of camels,
because of the region’s infestation with Trypanosomiasis.
85 There were three tla¯mı¯d. associated with this Kunta family from the
Azawad: “One organised and conducted the azalay [salt caravan], a second
supervised the mining and preparation of the salt blocks, and the third
attended to the livestock and camels. It is said that the one who managed the
mining sector amassed a considerable fortune through his own private trade,
which suggests that talamidh may have been given some sort of payment in
kind for their services.” (McDougall 1985b: 107)
86 Probably the best documented case is that of Šayh
˘
Sidyya al-Kabı¯r (1775-
1868 AD), who set out for sixteen years of study among the Kunta of the
Azawad at the age of thirty-four. Once he returned to his natal Gebla, he
managed to gain both economic power and spiritual influence over diverse
groupings within and beyond his own tribe. This enabled him to play an
influential role in Gebla politics and make of these another source of
symbolic and economic power (cf. Stewart 1973: 109, 112; Ould Cheikh
1991b; Taylor 1995: 430ff.).
87 The case of a h. ara¯t.ı¯n elite is reported from the Adrar region by Pierre Bonte
(1991: 182).
88 This woman lives in a small hut at the back of the ^amı¯r’s present residence in
Achram. She makes her living from drum-performances, a job she is engaged
to do to enliven festivities. The igga¯wen, traditionally the ones who did such
jobs, have become rare in the rural areas due to their migration to Nouak-
chott where it is easier to make a living.
89 Ever since the h. ella of the ^amı¯r ceased to mount the Tagant, the t.bal played
in Daber has changed. It is no longer the big drum of the tribe, but an old
mortar transformed into a drum by stretching a hide onto it. It is now played
with sticks instead of bare hands (Interview Doueige Mint Dvih, Daber,
21.12.1995). This instrument is often used among su¯da¯n and called šenna (cf.
Guignard 1975: 172).
90 This is confirmed in the case of Hammodi, a h. art.a¯ni who was able to gather
Chapter 5        343
 
 
great wealth in the early colonial Adrar, and subsequently was made
paramount chief by the colonial administration (cf. McDougall 1988: 379ff.)
91 Abdi Ould Embarek, put into office in 1909 by the French after having
joined their conquest of the Adrar, was deposed by the latter only a few
years later in an attempt to give way to pressures from opposing bı¯z. a¯n
factions. Abdi’s career ended when he was murdered on 26 June 1915 under
circumstances never fully uncovered. For the next few decades local politics
continued to involve much the same factional alliances that had been present
in the days of Abdi (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 567, 581ff., 594f., 622, 648, 683).
92 This is of course an ideal-type description, and in everyday life these
boundaries – as has been demonstrated in this chapter – were often less
clear-cut. The herding of small stock, like many other tasks, was frequently
done by children. However, speaking of child labour necessitates a definition
of what it means to be a child in bı¯z. a¯n society. Roughly the first initiation
into the social world of the adults takes place around the age of five to seven,
when bı¯z. a¯n children are considered able to receive Qur\a¯nic education, and
also could start to herd sheep and goats like the su¯da¯n children. A next step
was marked for the su¯da¯n boys by their shift from herding to agriculture,
which took place between the ages of fourteen to eighteen.
93 Norbert Elias (1990: 65-301) provides an authoritative study of how the
evolution of feudal habits and this very social group were interrelated. The
cultural practices thus developed do not constitute transcendental qualities
but are signs and metaphors in struggles constituting sameness and differ-
ence; inclusion and exclusion.
94 Barbara Cooper (1994: 70f.) analysed female labour and the development of
seclusion in the Maradi region of Niger. Recently the formerly servile female
labour supporting the legitimate wives in the polygamous Hausa society has
started to be replaced by that of now underprivileged junior wives. Similar
developments can be observed in Mauritania. While polygamy is not at issue,
the use of a household maid has become rather widespread. Millet, as I have
noted already, is no longer pounded, but ground for money in motor-driven
mills (cf. p. 147)
95 The equality of all (free) men is a central element in the bı¯z. a¯n conception of
their society. Therefore all members of a tribe are considered to share a
common patrilineal ancestor, and thus to be equals who share a common
solidarity. According to this model, it is the women, i.e. the uterine affilia-
tion which marks difference (cf. Bonte 1987a, 1991).
96 Within the uniform ideal of femininity indeed some differences exist too.
Women among the h. assa¯n used to accompany the men going to battle, as
Benne Mint Ahmed told me (Interview, h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995). While she
witnessed a battle of her tribe in which two men were killed, her veil was
riddled with bullets. No such account from zwa¯ya women has so far come to
my knowledge.
97 Proverbs and tales are most informative about the cowardice attributed to
blacksmiths (ma^alimı¯n) and musicians (igga¯wen; cf. Tauzin 1993: 69).
98 Those h. assa¯n who for various reasons were no longer able to maintain their
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status made the towba; they repented from their supposed immoral lifestyle
and adopted zwa¯ya status considered to be of lower esteem (cf. Bonte 1988).
99 Claude Meillassoux (1983: 49) describes slave women as being the only slaves
experiencing what he calls de-sexualisation. As the term clearly relates to the
domain of gender, and the present analysis is based on the distinction
between sex and gender I prefer to avoid Meillassoux’s terminology for the
sake of clarity.
100 This is the case in narratives of noblemen who were taken and treated as
slaves. This is usually discovered once the supposed slaves start behaving like
people of noble descent. Mohammed Khairat is said to have been treated as a
slave (like his mother) although his master knew him to descend from a
zwa¯ya. His real status became manifest once the master falsely accused
Mohammed of drinking, i.e. stealing camels’ milk while out on the pasture.
Thereupon one of the young camels responded in his place and confessed
having drunk the milk of his mother. This miracle made the master’s eyes
cross, his hand was paralyzed and his mouth deformed, while Mohammed
Khairat became a saint of renown (cf. Brhane 1997a: 127ff.). Similar narrati-
ves from the Tuareg have been documented by Clare Oxby (1978: 150f.).
101 This was already observed by Saugnier a Frenchman shipwrecked on the
th western Saharan coast in the late 18 century (cf. Saugnier/Brisson [1792]
1969: 94).
102 Su¯da¯n women not dressing correctly, i.e. not covering their hair, are an
embarrassment for political activists struggling for the integration of su¯da¯n
on an equal footing into bı¯z. a¯n society. Becoming an awakened h. art.a¯niyya,
i.e. a h. ara¯t.ı¯n woman, also means learning to dress correctly and devoutly (cf.
Brhane 1997a: 304).
103 Laura Fair (1998) analysed the gendered politics of dressing in post-abolition
Zanzibar, which became much more for the former slave women than the
men a field in which discriminating patterns had to be overcome. Crucial to
this undertaking was wearing clothes in line with religious precepts.
104 Slave masters constructed an analogy between slave offspring and animal
offspring. As in a herd of goats, only the relation between the she-goat and
sucking kids is of interest.
105 This paragraph is strongly influenced by the approach to slavery as social
death developed by Orlando Patterson (1979: 39, 1982: 35ff.) and recently
taken up by Patrick Manning (1990a: 113). Both stress that slaves were
excluded from society by its conceiving of them as socially unborn. This
analysis, partly re-emerging in Claude Meillassoux’s thesis of the slave as
non-kin (Meillassoux 1986: 99ff.) is strongly criticised by Jonathon Glass-
man (1991: 281) for being a mere reconstruction of the masters’ ideology,
neglecting the entire “slave” conception of society and slave agency. While
this argument is shared here, for it highlights major shortcomings in past
analyses, it appears nevertheless imperative to also reconstruct the masters’
ideology. This is essential to grasp the contradictory character of slaves’ a
gency, containing both submission and integration into the masters’ world
(as analysed here), and resistance and deviant ideology, which (besides the
short overview of these aspects in chapter one) will be the subject of chapters
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seven and eight. Finally the present case study aims to provide a glimpse of
how social practice offered a means for slave women to overcome their
fundamental exclusion from social motherhood even within the framework
of the masters’ ideology, as milk-kinship inserts slaves into precisely those
collective social relations, i.e. a “civilisation”, the denial of which is supposed
to be constitutive of their very estate (cf. Meillassoux 1986: 113f.). The
borders between inclusion in and exclusion from society are socially
constructed, and hence are both maintained and contested in interaction.
106 The social configuration expressed by this Tuareg proverb in fact illustrates
very well those aspects of slave men’s mobility and slave women’s immobili-
ty revealed by the narratives of Badeyn (with regard to his two, subsequent
wives), and of Zeyneb and her husband (i.e. Brahim’s father; cf.
p. 57-59 and 62f.).
107 Among pastoral-nomadic Tuareg in the early 1970s many divorces among
slave couples resulted from the camp splitting up, and the slave woman and
man from that moment on belonging to different camps. While some
ex-slave men, and slave men living in bad conditions left with their spouses,
those slave men who had a good job and living, did not leave. Some of them,
maintaining the marriage over great distance by temporary visiting, were
reluctant to leave their work even for these visits, for they feared their
masters might replace them with slaves present every day (cf. Oxby 1978:
196).
Chapter 6
1 This double meaning of sa¯h. il is present in the h. assa¯niyya dialect until now.
There are different terms for the cardinal points in the country. In the west,
where the sea is close, sa¯h. il comes to mean “west”, and represents the
direction leading to the sea-coast. In the east of the country, the directions
which the cardinal points represent shift. Sa¯h. il comes to mean “north” (with
some tendency to north-west), i.e. the direction towards the shore constitu-
ted by the Sahara desert (cf. Frérot 1989: 110).
2 It should be noted that the nomads of the desert were hardly ever as predato-
ry as commonly assumed. Much of the interrelations with the sedentary
population developed on peaceful terms, as both depended on each other.
This is especially true for the desert trade, which appears in the description
of Ibn Bat.u¯t.a as well organised and safe (cf. Ibn Bat.u¯t.a in Levtzion/Hopkins
1981: 282ff.). Warfare did indeed occur, but in general only when one of the
many parties involved in the business felt itself disadvantaged (cf. Clancy-
Smith 1994: 18ff.) or went through a crisis.
3 The trade in salt from the desert mines, which was witnessed already from
th the 9 century, indeed could not have been managed without the participa-
tion of – and without profiting – the western Saharans. The history of Awda-
th thg˙ust shows that already from the 9 to the 12 century both short and
long-distance trade co-existed, and that this trade helped develop and
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maintain a trade in grain. The pastoralist diet of milk, blood and meat has
always lacked carbohydrates and thus made relations of exchange with
cultivators (either by trade or warfare) a necessity (cf. McDougall 1983;
Bollig/Casimir 1993: 535f.). This reconsideration of small-scale trade and
bartering, for long time underestimated in relation to the more prominent
long-distance trade, is crucial to the understanding of the economy at the
desert edge.
4 See also Valentin Ferdinand’s report, where an annotation explicitly men-
tions the presence of North African (Tunisian) merchants at Ouadâne prior
to the activities of the Portuguese at Arguin (cf. Valentin Ferdinand, report
translated and edited by Kunstmann 1860: 260, note 59).
5 Such commodities were textiles, saddles, stirrups, metalwork, silver, spices,
and wheat. The western Saharans sold slaves, gold, and gum arabic (cf.
Valentin Ferdinand, report translated and edited by Kunstmann 1860:
264ff.).
6 The varieties of cotton cloth in this period were less standardised than the
uniform pieces of indigo-dyed cloth – the famous guinée – which were later
imported to the region from India by the European traders. Only Mauny
(1961: 380), who bases his assumption on Leo Africanus, states that the
thcotton cloth imported by the Saharans from the Sudan during the 16
century was blue.
th7 Cotton cloth production in the Sudan expanded in the course of the 18
century too. Richard Roberts (1987: 47ff.) describes the history of state
formation in the Middle Niger valley as closely interwoven with the evolu-
tion of trade, local production, and political organisation. One aspect of this
is that the Maraka responded to bı¯z. a¯n demand for cloth and grain by
expanding their production, and establishing slave plantations.
8 This was due to the development of the new cotton calico textile printing
which relied on the use of gum arabic. These new fabrics provided an
inexpensive substitute for tapestries, exotic silks, and expensive, imported
chintzes, and unleashed a veritable consumer craze (cf. Webb 1995: 99).
9 From the West African coast, the gum was first shipped to France or Great
Britain, from where a large part was re-exported to other countries, who
themselves often re-exported the gum (cf. Webb 1985: 150).
10 Of course the advantages in the terms of trade calculated for the barter of
gum and guinée, did not only result in a rise in the value of gum arabic, or
the increased ability of the bı¯z. a¯n traders to exploit their position of strength.
During the period examined here, guinée cloth became less expensive. While
in 1718, the price index for guinée imported to Senegambia was 100, it was
only 66 in 1753, and 68 in 1838 (cf. Curtin 1975a: 321).
11 An evaluation of the reasons for the increase in grain demand is difficult.
James Webb (1995: 118f.) argues that the terms of trade had become so
favourable for the bı¯z. a¯n, that the comparative cost of purchasing grain for
gum was lower than producing it locally in the Gebla. This view is contested
by James Searing (1993: 197), who holds an increase in the bı¯z. a¯n dependent
labour force (supposed to be great consumers of millet) responsible for the
rise in demand. While both points remain difficult to prove, Webb’s
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argument is flawed by the fact that the demand for grain persisted, although
from 1838 the terms of trade no longer developed in favour of the bı¯z. a¯n, and
the gum trade experienced several crises. There is also no proof of the bı¯z. a¯n
producing less grain than before; indeed, they were making use of a growing
number of slaves, many of whom were settled in the south. An approach to
this evolution considering it as an outcome of modes of production and
exchange transformed by the gum trade appears more fruitful. Less grain
may have been exchanged locally between pastoralists and sedentary
cultivators in the framework of reciprocal relations of exchange, and more in
commercial transactions. Once it had entered the trade networks, the trade
in grain became likely to figure in the statistics.
12 Sources quoted and used by James Webb (1995: 114) to produce the present
table: Gum prices for 1718 to 1823–27 are in pounds sterling from Curtin
(1975a: 217, footnote 4). Gum prices for 1830-49 are estimated from Curtin
(1975b, Table A15.14). Guinée prices before 1776 are rough estimates based
upon Curtin (1975b, Table 15.11), which provides an import price index for
the 1730s and is included only to estimate general magnitude. Guinée prices
from 1776 to 1849 are from Table 5.8 in Webb (1995); see also Curtin
(1975b, Table A15, 13). The guinée price for 1788 is unavailable: the 1787
price was used as a substitute. The guinée price for 1825 was used for an
average gum price in 1823– 27.
13 Collecting gum could be done in addition to other activities like herding.
Additionally it fell in the non-agricultural season, and therefore did not
conflict with other major productive activities of the servile strata. In the
th 18 century about 2,000 individuals would have been able to collect all the
gum harvested at this time. Despite the increased production of gum in the
th 19 century, the servile population of the Gebla still was large enough to
make more workers unnecessary. Rather than being one-dimensional, the
th 19 century increase of the western Saharan slave population might have
been driven by a complex set of various factors (cf. Webb 1995: 98).
14 Highlighting as it does the dynamic link between human action and natural
environment, this is a strong case against an interpretation of western
Saharan social and economic changes as being determined by ecological
factors such as proposed by James Webb (1995).
15 While documents concerning trade with Mauritania in this era are lacking
(cf. De Chassey (1984: 67; 84f.) there are strong arguments why the patterns
of consumption developed in the course of the gum boom persisted. Early
colonial accounts continue to report the bı¯z. a¯n preference for guinée cloth of
Indian origin, while at the same time an overall greater variety of commodi-
ties starts to be imported. How much the use of cloth had become indispen-
sable to life at the desert’s edge can be revealed from accounts of the great
drought of 1940-43. Despite the severe famine in these years, this period is
remembered above all as the time “where the people dressed in hides”.
16 This was largely due to the Awla¯d Bu¯ Sba, a tribe of the north who devel-
oped the trade in green tea “8147” from China, imported from Morocco
together with other luxury merchandise and modern rifles (cf. Ould
Cheikh/Bonte 1982: 34).
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th 17 Patterns of tea consumption have evolved significantly during the 20 centu-
ry. Throughout my interviews I was told how in former times, i.e. between
thirty and fifty years ago, the consumption of tea was still restricted to the
most wealthy. Trade in tea was not well developed in the hinterland until the
end of the 1940s. As many pastoralists lacked cash, they had nothing to
exchange but animals (Interview Isselmou Ould Sidi, zwa¯ya, 8.4.1995).
18 The ^ašu¯r is considered to have first reduced bı¯z. a¯n interest in agricultural
production (cf. Ould Cheikh/Bonte 1982: 41). However, numerous agricul-
tural and phenicultural undertakings can be traced in this period. These
moreover are unlikely to have resulted from the few colonial incentives.
19 An evaluation of livestock exports from Mauritania is difficult due to the
imprecision of data on both livestock numbers and animals traded. The
colonial sources, which are likely to be the most exact, were based on
assumptions too. E.g. the Commandant du cercle de l’Assaba noted in a
report in March 1929 that the economic situation in the region was bad, and
that its inhabitants had sold as many as 6,500 cattle and one thousand sheep
to pay the colonial taxes (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 863).
20 The development of the early colonial peanut economy in Senegal is
analysed by George E. Brooks (1975). Bernard Moitt (1989: 50f., 1993: 82f.)
has shown that slaves imported from the east contributed significantly to the
labour force in the peanut basin. These later sought emancipation by
becoming followers of the Mouride brotherhoods, which managed to gain
control of Senegal’s peanut industry (cf. Diouf 1998). In the last decade of
the slave trade Dagana on the left bank of the Senegal river was a major
market for slaves, before Kaédi on the right bank took up this role for some
years at the turn of the century. Here again the bı¯z. a¯n appeared as slave
dealers (cf. Klein 1993c: 176).
21 The whole Senegal valley functioned as a major labour reservoir, first for
peanut production, and later for French industry, until the 1970s. Cash
income in the area did not stimulate local agricultural production, but helped
develop new patterns of nutrition, based on imported foodstuffs like rice,
French style bread, coffee, pasta and others (cf. Bathily 1991: 61).
22 This description, essentially based on the work of Delaunay (1984), contra-
dicts the view held by Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh and Pierre Bonte (1982)
that the Senegal valley continued to be the “grain-basket” of the area until
the drought of the late 1960s, though they acknowledge this role to have
been in decline since the end of the Second World War. After the “pacifica-
tion”, as the French had named the installation of their colonial power, the
local production, especially on the bı¯z. a¯n-controlled right bank, is likely to
have increased due to its resettlement both by black African ethnic groups
and bı¯z. a¯n. No information is available whether the grain imports of the
th valley, which took place during the 19 century (cf. Hanson 1992: 209),
th continued during the 20 century, and thus eased the accessibility of
marketed grain for the bı¯z. a¯n pastoralists. Francis De Chassey locates first
signs of the valley no longer being able to meet the grain requirements from
the interior in the year 1945, and supposes the surplus in the years before to
have been moderate (De Chassey 1984: 67ff.).
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23 While accurate data is lacking it seems likely that grain consumption in bı¯-
th z. a¯n society rose during the 20 century. The pastoral diet of former times was
often described to me as having consisted only of milk during the rainy and
cold season, with millet only complementing the decreasing amount of milk
in the dry hot season. Eating in these times often was restricted to one or
two meals a day. Later, eating a dish accompanied with millet twice a day
became a sign of personal wealth (Interview Benne Mint Ahmed, h. assa¯n,
29.10.1995).
24 During this famine, slaves are reported to have been re-sold, and children to
have been pawned, because people did not have the means to acquire food or
pay taxes. Among the purchasers, the bı¯z. a¯n were reported to have been the
most important group at Bundu and Gajaaga (cf. Clark 1994: 63). Various bı¯-
z. a¯n groups buying slaves (among them the Idaw^I¯š) were also present in the
upper Senegal valley (cf. Clark 1995: 213).
25 This high percentage did not only result from the deliberate will of the
slaves. In many cases, the nobility responded to the French request for fixed
quotas by sending their slaves instead of their own sons (cf. Clark 1994: 65).
26 A very good description of the repercussions the First World War had in
West Africa is found in the autobiography of Amadou Hampâté Bâ (1992:
469ff.). The experiences the West African soldiers had on the European
battlefields hastened the collapse of the stereotype of the white man as an
almost supernatural being.
27 The French had already annexed the right bank of the Senegal valley to their
colony of Senegal in 1891. From 1900 on the frontiers of the future colony of
Mauritania were drawn and negotiated with other colonial powers, notably
the Spanish, who claimed possession of the Seguiet el Hamra and Rio de
Oro, which later became their colony and nowadays is known under the
term “Western Sahara”. In 1903 a protectorate over parts of today’s
Mauritania was established, and was declared “territoire civil” in 1904. Only
in 1920 was Mauritania integrated as a colony into French West Africa
(A.O.F.; cf. De Chassey 1984: 464f.).
28 The effects of the declining production and commercialisation of grain in the
Senegal valley on bı¯z. a¯n society are likely to have been tempered by the
reoccupation and re-cultivation of the right bank subsequent to the colonisa-
tion (cf. Ould Cheikh/Bonte 1982: 40).
29 In 1954 the Fulbe are reported to have reached the Tagant at Diouk and
Djonâba, their expansion then continued eastwards, where they crossed the
Assaba (cf. Santoir 1993: 138).
30 In some areas of the southern Gebla such as Trarza and Brakna, the right
bank populations suffered severely from the establishment of French control
th on the left bank in the second half of the 19 century. The French quite
effectively established a frontier, and prevented right bank populations from
moving southwards. This hit the local populations hard and led to the
pauperisation of many groups, as well as to northward migrations. In this
process the right bank became less densely populated and exploited than in
the first half of the century (cf. Taylor 1996: 216ff.). The beginning of the
th 20 century thus became somewhat a scramble for the reestablishment of
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territorial claims that, both among the bı¯z. a¯n and among left bank dwellers,
had not been effective for a long time.
31 This was especially true for the Brakna region, where in the second half of
th the 19 century the emirate had been weakened and tribal control of land
became fragmented. Additionally strong neighbouring tribal groups, among
whom were the ^amı¯r of Tagant, as well as the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d of the
Assaba, intervened in local conflicts and thereby sought to maximise their
influence (cf. Leservoisier 1994a).
32 The dam of Zemmal near Leklewa is an example of how this policy and the
underlying evolution of the relations of production had an impact even
within the remote area of the northern Aftout. Local tradition refers to the
construction of the dam as having coincided with the first presence of the
French. The dam, constructed and cultivated first of all by slaves, was
registered as tribal territory, and hence gave the Legwa¯t.it. a secure claim over
a large part of the fertile area of the Chelkhet Arkham. This is true for the
dam of Achram too. According to interviewee Mohammed Yahya (zwa¯ya,
21.9.1995), this dam was first constructed around 1915 by Tarkoz of the
Leg˙wa¯reb fraction.
33 Tribal rights and tribal authority were difficult to eradicate by colonial
decrees. Still in 1969, i.e. nine years after independence, and in the middle of
the severe drought, the ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar,
prevented pastoralists who had no relations of affinity or affiliation with him
from entering the Tagant plateau where the local animals were already dying
in large numbers (AM, confidential letter from the préfet at Moudjéria,
15.4.1969).
34 Southward migrations as such were nothing peculiar in the western Sahara
and frequently resulted from periods of economic crisis engendering social
conflict. The foundation of Tidjikja goes back to a southward migration of
Idaw^Alı¯ from Chinguetti in the Adrar. The Idawalhagˇgˇ are a zwa¯ya group
th th from Ouadâne in the Adrar, who during the late 16 or early 17 century
migrated to the Trarza, where they developed the marketing of gum. Later in
th the 18 century many settled on the left bank of the Senegal, where their
religious prestige attracted numerous black African students and provided
them with considerable power. They successively adopted the Wolof
language and intermarried. Today they are almost “Wolof”, but still remem-
ber their noble bı¯z. a¯n descent (cf. Webb 1984: 62ff.) An interpretation of
bı¯z. a¯n history as a continued southward migration fleeing from a desiccating
environment is proposed by Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1995).
35 Especially the zwa¯ya scholars felt a need to reduce mobility in order to
obtain better conditions for teaching and learning. One zwa¯ya woman
remembered that in the past it were only their su¯da¯n who tended the
livestock, consisting of sheep, goats and cattle. While the su¯da¯n were highly
mobile, the bı¯z. a¯n remained almost sedentary (Interview Loughaye Mint
Driss, zwa¯ya, 18.9.1995).
36 According to Loughaye Mint Driss (zwa¯ya, 18.9.1995), who was born
around 1945, her family (before their herds were destroyed in 1969) used to
sell their animals “at all places”, i.e. the traders came to meet the pastoralists
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and buy the meat stock on the spot. Payment was either in cash, or on credit
to be paid in tea or other commodities.
37 After independence the structure of the meat market was profoundly
changed by the emergence of the mining town Zouérat in the north, Noua-
dhibou on the coast, and the capital Nouakchott. The capital for one of the
now largest shops in Achram was generated by first bringing and selling
sheep, and when the business had began to develop well, camels to Zouérat.
38 The trade of western Saharan desert salt for grain from the Senegal valley
was still active in the first decades of this century – e.g. there were 1,000 ca-
mels loaded with grain passing through Tidjikja in 1907 (cf. Ould Cheikh/
Bonte 1982: 35) – but then fell quickly into decline due to the import of
French salt. Already before the great drought virtually no more salt caravans
left the Adrar (cf. Ritter 1986), and the trade became limited to individual,
small-scale exchanges e.g. between inhabitants of the Adrar who came to the
Tagant, where they could exchange salt for grain with local su¯da¯n (Interview
Bâke Mint El Mokhtar, h. art.a¯niyya 2.11.1995).
39 D’Hont (1986: 157) notes that it was this monetisation of the commercial
transactions that weakened the old trade elite’s former privilege to create and
maintain relations of dependency by providing credit.
40 The monetisation of the grain trade in the Senegal valley was effectively
accomplished quite early this century. Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh and
Pierre Bonte (1982: 43) locate the golden age of this trade in the years from
1931-48.
41 Speculating on the direct barter of grain for animals or other commodities
was less reliable than accepting perhaps less favourable terms of trade, but
gaining quick service in the trade towns. Isselmou Ould Sidi told me he had
often failed to barter millet locally with su¯da¯n because he arrived too late,
when the latter had already sold off their surplus grain, e.g. to people from
the Adrar, paying in cash. Still needing millet, Isselmou Ould Sidi then
finished up travelling to Kaédi, where grain was always in supply. All this
ended with the drought in 1969 (Interview Isselmou Ould Sidi, zwa¯ya,
8.4.1995; Bake Mint Mokhtar, h. art.a¯niyya 2.11.1995). Information on the
modes of exchanges was more detailed from women than men and it was the
former who highlighted that animals were converted into money (Interview
Benne Mint Ahmed, h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995; Loughaye Mint Driss, zwa¯ya,
18.9.1995).
42 These middlemen were at the heart of the spread of the large bı¯z. a¯n trade
diaspora, covering first of all West Africa, but later the rest of the continent
too. E.g. some migrants from the region of Achram-Diouk are involved in
the diamond business in central Africa.
43 Prices for small stock differed according to the species. Most prized were
white sheep, which fetched a considerably higher price than the black sheep
kept by the bı¯z. a¯n to furnish wool for tent-making (Interview Isselmou Ould
Sidi, zwa¯ya, 8.4.1995).
44 Sugar, though necessary to the preparation of the typical green tea, was not
among the goods Weddou Ould Jiddou imported. The profits to be drawn
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from this bulky and heavy commodity, which was available at good prices in
Kaédi too, were much too low.
45 Weddou Ould Jiddou, however, insisted that he had been a pastoralist above
all. He undertook the journey only twice a year, while others, who accord-
ing to his statement assembled the animals only on the basis of credit, kept
coming and going throughout the year.
46 Kiffa, though passing through several periods of crisis, quickly developed
into the most important trade town of east-central Mauritania. Already in
1917 a local market was declared open by the colonial administration, and in
1924 a branch of the French west-African trading company “Maison Maurel
et Prom” was established. Droughts in 1926-27, and later economic
depression led to an occasional breakdown of local trade business, and the
reorientation of trade to the river Senegal. The sustained growth of Kiffa as a
centre both for regional and export trade began in 1944, when the drought
and recession of the early 1940s had ended (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1995:
662f.).
47 Prostitution in the towns is documented in many colonial reports (cf. for the
Adrar McDougall 1988 and for Kiffa ANM B1, anonymous, “La question
des haratines et serviteurs dans l’Assaba” 1931; document kindly passed on
by Roger Botte).
48 Some aspects of these liaisons were discussed on H-Net List for African
History [H-Africa@H-Net.msu.edu], see e.g. Klein, Martin [mklein@chass.
utoronto.ca] “Interracial Marriage & relationships: reply”, in: [H-Africa@
H-Net.msu.edu], 21 January 1998.
49 It was the presence of colonial administration that tempered depopulation of
many of the old Mauritanian trading towns, which lost their former function
as centres of trade and scholarship. E.g. Tîchît, which witnessed a net
emigration not only of the su¯da¯n; documented already in 1926 as leaving in
large numbers for Oualâta, but of bı¯z. a¯n too (cf. D’Hont 1986; ANM E1-20,
Colonie de la Mauritanie, Cercle du Tagant, Subdivision de Tidjikdja,
“Lettre du Capitaine Commandant du Cercle du Tagant à M. le Lieutnant-
Gouverneur de la Mauritanie à Saint-Louis” 14.8.1926; document kindly
passed on by Roger Botte).
50 ANM E2-114, Cap. Gilles, Colonie de la Mauritanie, Cercle de Kiffa,
“L’Aftout de Kiffa” 1936, p 3ff.; document kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
51 ANM série Tidjikja, dossier 33/1 “Compte rendu du conseil des notables,
séance du 15 et 16 juillet 1921”, cited in Ould Khalifa (1991: 777f.). It has to
be noted that the French commandant at the time felt concerned about the
su¯da¯n leaving for the south less because he wanted to support the bı¯z. a¯n
claims, but because this endangered his ambitious projects of agricultural
development of the Tagant (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 778).
52 AT, Vézy, Résident Moudjéria, “rapport Tribu Tarkoz” 30.9.1940; docu-
ment kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
53 AM, Cercle du Tagant, “Procès verbal de la réunion du conseil des notables
du Tagant” 29.6.1953.
54 The role of patronage in the acquisition of work is difficult to ascertain on
the basis of individual narratives, which cannot be cross-checked. There are
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good arguments for attributing credibility to the many su¯da¯n claims to have
looked for and found work without external (i.e. bı¯z. a¯n) assistance and
patronage. Some of the most menial jobs can be accessed directly. Also there
are now some su¯da¯n networks. This question, however deserves further
exploration.
55 The valley is the locus of recession cultivation (waalo). Sowing and matura-
tion here takes place later than with rainfed cultivation (dieri). The delay
between the two harvests allows farmers from areas of rainfed cultivation to
migrate to the locations of recession cultivation and work during harvest (cf.
Grayzel 1988: 312; Leservoisier 1994a: 284).
56 Exploration began definitely in 1959, and mining in 1963. Only five percent
of the MIFERMA, as the SNIM mining company was called prior to its
nationalisation in 1974 and re-privatisation in 1978, was initially held by the
Mauritanian state. All the remaining capital was held by French, British,
Italian, and German investors (cf. Reichhold 1964: 71).
57 Above all watering was paid in cash, but wages seem to have varied strongly.
Laghlave Ould Mahmoud (Interview, h. art.a¯ni, 13.4.1995) claims to have
earned 3,000 UM per month while watering cattle from different bı¯z. a¯n in
1968, the year prior to the drought. This seems particularly much, for a
medium cow then cost about 5,000 UM and a goat between 150 and
200 UM.
58 Many bı¯z. a¯n owning only smaller herds put these together and thus had to
pay only one herder instead of paying one for every herd or sustain a slave
herder. While this trend created a certain amount of occasional job opportu-
nities for su¯da¯n seeking a greater autonomy, it also released the former
masters and patrons from their obligation to assist their dependents in times
of need (Interview Laghlave Ould Mahmoud, h. art.a¯ni, 13.4.1995).
59 Among well-off bı¯z. a¯n excessive mobility, i.e. submission to the needs of the
livestock, was perceived as an expression of rudeness and lack of standing
that had to be relayed to the su¯da¯n or zna¯ga (Interview Loughaye Mint
Driss, zwa¯ya, 18.9.1995).
60 There are numerous examples of herders who have a great knowledge of
distant pastures and migrations. Such people, however, rarely appear in my
sample, which is dominated by sedentarised su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n now typical for
the region. Most of the pastoral activity once located in the area has now
moved south, namely to the region of Sélibabi and even further south
beyond the Mauritanian border (cf. Interview Mohammed Ould Abass,
zna¯ga, 5.12.1995; Sidi Ould Gere, zwa¯ya 19.4.1995).
61 The pastures of the north are supposed to be of higher nutritive content than
those of the south. The latter are suspected by many to be “like water”, and
thus unable to give weakened animals their strength back. The case of the
pastures of the east, i.e. the Hodh, is different. Here pastoralists from the
Aftout and Tagant are reluctant to go. They state that their animals are
accustomed to pastures of stony soils and therefore do not thrive in pastures
of sandy soils (and vice versa). These conceptions of different pastures can be
found not only in the Tagant and Aftout region, but throughout Mauritania
(Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, personal communication).
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62 According to Ahmed Ould Breik (h. art.a¯ni, 11.4.1995), “One member of the
family has to keep here [in the village, close to the land], not all [members of
the family] can leave. All other brothers have left, therefore I have to take
care of everything here. They [the brothers] have things here that one cannot
leave just like that. One needs a brother who stays with these things.”
63 On the practices of veil-dyeing, which is both an art and a big business, refer
to Tauzin (1986). While bı¯z. a¯n women are most frequently engaged in large
scale manufacturing and especially trading of veils, su¯da¯n women first of all
dye small numbers of veils on an occasional basis, thus achieving far smaller
profits. On Mauritanian women traders refer also to Simard (1996).
64 ANM B1, Colonie de la Mauritanie, Direction des Affaires Administratives,
rapport “La question des haratines et serviteurs dans l’Assaba” 1931;
document kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
65 Every year, shortly before the rainy season, the government initiates cam-
paigns for the return to the rural area, and provides subsidised transport on
lorries for the inhabitants of Nouakchott. Deprived populations who
migrated from their rural home to the city thus are to be given a chance to
restart cultivation and life in the rural area. These transports enable many
who otherwise would be unable to get back home to start the trip. The
sustainability of the measure, however, has to be questioned.
66 One h. art.a¯ni told me how he recovered from coughing blood by permanently
leaving Nouakchott and returning back home to his field, where he now
lives almost exclusively on millet (Interview Ally Ould Mohammed Ghalle,
h. art.a¯ni, 12.12.1995).
67 One well established h. ara¯t.ı¯n employee of the Achram-Diouk rural develop-
ment scheme helped his mother, who had lived in Nouakchott for more than
a decade, to move to Achram. There he offered her a cow with the single
purpose of improving her health and well-being with large quantities of fresh
milk.
68 The central thesis in the most prominent bı¯z. a¯n scholarly work on medicine
can be summed up in the following words: “L’estomac est la demeure du
mal”. Consequently the main treatment for acute diseases was the laxative
(Ould Ahmedou, E.G. 1990: 98).
69 Similar results are reported from other studies comparing sedentary and
nomadic populations. The closer children lived to a modern, sedentary and
urban environment, the worse was their nutritional state (cf. Oba 1990: 43).
Chapter 7
1 This overall discrepancy between local production and consumption of grain
does not imply that no grain was exchanged locally. Until the big drought in
1969 pastoralists from the Adrar used to come to the Tagant to buy local
grain, thus economising on the long journey to the Senegal valley. Caravans
buying grain abundant on the Tagant are also reported by Bou el Moghdad
th from the second half of the 19 century, but doubts have to expressed about
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his assumption that these were directed towards the black Africans of the
šema¯ma (cf. commented and edited report of Bou El Moghdad from 1894 in:
Ould Mohameden 1995: 94f.; see also the report of Bou El Moghdad issued
in 1861).
2 Land that is to be “vivified” has previously to be identified as “dead land”,
i.e. it has to be proved that there has been no occupation or appropriation of
any kind (Ould al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996: 164). As a consequence legal
regulations abound concerning the status of abandoned land (either by force
or intention), land conquered by force, different modes of transmitting land
involving different regulations concerning further alienability, etc., which
allow for overlapping and conflicting claims to land ownership.
3 The nawa¯zil are a distinct kind of literature concerning juridical cases. In the
western Sahara, the term often was used synonymously to fatwa¯ (cf. Oßwald
1993: 23f.).
4 Wells can be constructed and owned collectively or individually. One can
only claim ownership if they are located on one’s own tribal land; in the case
of wells built on foreign land, these will become the property of the collec-
tivity holding ownership rights over this territory. Access to wells has to be
granted to foreigners, as far as drinking is an essential need.
5 The definition of tribal territories depended also on pastoral specialisation. Bı¯-
z. a¯n specialised in camel rearing, implying long and frequent migrations, had
less well-defined tribal territories than bı¯z. a¯n specialised in cattle, which
depended on watering every, or every second day, and which followed
patterns of transhumance rarely spanning more than one hundred kilometres
(cf. Bonte 1987b: 196).
6 The desire to trace actual ownership back to the introduction of Islam
highlights the zwa¯ya preoccupation that their possession does not arise from
illegitimate sources. This is documented by a special genre of legal docu-
ments, focusing on the supposedly illegitimate nature of most h. assa¯n (but
also other groups’) belongings. Many zwa¯ya claimed to be (in a kind of a
primordial definition) the only Muslims in the western Sahara and to be poor
(thus entitling them to receive the zaka¯t, the Islamic tithe for the poor).
Therefore they saw themselves legitimised in taking over possession of goods
of illegitimate origin, i.e. goods whose legitimate possessor was no longer to
be ascertained. This definition included the belongings of the h. assa¯n, who
often were portrayed as evil beings, living only from theft and robbery (cf.
Oßwald 1993: 190ff.; Brückner n.d.).
7 Among the Kunta of the Tamourt-en-Naaj, a few strangers were able to
acquire land and palm trees. This, however, is inconceivable among the
Idaw^Alı¯ of Tidjikja, among whom strangers may own palm trees, but would
never be allowed to own the land on which they grow (cf. Ould Khalifa
1991: 402).
8 The central role distinct places can play in the constitution and maintenance
of tribal or ethnic identity and cohesion among pastoral nomadic people, and
the strong link between these processes and either practical and symbolical
territorial hegemony has been highlighted by Günther Schlee (1990) with
regard to the “holy grounds” of the Gabbra of northern Kenya.
356        Notes
 
 
9 Apparently the legal framework for the local land registers was introduced
by laws in 1902 and 1932 (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1991: 193).
10 This indeed brought about some problems, for there hardly ever was such a
neatly defined hierarchy in tribal terms. However, as Colette Establet (1987)
has shown for the case of the Algerian south, the indigenous population
learned to express themselves in a way matching up with the colonisers’ idea
of a tribal hierarchy well organised into tribes, fractions and sub-fractions.
11 The mobility of tribal habitat was limited by the French practice of register-
ing tribes in one administrative post, and of appointing them distinct areas of
nomadisation, which in general were limited by the boundaries of the
different administrative regions, called “cercles”. This was rarely respected
by the nomads, as administrative reports full of complaints on the issue
show. The attempt to control bı¯z. a¯n caravan transport and trade failed as well
(cf. AM series of monthly reports by various local residents from 1937-
1943).
12 These measures of course could not prevent a number of arbitrary decisions,
and the registers reveal certain tribes to have profited much more from land
entitlements than others. This reflects not only the arbitrary nature of
colonial policy and its ability to make and unmake bı¯z. a¯n tribes, but also the
complex interaction between colonial and indigenous power. The good
relations some bı¯z. a¯n tribes and chiefs had with colonial officials enabled
them to fuel the latter with well selected information and hence influence the
administrators’ decision making.
13 In the case of the lake R’Kiz the French undertook several inquiries into the
history of land ownership, in order to deal competently with the many
demands for attribution of land and facilitate arbitration with regard to
disputes between tribes and fractions. The outcome of the case is revealing of
the reluctance of the French to enmesh themselves too deeply in bı¯z. a¯n
affairs. In 1916, and again in 1920, the distribution of the precious land
surrounding the lake is carried out by a local qa¯d. i – acting under the
authority of two capitaines. Until today, this distribution, apart from some
minor rectification, prevails. No authority, either of colonial or independent
Mauritania has ever since dared to endanger this compromise (cf. Ould
al-Barra/Ould Cheikh 1996: 171f.).
14 In fact there are many means by which women can – legally – be excluded
from their rights of inheritance. Declaring property h. ubs (synonym: waqf),
i.e. a pious endowment which can be bound to different conditions, is one of
the most prominent of such means. A detailed study of such practices (in use
in Mauritania too), for Tunisia is presented by Sophie Ferchiou (1987), and
Geneviève Bedoucha (1987).
15 These arrangements were defined as loans for use, and called ^a¯riyya,
according to the ma¯liki jurist Ibn Abî Zayd Al-Qayrawânî (1983: 237). In
general the beneficiary of the loan had to guarantee it would be returned
intact.
16 The permanent installation of h. ara¯t.ı¯n in the Aftout, e.g. around Mbout,
antedates the colonial period. The more permanent, and later sedentary
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presence of the bı¯z. a¯n began with the colonial presence in the region (cf. RIM
1986: 57).
17 There are strong regional variations in the access of h. ara¯t.ı¯n to ownership of
land. Thomas K. Park (1988: 62, 64) witnessed the local qa¯d. i of Mbout
stating that the h. ara¯t.ı¯n in this region all were legal owners of land, because
they had initially cleared and cultivated it. This raised protest among the
Mauritanian students in his research team. Coming all from the west of the
country, they until then had never heard of h. ara¯t.ı¯n legally owning land. Still
another picture is drawn by Olivier Leservoisier (1994a: 290f.). He saw the
ownership rights of h. ara¯t.ı¯n were recognised only in so far as they could not
be expropriated by bı¯z. a¯n. The observation made in this context that land
cannot be sold by h. ara¯t.ı¯n to people outside the tribe applies, however, to
bı¯z. a¯n too.
18 The limitation of the duration of a h. ubs causes many quarrels. Beneficiaries
of a h. ubs are likely to raise claims that the h. ubs they profit from was made
forever, or at least for the duration of their lifetime (Interview Ahmed Ould
Aly, qa¯d. i, 24.12.1995).
19 Viewed rigorously, these contracts involved not only the h. art.a¯ni who
concluded the agreement, but in the case of his death his successors too.
These inherited the obligations, and consequently also the rights of their
father (Interview Ahmed Ould Aly, qa¯d. i, 24.12.1995).
20 It is this difference drawn between ownership of trees and land that allowed
the alienation of palm trees to foreigners, i.e. members of tribes who did not
share the local collective rights of land ownership. Local bı¯z. a¯n thus could
contract h. ara¯t.ı¯n from other tribes, and not only h. ara¯t.ı¯n of their own tribe, as
these were not allowed to become owners of land, but only owners of trees
(cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 404). In the Tamourt en-Naaj on the Tagant plateau,
however, individual members of tribes alien to the area were allowed to buy
individual plots.
21 Ahmed Ould Aly, the most respected traditional qa¯d. i of the region of
Achram-Diouk (Interview 24.12.1995), insisted while describing the
stipulation of the mug˙arassa-contract on the importance of concluding any
such contract in written form, and not relying on witnesses. This is clearly
because quarrels over mug˙arassa are among the most frequent. A h. art.a¯ni
originating from the Tamourt en-Naaj confirmed that he knew h. ara¯t.ı¯n who
gained ownership of palm trees through mug˙arassa-contracts, but expressed
serious doubts whether they had profited from the full number of palm trees
(Interview h. art.a¯ni, 22.3.1995). Still 72 percent of the palm tree groves in the
Tamourt en-Naaj, and 54 percent in Tidjikja, continue to be exploited
indirectly, i.e. by means like the mug˙arassa, with this rate being lower in
other regions of date palm cultivation (cf. Ould Abde 1989: 39).
22 Grosser and Ibra Bra (1979: 178ff.) report that at El Mechra in the Tamourt
en-Naaj, one of three date palm groves is entirely owned by h. ara¯t.ı¯n. This in
turn may be a result of the zna¯ga status attributed to the Kunta fraction
living in El Mechra, which had a long history of conflict with the dominating
Kunta groups of the region to ascertain its own territorial claims. Allowing
h. ara¯t.ı¯n to appropriate contested “tribal” land in this respect could be viewed
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as a bı¯z. a¯n (or zna¯ga) strategy first of all motivated by the wish to strengthen
their own group’s solidarity and territorial boundaries.
23 Jean Schmitz (1987: 12) in his study on the Gorgol Noir, does not mention
this conflict over land between bı¯z. a¯n and h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Mbout region.
According to him the significant proof of h. ara¯t.ı¯n independence in matters of
land ownership is that they do not pay an agricultural rent. Paying the zaka¯t
bears no analogy to the rent, it only symbolises the recognition of spiritual
leadership and protection by local bı¯z. a¯n (cf. Park 1985: 68f.).
24 This was ordinance nº 1983.127 of 5 June 1983, and decree nº 1984.009 of
19 January 1984. For a presentation in full detail refer to Park (1985: 69ff.).
The 1990 decree was issued 31 January with the reference nº 90.020 and
replaced the one of 1984 (cf. Crousse/Hessling 1994: 91).
25 Trying to erase all references to tribalism, the text of the law employs rather
subtle prose: “les immatriculations foncières prises au nom des chefs ou
notables sont réputées avoir été consenties à la collectivité traditionnelle de
rattachement”, i.e. the tribe (cited according to Ould al-Barra/Ould Cheikh
1996: 177f.).
26 This was how Colonel Ould Haidalla was reported to have circumscribed
the official abolition of slavery (decreed in July 1980, legislation passed in
November 1981) in a national radio broadcast condemning slavery firmly on
5 July 1983 (Mauritanie Nouvelles, nº 235, 23.1.1997: 8). On su¯da¯n reactions
refer to the narratives of Brahim and his mother Zeyneb, p. 63-66.
27 A narrative of the formation of this coalition between many tribes and
fractions which over most of their history had been involved in inter-tribal
conflicts is presented by Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (1995: 593-595).
Although resistance from the bı¯z. a¯n to the French invaders was strong, this
statement by a leading member of the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d fails to acknowl-
edge the ongoing quarrels within the coalition, as well as the abstention of
numerous tribes and fractions (cf. Frèrejean 1995: 193ff.)
28 Xavier Coppolani is an illustrious personality in Mauritanian history. Born
as the son of poor peasants in Corsica, he chose to emigrate to Algeria,
where he made a career as an administrator. Considering colonial policy
unsuited to meeting the problems French rule raised in a Muslim country, he
undertook studies of Islam to develop a both more sensitive and efficient
policy. After promotion to the colonies of the “Soudan français”, in 1898 he
achieved the submission of several Tuareg and bı¯z. a¯n tribes purely by
negotiation. Thus encouraged he designed the plan for the constitution of a
Mauritanian colony, which was initially met with adamant opposition by the
Governor of Senegal representing the Saint-Louis establishment (cf.
Désiré-Vuillemin 1997: 471-473).
29 The French troops were composed of about 30 Frenchmen and 800 men on
foot, horse and camel (composed of tirailleurs from Senegal and bı¯z. a¯n allies).
Soon the food supply became a severe problem, and was tackled by the
extensive slaughter of conquered bı¯z. a¯n livestock (cf. Désiré-Vuillemin 1997:
481).
30 The death of Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed in the battle of Bou Gadoum is
contested, not in the literature on the period, but by oral tradition from the
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later ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Soueid Ahmed. Bakkar is said to have died
not in 1905, but a few years earlier in 1901 and some days after his leg had
been wounded in battle with French troops. In his last days Bakkar was
described as being so old he had to wear a sort of a blindfold to keep his
eyelids open. It is believed that had the old ^amı¯r not already been weakened
by his age, and died before the invasion of Tidjikja, his potential for resist-
ance would have pushed the French back from the Tagant (Interview
Khattar, zwa¯ya, 12.10.1995). While the circumstances of this battle are
reminiscent of those of the battle at Bou Gadoum, and thus raise doubts
justifying a rectification of the year of Bakkar’s death, his almost biblical age
is certain: born in around 1816, he replaced his brother as ^amı¯r of the
Idaw^I¯š Abakak in 1836. Reigning for about 70 years (as later did his son
Abderrahmane!), and reaching an age of about 90 years is indeed extraordi-
nary (cf. Frèrejean 1995: 263, note 326 edited by Désiré-Vuillemin).
31 The occupation of Tidjikja was on the 4 May 1905, and followed by the
submission of several tribes, such as a fraction of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak led by
Houssein Ould Bakkar, a son of Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed. The Idaw^Alı¯,
resident in Tidjikja, had already made their submission to the French, i.e. to
Coppolani, on the 6 March 1905 in Kasr el Barka (they had already
signalled their acquiescence to Coppolani’s project in 1903). At this time
large parts of the Kunta and the Tagˇaka¯net had already sent emissaries to the
French to negotiate peace (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 538ff.).
32 The small population of the town, about 2,000 people, had to provide 100
workers each day. About 700 animals per month were needed by the French
for slaughter. This number was more than a heavy load for the sedentary
people of the town who were not rich in animals, due to the scarce pastoral
resources (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 542ff.).
33 This major exploit of bı¯z. a¯n resistance to the French invaders is most vividly
remembered up to the present day. While French historiography close to the
sentiments of the colonial period continues to underline the treacherous and
dirty nature of the ambush, and portrays Coppolani as a Frenchman who
wanted nothing but to benefit the bı¯z. a¯n (for such exploits see Désiré-Vu-
illemin 1962 and 1997), the latter today express their sentiments by calling
their dogs “Coppolani”.
34 The town of Smara was founded by Ma al-Aïnin, with the aim of developing
a significant urban centre within the northern fringe of the Western Sahara
(cf. Vergniot 1984: 138f.). What had remained of Smara after the death of Ma
al-Aïnin (his house was reported to have comprised a vast library, and Ma
al-Aïnin to have written more than 300 œuvres) was burnt to the ground on
the 10 January 1913 by French troops led by Colonel Mouret. For
further information on Smara refer to Aguirré (1988: 202) and Gaudio (1978:
81). A comprehensive study of the history of the former Spanish Western
Sahara is provided by Barbier (1982).
35 The control of Bakel by Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed, and the payment of
“coutumes” by the French was confirmed in his treaty with the governor of
Senegal Faidherbe in 1858 (cf. Amilhat 1937: 96).
36 The division of the Idaw^I¯š into different major branches (the Abakak, the
360        Notes
 
 
Šra¯tı¯t, and the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d), each constituting large tribal confedera-
tions, took place around 1830. Conflict arose when the succession to the
emirate was contested by different factions (cf. Ould Cheikh 1991a: 108f.).
37 This description fits well with accounts of the battle at Goumal, a pass in the
Assaba mountains which took place 9 March 1904 and hit the Idaw^I¯š
Abakak hard (cf. Désiré-Vuillemin 1962: 118).
38 The participation of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak in the resistance against the French
invaders seems to have temporarily ceased after the battle of Bou Gadoum
which lead to a terrible defeat for the emiral tribe, the Ahel Swayd Ah. med.
While the Idaw^I¯š Abakak united some of the most powerful warrior
fractions under the leadership of their ^amı¯r, not all of the confederation’s
tribes supported the military resistance. E.g. Ethman Ould Bakkar and
Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Bakkar, both leading the strongest h. assa¯n
fractions within the emiral tribe of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak, the Ahel Swayd
Ah. med, participated in resistance only two days after the battle of Niemelane,
where the French experienced one of their heaviest defeats. Ethman kept up
his resistance until 1910, and was part of the Ahel Kedia, the people of the
hills, as the opponents to French rule operating from the north were called
(cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 605, 620).
39 Originally, Houssein Ould Bakkar had been considered ^amı¯r by the French
after the death of Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed, as according to their infor-
mation he received all the tributes his father had. The French deprived him
of this title when he – after first having negotiated peace with the French –
joined the bı¯z. a¯n coalition of resistance. This, however, remained without
consequences. Houssein continued to send letters of submission even during
his stay in the Adrar, never fought the French, and was among the first to
return from the Adrar. After the breakdown of bı¯z. a¯n resistance he again
became the prime intermediary of the French (cf. AT, “Projet de directives
politiques” 13.4.1938: 2f.; document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
40 Neither Ethman Ould Bakkar, who was at the heart of Idaw^I¯š military
resistance to the French (and today is barely remembered), nor Houssein
Ould Bakkar are remembered as having been ^amı¯r of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak,
but only paramount chiefs (Interview Khattar 12.10.1995).
41 Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, who led a “goum”, a group of voluntary bı¯z. a¯n
camel riders, during the conquest of the Adrar, was awarded honours for his
exploits in this undertaking (cf. AT, Résident Moudjéria, “Notice sur la
subdivision, Satisfaction à circulaire nº 28/AP, du 20-2-32” 9.5.1932: 2).
42 Not only the bı¯z. a¯n portray Abderrahmane as a most extraordinary personal-
ity (and the su¯da¯n as one who shares his roots with them!). Gabriel Féral,
who met Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar in 1942 as a young colonial adminis-
trator full of sympathy for great h. assa¯n personalities, described their
encounter as follows:
“L’homme n’avait rien qui puisse retenir l’attention. Plutôt misérablement
vêtu, noir de peau, les traits négroïdes, il se dégageait cependant de lui, je
n’ose dire une aura, mais indubitablement quelque chose qui le plaçait hors
du commun. Son geste pour ramener le pan de sa draâ sur son épaule
trahissait l’aisance d’un homme bien dans sa peau. Le mousqueton que son
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suivant venait de poser sur son illiouich soulignait, s’il en était besoin, que
cet homme n’était pas n’importe qui.” (Féral 1983: 64f.)
43 The instauration of the Tagant emirate by the colonial authorities took place
at Saint-Louis on the 31 August 1918. The treaty guaranteeing also the
tribal status quo comprised 11 articles, and gives a complete outline of the
French conception of colonial rule in Mauritania. Under the condition of
acting in agreement with the commandant of Tagant, Abderrahmane Ould
Bakkar got the right to police his territory. Limitations arose from excep-
tions vis-à-vis some tribes, namely the Kunta and G
.
u¯dv and by exempting
questions of land rights from the authority of the ^amı¯r (cf. ANM E2-16,
“Convention avec l’Emir du Tagant” 31.7.1918).
44 The French had been well aware of this opposition, and built up Abderrah-
mane step by step. While the greatest opposition was observed among his
brothers “more suitable to inherit [the office] by the nature of their birth”,
the zwa¯ya should have been consoled that a new ^amı¯r would not change
their situation, and that they would continue to depend directly on the
colonial administration. Rebuilding the emirate was also supposed to
compensate for a lack the bı¯z. a¯n were feeling and to help solve conflicts on
this lower level (ANM E2-16, “Lettre lieutnant colonel Gaden, commissaire
du gouvernement général en territoire civil de la Mauritanie à M. le com-
mandant du cercle du Tagant” 30.5.1917; author’s translation).
45 The demise of Houssein Ould Bakkar as general chief of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak
and his replacement by Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar in 1912 is mentioned in
a document from 1913 by Lt. Moulet, Commandant du cercle du Tagant
“Réponse au Rapport politique du 3º trimestre” (ANM E1-50). Already at
this time, the opposition between Abderrahmane and the then young leader
of the Awla¯d Talh. a, who maintained strong relations with Houssein Ould
Bakkar, were evident.
46 There had been sites associated closely with the emirate and emiral power,
but these did not correspond to a notion of property. In Tidjikja, the ^amı¯r
of Tagant owned a considerable number of palm trees, but not the land on
which they grew (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 402, 582). In a later treaty conclu-
ded parallel to the installation of Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar as ^amı¯r,
Houssein Ould Bakkar resigns from all his aspirations to the office of ^amı¯r,
getting in turn the ownership right to Kehmeit on the Tagant, and an annual
payment of 600 Francs (ANM E2-16, “Convention avec Houssein Ould
Bakkar” 31.7.1918).
47 Recognition of superiority and leadership among the h. assa¯n was based less
on descent than on the pursuit of a code of h. assa¯n values, among which
strength, and courage, but also generosity, were most prominent (cf. Ould
Cheikh 1985a: 368, 933ff.).
48 This was the case of the chief of the Ideybni. He had come to demand
transfer to the region of Mbout from the commandant de cercle in 1917
because he had been exploited and beaten by Abderrahmane. The adminis-
tration decided the chief had wanted to deceive them by false accusations and
decided to firstly depose the chief, and secondly to condemn his collectivity
to pay a fine of 1,000 Francs, thirdly to deprive them of all modern, French
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guns, fourthly to evacuate from the region all the five leading opponents of
Abderrahmane, among them those members of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med who
were actually in jail. (ANM E2-16, “Lettre nº 154, résident de Moujéria au
Commandant de Cercle Tidjikdja” 27.10.1917). The wish of the Ideybni to
leave the region, however, was accepted in 1924 (cf. note 51, this chapter).
49 In general these “independent” tribal fractions, i.e. those not registered as
being under the authority of the ^amı¯r, and therefore able to deal autono-
mously with the administration, became reintegrated into the Ahel Swayd
Ah. med, once their dissident leader died. The fission of the Ahel Muh. ammad
Swayd Ah. med, regrouping the major opponents to Abderrahmane, however,
was definitive. Today their area of residence is the vicinity of Guellaga on the
north-eastern Tagant.
50 ANM E2-16, “Lettre nº 24, le résident de Moudjéria au Commandant de
cercle du Tagant” 12 March 1918.
51 Other such cases are the Ideybni, who definitely left the region in 1923 for
Mbout, and the Ahel Swayd, who left in 1940. Not in all cases had political
dissent been decisive for this evolution, for many pastoralists sought to move
further south. However, the emirate thus suffered a considerable drain of its
population, as of originally seven tribes, constitutive of the Idaw^I¯š Abakak
confederation and residing on the Tagant and in the northern Aftout, three
had left by 1940.
52 AT, anonymous, “Historique Abakaks” ca. 1939; document kindly passed
on by Roger Botte; ANM E1-50, Capitaine Allut, Commandant du Cercle
du Tagant, “Rapport politique, 4ème trimestre 1914”.
53 In 1913 the ^amı¯r of Adrar started again to collect tributes from some of his
Tagant dependents. This was regarded as completely legal by the French. In
Trarza, some tributes on behalf of the emirate had then already been bought
back, though by far not all (ANM E1-50, Capitaine Allut, Commandant du
Cercle du Tagant, “Rapport politique, 4ème trimestre 1914”). Only in 1944
did the administration start a general policy aimed at ending the rights to
tributes of the h. assa¯n tribes. This was first achieved in the Trarza, and only
in 1952 in the Adrar (cf. Bonte 1989: 122; Ould Cheikh 1990: 91).
54 ANM E1-50, “Rapport trimestriel sur la politique générale de la Résidence,
2ème trimestre 1914”, cercle du Tagant, résidence de Moudjéria.
55 ANM E2-16, anonymous, Direction des affaires politiques et administrati-
ves, “Confidentiel A.S. Emir du Tagant” 10.6.1933. Problems arose especial-
ly with the many tributes the ^amı¯r of Tagant received from tribes residing
far beyond the Tagant. The agreements queried by Abderrahmane Ould
Bakkar were tributes bought up and negotiated in 1919 by his brothers Sidi
Mohamed and Ely Ould Bakkar (his fiercest opponent; ANM E2-16,
anonymous, Direction des affaires politiques et administratives, “Confiden-
tiel A.S. Emir du Tagant” 10.6.1933). The conflict was handled by the central
colonial authority in Saint-Louis, and settled by raising the pay of the ^amı¯r
considerably while stressing all treaties concluded so far were not to be
revised (ANM E2-16, “Le lieutnant-gouverneur p.i. de la Mauritanie à M. le
commandant de cercle du Tagant à Tidjjikja” 5.7.1933).
56 This description is reminiscent of the h. urma, insofar as it means an individ-
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ual tax due to the ^amı¯r, but a difference is marked by the supposedly
voluntary nature of this “gift”, intended to circulate only within the tribe or
confederation, and not implying protection. Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh
(1985a: 377) describes the gabez. as a tax paid by h. assa¯n, zna¯ga or h. ara¯t.ı¯n to
great scholars. Thus calling tributes paid more recently by various tribes, h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n and slaves to the ^amı¯r “gabez.”, may hint at practices replacing oppres-
sive forms of tributes with more lenient ones (Interview h. assa¯n 4.11.1995;
Interview Ghalim Ould Elkheir, ^abd, 17.12.1995). There has, however,
always been a multitude of tributes in the western Sahara, commonly
subsumed under the generic term of muda¯ra¯t, and g˙ara¯ma (cf. Oßwald 1993:
320ff., 327 note 65). Obligatory tributes (mag˙ram) were opposed by my
interviewees to gabez. , supposed to be voluntary.
57 Tributes are a delicate subject, not to be developed here in detail. The Ahel
Swayd e.g. paid tribute to the ^amı¯r, but no longer continually when Abder-
rahmane Ould Bakkar became old. The latter in turn could – and sometimes
did – send somebody to the tribe, which had migrated out of the Tagant in
the 1940s, to collect tribute. The h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Aftout stressed their pay-
ments to have been of voluntary nature, and the amount defined individual-
ly. It goes without saying that support from the ^amı¯r was crucial in ques-
tions of access to land, and his help with commodities like tea and sugar
depended on giving the ^amı¯r whatever he wanted.
58 Further research is needed to fully explore the French politics on the Tagant
with regard to h. assa¯n rights to tributes. From 1910 on, governor Patey had
developed a new policy more in favour of the h. assa¯n. He wished to maintain
at least partly their dominant political role and thus stabilise the social order.
Part of this engagement was the maintenance of tributes, and the instauration
of the formerly dissolved emirates (cf. reproduction of Patey’s directives in
Ould Khalifa 1991: 663f.). Those documents I could consult, however, prove
that in the Tagant region h. urma and g˙aver tributes were abolished between
1912-14. Some tributes nevertheless persisted. E.g. muda¯ra¯t, meaning an
additional gift in agricultural products and livestock the Idaw^Alı¯ of the
Tagant paid to the Idaw^I¯š (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 694), but also being a
generic term for tribute, continued to be paid on the Tagant (cf. AT,
commandant de cercle, “Confidentiel, droits coutumiers et tableau annexe”
27.2.1950, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
59 The major tributes of the Idaw^Alı¯ later were formally bought up for an
amount of 938 pieces of guinée (AT, anonymous “Projet de directives
politiques à l’occasion d’un passage du commandement” 13.4.1938, docu-
ment kindly passed on by Roger Botte). Their h. urma was received by one of
the most illustrious, and perhaps decisive personalities of Tagant history:
Abdi Ould Embarek (cf. p. 168f.).
60 These tributaries were under the suzerainty of the Idaw^I¯š Šra¯tı¯t. The
Idaw^Alı¯, after long negotiations, were ready to pay once 24, and once more
4 pieces of guinée to compensate the former overlords (cf. Ould Khalifa
1991: 668).
61 AT, anonymous “Projet de directives politiques à l’occasion d’un passage du
commandement” 13.4.1938, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
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62 Interviewees with a Tarkoz affiliation did not “remember” these tributes,
and neither did some of non-Tarkoz affiliation. However, there still are a
number of people who remember the past set-up of tribal hierarchies and
tributes, which while remaining unspoken, continue to shape the politics of
the present. On tributes paid by zwa¯ya and zna¯ga on the Tagant see also the
document ANM E1-50, “Rapport du capitaine commandant du cercle du
Tagant au sujet de l’application de décret du 12 décembre 1905 relatif à la
suppression de la traite” 2.11.1906.
63 ANM E1-50, “rapport politique 1er trimestre 1915”, cercle du Tagant April
1915.
64 Data is derived from two maps established for the rural development of the
Tagant: RIM, développement rural de la région du Tagant, SO.NA.DE.R/
GTZ, sheet “carte de la végétation” and “carte géologique”, established for
the GTZ by Arbeitsgemeinschaft IFP, Institut für Planungsdaten, Frankfurt,
in cooperation with Zentralstelle für Geophotogrammetrie und Fernerkun-
dung (ZGF), München, West Germany 1979.
65 It has to be remembered that the authority of the ^amı¯r of Tagant had been
limited by the French to the boundaries of the sub-district of Moudjéria,
covering only the southern part of the Tagant region. Extending this region
meant extending the territory on which Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar could
exert direct political influence.
66 The focus of my research on the land register was on the area of Achram-
Diouk. Unfortunately this area cuts across the borders of three administra-
tive regions, each holding its own land register. Of these I was only able to
consult the one in Moudjéria which has been revised essentially in 1950 by
colonial administrator Fargette. Here I wish to thank the préfet of
Moudjéria, who gave me free access to both the archives and the land register
and Mr. Fargette for having done a thorough work.
67 In this respect the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, and thus Idaw^I¯š Abakak leaders
developed a different strategy to the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d of the Assaba
region. While the registration of ownership rights in the latter district
already began in 1914, the number of registered lands became significant
only as late as 1934 and got a boost in 1949 at the conference of Galoula
promoting the procedure. The outcome, however, resembles the case of the
Ahel Swayd Ah. med: the family of the chief of the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d is
noted as owner (representing the collectivity of the tribe’s members) in
about 76 percent of registered lands in their main area of residence (cf.
Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 870ff.).
68 This is the case with the dam “Teidouma” (meaning Baobab in h. assa¯niyya,
bot. Adansonia digitata). Abderrahmane had built this dam together with the
Legwa¯nit. and the L^aweysya¯t. Later the ownership of this dam (always
comprising the land vivified, i.e. flooded by this construction) was restruc-
tured, and the ^amı¯r remained the only proprietor, having bought up the two
others’ parts. The case of the rights for cultivation around the source of
Garaouel is similar. These, but not the property in land, were granted by
Abderrahmane to his brother Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar.
Finally the group of dams registered under the name “Oulad Sneibe” falls
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into this category too. While the name of the dam clearly refers to a lineage,
the registered proprietor is Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar. The Ahel Sneibe, as
they are actually referred to, are a family of h. ara¯t.ı¯n, who profited from
patronage by the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane, and were granted the rights to
cultivate these lands, which according to the logic of French legislation,
continued to be property of the whole tribe.
69 This influential family is considered to be šurva, close friends of the emiral
family, and member of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med. The family also profited
from further attributions of land by the ^amı¯r of Tagant, Abderrahmane
Ould Bakkar.
70 All of the parents and grandparents of Mahmoud Ould Lella (h. art.a¯ni), who
was about fifty years old at the time of the interview (28.3.1995), were of the
Tarkoz Awla¯d Tı¯ki, and had cultivated at Mounhal. He himself had married
a slave woman of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, but lived with the šurva family
now possessing the land he continues to cultivate.
71 The reflux of tributaries who were under the domination of the Idaw^I¯š
prior to the French conquest of Tagant is revealed by a document from 1906.
According to this, among the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d the tributaries had all
become h. assa¯n, and the Kunta on the Tagant had reappropriated “their”
zna¯ga (ANM E1-50, Commandant du Cercle du Tagant, “Rapport du
capitaine commandant du cercle du Tagant au sujet de l’application de décret
du 12 décembre 1905 relatif à la suppression de la traite” 2.11.1906). For the
case of zna¯ga of the Šra¯tı¯t who had sought protection by the Idaw^Alı¯ see
p. 215. Another more practical reason why many zna¯ga sought new
overlords is that the Idaw^I¯š, during the time of their armed resistance to the
French occupation, were no longer able to provide undisturbed access to
pastureland to “their” zna¯ga (cf. AT, Résident de Moudjéria, “Notice sur la
subdivision, Satisfaction à circulaire nº 28/AP, du 20-2-32” 9.5.1932;
document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
72 The “coutumes” various h. assa¯n leaders received from the French for their
protection of the gum trade soon became a crucial resource for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of those inter-tribal and inner-tribal relations that
allowed the comparatively small emiral tribes to control large territories. In
turn these revenues also became a major reason for conflict, as many wanted
to get hold of them (cf. Taylor 1996; Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, personal
communication).
73 Colonial sources mention repeatedly the great number of “haratines” among
the h. assa¯n, especially the Idaw^I¯š. According to these sources, these tribes
consisted of only a small nucleus of noble, i.e. bı¯z. a¯n descent, around which
were grouped h. ara¯t.ı¯n, slaves, and zna¯ga, and with the h. ara¯t.ı¯n often having a
remarkable freedom of action (cf. e.g. AT, Résident de Moudjéria, “Notice
sur la subdivision, Satisfaction à circulaire nº 28/AP, du 20-2-32” 9.5.1932;
document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
74 Traditions of a past in the vicinity of the ^amı¯r, or as part of a distinct group
of warriors could not be traced among those su¯da¯n declared to be the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
Ahel Swayd Ah. med, i.e. a group of free people without a slave past. Never-
theless the existence of such groups is not altogether unlikely. Several
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independent and reliable sources mention independently acting warrior
groups called h. ara¯t.ı¯n. In Tidjikja a group of “old” h. ara¯t.ı¯n associated with the
old ^amı¯r Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed was reported to have lived almost
independently and while carrying guns and to have been almost like h. assa¯n
(cf. ANM E1-50, “Rapport du capitaine commandant du cercle du Tagant au
sujet de l’application de décret du 12 décembre 1905 relatif à la suppression
de la traite” 2.11.1906). One other group of h. ara¯t.ı¯n, the “Soucabe”, issued
from the Kunta and became famous as raiders, but later was annihilated by
bı¯z. a¯n for being a threat to local society (cf. Ba 1932: 117f.).
75 The Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d developed a similar strategy during colonial rule.
They readily enlisted every su¯da¯n settling in Kiffa as a member of their tribe,
thus offering the numerous slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n who came to this city a new
tribal affiliation (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais 1998: 88).
76 This was revealed to me by a zwa¯ya interviewee, whom I asked to explain
the meaning of tribe (qabı¯la) to me. Somewhat unsatisfactorily, in view of
my expectations at that moment, he explained: “Here are the Legwa¯t.it., we
are limited to the east by the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, to the west by the
Lemtu¯na, to the south by the Tagˇaka¯net, and to the north by the Tarkoz
Leg˙wa¯reb.” (Interview Mohamed Lemine Ould Belkhair, zwa¯ya 27.3.1995).
77 Further research, however, would be required to elucidate the question
whether cultivation necessarily implies a two-dimensional perception and
appropriation of space, as Ingold (1986) proposes. Cultivation in the
sahelo-saharian climate even until today is dominated by the use of “sites
and paths within a landscape” (153). A two-dimensional perception of space
is prevalent whenever the appropriation of sites and the legitimacy of land
ownership are concerned.
78 Not all villages are tribally homogeneous. Especially large villages located at
the tarred road attract many migrants of rather diverse origins. Here there is
a strong tendency for the formation of quarters that reproduce tribal
segregation, but also social segregation among bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n of one tribe
(cf. Ruf 1993).
79 I rarely witnessed something like pride in h. assa¯n status in the form of
remembering and glorifying warfare and battle. This was different among the
L^aweysya¯t, where several interviewees, both women and men, described
how they had defeated their enemies, and everybody, including the women
andtheh. ara¯t.ı¯n,hadtakenpart the inbattles (InterviewBenneMintAhmed,h. as-
sa¯n, 29.10.1995; Abdel Wedoud Ould Mamma, h. assa¯n, 31.10.1995)
80 The origin of the L^aweysya¯t is described by a h. art.a¯ni freed by his master, a
member of the chief’s family: “We are Abakak, we are Yah. ya Ben Etma¯n and
come from the Adrar, and the Ahel Ah. med ^Ayda. In the times we were in
the Adrar, then we could no longer endure the situation there. We are the
part of the Yah. ya Ben Etma¯n who could not bear to stay in the Adrar. We
came here in the times of Bakkar [Ould Soueid Ahmed]. It was our first
chief, Bnein, who made relations with the Abakak.” This description fits by
and large the glimpse of the L^aweysya¯t history provided by Pierre Bonte
(1991: 190): “Les Li’waysyât descendent, eux, des Awlâd ’Abdallah du
eBrâkna. Il partagèrent, au XIX siècle, les intérêts politique des Awlâd
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Quaylân avec lesquels ils entretinrent des relations matrimoniales étroites.
Certaines lignées sont affiliées à la tribu, mais la plupart durent quitter
l’Adrar sous des pressions politiques.”
81 One such event aimed to impress the ^amı¯r probably was the serious battle
causing several deaths taking place in 1950 at Diénour between the L^aweysya¯t
and the Awla¯d Talh. a (who had left to settle beyond the sphere of influence
of the ^amı¯r Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar). The fight still is remembered as
one of the great and glorious battles of the L^aweysya¯t. While the French
judged the L^aweysya¯t influence on the ^amı¯r to be insignificant, L^aweysya¯t
traditions portray their old chief as the “first friend of Abderrahmane in
Mauritania” (Interview Benne Mint Ahmed, h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995; Abdel
Wedoud Ould Mamma, h. assa¯n, 31.10.1995; AT, anonymous “fiche de
renseignement et notes concernant le nommé: Mohamed Ould Sidi Ahmed
dit Ould Mama, Chef de la fraction des Aoueissiat Mama” Subdivision de
Moudjéria 1951, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
82 The French colonial documents reveal at least for the 1940s a will to get back
to a single chief of all L^aweysya¯t, and thus to undo the decision taken in
1939 to tackle the internal opposition by installing two fractions and chiefs.
This example was considered to have been a bad example fuelling other
tribes’ factionalism (AT, various political reports concerning the “Aouissiat”,
documents kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
83 According to interviewee Benne Mint Ahmed (h. assa¯n, 29.10.1995), the
L^aweysya¯t moved onto the Tagant only once, when a French administrator
in the valley had forbidden the sale of grain to tribes from the north. This
year of “Vounsi”, as it was called according to the bı¯z. a¯n version of the name
of the administrator concerned, was probably around 1954-1956.
84 This deal is reported to have been concluded subsequent to the arrival of the
L^aweysya¯t in the area, and their incorporation into the Idaw^I¯š Abakak in
ththe course of the 19 century. However, the attribution of this land might be
more recent, as a written version of the treaty is said to exist. One copy of
this remains with the L^aweysya¯t and the other one is stored in Aleg
(Interview Boueibou Ould Amar, h. art.a¯ni, 1.11.1995).
85 AT, Alleman “rapport politique du 1er trimestre 1942”, Subdivision de
Moudjéria, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte. Some of the conflict
arose from the question when and how the Tarkoz Ahel Sı¯di Reyu¯g should
let off water from their dam situated upriver, since this strongly influenced
the submersion of the depression cultivated by the L^aweysya¯t (ANM
E2-109, Résidence de Moudjéria, “lieutnant René, Rapport de Tournée
nº 112” 25.5.1935).
86 ANM E2-82, lieutnant Fonde, “culture en barrage, résidence de Moudjéria”
1936, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
87 In 1924/25 the sale of formerly confiscated date palm gardens for about one
fourth of their market value witnessed lively interest among the bı¯z. a¯n
notability, which then was able to increase their grip on the most fertile lands
(cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 728).
88 Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (1991: 184) concludes with regard to the
Assaba region that agricultural production is more likely to have decreased
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than grown during the first decades of this century due to taxation and other
unfavourable factors. However a different interpretation seems plausible as
well, as the same author states that imposition of taxes in the Assaba and
especially of the tax on agricultural production has rarely been applied.
Furthermore the Ahel Sı¯di Mah. mu¯d, the major tribe of the region, are
described as having minimised their area of nomadisation since the end of the
th 19 century in response to increased cultivation (cf. Villasante-de Beauvais
1995: 957). Finally there are colonial records from the Assaba region report-
ing a considerable increase of agricultural production in response to a
changed economic environment, and hence an evolution comparable to that
in the Tagant area (cf. ANM B1, anonymous, “Confidentiel, la question des
haratines et serviteurs dans l’Assaba” ca. 1931, document kindly passed on
by Roger Botte).
89 This aspect of risk minimisation is already prominent in the 1936 colonial
report (ANM E2-82, lieutnant Fonde, “Culture en barrages”, résidence
Moudjéria 1936, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte). In recent
times this aspect has become a major concern of rural development policy
aiming at securing, and making more sustainable, local food production (cf.
Wüst 1989; Justen 1991; Seiler 1992; Davis 1997). An earlier, and critical
assessment of the efficiency of agriculture behind large dams (barrages) in
Mauritania is given by Charles Toupet (1977: 263ff.)
90 To complete this outline of agricultural history, a comparison with the state
and evolution of agriculture in bı¯z. a¯n society prior to colonisation would be
of great interest. Agricultural production in this period seems to have
depended heavily on a stable political environment. Kasr el Barka and
Rachid, two great oases of the Kunta of Tagant, went into decline when their
inhabitants got involved in the political conflicts dividing the people of the
Tagant (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 415ff.). While the livestock of nomadic
groups could be reestablished by counter-raids and negotiations, looted
trade towns and destroyed date palm plantations were much more difficult
to reconstitute.
91 A different date is mentioned by Wüst (1989: 75), who states that Zemmal
was constructed in 1926. While many interviewees were unanimous about
Zemmal being the very first dam of the Aftout, Charles Toupet (1958: 87)
notes the dam of Tachott to be the eldest in the region and even to antedate
French colonisation.
92 This view is confirmed by claims of Tarkoz Leg˙wa¯reb reproduced by Dubié
(1953: 193), and stating that their first dam was built near the mountain of
Akrerai in the Aftout, which is only a few kilometres east of Achram, in
around 1900 (cf. Map 3). Mohamed A. Ould Khalil, a member of the Tarkoz
Leg˙wa¯reb, stated that the dam of Achram was constructed in 1919 and had
been the first in the area (Interview 5.9.1995).
93 ANM E2-82, lieutnant Fonde, “Culture en barrages”, résidence Moudjéria
1936, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
94 AM, anonymous “Bulletin de renseignement, subdivision de Moudjéria”
8/1945.
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95 AM, various trimestrial and monthly reports 1935-1944 of the résident of
Moudjéria.
The colonial reports I was able to study in the archive of Moudjéria for the
period concerned are somewhat contradictory in this respect. In 1935 the
résident of Moudjéria mentions that there had not been any budget to
promote the construction of dams and wells, only to remark a little later that
the indigenous population actually is building dams (Tachott Dakhna
1,100 meters, Achram 800 meters, Djonaba 400 meters) and is greatly
interested in receiving the corresponding rewards (AM, “rapport trimestriel
résidence de Moudjéria” 30.12.1935). Occasional exemption from the ^ašu¯r in
this period is not mentioned in the reports but in the land register. In fact
colonial administrators often achieved their ends by illegal gifts and bonuses
(cf. De Chassey 1984: 81).
96 It has to be noted that the rapid expansion of dams was unique to the Tagant
district. Colonial reports note the construction of 75 dams in the Tagant in
the years 1934-36, but only of 10 in Brakna, and 7 in the Adrar (cf. Bonte
1986: 396, note 33). The number of Tagant dams was estimated to already
represent the maximum of what could be realised without reducing their
efficiency (too short distances between dams on one and the same water-
course; cf. Dubié 1953: 194). The concentration of dam building seems to be
the result of an early policy using funds from the “société indigène de
prévoyance” to promote agriculture and thus reduce food insecurity (cf.
Ould Khalifa 1991: 834).
97 An administrative report from the Assaba region echoed in 1931 masters’
complaints about slave flights and slave laziness. However, this was the way
the slaves responded to the expansion of agriculture putting a heavy load on
them (cf. ANM B1, anonymous, “Confidentiel, la question des haratines et
serviteurs dans l’Assaba” ca. 1931, document kindly passed on by Roger
Botte).
98 The French saw pacification and fixed ownership rights as the decisive
factors for the economic renaissance, while the stubbornness of the indige-
nous population remained the main obstacle to economic growth (ANM
E2-82, lieutnant Fonde, “Culture en barrages” résidence Moudjéria 1936,
document kindly passed on by Roger Botte).
99 AM, various trimestrial and monthly reports 1935-1944 of the résident of
Moudjéria; ANM E2-82, lieutnant Fonde, “culture en barrage, résidence de
Moudjéria” 1936, document kindly passed on by Roger Botte.
100 The population of the region of Achram-Diouk was estimated at 24,000 in-
habitants in 1987. This number has increased ever since due to the attractive-
ness of the zone, the vicinity of the road, and the proliferation of services and
wages due to the rural development project in Achram.
101 AM, various trimestrial and monthly reports 1935-1944 of the residents of
Moudjéria.
102 This period, and its consequences on the administration of French West
Africa subsequent to the Second World War is described by Gabriel Féral
(1983: 77, 99).
103 Still during the war, the leader of “France libre”, Général de Gaulle, had
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declared at the conference at Brazzaville (January-February 1944) that the
colonies should be given greater liberty in administration and economy.
Besides this process, to be implemented step by step, the colonies were to be
given a more powerful means to represent their interests in France. Another
aspect of these reforms was the official end of forced labour (cf. Désiré-
Vuillemin 1997: 566).
104 The anecdote reported by Gabriel Féral (1983), and taken up by Philippe
Marchesin (1992), that the grand-father of Horma Ould Babana was implied
in the assassination of Xavier Coppolani at Tidjikja, is obviously false (cf.
Villasante-de Beauvais 1995: 799).
105 One of the major problems in the handling of these dams is caused by
erosion. Rainwater run-off may damage the dam surface and water exceeding
the maximum capacity has to be diverted to an overflow to protect the dam.
Finally, erosive forces are high at the main outlet. This is especially true for
traditional dams, where water is let off by digging a breach into the dam and
thus weakening the soil on which the dam must be rebuilt in subsequent
years.
106 This opposition, which was shared by the majority of the Kunta too, can be
explained by the political rivalry between the Idaw^Alı¯ and the Idaw^I¯š
Abakak. While the former benefited from colonisation, and strengthened
their predominance in the course of the drought and economic crisis of the
early 1940s, the Idaw^I¯š Abakak lost both influence and prestige (Ould
Khalifa 1991: 898f., 939ff.). Quite a different perspective comes from people
of the vicinity of Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar, describing the latter to have
had good relations with Horma Ould Babana in the beginning. This changed
only in response to a conversation the old ^amı¯r had with Horma at Saint-
Louis after the latter’s success in the elections (at these times Abderrahmane
still had quarrels with his brothers). Horma then disclosed to Abderrahmane
that he now held all of Mauritania in his hands and asked what he could do
for him. While this in the eyes of Horma should have been an offer, Abder-
rahmane experienced it as a serious offence, calling his authority into
question. As a result Abderrahmane was on bad terms with Horma as long
as he remained deputy (Interview Khattar, zwa¯ya, 12.10.1995).
107 AM, report of the “conseil des notables du Tagant”, première session 1956.
108 The project was funded by German development cooperation and executed
by the German agency for technical cooperation (GTZ). The activities had
two focuses: the initial PAD (Projét Achram-Diouk) had the aim of integrat-
ed rural development. Later a second branch, the PBT (Projet petit Barrages
du Tagant) was launched, aimed solely at the development of dams, hand-
driven pumps and well infrastructure.
109 Recently Timothy Cleaveland (1995) formulated a lively critique of the
application of segmentary theory to bı¯z. a¯n society, e.g. by Pierre Bonte
(1991), a scholar who developed his own interpretation of this theoretical
approach on the basis of the structures of bı¯z. a¯n society, which in turn is
critical of earlier proponents, such as e.g. Ernest Gellner (1969).
110 This is merely a descriptive glimpse of the various articulations of tribal
structures in bı¯z. a¯n society and necessarily cuts short on this most complex
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issue (cf. Bonte/Conte/Hamès/Ould Cheikh 1991). The notion of tribe
referred to here reflects a major level of identification manifest among the
interviewees in particular circumstances.
111 Political authority did not follow a single model in traditional bı¯z. a¯n society.
While the centralisation of power in only one person was common, and in
principle could be inherited among the h. assa¯n, many zwa¯ya tribes never
formed stable chieftaincies. They practised collective forms of decision-mak-
ing with the gˇema¯^a as major forum (despite prolonged attempts, the French
colonial administration was never able to establish powerful chiefs among
the Tarkoz fractions). Charismatic religious leaders, however, could attract
numerous followers and clients too, thus gaining a dominant role in their
tribe, and revealing that the centralisation of power was not per se alien to
the zwa¯ya milieu (cf. Ould Cheikh 1991b).
112 The chief at the time made explicit references to the French colonial adminis-
trative practices whereby tribal land was registered under the respective
chief’s name. These formally individual entitlements later often led to the
disputes described.
113 This dam, constructed for the first time probably around 1905, is of particu-
lar interest, as it probably is one of the first dams ever constructed in the
area. All local traditions tell that the French colonialists, who at the time just
had arrived in the region, already supported the project. Construction was
carried out by slaves and other dependents, while the property of the plots
remained with the bı¯z. a¯n, and among these most probably those close to the
family of the chief supported by the French in their attempt at indirect rule.
114 Many of the former masters were reported to now live at Zemmal, in
Leqraye, or other villages inhabited by members of the Legwa¯t.it., but about
40 km to the south, like El Ghabbra and Boulahradh. For the description of
a similar case among the Ta¯ga¯t. refer to Boubakar Ba (1986: 10).
115 This ambivalent situation the su¯da¯n experience when they appropriate land
has already been observed by Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1985a: 470f.) in
the Gorgol Blanc region, which is part of the Aftout south of the region of
Achram-Diouk. In order to appropriate land, the su¯da¯n have to stress their
tribal affiliation and solidarity instead of a solidarity of class. In the conflicts
concerning the tribal territorial boundaries the su¯da¯n have to present
themselves as members of their respective tribe (refer also to note 152, this
chapter).
116 “Proofs” of ownership are a sensitive topic in bı¯z. a¯n society. They are far less
simple testimonies of legitimate ownership than something which involves
all of the tribe’s history, i.e. genealogy, and thus goes right into the core of
tribal ideology. Today, written accounts aiming to provide proof of legiti-
mate ownership for generations are likely to abound whenever conflict over
land begins to escalate (Interview Amadou Bâ, project leader SO.NA.DE.R,
30.1.1996).
117 In legal terms, there cannot be a due appropriation of land by slaves.
Nevertheless, bı¯z. a¯n in most cases had begun to tolerate such practices of
their slaves already prior to the heavy drought in 1969. After the drought,
with times getting harder, this aspect of slave autonomy, and thus slave
372        Notes
 
 
emancipation, became more and more a necessity for survival. The slaves,
however, were only rarely able to develop claims on the most fertile land and
thus created little space for conflict with former masters who, at least in
theory, could claim land vivified by their slaves.
118 These relations are confirmed by a survey study of five villages of the region
in Achram-Diouk. There su¯da¯n referred to the small dams as their most
important source of revenue (second come large dams). Among bı¯z. a¯n this
role is ascribed to the large dams too, but their much more diversified
economic activities make them depend less heavily on agricultural revenues
than the su¯da¯n (cf. Ruf 1993: 18ff.; and unpublished results of this study).
119 By this time only a few slaves were still living side by sides with the family of
their master, and worked only to receive food and clothing.
120 These rates of exchange can already be seen as gifts, and the aim of these
arrangements is likely not to be direct profit from the agricultural rent, but
the maintenance of relations of patronage, which might prove profitable in
other respects. Not all bı¯z. a¯n had relations of affinity to su¯da¯n, for many of
these had completely left the region, or had decided to break off relations
with their former masters. Therefore, although limited in its extent, a market
for sharecropping developed in which su¯da¯n to some extent could negotiate
the share they had to pay to the bı¯z. a¯n.
121 This was largely practised. E.g. in the case of the dam at Achoueibir, which
was the first construction supported by the local development project,
influential members of the tribe, among them the chief, acquired up to five
parcels.
122 Both a number of bı¯z. a¯n and of su¯da¯n finally refused to participate in the
dam, though for different reasons. Of the initially 120 su¯da¯n only 71
contributed to the dam. Those who left were reported to have done so
because the surface of land to be developed by this measure was considered
minimal. Some of these 49, however, today own land behind the dam, which
they acquired from both su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n, selling their land at considerable
prices (a plot of 15 metres width costs about 35,000 UM, one of 25 metres
about 45-50,000 UM (US$220-310); Interview Sidi Ould Salim, h. ara¯t.ı¯n,
27.7.1995).
123 Some bı¯z. a¯n had their slaves work for the construction of the first dam near
Leklewa at Dharagouadir. The land these slaves vivified became the sole
property of their masters. During an interview I met one of these slaves, a
man who had become old and weak. His master, whom I came to know as a
distinguished man of great knowledge, had assigned him a shed of about
1.5 by 1.5 metres, made of branches from the flimsy Calotropis Procera. This
shelter in the court of the master’s typical modest clay brick house barely
protected the old man from the beating sun. The only comment my research
assistant, Khalifa Ould Kebab, made on this situation was that the master
was waiting for the old man to die.
124 The dams built by the project have a design aimed to make repairs and
interventions on a level beyond the capabilities of the local population
superfluous. Although considerable achievements were made in this respect,
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in some cases erosive forces of water were stronger than calculated, and some
dams had to be reinforced.
125 There are plans to reanimate the rural development project in Achram by
extending dam-building activities to a larger area than before.
126 The definite character of these ownership rights is expressed very well by the
name of these dams. While collectively owned dams get the name of the
location, those of individuals are named according to their owner, e.g. the
sed Ahel Jiddou, the wa¯d Sid Mohamed Dey.
127 In fact, I was reproached for asking questions which only produced more
questions with this expression.
128 Not everything is left to non-verbal communication. Services by the h. ara¯t.ı¯n
cover a wide range, such as e.g. working as occasional driver, or assistance in
construction projects. The actual, unofficial ^amı¯r of Tagant, Ethman Ould
Abderrahmane, e.g. asked for assistance to build a new dam. “He asked the
people to help him, and nobody will ask him [for payment].” (Interview
Mahmoude Mint Ali, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 26.7.1995)
129 All the land is granted for only one season. Although the relations may
persist over years, they are nevertheless revocable from one year to the other,
and there is no doubt that people who disappoint the notables’ expectations
will encounter sanctions.
130 It has already been noted that bı¯z. a¯n too depended on land granted by other
bı¯z. a¯n and notables. These arrangements, however, were concluded for much
longer periods and implied much less heavy retributions than those concern-
ing su¯da¯n (cf. p. 204).
131 E.g. a h. assa¯n notable and large landowner asked the h. ara¯t.ı¯n community,
which in the overwhelming majority profited from his grants in land, to
thresh his millet (Interview Mahmoude Mint Benjik, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 8.8.1995).
Individual h. ara¯t.ı¯n, however, nevertheless stopped committing themselves to
these rules of “good conduct”, and now refuse to give the h. assa¯n notables
anything (Interview Daouda Ould Harouna, ^abd, 19.12.1995).
132 Among the Awla¯d ^Alı¯ Ntu¯nva, e.g. the current chief helped some su¯da¯n to
get land. These in turn insist that they do not give millet, but help the chief
by other means, e.g. with some work on the fields, like threshing millet. In
addition to this the chief also pays workers for distinct duties (Interview
Moise Ould Emine, ^abd, 10.2.1996). However, the resources these h. assa¯n
have to distribute are far less important than those of the Ahel Swayd
Ah. med .
133 These h. ara¯t.ı¯n claim to have had a distinct status that had no reference to a
slave past, and thus to have formed a group within the Ahel Swayd Ah. med.
These claims are hard to prove or to dismiss. None of those concerned
admitted to having had slave ancestors (while in other settings people did so,
or at least this condition was deducible from other variables). Neither did
any of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med bı¯z. a¯n refer to these h. ara¯t.ı¯n as former slaves.
The distinct collective status this group is likely to have achieved neverthe-
less depended strongly on the goodwill of the ^amı¯r.
134 The village of Hella was established only subsequent to the death of the old
^amı¯r in 1982. The redistribution of land therefore was not negotiated among
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the h. ara¯t.ı¯n and this old, unchallenged authority, but under the auspices of
his unofficial successor Ethman Ould Bakkar. While the redistribution of
land within the tribe reproduced the old relations of hierarchy, the authority
of the traditional elite is no longer uncontested. It is often said that the sons
of the old ^amı¯r do not match up to their father.
135 Information concerning this case was contradictory: According to a second
informant some h. ara¯t.ı¯n sold their land to the ^amı¯r, while another said that
nobody left this site.
136 This outflow was constructed in the evaluation period of the rural develop-
ment project at Achram, prior to the start of the large dam-building project
PBT (Petit Barrages du Tagant). The dam itself is of about one and a half
metres high, and was constructed by hand. Reconstruction after damage in
the past was occasionally done by renting the project’s caterpillar rather than
by manual work.
137 It is quite common that individuals can obtain the right to cultivate for one
season at collectively owned sites. The plots granted are deducted from the
whole site. Either these plots are calculated like all other plots, i.e. they add
to the total number of exploiters among whom the site is distributed, or the
owners of the site define a fixed plot to be shared among all of these contrac-
tors.
138 It was one of the aims – and in a way a precondition for work – of the
regional development project to “manage” the ^amı¯r and other local notables.
This goal was achieved, and the project became able to act largely independ-
ent of these instances of local politics (Interview Amadou Bâ, project leader
SO.NA.DE.R, 30.1.1996). In the early 1990s, democratisation in Mauritania
began to take on a new appearance. Multi-partyism was reintroduced in
1991/92, and an independent press that in the beginning was largely tolerated
by the regime in power, was established (cf. Clausen 1993, 1994a). In the
region of Achram-Diouk political opposition to the (unofficial) ^amı¯r was
strong, and successful in some elections that were the central arena for the
political struggles in these years. At least since 1995, a counter-movement in
national and local politics can be detected (Interview Mohamed A. Ould
Khalil, zwa¯ya, 1.8.1995).
139 With acknowledgements to Graham Greene.
140 Selling milk instead of sharing it generously is a most serious offence against
the rules of good conduct in bı¯z. a¯n society. It was repeatedly stressed to me
that only people of the Idebussa¯t. tribe used to sell their milk and nobody
else would dare do so. In the cities and close to the road, the selling of milk
has nevertheless increased. Small hand-written advertisements, or simply an
empty Tetra-Pak carton of milk (great quantities of long-life milk are
imported to Mauritania, but there is also a small dairy in Nouakchott selling
fresh pasteurised cow’s and camel’s milk [http://www.tiviski.com]) nailed
onto a stick, signal “fresh milk for sale” to the people passing by.
141 This may not only be interpreted as a measure by which the ^amı¯r wanted to
use his political authority for the sake of creating new alliances, but also as a
quite modern economic policy aimed at establishing conditions allowing for
increased local investment.
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142 In the words of the Idebussa¯t. leader “There is hardly anything to compen-
sate for something good that was done to somebody.” (Interview Mohamed
Sid’Ahmed, zwa¯ya, 13.9.1995)
143 This is a precondition for building a village. Cultivable land is concentrated
in depressions, and depends on their becoming flooded. This characteristic is
incompatible with perennial human occupation.
144 Unconditional access to water for their herds was a serious concern of the
Idebussa¯t., who qualified a number of local wells as “wells of problem”, i.e.
wells where the owners made clear that they did not want alien users to
come back. Having their own well of large capacity therefore was of a
considerable interest for the Idebussa¯t., who despite their shop continued to
be among the most important local owners of livestock (Interview Mohamed
Sid’Ahmed, zwa¯ya, 13.9.1995).
145 With these su¯da¯n conceiving themselves as true h. ara¯t.ı¯n without a slave past
and forming their own faction within the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, the integrity
of the symbolic representation of a free men’s status, e.g. the ownership of
cattle and land, attains an exceptional importance. Any violation of this
symbolic order directly calls into question their statuary identity.
146 This is true insofar as this is the family most interested in setting up their
own village. The statement, however, downplays the significance of this
settlement for several reasons. First the “family” concerned includes several
nuclear families, and second, there are a number of further Idebussa¯t. families
in the region, likely to settle too, once there is a good opportunity. In early
1996, five houses were under construction.
147 Mohamed A. Ould Khalil left no doubt about the nature of territorial
hegemony exercised by the ^amı¯r. On my request he detailed his statement,
saying that the ^amı¯r could give the right to live on his territory to whoever
he wants.
148 On the issue of land tenure, relations of domination and the conflict between
the Tarkoz and the Ta¯ga¯t. see Boubacar Ba (1986; esp. pp. 14ff.).
149 “It very frequently comes to conflict over land within the tribe, but these
affairs are handled on the basis of this book [the land register] It happens
that a field has been cultivated some time ago, but then was left uncultivated.
According to our legislation, a field has to be cultivated, or else there have to
be traces of this activity, to legitimise ownership. One is only allowed to
leave for ten years, once these have passed all individual rights are void. Then
there is an enormous amount of problems [that arise] with these cases. All
this will be brought here to the tribunal. In some cases the préfet will be able
to decide directly, but often everything remains pending. This is because
there are no written documents, there is no proof. There are a great many of
people around here who are quite sophisticated, who have assembled
documents from the beginning, and are able to prove everything. Many do
not have these means, like e.g. here the people of Moudjéria. In most of the
cases, where there is something unclear, we just forbid [the use].” (Interview
Khattar, zwa¯ya, 12.10.1995; emphasis added)
150 The Ahel Swayd Ah. med are renowned to have been among the most forceful
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and frightening warriors of all h. assa¯n and their su¯da¯n are supposed to share
these characteristics (Interview h. art.a¯ni, 5.2.1996)
151 Su¯da¯n of the L^aweysya¯t, living beyond their tribal territory, are to be found
in several places of the Aftout, and not only at Téjal.
152 In these descriptions, as well as the one of similar configurations of conflict
in the Gorgol Blanc area by Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1985a: 470f.), the
tribal affiliation of the su¯da¯n appears to be unambiguous. This is true insofar
as most su¯da¯n couples share the same tribal affiliation. In a significant
number of cases, however, su¯da¯n intermarried across tribal boundaries. In
such cases their children, who today are able to claim their descent also from
their father’s side, gain the option to switch between two different tribal
affiliations. They thus may profit from better access to land in one group, or
may continue to be involved in both tribes’ affairs (Interview Walid Ould
Mbarek, h. art.a¯ni, 7.2.1996).
153 These contacts developed in the course of an electoral campaign. Notables
from the Ta¯ga¯t. Ideyneb contacted the L^aweysya¯t su¯da¯n and asked for their
support. As the L^aweysya¯t bı¯z. a¯n reside in a different administrative region
than the su¯da¯n at Téjal (Tagant and not Brakna), it was easy for the latter to
side with the Ta¯ga¯t. faction (Interview Ally Ould Mohamed Ghalle, h. art.a¯ni,
12.12.1995).
154 Whether these accusations are right or not is difficult to discern. In fact
many inhabitants of villages with a predominantly su¯da¯n population com-
plained about being disadvantaged with regard to project activities. Almost
the same complaints, however, could be heard from bı¯z. a¯n. Several points
among the su¯da¯n critics are nevertheless right. Their villages got fewer large
dams (barrages) or hand-powered water pumps than the bı¯z. a¯n. This resulted
not so much from a deliberate will to act in favour of the bı¯z. a¯n, as from the
fact that in most cases, these villages are simply much bigger than the few
and generally more recent su¯da¯n settlements, and evidently most of the best
land – where dams could be built – was in the hand of the bı¯z. a¯n. All inter-
ventions focusing on a certain scale therefore automatically tended to benefit
(some) bı¯z. a¯n more than (some) su¯da¯n.
In the case of Labde, the most vehement accusations against the project
were that it had for a long time resisted any intervention. This situation, as
described to me by the most prominent leader of the su¯da¯n in Labde,
changed only after he asked the national minister for agricultural develop-
ment for help while on tour through the region in 1989 (Interview Yahya
Ould Emine, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 7.11.1995). This is one of the many cases in which
su¯da¯n, struggling for emancipation, portray their appeals to the (highest) state
authorities as successful and these institutions as defending their civil rights.
155 The amount of 80,000 UM had to be paid to the project for its services.
Calculating on a basis of 80 contributors, everybody was meant to pay
1,000 UM (about US$6). However, much less people than had been intended
paid their share, and finally a few persons, among them a quite well-off
migrant worker at the national iron ore mine (SNIM), subsidised the
undertaking by paying higher contributions.
156 Local communities have the right to have their own school. As a precondi-
Chapter 7        377
 
 
tion for the state to send (and pay) a teacher, the villagers, however, have to
provide the building. In theory, anyway. The biggest problems in establish-
ing local elementary schooling are witnessed in the most remote and
deprived communities, many of which are dominated by su¯da¯n (e.g. at Daber
on the Tagant). Teachers (most of whom are bı¯z. a¯n) do not want to live out
in the bush among “ignorant” su¯da¯n, and therefore resist, or simply leave
employment there and the su¯da¯n communities have few means to exercise
pressure on the state authorities.
157 Olivier Leservoisier (1994a: 292f.) bases his conclusion that the land reform
of 1983 and 1984 is not effective in the rural areas of Mauritania on the
argument that attempts of h. ara¯t.ı¯n to sell land to people alien to their tribe
failed. The h. ara¯t.ı¯n concerned are therefore supposed to have not yet
acquired full control of their land, but to continue to be subjected to the
tribal paradigm, i.e. the control by bı¯z. a¯n elites. However, the tribal frame-
work, and its restrictions with regard to land sales apply to bı¯z. a¯n too (cf.
p. 239-241). Within the tribe, land for cultivation today is marketed quite
liberally, and su¯da¯n buy land (e.g. plots behind dams) from bı¯z. a¯n, but it
hardly ever occurs that strangers not affiliated to the local tribe get the right
to own or buy land.
158 Pierre Bonte (1994c: 85) too states that the su¯da¯n effectively were attributed
the right to private appropriation of land prior to the new legislation on land
tenure in 1983 and 1984.
159 The zaka¯t makes up one tenth of the harvest, but has only to be paid if the
harvest exceeds 180 mu¯d (a more restrictive rule declares 150 mu¯d to be the
limiting value. i.e. either about 720 kg, or 600 kg). While harvests of full-time
cultivators, ranging between 200 and 300 mu¯d in the area of Achram-Diouk,
are likely to exceed this amount, and oblige the cultivator to pay the zaka¯t,
no zaka¯t at all is due for the half of this amount. All in all, any such trick is
illegal, for the zaka¯t has to be paid for all incomes of one domestic union –
and this applied fully to master-slave households.
160 Land in these cases is sold to members of the same tribe. Exceptions are only
made with regard to people who have affiliated themselves to the tribe, e.g.
by marriage, and the tribal community thus remaining able to exert some
control.
161 This is primarily the case for the former core locations of the emirate of
Tagant, the area of Daber, Kehmeit and El Fouj. Despite a few bı¯z. a¯n
notables once constructing houses in this area, and one of them running a
shop at El Fouj, today the locations are deserted by the bı¯z. a¯n and only su¯da¯n
remain.
162 The dam at Djouengi has about 160 plots (3 m width, and 2-300 m length),
and each plot was reported to cost about 120,000 UM. This price seems
exaggerated given the prices at Leklewa, where plots of 25 m width and
about 250-300 m length are sold for about 45,000 UM (Interview Abdel
Wedoud Ould Mamma, h. assa¯n, 31.10.1995).
163 E.g. a study entirely devoted to the situation of women in Mauritania, and
aware of almost all aspects of women’s economic activities (among which is
cultivation), is mute on all aspects of property rights exercised by women (cf.
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Smale 1980). To my knowledge only one study focusing on women and rural
development explicitly takes into account the question of land tenure and
women (Blanchard de la Brosse 1986).
164 In the data collected on households in eleven villages and quarters of the
region of Achram-Diouk (cf. p. 129f.) many women leading a household
were reported at least to have land behind large dams (barrages), and/or
small dams (diguettes). Women are also able to bequeath this land to their
children, but when these are affiliated to a different tribe than their mother
(as a result of their father being of a different tribe), the children only get a
use-right, and are not allowed to sell the land to people other than members
of their mother’s tribe (Interview Mahmoude Mint Ali, h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 26.7.1995).
165 A recent study of pastoral households found 19 women out of 30 to own
livestock, and 10 out of 30 to own houses or tents (cf. FAO 1990: 13)
166 This is the case e.g. when men are unable to bring land for cultivation into a
marriage. I observed one such case, where a su¯da¯n migrant from the Kunta
married a su¯da¯n woman from the Ahel Swayd Ah. med near Hella. Naturally
the man did not own land. Therefore he had to cultivate on rented and
borrowed land, but also on land belonging to his wife. Later he was allowed
to buy land from a member of the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, because his marriage
into the tribe had minimised his status as a stranger (Interview h. art.a¯ni,
15.3.1995).
167 Women quite often fail to get their legitimate claims be recognised in matters
of inheritance. Especially when husbands die young, the spouse and the
children are likely to become dispossessed by relatives of the deceased. The
women then have to defend not only their own rights, but also those of their
children.
168 This contradicts a view held by Véronique Blanchard de la Brosse (1986:
181), according to which gender-specific property rights are not practised by
su¯da¯n. This might appear to be the case so far as very poor su¯da¯n or ^abı¯d
are concerned, having no, or very little property. Among su¯da¯n owning
land, or animals, both marriage partners are well aware of who owns what.
This division becomes effective in the case of divorce.
169 Major activities promoted were gardening, dyeing veils, sewing, trade and
alphabetisation. Women organised themselves in women’s co-operatives,
deciding autonomously what activities were to be pursued.
170 The outcome of land attribution in the irrigated perimeters is different, as the
case of Foum Gleita shows. There a considerable number women signed up
for a parcel, but were only the front for local elites and other groups
interested in speculating with this land. However, some women profited
from this opportunity themselves. Together with their children they were
able to cultivate the small plots (0.25 ha) and increase their autonomy with
regard to grain or rice (cf. Blanchard de la Brosse 1986: 201).
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Chapter 8
1 This still applies to very few cases, but today h. ara¯t.ı¯n – given a number of
favourable circumstances – are able to marry bı¯z. a¯n women, and thus achieve
equality in a most sensitive field of bı¯z. a¯n social and symbolic relations:
matrimonial alliances. This is highlighted by an interview held by Meskerem
Brhane (1997a: 249) with a h. ara¯t.ı¯n woman on the subject of the marriage of a
wealthy and well educated h. ara¯t.ı¯n man to a bı¯z. a¯n woman: “‘don’t you think
he should have married a Haratine woman? . . .’ The woman replied, ‘No, I
think it’s a great thing because it means that Beidanes [bı¯z. a¯n] are now
accepting our men as their equals. It’s a step up for all of us.’” The way in
which matrimonial alliances continue to play a major role for the construc-
tion of social relations in India has recently been developed for the case of
the Andhra Pradesh region by Rainer Merz (1998).
2 While the emergence of a distinct ex-slaves’ political organisation is unique
in the context of the West African Sahelian societies, it was preceded in the
Sudan. There as early as 1938 a political organisation of slaves and ex-slaves
was founded (cf. Sikainga 1996: 168).
3 This position is held by sympathisers with the radical movement for the
liberation of the Mauritanian black Africans from oppression by the bı¯z. a¯n
(FLAM: Forces de Libération des Africains en Mauritanie). This latter
organisation states that all “blacks” are subject to the same social and
economic discrimination by the “white” Arab bı¯z. a¯n, and thus have to unite
(cf. Marchesin 1992: 211ff.; Ould Cheikh 1994a: 15; Al-Akhbar nº 1,
9.7.1995: 5).
4 The activists of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n cause in this respect are taking part in the creation
of an ethnic dichotomy between bı¯z. a¯n, including su¯da¯n, and the black
African ethnic groups (Toucouleur and Peul, who are part of the Halpu-
laar’en [speakers of Pulaar language], Soninké and Wolof), who are far from
forming one uniform block (cf. Ould Cheikh 1994a: 14f.).
5 Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 212ff.) assumes the social relations h. ara¯t.ı¯n practise
to depend on their affiliation with either radical or conservative h. ara¯t.ı¯n.
This can be questioned, as political orientation is also influenced by one’s
social relations. It thus seems to better suit the argument to speak of multiple
correlations rather than of a model comprising dependent and independent
variables.
6 A similar dichotomous characterisation of h. ara¯t.ı¯n attitudes towards the
bı¯z. a¯n has already been developed by Chambon (1962; cited in Martín 1991: 31).
Therefore the majority of the su¯da¯n stuck to the following description: “mon
maître est mon maître, celui que Dieu a mis sur moi, je lui obéis mais il me
secourt quand je suis en difficulté.”, and a minority to the statement “les
Maures sont d’iniques oppresseurs; les redevances ne sont pas légales, on doit
pouvoir se marier et être maître de ses enfants.”
7 Only few speakers of h. assa¯niyya are able to follow radio broadcasts in
modern standard Arabic, and therefore remain dependent on the national,
government-controlled “Radio Mauritanie”. In addition radio stations
remain scarce in many of the remote camps and adwaba, or there is no
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money to buy new batteries. The most apparent, and almost total lack of
radio stations I witnessed appeared among the su¯da¯n living on the Tagant
near Daber and El Fouj.
8 The opposition of hidden versus public transcripts has received substantial
criticism from Susan Gal (1995), who states that the definition of “public
used by Scott is unexamined and inadequate. The idea of public, far from
being a simple question of audience, based on the model of witnessed face-to
face interaction, is itself a deeply ideological construct in western thought,
often linked exactly to the separation of language from a face-to-face
situation and thus to the decontextualisation of language by print.” (Gal
1995: 417, original emphasis)
9 Referring to two brothers to tell the difference between su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n is a
recurrent scheme. According to a popular myth in bı¯z. a¯n society there were
once two brothers, both holding a copy of the Qur\a¯n, and walking around.
When it suddenly started to rain, one brother took his Qur\a¯n to shield it
under his clothes, while the other one put it on his head to shelter himself
from rain. The book got soaked with water and all of the ink ran, thus
staining the second brother black. For this disrespect he was condemned to
slavery by Allah (cf. Acloque 1995: 98ff.; Brhane 1997a: 121ff.).
10 This is the case for Mohamed Khairat, “the slave who made the camel talk”
and thus proved himself to have been wrongly enslaved (cf. Brhane 1997a:
127-137). Similar narratives are reported from the Tuareg by Clare Oxby
(1978: 150f.), and are part of Arab legends (cf. Brhane 1997a: 136, note 50).
The pattern equally applies to the dark-skinned and enslaved brother. He
does not address the members of his family, but these recognise his voice.
Today, however, undue status ascription is hardly accepted, as the case of
Brahim Ould Daddah shows. He successfully brought a paternity suit
against his prominent bı¯z. a¯n father, who refused to recognise his paternity of
his son born by a h. ara¯t.ı¯n mother (cf. Brhane 1997a: 74).
11 Indeed the term ^abd, and its female equivalent h
˘
a¯dem developed a racist
th th connotation, denouncing the blackness of the slaves, as 19 and 20 century
proverbs about slaves circulating in the Arabic-speaking world show. This
terminological shift reflects that by then almost all slaves in this cultural
sphere were of Sudanese origin (cf. Sersen 1985). Although strong inter-
ethnic relations among the bı¯z. a¯n and neighbouring Sudanese ethnic groups
in which both had equal power had always existed (cf. Schmitz 1996), those
members of the Sudanese ethnic groups who came to the bı¯z. a¯n scholars to
get instruction in Islam were treated with disrespect and as if they were
Muslims of secondary rank (cf. Caillié 1830: 112ff.). The racist attitude of the
bı¯z. a¯n vis-à-vis the Muslim black African ethnic groups was even denounced
by bı¯z. a¯n scholars such as T. a¯lib al-Bašı¯r (dec. 1197/1783) from Oualâta (cf.
Oßwald 1993: 124f.).
12 It is no longer possible to undertake a direct evaluation of the old ^amı¯r’s
behaviour vis-à-vis the slaves in the h. ella. It is, however, without doubt that his
style of rule – to put it mildly – was extremely authoritarian. This lasted until
his last days (cf. personal communication with Roger Botte, who in 1978
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spent two weeks in the emiral camp and on this occasion was able to have a
discussion with the old ^amı¯r).
13 Asked about the issue of the discord his mother Zeyneb mentioned once
having had with her master’s family (cf. p. 66), her son Brahim, reframed
some aspects of the story. Instead of speaking of the major conflict Zeyneb
had located at the time of the SEM, Brahim skipped back to a much earlier
event, having taken place before independence. The master’s wife wanted to
have two servants, i.e. two daughters of Zeyneb, instead of the one it had
formerly been. When the mistress visited the slave family in order to take
with her a second girl, Zeyneb started an open dispute with her, and finally
the two women started beating each other. This led Zeyneb to go to the ^amı¯r
Abderrahmane Ould Bakkar and complain about the unjustified demands
of her master. This apparently was successful. Abderrahmane was reported
to have admonished the master to be good to his slaves, and not to coerce
them into anything, so that they would be able to stay with him. Other-
wise, the old ^amı¯r told the master, he would have to free the slave family.
14 Claude Meillassoux (1986: 101f.) underlines the decisive impact the
development of slavery has on the elaboration of a master’s ideology
rationalising the difference between master and slave in the terms of a
dichotomous opposition and developing distinct social norms regulating the
society’s reproduction.
15 Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1985a: 406ff.) states that complementary
patterns of behaviour were common among several status groups. The
ma^alimı¯n thus were alleged to portray the counter-image of h. assa¯n values,
namely cowardice, greed and being demanding. The case of the igga¯wen is
similar.
16 To a zwa¯ya having owned quite some livestock prior to the drought in 1969
it was wholly incomprehensible how I could have imagined him to have
accompanied his slaves herding the animals out in the bush, for this would
have meant doing the same work twice, and thus been just a waste of time
(Interview zwa¯ya, 13.7.1995). For the master this meant also delegating much
of the pastoral decision-making and responsibility to his slaves. This view is
confirmed by former slaves too. A h. art.a¯niyya (Interview 22.10.1995)
described her former master as having laid the organisation of most work
into the hands of his slaves and as remaining with nothing but the work of
supervision.
17 Depicting slaves, especially newly imported ones, as “barbarian” and
“ignorant” is a common feature of the masters’ ideologies. Jonathon Glass-
man presents four overlapping occupational categories which slaves on the
Swahili coast could struggle to attain and hence reduce their marginality (cf.
Glassman 1991: 289ff.).
18 I am grateful to Jutta Bischoff, my wife, for having discussed this most
sensitive issue with the young h. assa¯n woman, and thus to have enabled me to
obtain these insights.
19 The depersonalisation of slave women can also be discerned from legal
practices denying the possibility of their being raped, while this crime is
recognised with regard to free women (cf. Al-Bayane nº 71, 21.4.1993).
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20 The matter of descendants of slaves guiding prayers – among other similar
topics – animated a long, lively and controversial discussion among Maurita-
nian intellectuals communicating on Mauritanie-Net in early 1997 (cf. among
others Tandia, Sidi [smtandia@iastate.edu], “Re: Encore l’esclavage!”, In
Mauritanie-Net [mauritanie-net@bat710.univ-lyon1.fr], 28.1.1997, Cheikh
Traore [cheikh.traore@lshtm.ac.uk], “Re: Encore l’esclavage !”, In Maurita-
nie-Net [Mauritanie-Net@bat710.univ-lyon1.fr], 27.1.1997). The issue is also
discussed in the independent press of Mauritania (cf. Al-Bayane nº 78,
16.6.1993: 9)
21 The songs presented by Aline Tauzin (1989b) were collected in the Hodh,
around Ayoûn el-Atroûs. These eastern parts of Mauritania are known to be
the ones where the grip of traditional hierarchy is still felt most strongly.
22 The topic was raised in the context of the narrative of M’Barke (cf.
p. 66-69).
23 Performances of meddh are supposed to happen on Fridays, but this is no
strict requirement, and they are much more likely to develop out of a
spontaneous mood. They start in the late evening, and may last until the
early morning.
24 The development of a distinct art of meddh in Nouakchott, implying also
the specialisation of its performers, may indicate the emergence of a kind of
emigrant culture and lead to a revival of what is perceived as tradition.
25 The shepherd living in symbiosis with his animals out in the bush is to some
extent the archetype of the ignorant in bı¯z. a¯n society (cf. Caratini 1989: 98),
and much fun is made of these “men of the bush” and their supposed
backwardness. In many jokes circulating these people commonly fail to
manage the pitfalls of modern life, and act much like poor Don Quixote
tilting at the windmills.
26 In bı¯z. a¯n society religious learning is not limited to men. A number of bı¯z. a¯-
niyya¯t, i.e. bı¯z. a¯n women, acquired a respectable knowledge of Islam and
related sciences and educated pupils themselves (cf. Simard 1996: 95; El
Hamel 1999: 74-76; see also the narrative of Brahim p. 61). Most disadvan-
taged in this respect were of course the su¯da¯n women.
27 In response to the increasing dissemination of colonial education, bı¯z. a¯n
scholars lifted former restrictions of access to their mah. az. ra (Qur\a¯n schools)
and hence enabled members of all social strata to take part in traditional
education (cf. Hirth 1994: 157).
28 Besides the claims of the su¯da¯n interviewed, the failure of the bı¯z. a¯n masters
to meet the obligations arising from the precepts Islam, which describe under
what conditions slavery is legitimate, are echoed in many publications; refer
e.g. to RAMS (1980: 74)
29 René Caillié (1830: 150) already recognised that the (lack of) respect for
Islam by slaves was a major argument by which the bı¯z. a¯n legitimised their
often cruel behaviour towards them. The supposed disrespect for and
ignorance of Islam on the part of the slaves, however, was a matter of
definition set up by the bı¯z. a¯n, for Caillié recognised that there was no
difference in the treatment of slaves who performed their prayers properly,
and those who did not.
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30 This issue was treated by zwa¯ya scholars in legal judgements and expertises,
who stress the obligation to pay zaka¯t for all Muslims, i.e. including the
slaves who only are nominally Muslim, and thus bring to light the fact that
many bı¯z. a¯n did not comply with this obligation (cf. Oßwald 1993: 127).
31 Stating to have always paid the zaka¯t was a common means by which
interviewees wished to generate legitimacy for their claim to have never been
a slave.
32 Zaka¯t in precolonial bı¯z. a¯n society in many cases came to be perceived as
something of a religious tax, paid by h. assa¯n or zna¯ga to zwa¯ya in compensa-
tion for their spiritual services, while the zwa¯ya had to pay other kinds of
taxes for their military protection (cf. Oßwald 1993: 104f.).
33 One such option was the fishy argument according to which all zwa¯ya had
to be regarded as poor, and therefore were automatically entitled to receive
the zaka¯t. However this point of view was declared to be “weak”, i.e. to
represent a minority opinion, by major zwa¯ya (cf. Oßwald 1993: 120).
34 Tebiba Mint Salem (Interview h. ara¯t.ı¯n, 29.7.1995) reported her former master
to have redistributed the zaka¯t payments of her family partly among his own
family, and needy people.
35 The local qa¯d. i of the region of Achram-Diouk, Ahmed Ould Aly (Interview
24.12.1995) renowned for his in many respects orthodox interpretation of
Islam offered a definition of zaka¯t payment by manumitted slaves that fits
closely into the traditional framework. Here the zaka¯t is destined for the
poor, but can also be given to a former master, who because of his nearness
becomes like other closely affiliated poor. While poverty and nearness,
according to this interpretation, are criteria of equivalent importance to
qualify for the right to perceive zaka¯t, under certain circumstances, nearness
outweighs poverty.
36 The development of an ethic based on the appropriation and revaluation of
the former social stigma of physical power and work has also been noticed
by Christine Hardung (1997: 133-135) among former Fulbe slaves in
northern Benin.
37 Most valuable insights on the role of work as a means of identification
among slaves are provided by Eugene Genovese’s (1974: 310ff.) sensitive
study on plantation slavery in the southern United States. The slaves’ work
was prominent in both how they were perceived by the free, and how they
defined themselves. Common prejudices saw slaves either as wild and
uncontrolled but strong workers, or valued attributes of their work like
steadiness. Among slaves, the hardest work, like harvesting, was remembered
as being the favourite. It was also subject to competition among the slaves
themselves, who remembered this time of the year as the best. Then great
numbers of slaves assembled and social life among the slaves was at its
climax.
38 Indeed El Hor is campaigning for the spread of capitalist wage labour, which
is to replace the unpaid work of slaves and h. ara¯t.ı¯n. According to the
constitutive charter of the organisation, El Hor wants to cultivate among the
su¯da¯n the “spirit of work by inciting them to refuse all activities that are not
remunerated in a just and equitable manner.” (El Hor, constitutive charter,
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cited and translated in Brhane 1997a: 307) While the question whether there
can be a “just remuneration” of workers within a capitalist economy
nowadays has been put aside under the predominance of neoliberal econom-
ic theory, the criticism vis-à-vis this ideology initiated by Karl Marx ([1863]
1983a ) and Friedrich Engels ([1880] 1978) still is on the agenda. Some su¯da¯n
also refuse to mould their existence to fit the needs of the labour market, as
the case of Hadama shows. This slave woman preferred to return to her
master’s brother rather than work for pay as a housemaid in Nouakchott (cf.
Brhane 1997a: 306ff.).
39 The increase of livestock marketing in the course of this century, and the
start of a wholesale market production of meat may have transformed the
attitude of bı¯z. a¯n pastoralists towards their livestock, by giving it a more
instrumental touch. Today sarcastic comments on the bı¯z. a¯n voracity for
meat and the lack of respect for the animals slaughtered fills the columns of
Nouakchott (bı¯z. a¯n!) newspapers.
40 The largest herds of camels in today’s Mauritania are owned by urban
residents, who reinvest their capital gained in the modern sector in animal
property. This has to some extent an economic rationale (cf. FAO 1990: 3f.),
but is also driven by the high symbolic value the possession of camels and
the link to the nomadic past still has in bı¯z. a¯n society (RAMS 1980: 38), but
also in other desert societies, like those of the Arabian peninsula.
41 Clare Oxby (1978: 155f.) in her study of slavery in a Tuareg community has
already focused on the impact of generosity on master–slave relations.
According to the masters only noble people are generous enough to maintain
a slave’s attachment, while slaves who became free men and slave holders are
judged unable to attain this moral stance, and fail to be successful slave
holders.
42 Colonel Dubost (1924: 463) noticed that the impact of the colonial policy in
Tidjikja increased sedentarity not among the bı¯z. a¯n, but definitely among the
h. ara¯t.ı¯n.
43 Mohamed Ould Ahmed Meidah (1993) puts the distinction between adabay
and vrı¯g in the following words: “Comme concrétisation de cette ségrégation
basée sur la liberté échelonnée, on refusait de désigner par ‘campement’
l’agglomération constituée par ces Haratines. On lui préfère le terme ‘Adabaï’
à connotation primitive.” Another perspective on how bı¯z. a¯n perceive su¯-
da¯n camps is developed in the narrative of Tourad (cf. p. 74).
44 A thorough discussion of the meanings and often contradictory use of
attributes like nomadic, transhumant, etc. is given by Fred Scholz (1991).
Günther Schlee (1991) discusses the multitude of pastoralist patterns of
mobility and the paradox that a decrease in mobility in one animal sector
becomes used by the same pastoralist group to increase mobility in another.
45 This is especially true of the adwaba in the remote areas of the Tagant.
Living under a tent today is not in itself a sign of modest property, as tents
can be anything from a costly luxury item to a piece of recycled cloth.
Among the su¯da¯n, most tents are of more or less modest quality.
46 For a discussion of different concepts of space among hunter-gatherer and
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nomadic societies, as well as the influence of nomadism and sedentism on
this issue refer to Ingold (1986: chapter six and seven) and Schlee (1992).
47 Here the logic of relativistic references to context-sensitive levels of segmen-
tation, as developed by Clifford Geertz (1977: 487ff.) in his study of
Sefrou/Morocco, comes to bear. Any reference to people depends on the
proximity or distance between the actors. A camp of foreigners in the region
of Achram-Diouk would be identified first of all by its tribal affiliation.
48 Achram e.g. is named after the nearby wa¯d Achram (i.e. wadi Achram),
Debissa is named after the neighbouring hill etc. Exceptions, however, exist:
Hella, a large village directly neighbouring Achram, is the name the camp of
the ^amı¯r had in former times. Sedentarising beneath Achram, this communi-
ty maintained this designation.
49 Members of different bı¯z. a¯n tribes and fractions are likely to have separate
land-rights, and thus to be not obliged to construct villages in direct
proximity to one another. This is more frequent for su¯da¯n whose claims over
land are relayed to the periphery of tribal lands. Factions, constituted by
dissension still internal to one tribal grouping, necessarily share the same
tribal lands and agricultural plots.
50 This has been a common practice throughout the history of bı¯z. a¯n society.
Colours like black and white are sometimes connected with disputes over
social status, but there is no universal and consistent use of blackness
(Arabic/h. assa¯niyya akh. al) in a pejorative sense (cf. Taine-Cheikh 1989a:
98ff.; Acloque 1995: 118-28). Distinctions by the attribution of colour (most
often black, white and red, but green too) seem to be much more a general
phenomenon in Sahelian societies and among other African ethnic groups.
Among the Fulbe e.g. places are commonly attributed colour characteristics
(Youssouf Diallo, personal communication). Colours (black white and red)
are also used to distinguish ethnic groups and to qualify social and status
groups as well as lineages among Fulbe of the Senegal valley (cf. Botte/
Schmitz 1994: 15). Among the bı¯z. a¯n e.g. the season of tiviski, lasting from
the end of February until the end of May, is distinguished in a white and a
black half (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 47; 97ff.). This does not inhibit that colour
attributes are used in a pejorative sense. In bı¯z. a¯n society the blacksmiths, i.e.
the ma^alimı¯n, are often described as being of red phenotype. Among the
Gabbra and Afar of East Africa attributes like white and red are used to
distinguish between different strata, e.g. nobles and commoners. The
association of colour with social status for these East African people is the
opposite of the one common among the bı¯z. a¯n, i.e. red means “noble”, and
white “commoner” (cf. Schlee 1989: 19; Lewis 1955: 155).
51 Topographical descriptions indeed still have to be clear in bı¯z. a¯n society,
where designations like “left” and “right” are still unknown, and directions
in almost all contexts are referred to from the matrix of the four cardinal
points. This is also a phenomenon common to many societies, who like
pastoral nomadic peoples depend strongly on exact references to places and
directions. In parts of East Africa, the native terms for “left” and “right” still
remain related to the cardinal points, and can partly replace them. To
properly reproduce the meaning of “left”, as used e.g. in English, which
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makes the body of the speaker the point of reference, one has to take the
detour of the expression of “to your left side” (Prof. Günther Schlee,
personal communication 16.10.1998).
52 One field in which French domination still is well remembered is school
policy. Here, the focus of colonial policy lay on the spread and promotion of
the French language. Accordingly, of thirty hours of schooling per week
only three were dedicated to Arabic (cf. De Chassey 1984: 184). Or as Sid
Mohamed Ould Dey (h. assa¯n, Interview 27.8.1995), who was already a
teacher under French colonial rule, put it: “Arabic had a lean time then, and
now it’s the turn of French to have lean time.”
53 Bı¯z. a¯n decry the use of ist^amma¯r as a synonym for slavery by su¯da¯n as
revealing an insufficient command of Arabic. The correct term, ^abu¯diya,
however, is not adequate for the su¯da¯n, for they not only want to name
“slavery” as an institution that is recognised within certain limits by Islam,
but the illegitimacy of enslavement too (cf. Brhane 1997a: 150f.).
54 In contrast to the reactions of several su¯da¯n in the region of Achram-Diouk,
an elderly slave woman living in the Trarza region displayed an indifferent
attitude towards Ould Haidalla’s speech: “[I feel just as I always have] – a
member of the community and above all, the mother of all the young people,
black or white.”(Yellin n.d.)
55 The SEM thus were somewhere half way between political mass organisation
and administrative structure. According to Mohamed Abderrahmane Ould
Khalil (zwa¯ya, Interview 1.8.1995) the SEM had to intervene in a great many
local problems: conflict, disaster relief, the building of schools, and organisa-
tion.
56 Recent trends in the religious landscape of Mauritania, showing a declining
significance of traditional authorities and the emergence of fundamentalist
discourses, are discussed by Constant Hamès (1994), Diana Stone (1994) and
Rahal Boubrik (1998, 1999).
57 The very first elections after the coup d’état in 1978 were the municipal
elections in Nouakchott in 1986. From 1989 the electoral process was
significantly amplified. In January 1989 the municipal councils and mayors
of thirty-two administrative centres were elected. In December 1990 finally,
elections were held in all 208 municipalities, thus finally reaching the capital
of the “commune de Soudoud” Achram (cf. Ould Cheikh 1994b: 31f.).
58 This observation contradicts the findings presented by Philippe Marchesin
(1992: 186ff.), according to which the SEM enabled a number of old notables
to re–enter politics. This probably is true in many cases, but the outcome of
the SEM was more ambivalent, for the strong influence of the state adminis-
tration which Marchesin rightly noted also led to a noticeable weakening of
many members of the old tribal notability. One such prominent victim was
the son of the old ^amı¯r of Tagant, Ethman Ould Abderrahmane. Within the
SEM he became only a “chief of zone” (an area that by and large correspond-
ed to the today’s municipality of Achram, and thus much inferior to the
sphere of influence of his father). Later his authority was cut down even
further, when several villages were assigned to another zone (Interview
Mohamed A. Ould Khalil, zwa¯ya, 5.9.1995).
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59 Su¯da¯n still enjoy telling how they experienced this new attitude of the
government and administration becoming effective.
SOS: There once was an assembly, together with the region’s reviser, the
latter explained that now there were no more slaves, i.e. he explained how to
build up a cell, etc., how all this had to be organised.
Author: Did this man come from Nouakchott [the capital]? [Sidi Ould
Salim laughs]
SOS: Yes, of course . . . There was a teacher here from the Legwa¯t.it.. When
they began to explain everything with the SEM, that everybody was equal,
one had to take ten families, and that bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n could be mixed, then
this man began to ask, and tell that he had not well understood what had
been said. The reviser therefore told him that he now would explain it one
more time for him that there are no more slaves. (Interview Sidi Ould Salim,
h. art.a¯ni, 30.1.1996)
60 This perspective complies with the argument developed by Susan Gal (1995:
412) that contradictory opinions which actors express in specific circumstan-
ces cannot be spoken of in terms of a dichotomy of genuine versus posed.
Rather they reveal the presence and weight of contested discourses.
61 Eugene Genovese (1974: 4ff.), basing the analysis of plantation slavery in the
US South on Gramsci too, highlights the contradictions inherent to paternal-
ism. As a mode of domination it produces both affection and hatred.
62 Meskerem Brhane (1997a) is far from schematising su¯da¯n (or h. ara¯t.ı¯n)
attitudes, but by focusing on affiliations to two opposite identities she runs
the risk of veiling the many contradictions underlying social practices in
both camps. In this respect the activists campaigning for h. ara¯t.ı¯n identity
resemble much the young women aspiring to initiation into Islamist subcul-
ture in Cairo described by Karin Werner (1997). This demands engagement
in a permanent process of self-domestication, meaning the refinement of
practices and attitudes which remain open-ended, because the ideals are
never met. Rather than reflecting an incomplete, or else defective identity
formation process, the incongruent nature of these identities is crucial to
maintaining the competitive and hence dynamic nature of identification.
63 Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (1985a: 505ff.) reports how in 1967 a metal box
was found beneath a tomb. The enclosed document, written in traditional
manner, made it possible to rewrite – and thus ennoble – the genealogy of
the Ahel Šayh
˘
Sidyya. Their status had remained contested because the
group’s genealogy did not match the hegemonic position it had achieved
th during the 19 century.
64 The ideological nature of this concept becomes apparent by the fact that, of
the Arab terms defining relations of parenthood, ^amm is one of the ones
with the most fluctuating meaning. It designates not only the father-brother,
but also all male members of a group assembled by a common ancestry, and
even the male members of the whole Arab nation. All these people can be
treated as if patrilateral parallel cousins (cf. Conte 1991: 56).
65 Ibn Khaldun is famous for his distinction between urban and nomadic group
solidarity (^as.abiya). According to his vision consciousness of common
ancestry vanishes and is no longer maintained once people settle in cities.
388        Notes
 
 
The once existing solidarity is weakened. Among the nomadic peoples,
ancestry does not become blurred, and these groups are thus able to maintain
strong ties of solidarity due to their purity (cf. Hamès 1987: 112).
66 This basic meaning is also referred to by Pierre Bonte (1987a: 77, note 28):
“^as.aba désigne le lien entre une chose et une autre, les relations entre un
homme et ceux rassemblés autour de lui pour combattre ou se défendre;
^as.aba(t) désigne les gens ou les partisans d’un homme qui se liguent ensemble
pour la défense, les relations du côté des hommes, les relations d’un homme
du côté de son père parce qu’elles le soutiennent et le renforcent.”
67 Tribal affiliation and sharing an ^as.abiya do not necessarily coincide. The
solidarity of diyya payment may concern only parts of a tribe (cf. Bonte
1987a: 71), but can also cross cut these boundaries. Tribes may contract
assistance in the payment of levies which can be called ties of ^as.abiya too.
Narrow ties of ^as.abiya which are limited to those who share reciprocal
rights of inheritance, i.e. common descent from an ancestor in the fifth or
sixth generation, may also transcend tribal boundaries, several su¯da¯n living in
such circumstances insisted. This notion of a nucleus of solidarity is also
used to portray tribes with a strong group solidarity (Interview Mohamed
Ould Khassar, zwaya, 7.8.1995).
68 This interpretation, as Pierre Bonte (1987a: 71) remarks, stresses masculine
relations of solidarity, created most often for reasons of defence, by referring
only to patrilineal filiation. This downplays matrilineal ties which were and
still are important in creating affinity and solidarity in bı¯z. a¯n society.
69 This seems to be no specificity of bı¯z. a¯n society, for as.l has come to be used
in quite the same way as nasab in other Arab tribal societies, like e.g. the Awla¯d
Ali of western Egypt (cf. Lila Abu-Lughod 1986: 41).
70 The Idaw^I¯š claim of an Arab origin is a recent phenomenon and contrasts
their renowned descent from the Lemtu¯na. These were Berbers, who like the
early Idaw^I¯š spoke a now almost forgotten Berber dialect called zna¯ga
(derived from the ethnonym S.anha¯gˇa; cf. Amilhat 1937). While the supposed
antagonism between “Arabs” and “Berbers” was taken first of all by colonial
authors to explain conflict in Mauritanian tribal society, contemporary
analyses have revealed the many weaknesses of this approach (cf. Ould
Cheikh 1991a: 108f.). Nowadays the remnants of a Berber past in many
bı¯z. a¯n tribes is reconciled with the wish for an Arab ancestry by statements
saying that there is no problem in having a Berber ancestry, for the Berbers
concerned had Arab ancestors (Interview Cheikh M. Ould Jiddou, h. assa¯n,
7.12.1995).
71 For a short evaluation of the difficulties of many bı¯z. a¯n tribes developing
legitimate claims to an Arab descent refer to Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh
(1991a: 11ff.)
72 For a comparative presentation of different traditions of bı¯z. a¯n origins refer
to Mariella Villasante-de Beauvais (1997). Different versions of traditions
telling of how Bou Bakkar ben Amar founded the tripartite bı¯z. a¯n society
are documented by Harry T. Norris (1972: 129-32, 152-54) and Rainer
Oßwald (1986: 314-21, 342-54).
73 Times are changing, and thus new terminologies enter the discourse on
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individual origins and actual social position. The local qa¯d. i Ahmed Ould Aly
(Interview 24.12.1995) e.g. told me his origin was Ligla¯gma (i.e. his father’s
tribe), but as he had passed all his life among the Ahel Swayd Ah. med, these
had become his “wat.ane”, i.e. his nationality, and he expressed this differen-
tiation by referring to a classical Arabic term derived from a modern context,
but now fitted back into the tribal framework. Others who could be suspect-
ed of being of zna¯ga status were unable to detail their tribe’s nasab beyond
the most general claim that it was Arab.
74 These kinds of su¯da¯n family genealogies could be classified as matrilineal,
because only descent from free mothers and foremothers allows one to prove
h. ara¯t.ı¯n status. It is a bitter irony that while becoming h. ara¯t.ı¯n is supposed to
bring all the social rights a freeborn person has (right to kinship, and
consequently to patrilineal filiation) to defend this status, h. ara¯t.ı¯n have to
step back to the slaves’ mode of filiation by uterine descent.
75 Having a free mother was indeed the only issue that mattered in achieving
and maintaining the freedmen’s status of descent, for as this interviewee
explained to me, one did not need a h. ara¯t.ı¯n father to become h. ara¯t.ı¯n, but a
h. ara¯t.ı¯n mother. Therefore there is little to gain from free male ancestors in a
h. ara¯t.ı¯n family genealogy.
76 In fact the kwa¯r, i.e. the members of the black African ethnic groups, were
described by su¯da¯n to be like the bı¯z. a¯n, meaning that they were as much free
men as the bı¯z. a¯n, and only used to speak a different language.
77 An interesting parallel here is opened with works focusing on bı¯z. a¯n repre-
sentations of hierarchy. Pierre Bonte (1987a; 1991), in his critique of the
theories of segmentary society, developed a model of bı¯z. a¯n society according
to which filiation can be interpreted to stress either equality or hierarchy.
The production of equality thus is seen as part of the male domain, i.e. the
patrilineage (which creates the solidarity of the awla¯d ^amm, i.e. all members
of the tribe), while statutory difference is created by the female domain, i.e.
the matrilineal filiation. This fundamental difference is well anticipated by
the bı¯z. a¯n.
78 A similar distinction is drawn, however, in the terms purity versus impurity
by Yu¯ba, a h. art.a¯ni living in Nouakchott (cited by Mariella Villasante-de
Beauvais 1991: 189). Living in slavery therefore is associated with impurity,
while manumission purifies the former slave.
79 The interview was held in the presence of two bı¯z. a¯n, of whom one directly
interjected that “h. ara¯t.ı¯n” could not be considered an origin (in this case the
term as.l was used by both interviewer and interviewee), for it designated
only a status within bı¯z. a¯n society.
80 These are alms handed out on the occasion of the celebration of the ^aı¯d
al-fit.r, at the end of the Ramadan.
81 A similar view is expressed by a member of the h. ara¯t.ı¯n of the Ahel Swayd
Ah. med, who claim that their ancestors were never slaves. Therefore the
relations of this distinct group of h. ara¯t.ı¯n with the ^amı¯r of Tagant (which
now is no longer an official title) are to be compared with a family among
whose members the inheritance is still undivided.
82 In another section of the interview Brahim told me that slavery indeed has
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no origin, i.e. in the beginning, all people were free. Similarly a slave once he
is dead again becomes equal to those who have been considered free men
before. A slave’s estate ends with his death.
83 In fact Brahim knows very well of his ku¯ri (matrilineal) ancestry. In another
section of the interview he recalls that one of his grandmothers had been
captured by Samori Ture, whom he described as a great h. assa¯n (i.e. warrior),
who captured many su¯da¯n and sold them to the bı¯z. a¯n.
84 Speaking about a different conclusion on aspects of su¯da¯n identity formation
and su¯da¯n aspirations, I first have to acknowledge how much the present line
of arguments has profited from Meskerem Brhane’s Ph.D. thesis (1997a),
without which this book would not have taken its present shape. With
regard to the different conclusions in our respective analyses, the major point
– in my opinion – concerns the issue whether su¯da¯n identify themselves as bı¯-
z. a¯n or as distinct from bı¯z. a¯n. A discussion of this divergence follows in the
next chapter.
Chapter 9
1 Well aware of this problem, Jeffrey Rubin (1995) opts for viewing only
conscious acts as resistance. On the basis of the preceding analysis, it could
be argued that consciousness too is laden with the very same ambiguities as
resistance, and therefore is unlikely to make of resistance a rigid analytical
category. Rather than undertake global definitions of resistance and subser-
vience, I would plead for a detailed and differentiated analysis of what are
moments of resistance and subservience in everyday acts. This paves the way
for the appreciation of the many subtleties in everyday interaction, and the
recognition of contradictory elements within gestures and discourses which
fail to be either “resistant” or “subservient”.
2 Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 122, 127, 133) herself reveals several of the
difficulties these su¯da¯n experience when trying to get their claims accepted.
A large part of su¯da¯n discourses reject not only traditions portraying the su¯-
da¯n as an accursed group, but also traditions speaking of su¯da¯n who turned
white, i.e. became bı¯z. a¯n or at least very close to them. Such status ascension
is rejected because it means a bı¯z. a¯n appropriation of what could be the
nucleus of a su¯da¯n elite. The very power of these doubts is revealed in an
interview with a woman claiming descent from Mohamed Khairat, a slave
who became a saint and thus bı¯z. a¯n, after having made a camel talk. While
this woman nominally, and according to bı¯z. a¯n statements, should be
regarded as a bı¯z. a¯n, she refrains from stating her bı¯z. a¯n-ness publicly. Living
in an all-su¯da¯n environment in a Nouakchott shantytown, she prefers
instead to make evasive claims of a šurva origin. This is known to have
become something of a safety-valve for all su¯da¯n seeking a bı¯z. a¯n status (cf.
the Interview with Brahim, p. 281f.).
3 Morally, this argument raised by su¯da¯n is certainly right, but it misses the
point Islamic jurisprudence makes about the illegitimate acquisition of
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slaves. According to this perspective, only the enslavement of pagans and
other non-Muslims is legitimate, for it can be seen as a means of saving the
unbelieving. This stipulation surely was one of the most blatantly violated in
the many slave raids in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Willis 1985a; on the legal and
ethical aspects of enslaving black Africans see especially Barbour/Jacobs
1985).
4 This is the goal Brahim (cf. p. 281f.) wants to achieve: to have a bı¯z. a¯n
providing evidence of him being a free man and full member of bı¯z. a¯n
society. This seems to work best when there is no more co-residence and
master-slave relations can be relegated to past generations (see also the case
of Ahmed presented by Meskerem Brhane 1997a: 142ff.).
5 Among others, Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 249f.) cites the case of Youba Ould
Abdi, the son of Abdi Ould Embarek, who had been a former slave and
right hand of Bakkar Ould Soueid Ahmed (^amı¯r of the Tagant until the
French conquest). After colonisation both successively became very
powerful and prominent figures in Tidjikja politics. However, the colonial
records of this case, as well as the study of Ould Khalifa (1991), are more or
less mute on the issue of how and whether the low-class origin of Youba
and his father became a topic in their fights with the bı¯z. a¯n notability. To
my knowledge the slave past of Youba’s father, which supposedly forbade
him a leading position in political life, was put forward by a bı¯z. a¯n delega-
tion to the French administrators on the occasion of one major conflict at
least (cf. Ould Khalifa 1991: 693; see also p. 168).
6 This can also be interpreted as being revealing of an increasing dichotomisa-
tion of bı¯z. a¯n society into bı¯z. a¯n, or here perhaps rather white Moors versus
su¯da¯n, i.e. black Moors, which Meskerem Brhane (1997a: 46) assumes.
7 Su¯da¯n who manage to make a career are accused of forgetting about their
past once they have attained a good post. Often having been supported by
influential h. ara¯t.ı¯n themselves, they fail to haul up members of their own
community, for fear of endangering their newly acquired position. Conse-
quently they are accused of forgetting those whom they come from, and of
not showing the same solidarity towards their brethren as bı¯z. a¯n do.
8 Such definitions are used by bı¯z. a¯n, who state that there is nothing different
about the su¯da¯n and bı¯z. a¯n except their colour, for both speak Arabic, and
thus are as Arab as residents of Egypt or Tunisia, where there are people of
light and dark complexion too (Interview Tourad Ould Taleb Mokhtar,
zwa¯ya, 3.2.1996).
9 This is the view held by the present majority of h. ara¯t.ı¯n activists. While it
seems to have a great support among the (many) su¯da¯n living in the kébbé,
the shanty towns of Nouakchott and the other few large cities of Mauritania,
it has – as could be revealed in the present analysis – only a partial influence
on su¯da¯n practices in the rural hinterland.
10 Mokhtar Ould Daddah liked to portray Mauritania as a hyphen between
black and white Africa, i.e. between sub-Saharan and North Africa (cf.
Balans 1980: 523; De Chassey 1984: 291). In some respects the country still is
perceived in this way, e.g. it is of concern to both scholars of North Africa
and the Middle East and to scholars of sub-Saharan Africa. On the political
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level, however, the northwards drift of Mauritania seems to be definitive.
Already a member of the UMA (Union du Maghreb Arabe), uniting the
Maghrib states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, Mauritania recently
was even recognised as a border state of the Mediterranean Sea by the
European Union (1995 Madrid conference on the economic integration of
nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea).
11 Discrimination against black Africans occurred all over Mauritania, includ-
ing remote rural areas such as the region of Achram-Diouk. However, it has
to be noted that many bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n also protected black Africans and
people of Senegalese origin from persecution, sometimes facing considerable
dangers themselves in the process.
12 The initial incident had taken place between Senegalese Soninké farmers and
Fulbe herders from Mauritania. In the course of this conflict two Soninké
were killed. In Senegal an estimated 15,000 to 40,000 bı¯z. a¯n shops of a bı¯z. a¯n
community estimated between 300,000 and 500,000 people (thus controlling
about 85 percent of the small retail trade), were looted. The later “repatria-
tion” was managed by an airlift linking Dakar and Nouakchott (cf. Baduel
1989: 46ff; Magistro 1993: 203ff.). For further information on the 1989
conflict, euphemistically called “événements” in Mauritania, refer to: Santoir
(1990a, b); Marchesin (1992: 210-25); Schmitz (1993, 1996); Clausen (1993,
1994b); Wegemund (1990); Park/Baro/Ngaido (1993).
13 John Magistro 1993: 203) reports that most h. ara¯t.ı¯n involved in the 1989 riots
in Nouakchott were brought into the capital on trucks. Such accounts leave
much room for speculation. First they are able to relieve the Nouakchott h. ara¯-
t.ı¯n at least partially of the charge of having performed and encouraged the
killings. Second, the government is charged with having deliberately fuelled
the riots instead of fighting them. And third, those having done the dirty job
again are the most “ignorant” and “backward”, i.e. the rural h. ara¯t.ı¯n. The
rationale for the riots taking place in the Senegal valley was first of all an
economic one. Landless h. ara¯t.ı¯n sought to appropriate black African land and
belongings. This was supported by the state authorities, equipping groups of
h. ara¯t.ı¯n with weapons supposed to be used for self-defence, but which were
more likely to have served other ends, while groups of displaced black
Africans started from Senegal raids on their homeland, to get back at least
some of their property and herds (cf. Ould Cheikh 1994a: 36, note 12;
Santoir 1990a)
14 Mauritania recruited teachers for the new Arabic branch of state education
first of all from the traditional Qur\a¯n schools. Therefore the country did
not import teachers from other Arab countries, such as Egypt, on a large
scale. These people, for a number of reasons such as social antagonisms in
their countries of origin, were likely to be adherents of ideologies such as
Islamic fundamentalism and, as Werner Ruf (1997: 71ff.) showed for the case
of Algeria, had a decisive impact on the spread of these new ideologies.
15 There continued to be two branches, a French and an Arabic one, in the
Mauritanian educational system. Former reforms had minimised the amount
of French in most classes, and closed down bilingual classes. The division
into two distinct branches, a French one preferred by the black Africans, and
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an Arabic one preferred by the bı¯z. a¯n and su¯da¯n, then lived on, especially on
the level of secondary education and university teaching. This policy,
however, hits only a part of the Mauritanian population. The poor quality of
the state schools, as well as their failure to provide an adequate knowledge of
foreign languages, made most members of the Mauritanian establishment
send their children to private schools, thus escaping all attempts at Arabisa-
tion (cf. Taine-Cheikh 1994).
16 The Fulbe Aynaabe are a pastoral group within the Halpulaar’en community
of Mauritania. They used to occupy the right bank of the Senegal river
valley. During the conflict between Mauritania and Senegal in 1989, the
Fulbe Aynaabe are reported to have been among the black African ethnic
groups who suffered the most from persecution at this time (cf. Sall 1999).
Commonly the Halpulaar’en in Mauritania are distinguished into three
broad, and partly overlapping categories: the Fulbe (or else Peul) jeeri, who
are principally pastoralists and practise some rainfed farming, the Fulbe
waalo, who besides pastoral activities put a stronger emphasis on recession
agriculture, and the Fulaabe, who mainly live in the Guidimaka region, and
combine rainfed agriculture and pastoralism (cf. Santoir 1990b: 569f.). For
further aspects of the Halpulaar’en in Mauritania refer to Santoir (1990a,
1993, 1994); Schmitz (1990a, b, 1993, 1996). Further aspects of Fulbe identity
formation are e.g. elucidated by Botte/Schmitz (1994), Diallo (1997), and
Guichard (1996).
17 The claim of the Fulbe to have an Arab origin is reported to have first
th occurred in the central Sudan in the early 19 century. According to this
claim, the Fulbe descend from Uqba ben Nafi (cf. Braukämper 1992: 84).
This interpretation of Fulbe origins, however, never gained broad acceptan-
ce, and is contradicted by anthropological evidence.
18 Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social
19 Hans-Dieter Evers and Günther Schlee (1995) provide a thoughtful analysis
of how ethnicity and the production of difference comes to be a decisive
factor shaping statehood in certain countries of the third world in the age of
globalisation.
20 This concerned a violent conflict between large parts of the Tarkoz and the
Ahel Swayd Ah. med at Achram in 1983 which was – again – instigated
mainly by su¯da¯n. The clashes in these times were so violent that the army
intervened and had to separate both parties.
21 A household servant in 1995 earned, in addition usually to sharing food and
shelter with the employers, between 2-3,000 UM per month; the wage
sometimes also depended on the amount of work.
22 Very sensitive discussions of how slaves and former slaves use distinct
religious practices, most often derived from Sufi spiritualism, to create their
own religious sphere are provided by Jonathon Glassman (1991) and G.
Makris (1996).
23 Praying in a community and especially guided by a learned man is always to
be preferred.
24 Some of these were hosted by su¯da¯n and of course in the presence of such
prestigious personalities there was no question of going to the mosque.
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Instead the prayers were performed at home and guided by the guests, thus
giving their su¯da¯n hosts a renowned opportunity to experience the tradition-
al bı¯z. a¯n mode of prayer.
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Transliteration of Arabic Characters
a¯ t.
b z.
t ^
t g˙
gˇ f (h. assa¯niyya: v)
h. q (h. assa¯niyya: g)
h
˘
k
d l
d m
r n
z h
s w, u¯
š y, ı¯
s. \
d.     
th Transliteration of Arabic as suggested by the 19 conference of Orientalists
in Rome in 1935 (cf. Krahl/Reuschel 1980: 31).
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